# Manzhou Rule in China

This collection includes articles on the history of China during Manzhou rule (17th-early 20th cent.). Drawing on Russian archival documents, their authors trace the process of consolidation of Manzhou tribes in the period between the end of the 16th and the middle of the 17th centuries, their penetration into the upper Amur basin in the 1680s, and the conquest of China.

Much space is given to the foreign policy of the Qings: their conquest of Zhungeer and Eastern Turkestan, the invasion of Vietnam, and relations with Tibet. The authors of the articles analyse the activity of the state apparatus of the Qings and their ideological policy.

A great deal of attention is devoted to popular anti-Manzhou movements and risings in China, and to the struggle against the Manzhous during the Xinhai revolution.

THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES,
USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

# Manzhou Rule in China

Progress Publishers
Moscow

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МАНЬЧЖУРСКОЕ ВЛАДЫЧЕСТВО В КИТАЕ

*На английском языке*

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English translation © Progress Publishers 1983

*Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

$М \frac{0506000000-528}{014(01)-83} 85-83$

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*S. L. TIKHVINSKY*

# MANZHOU RULE IN CHINA

The Manzhou Qing dynasty ruled China for 267 years—from October 30, 1644 to February 17, 1912. This rule was brought to an inglorious end by an armed revolution (the Xinhai revolution) that broke out in Wuchang on October 10, 1911, and spread quickly to the other provinces of Central, East, South, and North China.

Almost the whole of China's modern history is associated with the reign of the Manzhous. The Qings got their hold on China in a period when a bourgeois revolution took place in Britain and, together with the revolution in the Netherlands, rang in a new epoch in society's development, the epoch of capitalism. The Manzhou rulers were deposed by the Chinese and other peoples of the Qing empire only five years before the Great October Socialist Revolution, which ushered in the latest period of world history.

The two and a half centuries of Manzhou rule witnessed dramatic changes in China, as in the vast majority of countries in the world. From a feudal sovereign state with what for those times was a high level of development, even if it was torn by internal discord and shaken by peasant wars, China was reduced to a backward, semi-feudal and semi-colonial country dependent on the world imperialist system, a source of food and raw materials of the imperialist powers, and the object of the strife and quarrels among them. Only the acuteness of the inter-imperialist contradictions enabled China to preserve the semblance of an independent nation. The capitalist system was paving the way for itself in struggle against feudal barriers and restrictions, but it never became predominant in China's economy under Qing rule. China's new classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—were still weak economically and politically early in the twentieth century. But this did not prevent the democratic wing of the Chinese bourgeoisie from heading the Xinhai revolution in 1911, a revolution directed against the Qing monarchy, which personified the internal, feudal and the external, imperialist reaction.

A study of the history of Manzhou rule covers innumerable problems. In the course of more than two and a half centuries the Qing regime underwent a gradual transformation, adjusting itself to the far-reaching socio-economic changes in the country while remaining hostile to the working masses of the Chinese, Mongol, Uighur, and other peoples inhabiting the empire. After invading China and consolidating its positions in the country with the active assistance of the Chinese feudal lords, the Manzhou military-feudal aristocracy established a dictatorial regime supported by the Chinese feudal landowners and bureaucracy: following China's invasion by capitalist powers in the mid-nineteenth century, the Manzhou rulers, again with the support of the Chinese feudal lords, took the road of betrayal of the national interests of the peoples inhabiting the Qing empire, drawing ever closer to foreign capitalists and the local compradores. With the onset of the epoch of imperialism and especially after the suppression of the Boxer Rising of 1900-1901 the Qing government became a subservient tool of imperialist monopolies, the principal bulwark of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal regime. The following major periods may be distinguished in the history of Qing rule in China :

1. From the Manzhou invasion and the conquest of power (1644) to the establishment of the Qing regime within the boundaries of Ming China (1683);

2. From the 1680s to the 1770s, when the Qing regime was relatively stable in China and fought wars of conquest against the Mongol principalities of Halha, the Russian settlements along the Amur, the Junggar Khanate, Tibet, Eastern Turkestan, Vietnam, Burma, Nepal and other countries.

3. From the 1770s to the 1860s when the internal decay

of the Qing monarchy commenced and it was steadily weakened by Chinese peasant risings led by secret societies, the risings of non-Han peoples in the empire, and aggression by capitalist powers.

4. The period between the 1860s and the 1890s, when the Qing court and leaders of Chinese feudal-bureaucratic regional cliques sought to pursue a "policy of self-reinforcement"; and the mid-1890s when a "movement for equality", the first political action of the new classes, unfolded under the impact of China's defeat in the war with Japan in 1894-1895.

5. From the suppression of the Boxer Rising (1901) by foreign interventionists and the Qing court to the abdication of the Qings in February 1912, when the Qing dynasty performed the role of an obedient instrument of the internal Manzhou-Chinese feudal-compradore reaction and imperialist powers. The reduction of the Qing empire to a semi-colony and the overthrow of the Qing monarchy by the Xinhai revolution.[1]

This proved to be possible as a result of the convergence of the four cardinal streams of the anti-Qing struggle: 1) the national democratic movement headed by the United League formed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and supported by Chinese bourgeois-landowner revolutionary organisations; 2) the constitutional-monarchist movement of the Chinese bourgeoisie and landowners; 3) the spontaneous actions of Chinese peasants and the urban poor directed by secret societies; and 4) the liberation struggle of non-Han peoples forcibly incorporated in the Qing empire.

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[1] The problem of dividing Qing rule into periods is closely linked to the question of when Chinese feudal society became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.

We believe that foreign capital began influencing the political and economic life of the Qing empire only after the Beijing treaties of 1860, while with the entry of industrial countries into the epoch of imperialism, after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, the fight for concessions in 1898, and the intervention of eight powers in the Boxer Rising of 1900-1901, the Qing empire's semi-colonial status and dependence on world imperialism was established by the Final Protocol of 1901.

The problem of dividing China's modern history into periods is discussed in V. N. Nikiforov, "The Modern History of Asia and Africa in World History", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1962, No. 2, pp. 154-167; G. V. Yefimov, "The Historic Significance of the 1870s-1890s in China's Modern History", *Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1963, pp. 50-55 (both in Russian).

Let us briefly review some aspects of Manzhou rule in China, notably the domestic policy of the Qings.

The ethnic history of the Manzhous goes back deep into the centuries; the small Manzhou tribes living in the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula at the close of the sixteenth century sprang from the Nüzhens, who in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were in control of the southern part of present-day Northeast China and of North China.

At the stage of its conversion into a military-feudal state at the end of the reign of its founder, Nuerhaqi, and during the reign of his son, Abahai (1599-1644), the Manzhou tribal group included the Nüzhen tribes inhabiting the territory of present-day Northeast China. The seizure of Ningguta (the present-day town of Ning'an) in 1610 was followed by a series of wars with the purpose of increasing the numerical strength of the army and able-bodied population and seizing land and property; some of these wars took the Manzhous far beyond the Jianzhou area, which was the main territorial base of the Manzhou tribal union. In these wars against neighbouring northern, northeastern and northwestern tribes (Warka, Woji, Huerha, and Solons), the Manzhous drove to the Jianzhou area those who failed to flee to the south, with the result that vast regions of Central and North Manzhou were devastated.[2]

In 1577 the Manzhous did not number more than 100,000, but after Nuerhaqi's conquest of neighbouring tribes, their union consisted of between 400,000 and 500,000 people.[3]

Under Abahai the Manzhous made successful cavalry raids deep into North China in 1629, 1632, 1634, 1636, and 1638, reaching Tianjin (140 kilometres from the capital, Beijing), southern Hebei, and Shandong, ruthlessly pillaging and killing the Chinese population and laying waste to cities and villages by fire and sword. In one of these raids the Manzhous took 260,000 captives whom they turned into slaves and 550,000 head of cattle and horses to Manzhouli. The baggage train filled with booty was, according to eyewitnesses, 15 kilometres long.[4]

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[2] This is discussed in this volume by G. V. Melikhov in "The Process of the Consolidation of the Manzhou Tribes Under Nuerhaqi and Abahai (1591-1644)".

[3] Wang Zhonghan, *Qing shi za kao* (Studies of the History of the Qing Dynasty), Beijing, 1957, p. 6.

In 1644 the Manzhous invaded China again, easily capturing its capital chiefly on account of the anti-people attitude of Chinese feudal lords, some of whom sided with the Manzhous in the last years of Ming reign. Among the latter were Kong Youde, Geng Zhongming, and other commanders, who surrendered their numerically large land forces, warships, and modern artillery to the Manzhous, after crossing the Gulf of Zhili; the Ming General Shang Kexi, the viceroy of the border regions Hong Shenghou, and, lastly, General Wu Sangui, charged with guarding the most vital sector of the Chinese frontier with the Manzhous (he opened the Shanhaiguan gate in the Great Wall to allow the Manzhous to enter China and crush the powerful peasant uprising led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xinzhong).

A contemporary of these events tells us that in 1644 when the Manzhous' regent Duoergun was mustering a 100,000-strong army for a raid into China, an envoy came to him from General Wu Sangui, inviting the Manzhous to suppress insurgent peasants. Duoergun did not believe the envoy, fearing a trap. Wu Sangui pleaded with the Manzhous on eight occasions. "Only after this did a Manzhou force of 140,000 horsemen take the road."[5]

Formed in the campaign to suppress the insurgent Chinese people, the alliance of the Manzhou invaders with the Chinese feudal lords was the class base of Manzhou domination in China. After conquering China the Manzhou rulers made no essential changes in the country's state system; however, all key posts in the state apparatus went to members of the Manzhou aristocracy, for they did not entirely trust the Chinese generals and dignitaries who had sided with them. While, on account of their numerical weakness, the Manzhou feudal nobility had to rely on the Chinese feudal lords, they were not inclined to share all power with them. In the Imperial Secretariat, which was in fact vested with all government functions, the

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[4] Tung Chi-ming, *An Outline History of China* (China Knowledge Series), Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1959, p. 187.

[5] Qi Liuqi, "How Wu Sangui Invited Manzhou Troops", *Mingji beilue*, Beijing, 1958, p. 370.

5 : 2 : 1 ratio of Manzhou, Chinese, and Mongol officials remained unchanged from 1662 to 1796, i.e., throughout the reigns of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong.[6]

The most important political and military affairs were handled by the Manzhou emperor in consultation with members of the council of princes and dignitaries, consisting exclusively of members of the Manzhou aristocracy (subsequently, in the 1720s, during the reign of Yongzheng, this council was replaced by a military council, in which, despite the inclusion of some members of the higher Chinese bureaucracy, the decision-making remained in the hands of the Manzhous.[7] To prevent Chinese military and civil officials from conspiring against the Manzhous, the Qing government forbade Chinese high officials to serve in the provinces of their birth. Qing legislation placed Manzhous outside the jurisdiction of Chinese courts and provided for lighter sentences for them than for Chinese for the same crimes. Marriages between Manzhous and Chinese were forbidden.

Until the very eve of the Xinhai revolution the Manzhous were in firm control of all the commanding posts in the empire's central government. Even during the extremely acute national crisis generated in the mid-nineteenth century by the Taiping peasant war, all power continued to be exercised by various groups of the Manzhou aristocracy. Although in that period the Manzhou monarchy was propped up solely by the efforts of a military group of Chinese feudal lords of Hunan and Anhui provinces led by Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, members of that group played only a subordinate, minor role in the government.[8]

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[6] J. K. Fairbank, S. Y. Têng, "The Types and Uses of Ch'ing Documents", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 1, Harvard-Yenching Institute, January, 1940, p. 14.

Here and elsewhere in this volume we use the designations, widespread in Chinese and foreign literature, of Manzhou emperors by the names of their years of rule; under the Qings (as under previous dynasties in China) it was forbidden, on pain of death, to pronounce the proper names of emperors (this was a survival of the tribal system of tabooing names to avoid harm to their bearers). A supplement to this volume gives a chronological table of the Manzhou emperors with their proper names and the years of their reign.

[7] Various aspects of China's state system under the Manzhous and the policies of the Qing government are considered in detail by I. S. Yermachenko in "The Qing State Apparatus at the Time of the Conquest of China" in this volume.

The Manzhou rulers kept a close watch to prevent members of influential Chinese feudal clans from acquiring too much power; to this end, in the year 1700 the emperor Kangxi established a strict quota for members of influential Chinese feudal clans aspiring to the academic degree of *juren,* which formally opened the way for an official career.[9] Even in the last period of their rule, when the existence of the Qing dynasty depended not only on Manzhou rulers' alliance with Chinese feudal lords but also on support from foreign capitalists, the Qing emperors set up every possible roadblock to access by Chinese to key posts in politics and, in particular, to relations with the West. In a memorandum submitted to the throne on January 13, 1861 by three of the top-ranking Manzhou dignitaries in the government—Grand Prince Gong, Guiling, and Wenxiang—on the institution in the capital of a collegium for foreign affairs with a foreign languages school, it was stated that students should be enrolled from among people on the roster of the eight-banner troops.[10] Because it was impossible to enrol the needed number of able students from this category, the government decided to allow Chinese youths to be accepted at the Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou schools that trained interpreters for intercourse with foreigners (in 1879 less than 20 per cent of the students at the Beijing school were Chinese). However, in 1880 this decision was flouted by the Manzhou military commander in Guangzhou, who had the authority over the local school. He regarded the funds allocated to this school as a sort of sinecure for Manzhous, both students and teachers, despite their obvious inability to study or teach.[11]

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[8] Masataka Banno, *China and the West. 1858-1861. The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen,* (Harvard East Asian Series 15), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964, pp. 55-56, 84-85, 188-89, 237-40.

[9] Ho Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China. Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911,* Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1962, pp. 187-88.

[10] All Manzhous as well as those Mongols and Chinese whose ancestors had helped the Manzhous to conquer China in 1644 were on the roster of the eight-banner troops. *Chouban Yiwu shimo* (On the Conduct of Relations with Barbarians), 1930, section *Xianfeng Rule,* Chapter 71, pp. 24-25.

At the same time, conscious of the importance of maintaining their alliance with the Chinese feudal lords, the Manzhou emperors and the court aristocracy undertook from the outset to foster traditional Chinese feudal ideology, Confucianism, which had for many centuries been a powerful ideological weapon of the Chinese feudal lords in preserving unchanged the system of ruthless exploitation of the Chinese peasant. As early as 1656 the emperor Shunzhi said: "Controlling the universe, my first concern is to correct people's minds. To correct people's minds, my first concern is to exorcize heterodox skills" (in other words, all forms of protest against official Confucianism.—*S. T.*)[12] In one of his early edicts in 1670 Kangxi acknowledged: "In my endeavour to bring about supreme control in the world, laws and regulations are not my only concern, but I put transformation through indoctrination first."[13] In ideology the Manzhou emperors had most frequent recourse to terms like "correcting people's minds" (*zheng ren xin*); terms like "cleansing hearts" (*xi xin*) or "heart-washing and thought-cleansing" (*xi xin ti liu)* predominated in the edicts of the emperor Yongzheng. The entire official system of education was geared to ensure these goals. In a 1735 edict the emperor Yongzheng wrote: "The supreme usefulness of reading books consists solely in fostering the way of cultivating one's personality and controlling people." In another, he conceded that the "state does not support scholars merely to stimulate literary talent ... but in order to inspire due respect in the people toward their rulers and ancestors".[14]

The special patronage of the Manzhou emperors was enjoyed by the Sung neo-Confucian school of the brothers Cheng and Zhu Xi, whose doctrine accentuated the strictest regulation of the people's social duties and mutual relations. In an edict of March 12, 1712, the emperor Kangxi awarded to Zhu Xi the title of a "Man of Genius" posthumously.[15] The Manzhou emperors used the system of civil exams with its dogmatic requirements to maintain an ideological hold on members of the academic estate of the Chinese feudal lords.

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[11] Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1965, pp. 37, 41.

[12] Hellmut Wilhelm, "Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great Encounter" in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization.* Edited by Marius B. Jansen, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p. 285.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

As early as under the first Qing emperor, Shunzhi, the Manzhous established the strictest control over all the non-Manzhou inhabitants of the empire. In view of the almost total illiteracy of the rural and urban population, they instituted and actively used a system of ideological indoctrination called *xiangyue*—"rural lectures". In 1652 the emperor Shunzhi issued an edict laying down six maxims (*liu yu*) of moral behaviour, worded as aphorisms calling upon all subjects to be virtuous and live a peaceful life. Special lecturers were appointed in every locality with the duty of periodically lecturing on these "six maxims" of virtue. In 1659 an edict on rites obliged all local authorities to use as "lecturers" the most esteemed local inhabitants over the age of 60 who had at least an elementary education. On the first and fifteenth of each month these lecturers had to explain specified imperial maxims to their fellow-villagers and register all virtuous and evil deeds of the inhabitants of the given locality (in other words, to act simultaneously as government spies). In 1670 the emperor Kangxi wrote a new set of edifying maxims and published them in the form of a special imperial edict (*shengyu* or Sacred Edict of Kangxi). All the lecturers were now obliged to interpret these 16 maxims of Kangxi. In 1724 the emperor Yongzheng published the "Amplified Instructions of the Sacred Edict", a lengthy document of about 10,000 words. Now the local lecturers each had three or four assistants, who alternated monthly. Twice a month the entire population of villages and towns had to gather in groups for the "lectures". The authorities made sure that these requirements were met. In 1736, 1737, and 1743 the emperor Qianlong decreed that these "lectures" should be conducted with the utmost enthusiasm.[16] This system remained in operation in rural communities up to the revolution of 1911.

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[15] Ibid., p. 286.

[16] Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China. Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1960, pp. 184-86.

Whereas the six maxims of moral behaviour proclaimed by Shunzhi in 1652 were relatively simple—1) perform your filial duty to your parents; 2) esteem and respect your elders and superiors; 3) maintain harmonious relations with your neighbours; 4) instruct and restrain your sons and grandsons; 5) work peacefully for your sustenance; and 6) do not commit incorrect deeds—and schematically reduced feudal Confucian ethics to the regulation of social and family relations, education, welfare, and the maintenance of law and order, the 16 maxims of the emperor Kangxi of 1670 amplified, specified, and complemented the original six maxims, and especially amplified the sixth maxim of Shunzhi on the maintenance of public law and order (the 8th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th maxims of Kangxi).

Because some Chinese historians have lately been giving special attention to the personality of Kangxi and because of the idealisation of his administration, it would be interesting to consider his programme for the verbal ideological indoctrination of China's illiterate population (each of Kangxi's 16 maxims consisted of seven words-hieroglyphs):

1) faithfully perform your filial and fraternal duties in order to consolidate relations in society;

2) be magnanimous to your relatives in order to bring harmony and affection;

3) foster peace and concord in your community in order to avert quarrels and litigation;

4) recognise the importance of farming and the cultivation of mulberry trees in order to ensure an abundance of food and clothes;

5) value thrift in order to preserve your money and goods;

6) expand schools in order to direct the knowledge of scholars;

7) reject false teachings in order to assert true knowledge;

8) explain laws in order to enlighten ignorant and stubborn people;

9) show deference and courtesy in order to improve mores and customs;

10) work tirelessly at your post in order to ensure the fulfilment of the people's aspirations;

11) bring up your sons and younger brothers in such a way as to keep them from committing evil deeds;

12) cut short false accusations in order to protect innocent and good people;

13) refrain from sheltering fugitives in order to avoid becoming an accomplice of their crimes;

14) pay taxes in full in order to avoid official reminders;

15) take part in the system of mutual guarantee (*baojia*) in order to suppress thieves and brigands;

16) subdue anger in order to evaluate life on its merits.[17]

The effectiveness of the *xiangyue* system—public gatherings at which every fortnight, month after month, year after year the injunctions of the Manzhou emperors were interpreted and the seemly and unseemly deeds of fellow-villagers were discussed—in combination with the strictly enforced *baojia* (mutual guarantee) system—was frankly noted by a high official named Dong Guoji, who was governor of the provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang in 1653-1660: "...of all the measures to eradicate banditry none are better than the *hsiang-yüeh* [*xiangyue*] which encourages good conduct, and the *pao-chia* [*baojia*] which suppresses robbery."[18]

The *baojia* system, enforced in China by many preceding dynasties, was brought to perfection by the Manzhou emperors. The sophisticated police function of this system in the reign of Kangxi is revealed in a government circular issued in 1708: "Each household is given a placard on which the official seal is affixed. The names and number of adult males are written on it. In case any of them go away, their destination is recorded; in case any come into the households, the places from which they come are ascertained. It is forbidden to take in strangers and suspicious characters, unless a thorough questioning of them has been made. Every ten households set up a *p'ai-t'ou* (placard-head), every ten *p'ai* a *chia-t'ou*, and every ten *chia* a *pao-chang*... At the end of each month, the *pao-chang* submits a *kan-chieh* (willing bond), giving assurance that everything has been well in the neighbourhoods, which (*kan-chieh*) is sent to the official concerned for inspection. Whoever fails to comply will be punished." [19]

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[17] The Chinese text of the Sacred Edict is given in *Xuezheng quanshu* (A Reader for the Study of Politics), 1810, Chapter 9, pp. 2a-2b; also, John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, *A History of East Asian Civilization,* Vol. 2, *East Asia, The Modern Transformation,* Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1965, p. 85.

[18] Hsiao Kung-chuan, op. cit., p. 617.

The Qing court forbade the private possession of weapons. According to the chronicle, in the 5th year of Shunzhi's reign (1648) "stricter measures were enforced to forbid the private possession of weapons. After a conference, the Board for the Prevention of Crime drew up an imperial edict according to which nobody, with the exception of civil and military officials performing their duties, and also soldiers, could have possession of muskets, guns, armour, spears, swords, bows, arrows, and other weapons. The punishment for an infraction of this edict was death, confiscation of property, and the reduction of offenders' wives and children to state slaves. The heads of ten households neighbouring on that of the offender were beaten with sticks and sentenced to exile". [20]

The Manzhou emperors were seriously worried over the unceasing resistance of the Chinese people to their rule. [21]

The Manzhou conquest brought great economic hardship to China. Dai Yi, a contemporary Chinese historian, writes that "the Manzhou tyranny, established in the seventeenth century, exercised a huge destructive influence on the economy of Chinese society: most of the farmland was turned into desert; towns inhabited by artisans were mercilessly destroyed and ravaged". [22]

Following the gradual restoration of the economy, the growth of the population, and the increase of the cultivated area in the 1680s, the Manzhou and Chinese feudal aristocracy intensified their exploitation and pillaging of the peasants. This was seen in further seizures of land by the feudal lords and the growth of taxes and levies. The Chinese historian Shang Yue writes that in the reign of Kangxi "wives and children were sold and people turned to begging in order to pay their head tax arrears".[23] At the close of Kangxi's reign there were nine landless persons to every landholder.[24]

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[19] Hsiao Kung-chuan, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

[20] *Qingchao wenxian tongkao* (A Reader on the Qing Dynasty), Shanghai, 1936, pp. 195, 599.

[21] Interesting information characterising the early period of Qing rule in China and resistance to the invaders by the Chinese people is given by V. S. Myasnikov in "Russian Archival Documents on the Manzhou Conquest of China (1618-1690)" in this volume. However, it should be borne in mind that being in strict isolation and having no knowledge of the language the Russian captives and travellers in China could not, of course, obtain comprehensive information on all aspects of Manzhou rule in China.

[22] Dai Yi, *Zhongguo jinda shi kao* (Outlines of China's Modern History), Vol. I, Beijing, 1958, pp. 11-12.

Conquest and rule by the Manzhous contributed to the conservation of feudal relations in the economy for a long time and also led to a considerable reanimation of pre-feudal forms of farming.

The seizure of captives in war and their conversion into slaves engaged in farming and craftsmanship were widely practised under the Manzhous, and this contributed to the growth and consolidation of the slave-owning system in feudal Chinese society and slowed down the disintegration of feudalism and the appearance of elements of capitalism. Peasants were forcibly driven from their land and made serfs totally dependent upon Manzhou-Chinese landowners. The authorities dealt severely with peasants or slaves who fled from their owners. An edict issued in 1652 decreed: "A fugitive caught for the first time shall be given 100 lashes of the whip and returned to his owner." The harsh laws on the punishment of runaway slaves remained in force into the eighteenth century.

The Manzhou conquest placed a heavy burden on the Chinese people,[25] thrust back China's economy, reinforced the most backward forms of feudal landownership, revived serfdom and even slavery, reduced the peasants to subsistence farming, and held up the social division of labour and the development of commodity-money relations in Chinese agriculture. Prices of raw material for the handicraft industry and for agricultural products grew sharply together with land rent and the price of land. To maintain and consolidate their hold on the country, the Manzhous pursued a rigid policy of attaching the peasants to the land.[26]

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[23] *Essays on the History of China From Antiquity to the Opium Wars*. Edited by Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959, p. 515 (Russian translation).

[24] Ibid., p. 517. Data on the extent the nation's productive forces were destroyed as a result of the Manzhou invasion are also given on pp. 512-13 of the above book.

[25] This is discussed by the late K. V. Lepeshinsky (Zuo Shi) in "Some Socio-Economic Consequences of the Manzhou Conquest of China" (in Russian). Regrettably, Lepeshinsky died before he could complete his essay.

Concentration of land ownership in the hands of the Manzhou-Chinese feudal lords was particularly conspicuous during the reign of Kangxi, although to forestall rebellions and further his own interests the emperor took steps formally designed to ease the unbearable condition of the Chinese peasants (for instance, temporary tax exemption for the population of regions hit by crop failures or natural calamities).

In 1704 one of the emperor's edicts stated that in some provinces "a large portion of the land has passed to *shenshi* and other wealthy people; only three or four out of every ten peasant households own land, the others are tenants".[27] Three years later another edict noted that in the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang "few peasants own land; there are many tenants".[28]

The cruelty of Manzhou feudal landowners during the reign of Kangxi and then of his son Yongzheng is described by Sun Jiagan, who at one time headed the Civil Office and won wide renown as a jurist. In particular, he noted the upturn of litigation between Manzhou landowners (owners of "banner land") and Chinese tenants over nonpayment or incomplete payment of rent and the confiscation of land held by tenants. "Wishing to improve the land, the common people work it with great diligence for two or three years: ploughing deeply, fertilising, and carefully weeding. But as soon as the land begins to yield good crops, the local rogues conspire to take it away. They raise the rent and gain possession of the land. If anybody ventures to protest, that person is taken to court on the accusation that as a Chinese he had unlawfully seized banner land."[29]

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[26] Li Zhiqin, "Lun yapian zhanzheng yiqian Qingdai shangyexing hongyedi fazhan (Development of Marketing Farming Under the Qing Dynasty Prior to the Opium Wars)", in the collection *Ming Qing shehui jingji xingtaidi yanjiu* (Studies of the Economic Structures of the Ming and Qing Societies). Edited by Shang Yue, Shanghai, 1957, pp. 347-52.

[27] Wang Xianjian, *Donghualu* (Notes on the Manzhous and China), Kangxichao, Chapter 73.

[28] Ibid., Chapter 80.

The Manzhou-Chinese feudal lords were no less despotic towards manufactories—silk, pottery, porcelain, and others—and also towards the mining industry. Exorbitant taxes and other duties were imposed on these industries, the range of their products was strictly regulated, and the hire of labour and economic activity were subjected to strict government control. The Qing authorities feared concentration of large numbers of workers at enterprises and mines and raised every possible obstacle to the further industrial development. The innumerable internal customs posts and barriers hindered the growth of domestic commerce.

The Qing policy of isolating China from the rest of the world led to a sharp diminution of China's foreign trade and to the decline of export-oriented handicraft industries.

The Manzhou rulers' inability to find a reasonable solution to the country's problems explains the predominance of military and political methods in their policy, their reliance on crude force in combination with pervasive police control of the thoughts and sentiments of the population and systematic ideological indoctrination.

Following China's conquest by the Manzhous large Manzhou banner garrisons were stationed in the imperial capital, Beijing, and 72 key strategic strongpoints. Initially an essential and active instrument of occupation, the bannermen gradually lost their fighting efficiency and became "objects of hatred to the Chinese and a heavy and largely unnecessary drain on the exchequer".[30] In 1810, according to the American historian L. Carrington Goodrich, the numerical strength of the bannermen was 220,960 in the Manzhou, 55,639 in the Mongolian, and 143,893 in the Chinese units (altogether, including their families, they numbered a million and a half. All lived a parasitical life at the expense of the Han and other peoples of the empire).[31]

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[29] Sun Jiagan, *Huangchao jing shi wenbian* (A Report on Banner Land), compiled by Huo Changling, 1826, Chapter 35, p. 11a. Agrarian relations in Qing China before it was reduced to a semi-colony are also described by A. N. Khokhlov, "Agrarian Relations in China in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth and the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century", in *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta narodov Azii*, 1962, No. 53, pp. 95-115.

[30] L. Carrington Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People*, New York-London, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1943, p. 212.

The Manzhou aristocracy saw all Manzhous as belonging to the estate of professional soldiers; for Manzhous commerce and industry were disgraceful occupations and prohibited by law. Even study at official "science" courses needed for exams to attain academic degrees that formally were the gateway to a successful civil career was regarded by the Manzhou rulers as "dishonourable" for their fellow tribesmen. In 1836 the Emperor Daoguang punished some high-ranking banner commanders for having allowed a Manzhou subordinate to them to sit for civil exams for the academic degree of *jinshi* before requiring him to pass the test of horsemanship and bowmanship provided for in the regulations for Manzhous. In 1822 Daoguang denied a subsidy to a school for Manzhous in Xian on the grounds that for Manzhous it was quite enough to speak the Manzhou language and be able to ride a horse and handle a bow; "those who for their advancement intend to read books and study should find the tutors and money themselves". In another case, in 1833, he recommended teaching Manzhous nothing except riding and shooting so as not to expose them to "enervating influences". Book learning, he declared, meant "leaving fallow their main occupation", and, the emperor asked rhetorically: "In what way would they differ from Chinese officials?"[32]

In an autobiography published in China in 1964[33] the last of the Manzhou emperors Pu Yi writes of the incredible ignorance and superstitions of the Manzhou imperial family and the higher Manzhou aristocracy at the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.

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[31] The Russian sinologist K. A. Skachkov who lived in China in the mid-nineteenth century, writes that there were some 600 companies of bannermen in 1853. Each of the eight Manzhou corps had its own banner: 1. Yellow, 2. Bordered Yellow, 3. White, 4. Bordered White, 5. Red, 6. Bordered Red, 7. Blue, and 8. Bordered Blue (K. A. Skachkov, *Beijing During the Taiping Uprising. Notes of an Eye-Witness,* Moscow, 1958, p. 339 [in Russian]).

A census taken in 1953 showed that in China there were 2,419,000 Manzhous (including "banner Chinese" or *qiren*). Most—2,100,000—resided in South Manzhou (*Peoples of East Asia.* Edited by N. N. Cheboksarov, S. I. Bruk, R. F. Its, and G. G. Stratanovich, Moscow-Leningrad, 1965, p. 672 [in Russian]).

[32] Hellmut Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 289.

[33] *From Emperor to Citizen. The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi,* Foreign Languages Press, Bejing, Vol. 1, 1964; Vol. 2, 1965.

Even as late as the latter half of the nineteenth century, following Qing China's dramatic clash with capitalist powers and the commencement of China's acquaintance with modern Western science and technology, the Manzhou dignitaries strongly opposed every attempt at reforming education, specifically, at introducing the study of mathematics at the Beijing school run by the Collegium for Foreign Affairs. They dismissed mathematical knowledge "as mere craftsmanship to be eschewed by the educated and left to ordinary men".[34]

To break the spirit of resistance among patriotic members of the academic segment of the Chinese feudal aristocracy and keep them in submission, the Manzhous enlisted their support by giving them official posts and well-paid literary and editorial assignments: the court commissioned, at the expense of the exchequer, the reprinting of ancient and medieval Chinese literary works and the compilation of voluminous encyclopaedias, anthologies, dictionaries, and so on, engaging many Chinese literary critics, historians, philologists, writers, calligraphers, engravers, and members of other professions in this work. Further, to achieve their aim, the Manzhous encouraged in education and at civil examinations an abstract and speculative neo-Confucian Chinese feudal ideology invested in the dry, dogmatic, and scholastic forms of the "octonary essay", whose writing took long years of training, required blind, mechanical cramming, and in no way fostered natural talent and capability. This throttled initiative and doomed to long decline a crucial branch of knowledge such as the natural sciences, which was looked upon with disfavour by the authorities.

The Manzhou rulers had recourse to the most brutal repressions against those Chinese who refused to submit to the scholastic pattern of education, carried on the humanistic traditions of Chinese social thought, and ventured to protest against foreign domination and the destruction of the Chinese people's cultural values. The Qing authorities ruthlessly burned Chinese works of history and literature recording patriotic actions of the Chinese people against the foreign invaders who had overrun China over the ages —Huns (Xiongnu), Qidan, Nüzhen, Mongols, and others— and executed their authors.

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[34] Knight Biggerstaff, op. cit., pp. 37, 41, 74, 114-15.

The Manzhous turned their hatred and vengeance not only against the living. The literary inquisition lashed out at long-deceased authors of "seditious" books: their graves were dug up and their remains profaned; their living kin were treated harshly. At the height of its activity the Qing literary inquisition under the emperor Qianlong (1774-1782) publicly burned 13,862 books; around 2,320 titles were prohibited and, consequently, made subject to destruction throughout the empire. A strict ban was also imposed on innumerable folk novels and Chinese epic tales that were permeated with loathing for foreign invaders.[35]

On pain of dreadful punishment forbidden books were confiscated from the people and destroyed. The ban covered, above all, books whose authors were disrespectful of the Manzhou and other non-Chinese dynasties, or called for insurrection, or discussed frontier issues and problems of defending the country against invasion by neighbouring tribes and peoples. Books of folklore and many novels and narratives of everyday life were prohibited if the censors found they were "immoral".

In many cases the Manzhou emperors themselves fulfilled the role of censors and inquisitors. Thus, in 1691 the Emperor Kangxi wrote in a foreword to a Manzhou translation of *Tongjian gangmu,* the famous Chinese historical encyclopaedia by Zhu Xi, that it was mandatory for the college of translators, set up at the court by his edict, "to submit for our consideration translated pages that we have corrected by our own labours, explained with interpretations, and to make certain that nothing is omitted or left without explanation". Kangxi felt this work had to be "explained" because, as he saw it, there were many "biased and unjust contentions" and also assertions "conflicting with the truth" in the section of *Tongjian gangmu* devoted to the deeds of rulers of non-Han origin.[36]

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[35] In this situation patriotic Chinese authors had to resort to allegory or enter the world of fantasy. This is discussed by P. M. Ustin in "Pu Songling: Accuser of the Manzhou Conquerors" in this volume.

[36] I. Y. Zlatkin, *A History of the Junggar Khanate (1635-1758),* Moscow, 1936, p. 7 (in Russian).

Qing emperors were behind the falsification not only of the history of preceding dynasties (the Ming dynasty in particular), the history of the Manzhou tribes, their invasion and conquest of China, but also the history of the peasant war of the 1620s-1640s in China. In 1713 Kangxi addressed a commission of historians, telling them how to depict some episodes of that war. An imperial edict was issued in 1786 ordering modifications in Gu Yingtai's *Mingshi jishi benmo* (Ming History in Records From Start to Finish of the Events) where it dealt with the peasant war. The most massive falsification of the history of the peasant war by the Manzhous was to be seen in *Ming shi* (Ming History).[37] Completion of the first version of *Ming shi* in 1739 was a major milestone of Chinese historiography; deleting or doctoring many records, the Qing rulers created the official version of the history of the Ming dynasty (the history of the first half of the 17th century was distorted more than that of any other period).[38]

On account of the deliberate falsification of innumerable facts, many of the books and documents published during the reign of the Manzhous about the Qing's relations with neighbouring peoples and countries, notably with the Mongolian Junggar Khanate, were totally untrustworthy.[39]

Soviet historians have noted the tendentiousness of official Qing sources and literature about the conquest of Eastern Turkestan in the 18th century. For example, in *Huaijiang zhi* Su Erde tried to prove that before Eastern Turkestan was incorporated in the Qing empire the tax policy had been more onerous for the people than it became under the Manzhous. But he fails to mention that the aggregate tax revenue fell because of the dramatic numerical diminution of the population as a result of internecine strife prior to the Qing invasion and of the devastation wrought by the invaders.[40] Despite the strict censorship and the brutal persecution of dissidents, Chinese patriots were, in their writings, bitterly critical of Manzhou rule.

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[37] B. G. Doronin, "Chinese Sources on the History of the Peasant War of 1627-1646 in China", in *Problems of the History of Asian Countries,* Moscow, 1965, p. 51 (in Russian). Doronin cites the works of many contemporary Chinese historians to show how the Manzhous falsified the history of the peasant war.

[38] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

[39] I. Y. Zlatkin, op. cit.

[40] L. I. Duman, *Agrarian Policy of the Qing Government in Xinqiang at the Close of the 18th Century,* Moscow, 1936, p. 21 (in Russian).

Under the Manzhous, the Soviet historian B. G. Doronin writes justifiably, "historiography, which had long played a prominent role in Chinese politics, became a powerful weapon of patriotic intellectuals, a form of resistance by them". In support of this statement Doronin offers many illustrations.[41]

An analogous pattern is to be observed in Mongol historiography; under the Qing dynasty the Manzhou-Chinese authorities caused crippling damage to Mongolian culture. Nevertheless, Mongolian historians articulated their protest against Manzhou rule in diverse ways: references to the glorious historical past of the Mongolian people prior to the Manzhou conquest, refusal to write of the deeds of the Mongol secular and ecclesiastical feudal lords who were Manzhou-Chinese henchmen, total disregard of the activities of the Manzhou emperors, dignitaries, and military leaders, and so on.[42]

A heavy blow was dealt in that period at Chinese belles-lettres. The officially approved literature of the Qing period was divorced from reality, from the problems of Chinese society.[43] With this constraint, eighteenth-century Chinese popular literature developed a unique genre of folk anecdotes, vulgar and scabrous in form but highly anti-Qing in content, ridiculing the fatuousness and narrow-mindedness of the Manzhou rulers and contrasting to them the quick intelligence and vigour of the Chinese. One of the most frequently mentioned negative personages in anecdotes of this kind was the emperor Qianlong, whose harem escapades were described sarcastically, to say the least.[44]

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[41] B. G. Doronin, op. cit., p. 40.

[42] S. Bira, "Mongolian Historiography", in *Comité international des sciences historiques. XIIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques,* Vienne, August 29-September 5, 1965. Rapports IV, Méthodologie et histoire contemporaine, Verlag Ferdinand Berger und Söhne, Horn/Wien, 1965, pp. 51-52.

[43] This is discussed by O. L. Fishman in "Qing Policy in Ideology" in this volume. The wiles used by Chinese patriotic writers to get past the censors are described in P. M. Ustin's contribution to this volume.

[44] Harold L. Kahn, "Some Mid-Ch'ing Views of the Monarchy", in *The Journal of Asian Studies,* New York, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, February 1965, p. 239.

The denouncement of Manzhou rule in Chinese belles-lettres and fine arts took a new dimension at the turn of this century with the appearance of new social forces on China's historical scene. Banned patriotic, anti-Manzhou works of the mid-seventeenth century were published in large editions. These included *Ten Days in Yangzhou* by Wang Xiuchu, who witnessed the ruthless slaughter by the Manzhous of the entire population of the Chinese town of Yangzhou who refused to surrender to the foreign invaders; *A Short Description of the Massacre in Jiading* by Zhu Zisuo; and *Recollections of the Defence of Jiangying* by Xu Zhongxi. Mention must be made of the anti-Manzhou pamphlet *Revolutionary Army* (first printed in the newspaper *Subao*) by Zou Rong (who was arrested for it and died in prison). Very popular, among others, were the ardent publicistic articles of Sun Yat-sen, Chen Tianhua, Zhang Taiyan,[45] patriotic poems by Huang Zongxian, Tan Sitong, Qiu Jin and the accusatory novels of Li Baojia and Zeng Pu.

All these works had a very wide readership among the most diverse sections of the people, especially among students, and helped to foster anti-government, patriotic feeling during the war of 1894-1895 between Japan and China (this is mentioned in the memoirs of Wu Yu-chang, a veteran of the Communist Party of China and rector of the People's University of China).[46]

Throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century there was tenacious popular resistance to the Manzhou invaders in Central, East, South, Southwest, and Northwest China. The outset of the eighteenth century saw the anti-Manzhou struggle enter a new phase, which, despite the relative stabilisation of Manzhou rule, featured the mushrooming of secret societies that were joined by peasants, artisans, merchants, and *shenshi*. One of these was the Triad Society, which was formed at the close of Kangxi's reign. This relatively "peaceful" phase for the population of China proper ended in the 1770s with armed risings against the Qing dynasty. These were led by secret societies.

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[45] Detailed in A. M. Grigoryev, *Anti-Imperialist Programme of Chinese Bourgeois Revolutionaries (1895-1905)*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

[46] Wu Yu-chang, *The Revolution of 1911—a Great Democratic Revolution of China*, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1962.

The first major rising took place on Taiwan in 1787-1788 and was led by the secret Tiandihui, or Heaven and Earth Society.[47] It was followed by an unbroken chain of armed anti-Manzhou, anti-government, and anti-feudal actions that lasted from the end of the eighteenth to the early twentieth century.[48] A study of the programme and propaganda documents of these innumerable actions brings out the fact that despite the appearance in the mid-nineteenth century of a new and formidable enemy—capitalist aggressors—the working masses of China continued to regard the Manzhou rulers and the Chinese officials and feudal lords supporting the Qing regime as their principal oppressors in this period.

For example, the documents of the great Taiping peasant war,[49] which gripped almost the whole of China in the mid-nineteenth century, bitterly denounce the Manzhou rulers. The address of the Taiping leaders Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui to the people known as the "Manifesto on the Need to Destroy the Northern Barbarians by the Will of Heaven" published in 1852 and circulated widely in China's central provinces, declared in part:

"China is the head, the Manzhous are the feet. China is a sacred land and the Manzhous are foul scum. But, alas, the feet tower over the head, and the filthy riff-raff are committing outrages in the sacred land, turning us, its inhabitants, into devils... China has always had its own ideals about a person's external appearance. But the Manzhous have forced the people to shave their heads and leave a long tail at the back, thereby converting the Chinese into wild beasts. China has always had its own clothes and its own headwear. But the Manzhous have introduced peaked caps, compelling people to wear barbarous clothes and simian skullcaps instead of their traditional clothes and hats... China has always had its wedding customs. But now the Manzhou devils are taking beautiful

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[47] See B. M. Novikov, "The Rising of 1787-1788 on Taiwan" in this volume.

[48] The history of mass anti-Qing actions led by proponents of the White Lotus doctrine (*bailianjiao*) and Triple Harmony (Sanhehui) societies is described by Y. B. Porshneva in "Popular Religious Sects in Opposition to the Qing Dynasty" in this volume.

[49] See V. P. Ilyushechkin, "Anti-Manzhou Edge of the Taiping Peasant War" in this volume.

Chinese girls and making them slaves and concubines... China has always had its own order, but the Manzhous have now introduced satanic laws preventing the Chinese from breaking out of the nets that tie them hand and feet in order finally to subjugate and enslave the men of our nation... Avaricious and corrupt officials have flooded the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace. They are sucking all of the people's blood. On all roads there is moaning and weeping. They want to reduce the Chinese people to abject poverty. Government posts are acquired by bribes; exemption from punishment is bought with money; the right to power is given by wealth, with the result that the daring and the able are in despair, and heroes, the flower of the nation, pine and perish. Those who make bold to raise the banner of struggle for China's liberation are falsely accused of treason and done to death together with all their, even most far-removed, kin."[50]

The Taipings called upon all Chinese, regardless of their social status, to rise against the Manzhou "barbarians".

They saw their principal enemy in the Manzhous and the officials and generals appointed by them.

The prominent Russian scholar K. A. Skachkov, who was a member of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Beijing at the time of the peasant war, credited the hatred for the Qings to their cruel and inept administration. He wrote: "In this country despotism bears down everywhere on all Chinese trivia so that here people dare not drop a single careless word against the Manzhou government."[51] "For 200 years China has been languishing in helplessness, poverty, a historical fear of ruin in every family, in the ignominy of every estate without distinction, crushed by bribes, lies, and bigotry—and all this behind vainglorious silk curtains and gowns."[52] Elsewhere, he noted: "Among other loot much cloth falls into the hands of the Manzhous. For lack of storage facilities these expensive pieces of cloth frequently serve as pillows, soiled by the greasy head of a grimy soldier, after which they are used as rags. A lot of goods is wasted wantonly in this way, goods that cost the hard-working Chinese—tillers of the soil and workers—so dear and so much labour. Of course, the Manzhous would have been more benevolent had they had an understanding not only of how to scatter and squander but also how to make things; they will never understand this for they scorn all heavy labour."[53] The hostility of the Chinese towards the Manzhou rulers is related by another Russian scholar, P. A. Kornievsky, a contemporary and witness of the Taiping uprising.[54]

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[50] *The Taiping Uprising. 1850-1864*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 21-22 (in Russian).

[51] K. A. Skachkov, op. cit., p. 25.

[52] Ibid., p. 196.

The formation of the Chinese nation visibly gathered momentum in the closing 30 years of the nineteenth century. A distinctive feature of this process was that it proceeded under the predominance of feudal practices jealously guarded by the Qing court and in a situation marked by China's colonial subjugation by capitalist powers.

As a consequence of the Manzhou policy of maintaining feudal practices and opposing new, capitalist forms of economic activity and bourgeois socio-political phenomena and ideas (most of whose protagonists were Chinese), the unending territorial concessions to foreign powers, the abandonment of the Chinese people's sovereign rights in favour of foreign capitalists, and the deterioration of the people's economic condition, Manzhou rule came to be regarded by the working masses of China as the primary cause of all their hardships and suffering. During this period the anti-feudal struggle of the peasant masses and the movement for liberation from foreign capitalist oppression were seen most strikingly as directed against Manzhou rule.

At the close of the nineteenth century the Manzhous were still in command of the nation's political life despite their small numerical strength and the further decline of their military organisation.[55] They held 50 per cent of the ministerial, and 75 per cent of the vice-ministerial posts, and 77 per cent of the high-ranking officials in the capital were also Manzhous.[56]

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[53] K. A. Skachkov, op. cit., p. 296.

[54] G. V. Yefimov, "The Beijing Diary of P. A. Kornievsky, Physician of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission", *Narody Azii i Afriki,* No. 6, 1965, p. 142.

[55] "That the Manchus should have permitted the Huaichun to dominate the defenses of Daiven [Dalian], Chinchow [Jinzhou], and Mukden [Fengtian] is striking proof of the decline of their own power in contrast with the growing strength of Li Hung-chang and his army," writes the American historian Stanley Spector (*Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism,* University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964, p. 143).

Manzhous held key posts in the army, and there still were Manzhou garrisons in all the big cities. The imperial court and the Manzhou aristocracy owned vast areas of ploughland and pastures, which were leased to Chinese peasants at exorbitant rents.

Huge sums of money from the exchequer went for the upkeep of the Qing court and the Manzhou military-feudal nobility. According to official statistics of the Tax Office, 22,700,000 liangs of silver were allocated from the exchequer in 1894 for the upkeep of the banner troops. A sum of 7,600,000 liangs was allocated annually for the expenses of the Qing court. Thus, more than 37 per cent of the empire's revenue of 81 million liangs were spent only to maintain the Manzhou troops and court (according to understated figures). Another 19 million liangs were allocated from the exchequer to maintain the Chinese troops used by the Manzhous to suppress the national liberation movement of the Chinese people.[57]

The Qing monarchy was able to remain in power only because of the solid support it got from Chinese feudal and bureaucratic reaction and, from the 1860s, also from foreign capital that helped it to suppress popular risings and gave it loans and deductions from customs revenues.[58] The degradation of the Manzhou aristocracy, the undisguised embezzlement of public property, corruption, favouritism, and intrigues and infighting among the court cliques acquired catastrophic proportions towards the close of the nineteenth century.

In that period the camp opposed to the Qing regime consisted of large sections of the Chinese working people, ethnic minorities, groups of Chinese bourgeois revolutionary democrats led by Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese bourgeois-landowner party of reform headed by Kang Youwei.

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[56] See Zou Rong, "Geming jun (The Revolutionary Army)", in *Xinhai geming* (The Xinhai Revolution), Vol. 1, Shanghai, 1957, p. 337.

[57] See Lü Yuyun, *Guangxu kuaijibiao* (Budget Tables Related to the Reign of Guangxu), Part I, Shanghai, 1901.

[58] The extent of the Manzhou court's dependence on foreign powers, notably on Britain, is eloquently illustrated by the fact that in 1875 there were more than 400 foreigners (252 Englishmen and 156 other foreigners of 16 different nationalities) in the imperial customs service. These held all key posts and controlled all the customs revenues going to the exchequer (John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, *A History of East Asian Civilization*, Vol. 2, *East Asia. The Modern Transformation,* Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1965, p. 318).

The Chinese people's anti-Qing feeling, shown strikingly during the Taiping and Nianjun wars and by the many risings of non-Han peoples in the 1850s-1860s, resurged with greater force than ever and acquired a mass character after China's defeat by Japan in the war of 1894-1895. In 1895 the Chinese population of the island of Taiwan, ceded by the Qing court to Japan under the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty, refused to be separated from China. There was an uprising and the island was proclaimed a republic. Beginning with 1895 anti-government and anti-foreign unrest flared up spontaneously more and more often among the Chinese peasants and urban population. Towards the end of 1899 these developed into the great popular Yihetuan (Boxer) Rising in North China.

In August 1894 the outstanding Chinese bourgeois revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen founded the secret Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui) with the immediate aim of organising an armed uprising against Manzhou rule and forming a Chinese republican government. It planned its first anti-Qing action in Guangzhou for October 26, 1895, jointly with the anti-Manzhou secret Heaven and Earth Society, whose membership consisted of peasants, artisans, urban petty bourgeois, and the Chinese landowners in the southern seaboard provinces opposed to the Qing government. After the failure of the rising, on account of the absence of links with the masses, Sun Yat-sen and his supporters emigrated and continued uniting revolutionaries and preparing for another armed action in China.

Extant documents about the first revolutionary action by Sun Yat-sen and his supporters tell the story of the formation of a revolutionary-democratic opposition to Qing rule among the new Chinese bourgeoisie. Borrowing the popular slogan of "Down with the Qings!" current among the millions of Chinese peasants, the Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries complemented it with two others: "Restoration of state sovereignty" and "Formation of a democratic government". They went much further than many of the secret societies with their traditional royalist call for the restoration of the Mings or with their utopian egalitarian ideals (Taipings) demanding the abolition of the feudal monarchy, the proclamation of a bourgeois republic, and the enforcement of some anti-feudal economic reforms. The anti-Manzhou programme of the Chinese bourgeois democrats was not an end in itself but only the point of departure for the subsequent struggle against the semi-feudal and semi-colonial social system.[59]

The Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries wanted a phased attainment of the aims of the national movement—first the overthrow of the Manzhous and then the retrieval of forfeited rights and sovereignty. This accounted for the weakness and failure of the Xinhai revolution. However, from the outset Sun Yat-sen and his supporters realised that the Qing court had close links with imperialist powers. One of them, Zhang Taiyan, wrote in 1902 that "if we do not drive the Manzhous out we shall ultimately become slaves of Europe and America".[60] Another bourgeois revolutionary, Ou Jujia, also writing in 1902, noted: "The Manzhou court is incapable of safeguarding China and its property against foreigners and does not let the people defend themselves."[61] The Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries saw the overthrow of Manzhou yoke as only the first, even if most essential, step in the struggle for their country's independence.

The large sections of liberal Chinese landowners of the southern, central, and eastern provinces and members of the new Chinese national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, who were involved in the movement for reforms in 1895-1898, also could not but determine their attitude towards the Manzhou court. But unlike the Chinese working masses and the revolutionary democrats grouped around Sun Yat-sen, the Party of Reform adopted a less resolute and consistent stand on this question.[62] In turn, under the impact of the socio-economic processes at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries and the influence of the Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries from Sun Yat-sen's United League and the left-wing reformers (of Tai Caichang's Army of Independence), the traditional anti-Manzhou call of the secret societies, "Bring down the Qings, restore the Mings!", began to undergo some modification and acquire new demands. But five years before the Xinhai revolution, in 1906, the call "Down with the Manzhous!" was still strong enough to bring tens of thousands of members of secret societies of the districts of Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces into an unequal life-and-death struggle with government troops.[63]

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[59] See L. N. Borokh, "Anti-Manzhou Ideas of the First Chinese Bourgeois Revolutionaries (Lu Haodong Confession)" in this volume.

[60] See A. M. Grigoryev, op. cit., p. 66.

[61] Ibid., p. 65.

[62] The attitude of the reformers to Manzhou rule in China is discussed in detail in S. L. Tikhvinsky, "Manzhou Rule in China at the Close of the 19th Century and the Party of Reform", *Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Orientalists,* Vol. V, Moscow, 1963, pp. 83-89 (in Russian); S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The Reform Movement in China and Kang Youwei,* Moscow, 1959 (in Rus-

But as the character of Manzhou rule changed, so did the forms of resistance to it by the Chinese masses and other peoples of the Qing empire. As Lenin put it in 1908, the old-style Chinese revolts were developing into a conscious democratic movement.[64] In various forms the patriotic struggle against the foreign invaders never ceased throughout the 267 years of their domination.

The Manzhou rulers disregarded the powerful protests resounding throughout the nation, clinging tenaciously to their predominant position. In May 1911 the Qing court formed a new government, of whose 13 members eight were Manzhou aristocrats. The Manzhous controlled all the key ministries: of war, finance, navy, agriculture, industry and commerce, internal affairs, and others.[65]

On the eve of the revolution of 1911 Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese revolutionary democrats, members of the United League and other bourgeois-revolutionary organisations, were active among the population, clearing the ground for the revolutionary overthrow of Manzhou rule.

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sian); S. L. Tikhvinsky, "Tan Sitong, Leader of the Left Wing of the Reform Movement in China in 1898", *Sovetskoye kitayevedeniye,* 1958, No. 3, pp. 59-71.

[63] See A. S. Kostyaeva, "The 'Down with the Qing!' Slogan in the Pingxiang Uprising of 1906" in this volume.

[64] See V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works,* Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 185.

[65] See Y. V. Chudodeyev, "The Bourgeois-Liberal Camp on the Eve of the Xinhai Revolution (The Constitutional-Monarchic Movement of 1909-1911 in China", in *The Xinhai Revolution in China,* Moscow, 1962, p. 187 (in Russian).

There is passionate, stigmatising criticism of the Qings in all of Sun Yat-sen's documents and articles, beginning with the 1894 Declaration of the Revive China Society and up to his declaration when he assumed the office of interim President of the Republic in January 1912.[66]

In the pamphlet "A Genuine Solution of the Chinese Problem", written during the Russo-Japanese War, Sun Yat-sen brought the following 11 charges against the Qing government: "1. The administrative measures of the Manzhous are carried out exclusively in their own selfish interests and by no means in the interests of the people ruled by them. 2. They are inhibiting our cultural and material development. 3. They treat us as a conquered nation, denying us equal rights and privileges with themselves. 4. They are trampling our right to existence, our right to freedom, and our right to own property. 5. They engage in bribery and corruption and encourage the bureaucracy to act in the same way. 6. They suppress freedom of speech. 7. They forbid freedom of organisation. 8. They impose heavy taxes and dues without the consent of our country. 9. When people are interrogated recourse is made to the most barbarous tortures and beatings to elicit evidence. 10. They strip us of all rights, not being guided by the laws. 11. They are unable to give effective protection to the life and property of the population ruled by them."[67]

In the innumerable appeals and pamphlets of other Chinese revolutionaries of the period of the preparations for and during the Xinhai revolution there is a similarly sharp denunciation of the Qing regime.

In the Declaration of the League of Universal Progress,[68] published in 1911 by the anti-Manzhou bourgeois revolutionary organisation of the middle basin of the Yangzi River, there is withering criticism of the Manzhou rulers and their policy in China from the moment of the Manzhou invasion, when they mercilessly massacred Chinese ("mountains of corpses lay about, a sea of blood was shed, the Manzhous raped, robbed ... the Manzhou emperor turned the survivors into slaves, atrociously tormenting them") up to the contemporary situation in the Qing empire ("They are eating and clothing themselves at our expense... The Manzhous send greedy officials, who take all our money, earned by exhausting labour ... unlawfully imprison people and break their lives"). The Declaration accused the Manzhous of conspiring with foreign powers and betraying China's national interests ("The Manzhous ingratiate themselves only with foreigners, have themselves become slaves of foreigners, and have made us slaves of slaves. Today they give our land to some foreigners, and tomorrow to others ... they keep paying indemnities to foreigners, giving them railways, presenting them with mines, and turning over the customs to them... If we do not drive out the Manzhous in good time, within a few years the whole of our China will be in the hands of foreigners").

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[66] See Sun Yat-sen, *Selected Works,* Moscow, 1964, pp. 64-136 (Russian translation).

[67] Sun Yat-sen, *Selected Works,* Beijing, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 60.

[68] "Gongjinhui xuanyanshu (Declaration of the League of Universal Progress)", *Jindaishi ziliao,* 1957, No. 2, pp. 94-98.

There is angry denunciation of Manzhou rule in documents published in October and November 1911 (i.e., soon after the outbreak of the Xinhai revolution) by various revolutionary provincial governments in China that proclaimed their independence of the Qing government and declared war on it. For instance, the Address to the Nation adopted at Wuchang by the military government of the Hubei Province, contains a long list of crimes committed by the Manzhou rulers from the moment they conquered China. Although the tenor of this and other analogous documents was bourgeois-nationalist and even feudal-chauvinistic, contemptibly hostile to everything foreign, non-Chinese, they objectively mirrored the patriotic feelings of the millions-strong Chinese people. The Address, for instance, stated in part:

"The Manzhous are savage Nüzhen nomad tribes... their ways are bestial, and they have no notion whatever of how relations between people should be shaped. While at first they raided our border lands, took our people captive, and pillaged our homes, later, envying our wealth and taking a liking for our luxury, they began thinking of conquering our country and seizing the imperial throne. They realised that barbarians cannot govern a civilised people, that savage tribes cannot establish their dominion over China, that a numerically small people cannot rule a numerically large nation. Therefore, as soon as they penetrated China they began their ruthless killing and destruction of everybody and everything standing in their way, hoping to intimidate the people and thereby assert their domination. Neither the young nor the old, neither men nor women, nobody in all the 18 provinces could feel safe, and anyone could be killed and his family destroyed. The chronicles tell us of the horrible massacres in, for example, Yangzhou, Jiangyin, and Jiading. The Manzhous compelled us to stop wearing our comfortable clothes so that in spirit and appearance we should resemble animals, while our cultural traditions, our mores and customs, handed down from one generation to another, were trampled under foot. It was then that they burned books, changed their texts, introduced a harsh censorship, and innocent people were called to account; base words and flattery were esteemed as the sermons of sages, while humility before the enemy and abetment of brigands were the norm of behaviour. The purpose was that book wisdom of this kind should make people forget their ancestors. Thus, the Manzhous not only destroyed the Chinese physically but poisoned their minds and crushed their customs."

Condemning the Qing court for its refusal to enforce reforms that could take the country out of backwardness, the Address laid bare the anti-people nature of the Qing regime.

"A hungry people, neglected fields, and everywhere groans and cries of the poor for help. Who if not the Manzhous have deprived people of everything and pushed them to the verge of death ? And they still dare to say brazenly: 'It is better to give China to friendly powers than to the Chinese people'; one day foreigners are being given land, the next they are given cities; one day mines, the next day railways are sold." [69]

Manzhou rule was condemned in impassioned terms in a telegram sent to the Qing government on the third day of the uprising, October 12, 1911, by the command of the revolutionary troops. [70] The telegram lauded Chinese patriots of the period of struggle against the Manzhou invasion (Shi Kefa, Huang Daozhou), patriotic scholars (Gu Tinglin, Huang Lizhou, and Wang Fuzhi), and the Taiping leaders Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing, and strongly condemned the butchers of the Taiping uprising, leaders of the Chinese feudal estate who saved the Qing regime in the 1860s—Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, and Luo Bingzhang.

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[69] *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. V, 1957, pp. 136-37 (in Russian).

[70] Ibid., "Telegram From Li Yuanhong to the Manzhou Government", pp. 149-52.

Because the young, numerically small, and economically and politically weak Chinese bourgeoisie was unable to tackle anti-feudal and anti-colonial tasks, the Xinhai revolution of 1911-1912 was aimed mainly at overthrowing the Qing monarchy.[71]

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Now a brief survey of some aspects of the foreign policy pursued by the Qings in different periods.

As soon as they established themselves in China the Qings began suppressing resistance from the peoples subjugated by them and pursuing a policy of aggression against neighbouring countries.

Until the mid-1670s the fortress of Ningguta, in the northeast of present-day China, was the main outpost of the Qing empire. Relying on this fortress they went to all lengths to win over the local Tungus tribes and enlist the able-bodied men of these tribes into their banner corps. When Russian colonisation of the Amur region commenced, the emperor Kangxi feared for his ancestral lands in the southern and central parts of the huge Manzhou plain. After the Manzhou conquest of China these lands remained not only without protection but also virtually without a population (the bulk of the Manzhous had moved to Beijing and other Chinese cities garrisoned by bannermen while Chinese were not permitted to settle on Manzhou tribal land).[72] The emperor initiated steps to prevent the

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[71] See Y. A. Belov, "The Xinhai Revolution and the Question of Struggle Against the Manzhous" in this volume. Various aspects of the preparations for and the actual revolution are examined in a book entitled *The Xinhai Revolution in China,* Moscow, 1962 (in Russian).

[72] In 1668 northern and central Manzhou were officially closed to Chinese colonisation. (see John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, op. cit., pp. 365-66).

Chinese colonisation of Manzhou began only in the last decade of the nineteenth century, when the Manzhou government lifted the restrictions. In the first half of the seventeenth century, on the eve of the Manzhou invasion of China, between one-fourth advance of Russian settlers and for this purpose, in 1676, he moved the headquarters of the Ningguta warlord to the southwest, to the small fortified settlement of Girin (Jilin), whose construction had been started in 1674. Kangxi turned Girin into the main springboard for a military campaign against Russian possessions on the Amur.

In Girin the Manzhous constructed a shipyard, stored large quantities of weapons and food, and stationed a large garrison. Nonetheless, in the 1680s-1690s the Ningguta area and the small town of Girin with the adjoining territory were not incorporated in the Qing empire as an administrative-territorial unit. They were far to the north of the Qing empire's fortified border line in Manzhou, a border line built in 1678 and called the Willow Stockade after the young willow stakes planted along the frontier; in many sectors these stakes soon formed a solid wall of verdure. The territory beyond the Willow Stockade was regarded as external and special permission and passes were required to enter it.

At the time the Qing government had no trustworthy information about the geography of these external territories or about the tribes inhabiting them. Throughout the 1680s the Qing government conducted extensive surveys of these territories as part of its preparations for an attack on Albazin and other Russian settlements on the Amur. The information gathered by it allowed it to concentrate and send a large force against Albazin which was the main Russian town on the Amur. The repeated long sieges and, on two occasions, the destruction of this town did not stop Russian colonisation of the territory. Every time the town was ravaged the Russian Cossacks and settlers returned, rebuilt it, and extended their farmland. It was only under the 1689 Peace Treaty of Nerchinsk, imposed upon Russia by force of arms, that Albazin and other Russian settlements on the Amur were abandoned by their inhabitants and Russian colonisation of the Amur region and the maritime

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and one-third of the territory of modern Manzhou (Dongbei) was inhabited by Mongol tribes, but during the first 30 years of the nineteenth century most of these Mongol lands were taken over by Chinese settlers (See Owen Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers. 1928-1958,* Mouton and Co., Paris-The Hague, 1962, pp. 308-12, 325).

territory was halted for more than 150 years.[73] After the Nerchinsk Peace Treaty was signed, the Qing rulers lost all interest in developing the wild taiga territory.[74] They maintained small garrisons at only two points: Meergen and Qiqihar. In the mid-nineteenth century, the development of the Amur territory, begun by Russian settlers, was continued when the second wave of massive Russian colonisation reached the Far East.[75]

One of the main preoccupations of the first Manzhou rulers was to prevent tribal unions from being formed on the frontiers of conquered territories and challenging their supremacy. To this end they incited some tribes against others and after the sides had significantly weakened each other acted as arbiters.[76]

After the Manzhous came to power in China, the Oirat state (nomad herders) remained the only Mongol feudal principality that continued to deny allegiance to the Qings.

The striving of the Oirat feudal lords to preserve the political independence of the country motivated their anti-Qing foreign policy, which to no little extent was inspired by some influential Tibetan Lamaist dignitaries. Kangxi had no intention of permitting the formation of a united Mongolia under the aegis of Junggar princes or the Dalai-lama of Tibet. He backed the separatist ambitions of the Mongolian princes of Halha and prepared to carry out the expansionist plans of the Manzhou and Chinese feudal lords hungering for possession of the whole of Mongolia. In the Qing war against the Junggar Khan Galdang in 1690-1697 Kangxi used nearly 400.000 troops and all the artillery his empire could muster. Halha was incorporated in the empire, but fighting continued for the next

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[73] Manzhou development of northwest and north Manzhou in connection with the campaigns against the Russian settlements on the Amur is discussed by G. V. Melikhov, "Manzhou Penetration Into the Basin of the Upper Amur in the 1680s" in this volume.

[74] Characterising Kangxi's foreign policy, the American historian John Fairbank writes that the "K'ang-hsi Emperor's aim ... was not only to eject the Russians from the Amur but also, and primarily, to forestall the growth of their influence among the Tungus tribes and the Mongols" (John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, op. cit., p. 46).

[75] Russian colonisation in the Far East is described in V. M. Khvostov, "The Chinese 'Count Bill' and the Facts of History", *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, No. 10, 1964, pp. 21-27.

[76] Owen Lattimore, op. cit., p. 184.

60 years and more, ending with the destruction of the Junggar Khanate and the seizure of its territory. The Qing troops "wiped the Oirat state from the face of the earth and consummated their victory with the physical annihilation of hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants".[77]

All sources agree that the massacre of the Oirat population was conducted methodically by the Qing army. According to one chronicle, "all the people and livestock were slaughtered: nobody was taken prisoner". Of a nation of at least 600,000, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 survivors, who fled to Russia.[78]

In 1639, before their conquest of China, the Manzhous established relations with the supreme feudal rulers of Tibet—the Dalai-lama and the Panchen-lama. On the invitation of the Manzhou emperor the 5th Dalai-lama went to Beijing in 1652, where an attempt was made to use him to influence the Lamaist Mongol princes of Halha. In 1654, through the offices of the Dalai-lama, the Qings got the support of the Khuoshut Mongols in suppressing an anti-Manzhou uprising of the Muslim population of Gansu province, while in 1667 the Dalai-lama persuaded the Mongols settled along the frontier of Qing China and engaged in farming to return to the steppe. However, in the 1670s, after the Junggar Khanate of the Oirats had gained strength, the Tibetan clergy began supporting the idea of uniting the Mongol tribes under the aegis of the Oirats.

After Mongolia's final subjugation by the Manzhous Lhasa could no longer inspire the anti-Qing struggle of the Mongols. Tibet itself was soon incorporated in the Qing empire.

The question of what motivated the expansion of Qing feudalism, what prompted Manzhou-Chinese rulers of China to conquer new countries was raised and answered on the example of Eastern Turkestan by the Soviet historian L. I. Duman as early as the mid-1930s.[79] He was the first to draw attention to the factors that operated in the Qing empire itself—the development of feudal relations, the feudal economy of that period, the further aggravation of class and ethnic contradictions, and so on. He attributed the wars fought by the Qings to the relative over-population resulting from the concentration of land in the hands of the feudal bureaucracy and big landowners and the landlessness of the Chinese peasants. These difficulties were partially overcome by colonisation, through the annexation of more countries. Moreover, wars of conquest were a means of diverting the revolutionary peasants from the class struggle and delaying the eruption of social protest—the anti-feudal war. A factor of no little significance was the striving of the Manzhou-Chinese artistocracy to obtain a surplus product by pillaging the working population of conquered countries.

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[77] I. Y. Zlatkin, *A History of the Junggar Khanate,* p. 425.

[78] Ibid., p. 462.

[79] See L. I. Duman, op. cit., pp. 57-70. For this volume L. I. Duman wrote an article headed "The Qing Conquest of Junggar and Eastern Turkestan".

The brutal aggressive policy of the Qings, their endless wars of conquest against neighbouring peoples, and their merciless destruction of villages, towns, and these peoples themselves triggered off repeated risings of the population forcibly incorporated in the Qing empire.[80]

One of these was the anti-Qing rising of the Muslim population of Gansu in 1781-1784. It was crushed with unprecedented cruelty by the Manzhou general Fukanan.

The Chinese historian Professor Shang Yue writes that "the conquests of the Manzhous reached their peak at the close of the eighteenth century, definitively forming the vast territory of multi-ethnic China. But on account of the backwardness and brutality of the Manzhou rulers the conquest of different nationalities brought with it the destruction of industry and productive forces, national oppression, and exploitation. These conquests laid waste to peoples and ethnic minorities materially and culturally, and thereby plunged them into stagnation or delayed their development... But regardless of nationality, the subjugated peoples relentlessly fought the Manzhou tyranny."[81]

Many insurgent actions of non-Han peoples of the Qing empire (Miao, Huai, Zhong, Tong, Yizu, Tai, and others) took place in the period from 1847 to 1876 almost simultaneously with the Taiping peasant war and the Nianjun uprising and were precipitated by the same socio-economic factors as the above-mentioned movements of the oppressed Chinese peasantry.

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[80] See A. S. Martynov, "Some Aspects of Qing Policy in Tibet at the Close of the 18th Century (Pre-History of the Manzhou Invasion of Nepal in 1792)" in this volume.

[81] *Essays on the History of China.* Edited by Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959, p. 560 (Russian translation).

K. A. Skachkov wrote of the anti-Qing rising of Donggan Muslims in Northwest China in the mid-1860s: "I believe that in rising against the Manzhous the Donggans were motivated not by religious fanaticism but by the same reasons that had in the course of the previous fourteen years been motivating the Chinese in all the provinces of their vast empire—the general disaffection with the privileges and greed of the Manzhous."[82]

The Qing emperors fought wars of conquest against Burma (1767-1769, 1788) and Vietnam (1788-1789). These wars ended in the defeat and expulsion of the Qing invaders.[83]

The anniversary of the defeat of the invaders is to this day marked as a national holiday in these countries. Thus, on January 24, 1966, when the people's war against US aggression was at its height, the Administrative Committee of Hanoi and the Hanoi Committee of the Fatherland Front of Vietnam celebrated the 177th anniversary of the victory won over the Manzhous by the Vietnamese army and people in 1789 under the leadership of Nguen Hue. At these celebrations Nguen Bak, head of the cultural service in Hanoi, said that nearly 200 years previously the Vietnamese army faced an invasion force 20 times larger and won one of the most glorious victories in history.

Long before the mid-nineteenth century, in other words, at an early stage of their rule in China the Manzhous used foreign missionaries and even enlisted foreign armed forces to fight Chinese patriots. In 1683 Kangxi's troops captured one of the last centres of resistance to the Manzhous, the island of Taiwan, only when they were assisted by Dutch warships.[84] Until the beginning of the eighteenth century Jesuit priests were privy counsellors to Kangxi, advising him on artillery, astronomy, and mathematics, making translations from foreign languages, and helping to conduct affairs with other nations. The Portuguese Jesuit Thomas Pereira and the French Jesuit Gerbillon acted as interpreters and secretaries of the Qing delegation at the talks in Nerchinsk.

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[82] K. A. Skachkov, op. cit., p. 29.

[83] See I. A. Ognetov, "A Glorious Page in Vietnam's Struggle for Independence" in this volume.

[84] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, *A History of East Asian Civilization*. Vol. 1, *East Asia. The Great Tradition,* Haughton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1960, p. 354.

Soon after bringing the whole of China under their rule the Qings started to pursue a policy of isolating the nation from the external world, forcibly cutting short the rich sea and overland trade links that China had maintained for a long time with countries in the Far East, Southeast and South Asia, and Africa. One port in South China was designated for trade with Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British, French, and American merchants, and all commerce with them was conducted through the Cohong, a semi-governmental monopoly association of merchants. Trade with Russia was conducted by caravan across Mongolia and was likewsie strictly regulated by the Qing government.

The Chinese historian Hu Sheng writes that it was not fear of invasion by aggressive capitalist states that motivated China's isolation from the rest of the world. Until the first "opium war" the Qing government had no idea of the strength of the foreign powers. The point is that throughout Chinese feudal history every foreign invasion coincided with internal disturbances. The Manzhous had themselves invaded China when it was being shaken by the disturbances of the period of Ming decline. Hence the Qings' anxiety to forestall any invasion of China. Measures to this end were intensified, especially when their rule began to totter,[85] i.e., in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

In foreign policy the Qing government yielded ground to powers seeking to penetrate China economically. It took no steps to halt the British and American contraband opium trade in South China. The official appointed to combat this trade, a Chinese patriot named Lin Zexu, was removed from office for trying to take effective measures to stop the smuggling of opium into China, while the war with Britain (1840-1842) that followed demonstrated the Qing government's inability to organise the nation's defence and repulse a numerically small enemy force. Under the Nanjing (Nanking) Peace Treaty the British obtained the use of five Chinese ports, received a large indemnity, and seized Xianggang (Hong Kong). France, the USA, and other capitalist countries were not long in following Britain's example and signed analogous treaties with the Qing government.

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[85] Hu Sheng, *Aggression by Imperialist Powers in China,* Moscow, 1951, p. 21 (Russian translation).

Nor was the Qing court able to protect the empire against further aggression by capitalist Britain and France in 1856-1858 and 1859-1860. Moreover, brought to the brink of collapse by the Taiping uprising the Manzhou government remained in power in 1860-1864 largely as a result of support from the Chinese feudal-landowner camp led by Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, and others, and the active assistance of Britain, France, and the USA, who supplied arms and ammunition, and whose warships and armed forces joined in the civil war in China on the side of the government.

After the Taiping uprising was crushed, the Manzhou government, which had signed treaties with Western capitalist powers in 1842-1844, 1858, and 1860, continued its capitulatory foreign policy, reconciling itself to the aggressive actions of these powers, the expansion of foreigners' trade and missionary activity. The Chinese people responded to the actions of the foreign aggressors and their agents with spontaneous anti-foreign risings, which were brutally suppressed by the authorities. After its harsh treatment, on France's insistence, of the inhabitants of Tianjing for rising in 1870 against the wrongdoing of French missionaries and the French consul, the Qing government sought, in February 1871, to come to terms with foreign powers on a purely formal regulation of foreign missionary activity in China.[86]

The Manzhou policy of capitulation was seen strikingly in the war with France in 1883-1884, when, despite the defeat suffered by the French invaders in Vietnam from Vietnamese partisans and Chinese army units under Chen Yuying and Fen Zicai, the Qings made haste to sign a humiliating peace with France, fearing a mass patriotic movement of the Chinese people.[87]

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[86] See A. A. Monina, "The 'Missionary Question' in Qing Policy" in this volume.

[87] See M. S. Korsunskaya, "Qing Capitulatory Policy in the Franco-Chinese War of 1883-1885" in this volume. The anti-people foreign policy of the Qing government at the close of the nineteenth century is depicted vividly and in detail in G. V. Yefimov, *China's Foreign Policy (1894-1899)*, Moscow, 1958 (in Russian).

The Manzhou-Chinese alliance with Western colonial powers, an alliance formed during the suppression of the Taiping uprising in 1860-1864, was cemented in 1900-1901 when troops of eight powers helped to crush the Yihetuan (Boxer) anti-imperialist and anti-feudal rebellion.

Towards the close of the first decade of the twentieth century 100 towns, ports, and wharves in the Qing empire had been opened for unhindered trade of foreign capitalists. In the Qing customs service 1,378 key posts were held by foreigners. For more than 50 years after 1860 the Qing monarchy remained in power only with foreign support; foreign capitalists strove to keep it in power "in the interest of stability and order", to quote the American historian Knight Biggerstaff.[88] The Qing regime suited the imperialists, for it personified the alliance of the Manzhou-Chinese feudal reaction with the colonial-compradore elements that was giving Western powers a free hand to oppress the people inhabiting the Qing empire.[89]

At the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth spokesmen of the main trends of the Chinese people's struggle against the Manzhous distinctly saw and criticised the Qing government's policy of capitulating to foreign capitalists and its betrayal of the nation's interests. This policy was one of the principal factors that created the revolutionary situation in China in 1911.

The sharp contradictions between the imperialist powers on the eve of the First World War were the sole obstacle to the formation of a united imperialist action front against the impending Chinese revolution. When the Wuchang rising started, the foreign consuls at Hankou had impressive naval and infantry forces at their disposal but failed to agree on using them against the revolutionaries although a few days before the rising the consular corps had informed the local Manzhou governor that foreign intelligence was in possession of information that a rising was being prepared in Wuchang. In Beijing, too, there was no consensus in the diplomatic corps on supporting the Qing government: frightened by the rapid spread of the rising throughout the whole of China, the powers finally decided to sacrifice the corrupt Qing dynasty and support a "strong man"—General Yuan Shikai—who had close links with imperialist powers and compradore circles.

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[88] Knight Biggerstaff, op. cit., p. 4.

[89] Various aspects of Qing capitulatory foreign policy are considered in: A. L. Narochnitsky, *Colonialist Policy of the Capitalist Powers in the Far East, 1860-1895,* Moscow, 1956; G. V. Yefimov, *China's Foreign Policy (1894-1899),* Moscow, 1958; *International Relations in the Far East (1840-1949)*, 2nd printing, Moscow, 1956; B. A. Romanov, *Russia in Manzhou,* Leningrad, 1928; A. S. Yerusalimsky, "German Imperialism and the Diplomatic Preparations for International Intervention in China in 1900", *Narody Azii i Afriki,* No. 4, 1961; S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yat-sen: Foreign Policy Views and Practice (From the History of the National Liberation Struggle of the Chinese People, 1885-1925),* Moscow, 1964; R. M. Brodsky, *US Expansion in Northeast China, 1898-1905,* Lvov, 1965 (all in Russian).

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For an overall characteristic of the Manzhou conquest of China one can apply the words of Frederick Engels, who wrote in *Anti-Dühring* that after political power becomes independent of society and turns from its servant into its master, it has two options before it.

If it acts in the spirit and direction of law-governed economic development, there will be no conflict between it and this development, which will proceed faster. However, if it acts contrary to this development it will, with few exceptions, come under pressure of economic development. "*These few exceptions are isolated cases of conquest, in which the more barbarian conquerors exterminated or drove out the population of a country and laid waste or allowed to go to ruin productive forces which they did not know how to use...*" (my italics.—*S.T.*).

"Every conquest by a more barbarian people disturbs of course the economic development and destroys numerous productive forces. But in the immense majority of cases where the conquest is permanent, the more barbarian conqueror has to adapt himself to the higher 'economic situation' as it emerges from the conquest; he is assimilated by the vanquished and in most cases he has even to adopt their language." [90]

After the first 40 years, when there was ceaseless heavy fighting with Chinese patriotic forces, a period of relative political stability set in, lasting roughly from 1684 to the

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[90] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring,* Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 224.

1770s. The Manzhou rulers Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong had to give serious attention to restoring the economy that had been laid waste by long and devastating hostilities. But the decay and decline of the Manzhou regime commenced as early as the 1770s.

Marx offered some keen observations about the political regime in the China of his day. For instance, in the article "Revolution in China and in Europe", published in the *New York Daily Tribune* on June 14, 1853, he wrote of the social factors causing the "chronic rebellions subsisting in China for about ten years past" and manifesting themselves in "religious, dynastic, or national shape", and noted that "complete isolation was the prime condition of the preservation of Old China". He drew attention to the fact that "the hatred against foreigners and their exclusion from the Empire, once the mere result of China's geographical and ethnographical situation, have become a political system only since the conquest of the country by the race of the Manchu Tartars". Explaining the reasons for the isolationist policy adopted by the Manzhou government in its relations with the West, Marx wrote: "There can be no doubt that the turbulent dissensions among the European nations who, at the later end of the 17th century, rivaled each other in the trade with China, lent a mighty aid to the exclusive policy adopted by the Manchus. But more than this was done by the fear of the new dynasty, lest the foreigners might favor the discontent existing among a large proportion of the Chinese during the first half century or thereabouts of their subjection to the Tartars."[91]

The same article offers an extremely interesting comparison of Manzhou policy with that of the Hapsburgs in Austria-Hungary. Citing from an imperial edict of January 5, 1833 to the viceroys of the southern provinces on a deferment of taxes, composed of hypocritical rhetoric about the throne's concern for the welfare of the people, Marx noted that "such language and such concessions" were evocative of what was "heard from Austria, the China of Germany, in 1848". This comparison of the multinational

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[91] Karl Marx, "Revolution in China and in Europe", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works,* Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 93, 95, 98.

Qing empire with the multinational Austrian empire of the period of revolutionary actions by peoples oppressed by the Hapsburgs gives a profound insight into the reactionary character of Manzhou rule in China.

Lenin, too, vividly characterised the socio-political and economic system of China in the final period of Qing rule.

In his very first work devoted to China, "The War in China", published in the first issue of *Iskra* (December 1900), he gave a scathing characteristic of the Qing government, writing that like the Russian people the Chinese "suffer from an Asiatic government that squeezes taxes from the starving peasantry and that suppresses every aspiration towards liberty by military force".[92]

In "Democracy and Narodism in China", written in June 1912, he characterised Chinese society on the eve of the Xinhai revolution and the Qing emperor in the following words: "But the *objective* conditions of China, a backward, agricultural, semi-feudal country numbering nearly 500 million people, place on the order of the day only one specific, historically distinctive form of this oppression and exploitation, namely, feudalism. Feudalism was based on the predominance of agriculture and natural economy. The source of the feudal exploitation of the Chinese peasant was his *attachment* to the land in some form. The political exponents of this exploitation were the feudal lords, all together and individually, with the emperor as the head of the whole system."[93]

Chinese history of the Qing period attracts the close attention of historians in many countries.

An indication of the serious research being conducted by Soviet historians and Sinologists into modern Chinese history is the appearance, after 1949, of many studies, books, and articles, and also translations of Chinese works and documents.[94]

Modern history of China, especially aspects of Manzhou rule, is receiving considerable attention from historians in the People's Republic of China as well.

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[92] V. I. Lenin, "The War in China", *Collected Works,* Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 377.

[93] V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works,* Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 166.

[94] Books and articles by Soviet scientists on this subject published prior to 1957 are listed in P. Y. Skachkov's fundamental bibliographical work, *A Bibliography of China,* Moscow, 1960. Supplement No. 2 to this volume contains a brief bibliography of works by Soviet historians on the Qing period of China.

In the 1950s, Chinese historians were unanimously of the view that Manzhou rule in China was a period of brutal national oppression of the peoples inhabiting that country. One of them, a Marxist and eminent Chinese scholar, Fan Wenlan wrote:

"The Manzhous, who ruled China, were negligible numerically and backward economically and culturally. In order to rule the more advanced Chinese people they united with the small elite of Chinese and other feudal lords against the Chinese and other peoples inhabiting China. They used the contradictions between and in the different nationalities and kindled ethnic discord. For a fairly long period, beginning with the mid-seventeenth century, Manzhou oppression and the struggle of the peoples, the Chinese people in the first place, against this policy were the most significant factors in China's political life."[95]

Dong Jiming (Tung Chi-ming), another Chinese historian, wrote in *An Outline History of China* (which has had several printings and been translated into the English language by the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing in 1959 in the China Knowledge Series): "The Manchus over the whole period of the dynasty were oppressive towards the national minorities and ruthless against those who criticized the regime."[96]

In *Essays on the History of China* (edited by Professor Shang Yue), a book that has had several printings in the People's Republic of China, it is stated that after overrunning North China "the Manzhous fortified their hold by fire and sword".[97] "Many big cities in South China were almost entirely reduced to ruins by the Qing troops, whose rule was 'kill those who surrender and those who don't', pillaging, burning, and massacring as they went. Flourishing cities in South China, cities that had taken the Chinese people thousands of years to build, were sacked and vandalised in this war of unsurpassed brutality."[98] The Manzhous held up China's economic development, turned the Qing empire into a prison of the peoples inhabiting it,[99] pursued a savage policy of suppressing the creative initiative of the Chinese people in political and cultural life, and fought sanguinary wars to subjugate Mongols, Uigurs, Tibetans, and the ethnic minorities in Southwest China. "The military campaigns of the Manzhous had a shaky foundation... These were predatory wars and wars of extermination. The complexity and sharpness of national and class contradictions in the period of Manzhou rule made that rule unstable."[100]

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[95] Fan Wenlan, *China's Modern History*, Vol. 1, *1840-1901*, Moscow, 1955, p. 13 (Russian translation).

[96] Tung Chi-ming, *An Outline History of China*, China Knowledge Series, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1959, p. 198.

[97] *Essays on the History of China*, p. 499.

[98] Ibid., pp. 507-08.

Many American Sinologists have studied the Manzhou period of Chinese history. They include John K. Fairbank, Luther Carrington Goodrich, Owen Lattimore, M. Wright, Knight Biggerstaff, S. Y. Têng, Ho Ping-ti, Hellmut Wilhelm, Franz Michael, Feuerwerker, and Stanley Spector. In Britain Qing legislation has been researched by Sybille von der Sprenkel. Of Japanese Sinologists specialising in Qing foreign policy mention must be made of Masataka Banno. Professor C. P. Fitzgerald of Australia has written on various aspects of Manzhou rule.

Let us briefly consider some issues that we feel have been wrongly interpreted and assessed in bourgeois historiography of the Qing period.

1. Ignoring of Manzhou-Chinese ethnic contradictions. In *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* by the American historian Franz Michael the idea is advanced that "the majority of the 'Manchus' at the very time when they moved into China were racially of Chinese stock"[101] and the "ideological fight between the Chinese revolutionists of 1911 and the Manchu dynasty was therefore not so much a struggle between Chinese and alien conquerors, as it was a clash between the forerunners of a modern Chinese national state and the representatives of the old Chinese Confucian tradition".[102]

The task facing the Manzhou tribes in the early seventeenth century was, in Michael's view, "to blend their own organization with that of the Chinese state, attach the Mongols to it and thus form a unit of the three peoples of Manchuria".[103]

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[99] Ibid., p. 511.

[100] Ibid., p. 561.

[101] Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China. Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1942, p. 9.

[102] Ibid., p. 10.

Michael's book was published during the war in the Pacific and its social aim was to expose Japanese aggression in Asia and the Pacific and prove that the puppet state of Manzhou diguo in Northeast China, formed by the Japanese military with the help of the Manzhou aristocracy, and, notably, the last emperor Pu Yi, was an inalienable part of China. Carried away by his task Michael makes the unsubstantiated assertion that the Manzhous were actually Chinese. True, at the end of the book he had to concede that the "Manchus never became completely absorbed into the Chinese culture. They remained the privileged group of conquerors."[104]

Professor John K. Fairbank's two-volume history of East Asian civilisation studiously avoids the problem of Manzhou-Chinese ethnic contradictions and only in its concluding lines admits that the "Ch'ing regime vigorously suppressed racist-nationalist sentiment" and that the Manzhous "could not afford to mobilize the Chinese people for participation in political life lest the dynasty become more obviously alien and dispensable and be rejected".[105]

2. Idealisation of Manzhou rule in China and the personalities of individual Manzhou emperors. The beginning for European idealisation of Manzhou rule and the personality of the Emperor Kangxi was laid by Jesuit missionaries in China, who played a significant part in the emperor's immediate entourage. Thus, Kangxi was described by the Jesuit Parennin as "one of the most extraordinary of men, such as one finds only once in several centuries".[106] Jesuit writings about China, circulated widely in various European countries in the seventeenth century, contained idealised descriptions of China and its rulers and idyllic pictures of a monolithic Confucian state. As a consequence, this slanted presentation gave Europeans a biassed impres-

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[103] Franz Michael, op. cit., p. 24.

[104] Ibid., p. 119.

[105] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, *A History of East Asian Civilization,* Vol. 2, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1965, p. 406.

[106] *The Legacy of China.* Edited by Raymond Dawson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, p. 12.

sion of the social system in that distant and isolated country. In their attacks on European absolutism and feudalism, European enlighteners often referred to China as a model of an enlightened monarchy, as a "state of sages", a notion they got from Jesuit books about Confucian China. Voltaire, for example, frequently used his invention about a Chinese "antithesis" to strike at French absolutism. He maintained that in China despotism existed only in form, whereas in fact it was an enlightened monarchy, that the Manzhou emperors of his day embodied the ideal of an enlightened monarch with an entourage of wise counsellors concerned about the welfare and prosperity of the people.

In subsequent centuries many Western scholars continued to be prone to idealise Chinese reality.[107] To quote Professor Raymond Dawson of Oxford University, this "idyllic and oversimplified view of China ignored or played down the bitterness of the Ming-Manchu conflict in the seventeenth century, the clash of different schools of thought within Confucianism, the wicked influence at court of powerful eunuchs, the pervasiveness of Buddhism, the evils of religious persecution, the recurrent demonstrations of dissatisfaction afforded by peasant rebellions, the cruel intolerance of the literary inquisitions, the absurdly stereotyped nature of the literary examinations, and the ill-treatment of minority peoples, to mention but a few corrupt and divisive features of Chinese society".[108]

Nor is the American Sinologist John K. Fairbank entirely free of idealistic notions about Manzhou rule. In the first volume of the above-mentioned work he writes that "the Chinese social, political and ideological systems had achieved under the Ch'ing a stability unparalleled at any time... in any country of the Occident".[109] But the Australian historian C. P. Fitzgerald justifiably notes that the outward splendour of the reigns of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong "concealed the inward decay of the Manchu power".[110]

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[107] The question of seventeenth-eighteenth century European assessments of various aspects of Chinese philosophy and China's state system under the Qings is dealt with at length in the chapter "China and European Enlightenment" in O. L. Fishman, *The Chinese Satirical Novel (The Epoch of Enlightenment)*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 139-68 (in Russian).

[108] *The Legacy of China*, pp. 13-14.

[109] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, op. cit., Vol. 1, *East Asia. The Great Tradition*, p. 672.

3. Non-recognition of the fact that the risings of Chinese peasants and the empire's non-Han peoples were a major factor in shaking the feudal foundations of Manzhou rule prior to the 1860s. In the introduction to *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army,* a book by the American historian Stanley Spector, Professor Franz Michael out of hand dismisses the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasants in the struggle against Qing feudal oppression in the mid-nineteenth century and maintains that the *shenshi* were a stabilising factor in China's history. He maintains that in the crisis situation (precipitated by the decline of the central power and by unrest directed against arbitrary rule) the *shenshi* were active in anti-government risings purely out of lofty motivations as distinct from the peasants, who were allegedly motivated by self-interest, "to profit from the conquest of empire",[111] in other words, to acquire a higher status in the hierarchal ladder under a new dynasty.

Michael casts slurs upon the struggle of the peasants, objecting even to the term "peasant rebellions" on the contention that all risings against local authorities were headed and directed by the *shenshi,* and that the peasants were no more than a spineless mass blindly following the *shenshi.*[112]

It is indicative that many American historians, taking their cue from Chinese feudal historiography, tag the labels "bandits", "brigands", "rioters", and so on to insurgent Chinese peasants.[113]

4. Belittlement of the role of capitalist powers in preserving Manzhou rule during the critical years of the Taiping and Yihetuan risings. In the above-mentioned work by Professor Fairbank there are attempts to scale down the contribution of capitalist powers to the preservation of

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[110] C. P. Fitzgerald, *China. A Short Cultural History,* The Cresset Press, London, 1950, p. 545.

[111] Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism,* University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964, p. XXXVII.

[112] See our review of Stanley Spector's book and Franz Michael's Introduction to it in the journal *Narody Azii i Afriki,* No. 6, 1965, pp. 180-85.

[113] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 354-55.

Manzhou rule in China. For instance, in Volume 2 he writes that "the real Western aid to the Ch'ing cause seems to have come less through the intervention of foreigners than through the Chinese leaders' own use of foreign trade revenues and of Western guns, ships, and training, in the spirit of 'self-strengthening'. We may conclude that the Manchu dynasty was saved by Chinese scholar-officials." [114] In the closing section of the book, where he writes of the foreign policy of the late Qings, Professor Fairbank notes that the "dynasty did indeed accommodate foreign interests so as to preserve itself. Western 'imperialism' should not get all the credit for its longevity." [115]

A noteworthy point is that this view is not shared by all American historians. One is Stanley Spector. In his monograph about Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang) he avoids the subject of his foreign policy views and practice but admits that Li Hongzhang collaborated closely with foreigners to suppress the Taipings, and that "during the first phase of the campaign in 1862 the British and French regulars and the Ever Victorious Army cleared the outskirts of Shang-hai and occupied strategic neighboring localities". [116]

The Qing regime received significant assistance from the British, French, and Americans during the Taiping uprising. An instance of this is that on May 26, 1860, responding to a request from the Qing authorities in Shanghai, the British envoy Sir Frederick Bruce and the French envoy Alphonse de Bourboulon issued identical statements to the effect that the British and French were determined to defend Shanghai against the Taipings and help the Qing authorities maintain order in the city.

On August 18, 1860, a combined British and French military force intervened openly in the civil war on the side of the Qing troops in the vicinity of Shanghai. At the talks in Nanjing in March 1861 the British Consul Parkes insisted that the Taipings should not enter Shanghai and other "treaty" ports and warned the Taiping leader Chen Yucheng that a Taiping offensive on Hankou would not be tolerated. British interference thwarted the second western campaign of the Taipings. In October 1861 a combined British and French force under the French Admiral Protet struck at *nianjun* units, cutting short their attempt to take the "treaty" port of Yantai in Shandong province. On February 21, 1862, British and French regular troops, acting jointly with mercenaries under Frederick Townsend Ward, perpetrated an act of open aggression by making a sudden attack on positions held by Taipings near Shanghai.

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[114] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, op. cit., p. 177.

[115] Ibid., p. 407.

[116] Stanley Spector, op. cit., p. 68.

On May 9, 1862, British and French warships bombarded the port of Ningbo, which was held by the Taipings, forcing the latter to evacuate the city.

According to the evidence of the Taiping military and political leaders Li Xiucheng and Hong Rengan, the defeat of the insurgent army at the final stage of the civil war was largely due to the foreign powers which openly supported the Manzhous.

K. A. Skachkov wrote about the massive British, French, and American assistance to the Qing regime in suppressing the Taiping uprising. [117]

This view is supported also by the eminent Russian scientist and civic personality D. I. Mendeleyev, who wrote in his notes headed *An Attempt to Understand the Events in China* that the Qing regime was assisted by "European mercenaries commanded by Charles George Gordon (and Li Hongchang)". [118]

Western historians variously, but mainly from idealistic positions, explain the causes of the relatively easy conquest of China by the Manzhous, their long rule, and the decline of the Manzhou empire that began at the close of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. C. P. Fitzgerald, for instance, writes that "the real cause of the rapid decline of the Manchu Empire in the 19th century was intellectual stagnation brought about by the domination of a small alien ruling class, itself dominated by a petrified cultural tradition" [119] (by which he means orthodox Confucianism). He believes that in the eighteenth century, which witnessed dramatic changes in Europe, the Manzhou emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong tenaciously clung to a conservative policy, blocking all innovation and thereby ensuring a seeming tranquillity and an outward prosperity.

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[117] K. A. Skachkov, op. cit., p. 24.

[118] A. A. Yekimov, "Mendeleyev on China", *Sovetskoye kitayevedeniye*, No. 4, 1958, p. 237.

[119] C. P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 547.

In analysing the causes that brought the Manzhous to power in China ("how could a limited number of Manchus conquer and rule a people some fifty or more times as numerous and far more sophisticated?"[120]), John K. Fairbank considers a number of explanations widespread in Chinese, Japanese, and Western bourgeois literature. One explanation is that the Manzhous should not be regarded as aliens, the argument being that they had been under the influence of Chinese civilisation in East Asia for a long time. Another theory is that under the Qings, who were aliens after all, 90 per cent of the officials administering the country were Chinese and that the Manzhous were themselves ultimately assimilated. Fairbank accepts both theories, and adds one of his own, namely, that from time immemorial political life in China had been monopolised by the imperial court and the bureaucracy, with ordinary people having no part in it; that was why the state machine was seized so easily by the Manzhous without affecting the day-to-day life and cultural traditions of the Chinese people. While recognising that the Manzhous maintained their power not by peaceful means or purely cultural influence but by a ramified system of military and police control, Fairbank in passing mentions the role played by the *shenshi,* the Chinese landowners, in preserving Manzhou supremacy.[121]

We believe that China'a easy conquest by the Manzhous and the stability of the feudal social system at the initial stages of Qing rule prior to the opium wars of the mid-nineteenth century, which marked the commencement of the Qing empire's conversion into a semi-colony of capitalist powers, were due to the following reasons:

1. The erosion of the productive forces in the last decades of Ming rule. This took place as a result of a protracted internal crisis of the feudal system, the concentration of land in the hands of a few big feudal lords, the ruthless exploitation of the peasants, the exorbitant taxes on man-

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[120] John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 373.

[121] Ibid., p. 374.

ufactories, commerce, and mining, the corruption and degeneration of the central governmental and provincial administrative bodies of the empire, and the disorganisation of the tax system and of the government and public services. The erosion of the productive forces was accelerated by the outbreak of a powerful peasant war that began in North China in response to a drastic intensification of feudal oppression; on the eve of the Manzhou invasion this brought about the downfall of the Ming dynasty and led to the seizure of the capital by insurgent peasants under Li Zicheng.

2. Ming China's military weakness. The Manzhou military organisation was more mobile and centralised than the Chinese, and widely used artillery and engineering devices. (The Manzhous were served by innumerable defectors—Chinese military experts.) Moreover, the Manzhous had the experience of successful cavalry incursions into China in the 1620s and 1630s.

3. The devastation wrought by the long peasant war (which lasted more than 20 years) and by the nearly 40 years of fighting that brought the whole of China under Manzhou rule, took a toll of tens of millions of lives, depopulated formerly densely populated regions, and required a long period of restoration and the gradual economic development of abandoned land.

4. The physical extermination of opposition. As early as the first half of the seventeenth century reactionary feudal groups at the Ming court pursued a policy of vicious terror against patriotic elements (for example, supporters of the Dongling group) and peasant risings, with the result that the progressive forces championing bourgeois trends of social development were bled white. This persecution of patriots and the brutal treatment of inhabitants of towns and villages who refused to submit to the invaders broke the resistance to the Qings for some time. In addition, on account of the treachery of the Chinese feudal elite, who went over to the Manzhous in order to crush the insurgent peasants, the class alliance of the Chinese and Qing feudal lords gave Manzhou rule its relative stability in the eighteenth century.

5. The wars of conquest against the peoples of Mongolia, Vietnam, Junggariye, East Turkestan, Tibet, Nepal, and Burma, and the savage suppression of risings by Chinese

and non-Han peoples brought wealth to the Manzhou and Chinese feudal lords and strengthened the Qing military-police apparatus.

6. The Qings ruled the empire by purely military methods, actively supporting or implanting the most backward, conservative elements and traditions, the most reactionary practices (including slavery), and ruthlessly crushing all innovatory, progressive trends of economic and social development. The Manzhou rulers adopted all the most reactionary and conservative elements that had for centuries been accumulating in Chinese feudal culture: rigid regimentation of all aspects of public, economic, and private life in accordance with Confucian prescriptions, mind-draining dogmatism, superstition, fear of the new, progressive, and humane, chauvinistic hostility for everything foreign, the belief that their culture was impeccable and superior to the culture of other peoples, and so on and so forth. In this situation the new bourgeois forces paved the way for themselves with immense difficulty, and after the Qing empire became a semi-colony, they found themselves oppressed also by capitalist powers, with the result that capitalist development in the nation's economy acquired ugly forms, while the new social classes were much too weak to do away with the Manzhou monarchy together with its mainstay—the Chinese feudal system, and oppression by imperialist powers.

The factors I have listed give only a schematic answer to the questions I have raised, and the entire problem undoubtedly requires further study. There is a compelling need for comprehensive research of little-studied aspects of China's economic history of this period.

Although prior to the "cultural revolution" Chinese historians had amassed and published many documents on different aspects of China's economic life of the Qing period,[122] research of these documents has not yet produced comprehensive studies.

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[122] In this context mention must be made of the *Selected Economic Materials from "Qing shilu"*, published in 1959 by the History Department of Nankai University. This book contains a selection of revealing information on agriculture, livestock-breeding, the handicraft industry, transport, commerce and usury, foreign trade, finance, tax policy, the salt monopoly, transportation of grain collected as tax in kind for the period from 1583 to 1911. The compilers note that they went through 4,363 chapters of the *Dai qing*

Other questions concerning the history of the Qing dynasty await research. A comparative study should be made, in particular, of the "self-strengthening" of the ruling feudal elite, a process that followed an almost identical pattern in the Qing empire, Osman Turkey, and Iran under the Qajar dynasty when these states clashed with Western capitalist powers (the "tanzimat" policy in Turkey, the reforms of Tagi-zade in Iran, and the "self-strengthening movement" in China).

The "self-strengthening" policy pursued in the 1840s-1870s on the initiative of the more far-sighted members of the ruling feudal-landowner circles of the Ottoman, Qajar, and Qing empires, such as Reshid-pasha, Tagi-zade, Zeng Guofan, and Li Hongzhang, had much in common.

Like the Turkish and Iranian feudal reformers, their Chinese counterparts sought, above all, to consolidate the internal position of the ruling dynasties, muffle the rising tide of popular discontent (the Babides in Persia, the Taipings and Nianjuns in China, and so on), enhance the prestige of their feudal governments in the eyes of the European powers, and prevent or soften their aggressive actions.

All the innovations recommended by them were one-sided and half-hearted, they did not undermine the feudal system and brought no relief to the people. Nevertheless, even these recommendations encountered fierce resistance from the extreme reactionary forces of these empires, which saw them as an attempt to restrict their power and privileges.

The need for research into Qing history is made all the more compelling by the fact that some Chinese historians have published works in which they try to prove that the first Qing emperors were progressive and had rendered "historic services" to the Chinese people. One of them, Professor Liu Danian, published an article about the Emperor Kangxi in 1961, in which he asserted that "in its

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*lichao shilu* (shortened to *Qing shihlu*) for the period 1583-1908 and 70 chapters of the *Xuantong zhengji* for 1909-1911 (see *Qingdai jingji ziliao jiyao*, Beijing, 1959). Some of the documents on modern Chinese economic history published in the People's Republic of China prior to 1957 are briefly reviewed by A. V. Sergiyev in "New Documents on the History of China's Economy", *Sovetskoye kitayevedeniye*, No. 4, 1958, pp. 220-29.

long development the unification of the various nationalities of China *under the aegis of the Han nation* (my italics.—*S. T.*) achieved a new level in the reign of Kangxi and the early Qings".[123] To back up this conclusion he took a quotation from Lenin and used it out of context: "The proletariat cannot support any consecration of nationalism; on the contrary, it supports everything that helps to obliterate national distinctions and remove national barriers ; it supports everything that makes the ties between nationalities closer and closer, or tends to merge nations."[124] Lenin obviously meant the proletariat, the strategy and tactics of the working-class movement of the twentieth century! What connection is there to the epoch of feudalism, to China and the reign of Kangxi? Lenin's article "Critical Remarks on the National Question", from which Liu Danian lifted the above quotation, was written at the close of 1913 when there was an upswing of nationalistic vacillation among Jewish, Ukrainian, and Polish Social Democrats. It strongly criticised bourgeois nationalism and spelled out the principles of proletarian internationalism. The slanted use of fragmented quotations from works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism can under no circumstances be accepted as a means of giving credence to the argument that Qing rule in China was progressive.[125]

In other works, too, Liu Danian idealises the reign of Kangxi, lauds the isolation and feudal backwardness of Qing China, and portrays Kangxi as a benevolent patron of the arts, forgetting the savagery of his administration, the intensified exploitation of the peasants, the founding—precisely in his reign—of secret anti-Manzhou societies of the Chinese people, such as the Heaven and Earth Society and others.

By depicting Kangxi as virtually China's saviour from the threat of colonial conquest (and this at the close of the seventeenth century, i. e., 100 years before the French bourgeois revolution and 200 years before the opening of the Suez Canal, when Britain was only making its first steps in its colonial policy in India!) Liu Danian in effect asserts that China would have become a foreign colony had the degenerate Ming regime not been replaced by the strong Qing monarchy. Further, he entirely ignores another possibility—the victory of the peasant war headed by Li Zicheng and the installation of a new Chinese dynasty that would probably have offered less resistance to new trends in the nation's social development and would not have reduced the nation's productive forces to the state they were led into by the Manzhou invasion.

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[123] Liu Danian, *Zhongguo jindaishi zhu wenti* (Questions of China's Modern History). A Collection of Essays, Beijing, 1965, pp. 179, 180.

[124] V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishehrs, Moscow, 1977, p. 35.

[125] Liu Danian's erroneous theories were criticised in R. V. Vyatkin and S. L. Tikhvinsky, "On Some Questions of Historical Science in the PRC", *Voprosy istorii,* No. 10, 1963, pp. 3-20.

Liu Danian is inclined to bury in oblivion the negative, regressive impact of the invasion and long rule of the Manzhous upon the life of the Chinese people, to ignore entirely the fact that there were serious contradictions between the Manzhou conquerors and the Chinese people, and to impute the entire blame for China's backwardness in the new times to capitalist powers. To attribute the backwardness and weakness of the Qing empire exclusively to the aggressiveness of capitalist powers, as Liu Danian does, is as untenable as to ignore, as some Western historians are doing, the assistance that was extended to the Qing regime by capitalist powers beginning with the 1860s.[126]

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[126] For example, Liu Danian considers that the armed intervention by foreign states ("imperialism") was the main factor of the defeat of the Taiping uprising (*Questions of China's Modern History*, p. 15). In another essay, "On the Popular Masses in China's Modern History", he says that the Manzhou emperors Daoguang and Xianfeng (Hsien Feng), the regent Cixi, and the Chinese high-ranking officials Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang were "stooges of imperialism" (ibid., p. 99).

A volume of 12 essays by Liu Danian, published in 1958-1965 in Chinese newspapers and academic and socio-political journals, was brought out in Beijing in 1965 under the heading *Questions of China's Modern History.* In the introductory essay Liu Danian omits Manzhou-Chinese contradictions and the Qing period as the basic questions of China's modern history requiring research. Nor are these subjects mentioned in another programme essay in the volume "Some Questions Arising in the Study of China's Modern History".

Liu Danian's views are not shared by other Chinese historians. One of them, Hu Sheng, was quite right when he wrote that the "main reason for the defeat of the Taipings was that this uprising had the weaknesses and shortcomings of a purely peasant war. Lat-

In the wake of the publication of Liu Danian's article on Kangxi, there appeared in the People's Republic of China other advocates of Manzhou policy on the nationalities question. For instance, in an essay headed "Xinjiang's Historical Links to Our Motherland", the historian Lü Zhenyu wrote that "although the exercise of administrative authority by the Qing court and the stationing of frontier garrisons were aimed at maintaining the supremacy of the Qing empire and protecting its frontiers, this was a positive factor in preserving the nation's unity and territorial integrity. In this respect, we should pay tribute to the emperors Kangxi and Qianlong, and also to Zuo Zongtang and other prominent personalities." [127] It is symptomatic that in the foreword to his *A Short History of the Nationalities of China,* first published in April 1947 and subsequently reprinted many times in the PRC, Lü Zhenyu justifiably condemned great-power Han nationalism in Chinese bourgeois historiography, and in the book itself objectively traced the history of the various peoples inhabiting China. In a chapter devoted to Manzhou history he wrote that impelled by its expansionist ambitions and striving to subjugate other peoples inhabiting China, the Manzhou slave-owning aristocracy organised all Manzhous in military banner corps. Following the Manzhou invasion of China and the overthrow of the power of the Ming landowners, only an insignificant number of Manzhous remained in the Northeast; Chinese and people of other nationalities were prohibited from settling there. The bulk of the Manzhous resettled in China with their families and led a parasitical

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er, when the forces of the popular revolution had grown immeasurably, the rulers of China continued to enjoy the unqualified support of the landowners and assistance from foreign powers, but this assistance could no longer save them" (Hu Sheng, *Aggression of the Imperialist Powers in China,* Moscow, 1951, p. 69 [Russian translation]).

Another historian, Mou Anshi, wrote of the reasons for the Qing empire's defeat in the First Opium War: "The reactionary character and decay of the Qing dynasty were the basic reasons for China's defeat in the First Opium War" (see Mou Anshi, "Man as the Decisive Factor of the Outcome of War, and Weapons as an Important but Not the Decisive Factor in the Light of the Opium War", *Renmin ribao,* October 11, 1965.

[127] Lü Zhenyu, "Xinjiang he zuguodi lishi guanxi (Xinjiang's Historical Links to Our Motherland)", *Minzu tuanjie,* 1962, No. 2, pp. 27-38.

life by brutally exploiting the Chinese.[128] In the chapter on the Turkic peoples of China Lü Zhenyu wrote of mass extermination of the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang during the reign of the emperor Qianlong and the kindling by the Manzhous of discord between the Turkic and other peoples of the empire. "As a result," he writes, "under Manzhou rule the Turkic peoples were thrown far back economically and culturally."[129] Lü Zhenyu wrote bitterly of the atrocities committed by the "Manzhou-Qing rulers and their menials like Zuo Zongtang and Liu Ming-zhuan", who suppressed the just, anti-government risings of the Turkic peoples of Northwest China and Xinjiang with monstrous brutality early in the latter half of the nineteenth century.[130] Lü Zhenyu now makes an abrupt volte-face, "expressing gratitude" to the Manzhou conquerors and their myrmidons. This great-Han approach to assessing the historical role of statesmen of the past and the glorification of butchers of the Zuo Zongtang type conflict with historical objectivity and a class analysis.

The present stand and arguments adopted by Liu Danian and Lü Zhenyu scarcely differ from the views and arguments of the Chinese bourgeois nationalist and anti-Communist Gao Changzhu, who lives on Taiwan. The latter holds that under the Manzhous the glory and unity of the "Chinese nation" reached a level almost comparable to the "glory of the Chinese nation" under Chengjisihang and his successors, whom with a stroke of the pen the author includes in the "Chinese nation".[131] Some historians in the PRC have evidently been unable to shake off the influence of great-power Chinese chauvinism, the rising danger of which was seriously noted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1956 in an editorial in *Renmin ribao:* "We Chinese," the editorial said, "should remember in particular that under the Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing dynasties our country was also a great empire, although for approximately a hundred years, from the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was a target of aggression and was turned into a semi-colony. Although today we are still a backward country economically and culturally, when the conditions change the trend towards great-power chauvinism will unquestionably become a serious danger if every effort is not made to avert it. Further, it must be pointed out that this danger has already begun to manifest itself amidst some of our functionaries. This is why in the resolution of the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and in the statement of November 1, 1956 of the Government of the People's Republic of China our functionaries are enjoined to militate against the trends towards great-power chauvinism." [132]

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[128] Lü Zhenyu, *Zhongguo minzu jianshi* (A Short History of the Nationalities of China), Dalian, 1947, p. 53.

[129] Ibid., p. 102.

[130] Ibid., p. 103.

[131] See Gao Changzhu, *Bianjiang yu guofang* (Frontier Regions and State Defence), Taibei, 1961, pp. 3-4.

Thus, far from all Chinese historians share the views of Liu Danian and his followers. For example, at a conference of historians in Wuhan in 1961 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Wuchang uprising it was bluntly declared that Liu Danian was propounding erroneous views, belittling the anti-Manzhoucharacter of the Xinhai revolution, and ignoring Manzhou-Chinese ethnic contradictions. Still earlier, in *Sketches of China's Modern History*, the well-known Chinese historian Dai Yi rightly noted that under the Manzhous, who reigned for more than 200 years, the "class struggle was constantly influenced by the struggle between Manzhous and Chinese and took the form of a struggle of the Chinese against the Manzhous". [133]

Under the feudal Qing dynasty there were no conditions for friendship among the different peoples forcibly incorporated in the Dai Qing, or great Qing, empire. The longstanding hostility between the Manzhou conquerors and the Mongolian people was clearly seen in, for example, the statement of a Mongolian delegation led by Suhe-Bator that came to Moscow in April 1921.

"Over 200 years ago," this statement noted, "the Mongols, torn by internecine strife, fell under the power of the Manzhou emperor and remained under the rule of the Manzhou dynasty for more than two centuries. Eleven years ago, during the Chinese revolution, our Mongolian people raised the banner of insurgency for the independence of Mongolia ... They won freedom of independent existence, freedom of self-administration."[134]

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[132] "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", article in the newspaper *Renmin ribao* of December 29, 1956, Moscow, 1956, pp. 33-34 (Russian translation).

[133] Dai Yi, *Sketches of China's Modern History*, Vol. 1, Beijing, 1958, p. 41.

The formation of the Chinese nation, accelerated in the 1870s-1890s, took place in a situation witnessing the country's conversion into a semi-colony of foreign imperialism and strong opposition of the Qing regime and the Manzhou-Chinese feudal reaction to the growth of new social relations in the country.

In "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" Lenin wrote that in the epoch of the downfall of feudalism and absolutism, in the epoch of the formation of the bourgeois-democratic society and state, "when the national movements for the first time become mass movements and in one way or another draw *all* classes of the population into politics through the press, participation in representative institutions, etc.," the typical features are "the awakening of national movements and the drawing of the peasants, the most numerous and the most sluggish section of the population, into these movements, in connection with the struggle for political liberty in general, and for the rights of the nation in particular".[135]

In the same work Lenin pointed out that the "epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Western, continental Europe embraces a fairly definite period, approximately between 1789 and 1871. This was precisely the period of national movements and the creation of national states ... In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan wars—such is the chain of world events of *our* period in our 'Orient'. And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a *whole series* of bourgeois-democratic national movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states."[136]

Precisely by virtue of these processes the revolutionary national movement of the Chinese people, led by Sun Yat-sen and the United League, so easily put an end to the Qing regime in the period of the Xinhai revolution and led to the formal creation of the Chinese nation state—the Republic of China.

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[134] Quoted from M. S. Kapitsa and V. I. Ivanenko, *Friendship Won in Struggle*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 40-41 (in Russian).

[135] V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 401.

[136] Ibid., pp. 405-06.

The destiny of the Manzhou imperial clan and the Manzhou aristocracy followed a curious course after the Xinhai revolution. The bourgeois Republic of China left to the former Manzhou emperor and his kin huge land possessions, palaces, and incalculable wealth amassed by robbery over a period of more than two and a half centuries, granted them enormous pensions paid out of the exchequer, permitted them to have their own armed guards, and so on. As the former emperor Pu Yi himself said, he and his court camarilla were expelled from the Beijing palaces only shortly before the revolution of 1925-1927 on the initiative of the progressive General Feng Yuxiang, whose troops had seized Beijing. [137]

Closely linked with the Chinese feudal warlords of North China and with the diplomatic missions of the imperialist powers, the Manzhou aristocracy constantly plotted against the republican system with the object of restoring the Qing monarchy. In 1917, aided by the troops of the militarist General Zhang Xun, the feudal-compradore reaction made an attempt to return Pu Yi to the throne, but nothing came of this.

Taking up residence in the British settlement in Tianjin in the early 1920s and adopting the English name of Henry, the former Manzhou emperor Pu Yi continued to plan the restoration of the Manzhou dynasty, hoping for assistance from Chinese reaction and his foreign patrons.

After Japan seized Northeast China (September 18, 1931) and proclaimed the puppet state of Manzhou diguo, Pu Yi was made emperor of that state and faithfully served his masters, the Japanese imperialists.

When the armed forces of the USSR defeated the Japanese Kwangtung (Guangdong) Army and liberated Northeast China, Henry Pu Yi was arraigned before a special military tribunal in Khabarovsk as one of the chief war criminals. For his crimes against the peoples of the Soviet

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[137] *From Emperor to Citizen. The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi*, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1964, pp. 108, 145-47.

Union, China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan he was sentenced by this tribunal, but at the request of the Chinese authorities he was handed over to them. In the 1960s Pu Yi resided in Beijing, was a deputy to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council, and frequently published articles in the press on domestic and international affairs.

* * *

This collection makes no claim to giving an exhaustive review of all the main stages and events of China's modern history associated with Manzhou rule. It deals primarily with aspects of the Manzhou rule that have been inadequately studied by Soviet historians. It should be borne in mind that while concentrating their criticism on various aspects of Manzhou rule, the authors of the essays are by no means motivated by a desire to whitewash the Chinese feudal class, who were active accomplices and direct abettors of the Manzhou feudal aristocracy and military in oppressing the working people of the Qing empire. As we have already noted, the Chinese feudal lords bear most of the responsibility for the Manzhou invasion of China and the long and inglorious reign of the Qing dynasty (from the 1860s onwards they shared this responsibility with capitalist powers).

Also, the difficulties encountered by the authors of the essays in this volume should be appreciated: the Qing censors were careful to expunge from Chinese historical works all anti-Manzhou references, facts, and even hints; moreover, on account of the class specifics of Chinese feudal historiography most of the Chinese records of the Qing period contain no direct exposures of Manzhou rule. They therefore required a detailed analysis and critical approach. The essays in this volume are presented mainly in accordance with the chronology of their subject.

*G. V. MELIKHOV*

# THE PROCESS OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MANZHOU TRIBES UNDER NUERHAQI AND ABAHAI (1591-1644)

The early history of the Manzhous, prior to their invasion of China in 1644, continues to attract academic interest. The capital works of J. Ross, H. Giles, F. Michael, and other historians[1] consider above all various aspects of the relations of the Manzhous with China and of China's influence on their socio-economic system and state organisation.

However, the essential questions of the relations of the Manzhous with neighbouring tribes inhabiting the northeast of present-day China and the Russian Maritime Territory, the initial stage of the formation of the Manzhou nation, the specific features of this process, the ethnic composition of the Manzhous, and the original territory on which their consolidation took place have received little attention. Yet it is here that one finds the key to fundamental points of the history of the Manzhous and their socio-economic system.

This essay is an attempt to somewhat fill this gap.

In the 14th-17th centuries, a vast territory beyond the Chinese possessions in Liaodong was inhabited by many tribes of different ethnic composition but designated in Ming historiography by the common name of Nüzhi or Nüzhens, i.e., Zhuerzhens. Chinese authors of those times divided these tribes into three main groups: Nüzhi of Jianzhou and Maolin, Haixi-nüzhi (i.e., those residing west of the sea), and Nüzhi-yeren (savage Nüzhi). However, Manzhou sources totally ignore the Chinese classification. Thus, in the *Manzhou shilu* it is stated that this region was inhabited by the following tribes: Sukesuhuhe, Hunhe, Wanyan, Dongo, Zhechen, Hada, Yehe, and Huifa.[2] In addition to the tribe of Nuerhaqi, designated as the "domain of Manzhou", the *Nuerhaqi shilu* names some other tribes: Wangjia; Neyin and Yalujiang of the region of Changboshan; and the Woji, Warka, and Huerha of the region of the Eastern Sea.[3] None of these tribes bore the name "Manzhou".

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[1] J. Ross, *The Manchus, or the Reigning Dynasty of China*, London, 1880; H. Giles, *China and the Manchus*, Cambridge, 1912; F. Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China*, Baltimore, 1942.

The tribe of Nuerhaqi was one of the many small tribes of the frontier area of Jianzhou beyond the Ming frontier wall in the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula. From the *Nuerhaqi shilu* we learn the following of the homeland of the ancestors of Nuerhaqi: "The six sons of Dudu (Xingzu) lived in six fortresses and were called the 'six Wangs' or 'six ancestors'. The most distant of these fortresses was not farther than 20 and the nearest not nearer than five or six li from Hetuala (the present town of Yilanhada in Liaoning Province, Northeast China.—*G. M.*)."[4]

All of these six small towns have been quite satisfactorily identified by Liu Xuanmin.[5] They were situated in the basin of the upper reaches of the Sukesuhuhe (the present Suzihe River, a tributary of the Hunhe).

The diminutive size of this territory makes Liu Xuanmin's conclusion fully acceptable, namely, that this was a numerically small and weak tribe and that initially it was not seen as important by its neighbours.[6]

Its rise to prominence is associated with the name of Nuerhaqi. In his first years in power (1585-1589) he united all the tribes of the Manzhou Assembly and of the Jianzhou area: Sukesuhuhe, Hunhe, Zhechen, Dongo, Suan,

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[2] *Manzhou shilu* (Factual Records of the Reign of Manzhou Emperors), Beijing, 1937, 1st printing (compiled in 1635). Quoted from Mo Dunyin, *Manzu shi luncun* (On the History of the Manzhou Nation), Beijing, 1958, p. 82.

[3] *Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi Nuerhaqi shilu* (Factual Records of the Reign of the Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi Nuerhaqi), Beiping, 1932, Vol. 1, p. 2a (compiled in 1636). (Further—*Nuerhaqi shilu*).

[4] *Nuerhaqi shilu*, Chapter 1, p. 1b.

[5] Liu Xuanmin, "The Territory Inhabited by the Various Tribes Subjugated in the Early Period of the Formation of the Qing Empire", *Yangjing daxue xuebao*, 1938, No. 23, pp. 131-35.

[6] Ibid., p. 130.


YEHE
Yehe
Liaohe
Weiyuanpu
Kaiyuan
Shahezi
Meihe
Daqinghe
Daqinghe
HADA
WANGJIA
HUIFA
Liuhe
Tieling
Chaihe
Liaohe
Fanhe
ZHECHEN
HUNHE
Hunhe
Hunhe
SUHUHE
Suzihe
Fushun
MUKDEN
(Shenyang)
SUKESUHU
MANZHOU
Hetuala
Xingjing
Shohe
Taizihe
Taizihe
Daerhe
Hunjiang
DONGO
Badaohe
Aihe
Hunjiang
YALUJIANG
Yalujiang
Aihe
The Willow Stockade (since 1678)
Ming border in Liaodong
20
0
20
40 km

Manzhou and neighbour tribes in the late 16th and early 17th cc.

Wangjia, and others.[7] The adult male population of these tribes were enlisted into the *niurhus*[8] of the eight Manzhou banners. There is no mention in sources of the resettlement of the inhabitants of captured fortresses and towns in the territory of Nuerhaqi's tribe (this became the practice in the second period of Nuerhaqi's campaigns). The lands of the tribes were incorporated in the possessions of the Manzhou, and were initially the venue of the formation of the tribal association that later called itself Manzhous. Sources note that Nuerhaqi's power and wealth grew steadily not only through conquest but also as a result of the lively commerce of the Zhuerzhen with lands in the Ming Liaodong Peninsula.[9]

After the tribes of Jianzhou were united, Nuerhaqi turned his attention to three Changboshan tribes: Yalujiang, Neyin, and Zhusheli. In 1591, he subjugated the Yalujiang tribe.[10] which inhabited both banks of the Yalu Jiang east of the Ming frontier wall up to the frontier post of Kuangdianliupu.[11] The Neyin, inhabiting the basin of the Foduohehe, a tributary source of the Sungari, were conquered in May 1594.[12] The Neyin comprised four *riurhus* in the Manzhou banners.[13]

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[7] A. V. Rudakov, *On the History of Chinese Culture in Jilin Province (1644-1902)*, Vladivostok, 1902, pp. 7-8 (in Russian).

[8] These were complex military-economic units of the Manzhou eight-banner organisation. In a purely military respect, the *niurhu* was the lowest banner unit consisting initially of 300 and then of 150 warriors (comparable to a modern company). Apart from fighting men, the *niurhu* had a certain number of artisans of diverse trades. The *niurhus* were instituted by Nuerhaqi in 1601 and were components of the four banners set up at the same time: Yellow, White, Red, and Blue. The appearance of eight banners dates from 1614, when four were added to the existing four: Bordered Yellow, Bordered White, Bordered Red, and Bordered Blue. See *Baqi tongzhi chuji* (A Description of the Eight Banners), Beijing, 1739, Chapter 3, pp. 18b-19a.

[9] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 1, p. 8b; V. Gorsky, "The Origin and First Actions of the Manzhou House", *Trudy RDM v Pekine,* Vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1852, p. 45.

[10] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 1, p. 9a.

[11] *Shengjing Jilin Heilongjiang deng chu biaozhu zhanji yutu* (Atlas of Military Operations in Mukden, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Other Places With Commentaries), Dairen, 1938, Section 3, p. 3b (compiled in 1775).

[12] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 1, p. 11b.

[13] Fifth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment of the Bordered Yellow Banner, the first *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Red Banner,

The Zhusheli were subjugated by Nuerhaqi in November 1593.[14] There is nothing specific in sources about the territory of this tribe and it is therefore hard to identify it. It was apparently a direct neighbour of the Neyin in the east.

After the Changboshan tribes were subjugated the geographical framework of Nuerhaqi's wars widened considerably. However, the tribal association of the Manzhous continued to experience a shortage of manpower. Nuerhaqi sought to resolve this problem chiefly by seizing and taking the population of neighbouring tribes to the territory of Jianzhou. This is illustrated by his wars against four tribes of the Hulun association: Hada, Huifa, Wula, and Yehe (according to Chinese terminology these belonged to the Haixi-Nüzhi).

The history of the subjugation of this tribe is given in the *Nuerhaqi shilu:* "In the ninth month of the year *jihai* (October 1599) troops were sent against the Hada. Nuerhaqi's younger brother, the *beile* (prince) Shuerhaqi said: 'Send me in the vanguard and we shall see what will happen!' Nuerhaqi ordered 1,000 troops to advance. These reached the lands of the Hada and the warriors of the Hada came out of the town to offer resistance... On the seventh day (October 25) the town was taken by storm. All the towns subordinated to the Hada went over to the side of Nuerhaqi. [The troops of Nuerhaqi] conquered the entire state and returned. Ever since that year nothing more was heard of the Hada."[15]

The tribe settled in the basin of the Hadahe (hence its name) and partially in the basin of the Chaihe. In the south its immediate neighbours were the Hunhe and the Zhechen tribes, in the north the Yehe, and in the east the Huifa. In the west the Hada lands extended to the Ming frontier wall.

Five *niurhus* were formed of the captured population.[16]

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the thirteenth *niurhu* of the first regiment and the fourth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered White Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 3, p. 22a; Chapter 6, p. 21a; Chapter 7, pp. 4b, 12b.

[14] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 1, p. 11b.

[15] Ibid., Chapter 2, p. 1b.

[16] The first *niurhu* of the third regiment and the first *niurhu* of the fourth regiment of the Bordered Yellow Banner; the twelfth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered White Banner; the eight *niurhu* of the third regiment and the tenth *niurhu* of the

After subjugating the Hada, Nuerhaqi wasted no time attacking the Huifa tribe. The Huifa troops were defeated and their chief Baiyindali and his sons were killed on October 29, 1607; the people pledged allegiance to Nuerhaqi. Since then the Huifa has been regarded as a subjugated tribe.[17] From the evidence of the location of the main town the conclusion may be drawn that the Huifa were settled chiefly in the basin of the Hunhe. Their neighbours were the Yehe and Hada in the west, the Wula in the northeast, and the Neyin in the southeast.

There is mention that three *niurhus* were raised among the Huifa population, but in all probability a larger number was formed.[18]

In April-May 1608 Nuerhaqi led a force of 5,000 troops against the Wula, laying siege to and capturing the fortress of Yiganshancheng. Here "more than 1,000 persons were killed, 300 sets of armour were seized, and all the people were led away to captivity".[19]

Then followed a respite in the war against this tribe.

On October 23, 1612, four years after the first clashes with the Wula, Nuerhaqi's forces again invaded the territory of this tribe. Advancing along the Wulahe, the Manzhous occupied five towns, halting only two li from the main town of the Wula *beile* Buzhantai.

Nuerhaqi again sent troops against Buzhantai at the close of February 1613. In the battle at the fortress of Fuerha, the Wula ruler's army of 30,000 troops was smashed and he fled to the Yehe. "All the Wula towns," sources say, "pledged allegiance to Nuerhaqi and the Wula tribe as such was extinguished."[20] This numerically large tribe gave the Manzhous seven *niurhus* that were distributed among the various banners.[21]

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fifth regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 3, pp. 14a, 20a; Chapter 7, p. 15a; Chapter 10, pp. 14b, 27a.

[17] *Nuerhaqi shilu*, Chapter 2, p. 3b.

[18] Sixth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment of the Bordered Yellow Banner; tenth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered Red Banner; and the first *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 3. p. 22b; Chapter 8, p. 18b; Chapter 10, p. 12a.

[19] *Nuerhaqi shilu*, Chapter 2, p. 4b.

[20] Ibid., p. 6a.

[21] The tenth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment and the fifth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the White Banner; the eighth *niurhu* of


RUSSIANS
Angara
L. Baikal
Nercha
Shilka
Albazin
Zeya
Amur
TUNGUS
Ingoda
Nerchinsk
Onon
DAUR
Argun
Selemdzha
Amgun
Zeya
Bureya
Amur
Sakhalin
Dalai Nur
Argun (Hailarhe)
Kerulen
SOLONS
Nunjiang
Sungari
HUERHA
Amur
Ussuri
Naolihe
Mulinghe
WOJI
L. Hanka
MONGOLS
Sungari
Ningguta
WULA
WARKA
SEA OF JAPAN
Hokkaido
Honshu
YEHE
HADA
HUIFA
DONGO
Plateau
Changbai Shan
K
TI
Liaohe
Fushun
Mk
MIANZHOU
YALUJIANG
Yalujiang
Liaodong pen.
Huanghe
BEIJING
Shanhaikuan
180 km
0
180
360
The Great Wall of China
Ming border in Liaodong
Abbreviations: Mk-Mukden (Shenyang), TI-Tieling, K-Kaiyuan

Population of the Far East in the early half of the 17th c.

The area settled by this tribe as indicated in *A Description of Jilin* may be accepted. In the south its neighbour was the Huifa tribe, in the southwest its territory extended almost to Suan, and in the east the Zhangguaicailing Mountains were the natural boundary of its lands.[22]

After the subjugation of the Wula, of the four Hulun tribes only the Yehe remained outside Nuerhaqi's control. The Yehe tribe was the most powerful of this group of tribes and was the last to fall to Nuerhaqi—after the Manzhou tribal association began coming into conflict with Ming-ruled China.

The *Nuerhaqi shilu* informs us that the founder of the Yehe tribe was a Mongol of the *aimak* of Tumote. He settled on the site of a clan destroyed by him in Hulun-Narha and became known as Narha. He then moved to the Yehei River, receiving the name Yehei.[23]

In October 1614 Nuerhaqi led an army of 40,000 men against the Yehe. Encircling the fortress of Wusu, Nuerhaqi called upon the population to join him. In response the garrison commanders opened the fortress gates. The seizure of Wusu marked the beginning of the bloody subjugation of the Yehe tribe.[24]

In February 1619 the Manzhous undertook a new campaign. "On the seventh day of the first month (February 20)," the *Nuerhaqi shilu* says, "the troops entered Yehe territory and in an area stretching from the fortress of Kente and the village of Zhanhan to a point some 10 li east of the town of Yehe they seized the entire population of the fortresses that surrendered. Within an area of ten li more than 20 hamlets, villages, and settlements were burned to the ground."[25]

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the second regiment of the Red Banner; the eleventh *niurhu* of the first regiment and the eighth *niurhu* of the second regiment of the Bordered White Banner; the ninth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment of the Blue Banner and the fourth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 5, pp. 24b, 29b; Chapter 6, p. 8a; Chapter 7, pp. 3b, 8a; Chapter 9, p. 20a; Chapter 10, p. 13a.

[22] *Jilin tongzhi* (A Description of Jilin), 1891, Chapter 12, p. 18b.

[23] *Nuerhaqi shilu*, Chapter 1, p. 3b.

[24] Ibid., Chapter 2, p. 6b. In *A Description of Jilin* the fortress of Wusu is identified as the modern town of Yitongzhou (Chapter 12, p. 6a).

[25] *Nuerhaqi shilu*, Chapter 3, p. 1a.

The Yehe were finally defeated in September 1619. Nuerhaqi's troops surrounded the small town of Buyanggu, and in the east they stormed and captured the town of Jin-taishi (Eastern Town).[26] "Learning of the fall of the Eastern Town, the garrisons of the other besieged small towns opened the gates and surrendered. Since then the Yehe tribe has been regarded as conquered."[27]

The Yehe lived in the basin of the Yehe River northeast of the Weiyuanpu frontier post in the Chinese frontier wall. In the south their immediate neighbour was the Hada tribe, separated from them by the Daximulushan Mountains, in the north were the Mongolian aimaks of Kuoerqin and Guoerluosi, and in the southwest their lands were bounded by the Ming wall.[28]

Eighteen *niurhus* were raised among the Yehe population.[29]

The tribes of the Hulun Union significantly augmented the numerical strength of the Manzhou troops and population. These tribes with their large settled population comprised the core of Manzhou strength.[30] Even according to the incomplete data in sources, more than 33 *niurhus* were formed of men from these tribes. The subjugation of the Hulun tribes gave Nuerhaqi access to the lands of the more distant Nüzhen tribes, called Nüzhi-yeren by the Chinese. Among them were the Woji, Warka. Huerha, and other tribes.

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[26] The Eastern Town, Yehe, was the residence of the tribal chief.

[27] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 3, pp. 6b-8a.

[28] *A Description of Jilin*, Chapter 12, p. 19a; Chapter 18, p. 26a.

[29] The seventh (half-strength) *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered Yellow Banner; the eighth and the ninth *niurhus* of the third regiment of the Yellow Banner; the fourth and the seventh *niurhus* of the second regiment of the White Banner; the fifth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment and the third *niurhu* of the fifth regiment (both half-strength) of the Red Banner; the seventh, ninth, and twelfth *niurhus* of the fifth regiment of the same Banner; the second *niurhu* of the first regiment and the sixteenth *niurhu* of the second regiment of the Bordered Red Banner; the sixteenth *niurhu* (half-strength) of the first regiment, the ninth and sixteenth (half-strength) *niurhus* of the fifth regiment of the Blue Banner; the thirteenth *niurhu* of the first regiment and the first and third *niurhus* of the second regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 3, p. 28b; Chapter 4, pp. 15b, 16a; Chapter 5, pp. 9a, 10a; Chapter 6, pp. 17a, 21b, 23a, 24a, 25a; Chapter 8, pp. 1b, 13b; Chapter 9, pp. 6a, 26a, 28b; Chapter 10, pp. 4b, 6b, 7a.

[30] A. V. Rudakov, op. cit., p. 7.

Nuerhaqi first warred against the Waerka as early as 1598. A force of 1,000 troops marched against two areas of that tribe, Anchulaku and Neihe, where they seized 20 settlements, while the others submitted voluntarily. This campaign brought more than 10,000 prisoners.[31] There is mention that one *niurhu* was raised in the Anchulaku area.[32]

In 1607 Nuerhaqi started his second campaign against the Waerka with the objective of capturing an important strategic stronghold opening the road to the east—the town of Feiyou (20 kilometres from the modern town of Hunchun).

The seizure of Feiyou enabled Nuerhaqi to attack the Woji tribe.[33]

In December 1610 Nuerhaqi sent a force of 1,000 men against four districts of the Woji tribe: Namdulu, Suifen, Ningguta, and Nimacha.[34] All the Woji chiefs were urged to side with the Manzhous voluntarily.

Three special *niurhus* were raised in Namdulu (the commanders were given honorary titles),[35] two were raised in Ningguta,[36] three in Nimacha[37] and two in Suifen.[38]

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[31] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 1, p. 12a.

[32] Of these the thirteenth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Red Banner was formed. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 6, p. 16a.

[33] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 137, p. 18a.

[34] Namdulu was situated south of the modern town of Ningan, Ningguta to the northeast of it, Suifen on the upper reaches of the Suifun River, Nimacha south of the Ussuri and Lake Hanka and north of the Suifun River.

[35] The thirteenth and fifteenth *niurhus* of the first regiment of the Yellow Banner; the tenth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered Red Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 5, pp. 6a, 6b; Chapter 8, p. 31a; Chapter 152, p. 12b.

[36] Later included in the fourteenth *niurhu* of the fourth regiment of the Bordered Yellow Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 3, p. 25b.

[37] The fifteenth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered White Banner; the fourteenth *niurhu* of the first regiment of the Bordered Red Banner; the twelfth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 7, p. 27b; Chapter 8, p. 6a; Chapter 10, pp. 15b-16a.

[38] The sixth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Yellow Banner; the eleventh *niurhu* of the second regiment of the White Banner.

In 1611 a campaign was conducted against the districts of Wuerguchen and Mulun [39] of the Woji tribe. The Manzhous returned with 1,000 prisoners. [40]

In Mulun they raised one *niurhu*. [41]

The first clash of the Manzhous with the Huerha tribe took place at the close of 1611 and early 1612. The Manzhous took the fortress of Zhakuta, [42] killing 1,000 Huerhas (!) and taking 2,500 prisoners. [43] After the fall of Zhakuta the Huerha tribe is not mentioned in Manzhou sources for nearly seven years.

The year 1619 saw two campaigns against the Huerha. These gave Nuerhaqi 2,000 prisoners, while 1,000 families were forcibly resettled. [44] During the campaigns in 1625 the Manzhous took 2,000 prisoners. [45]

The further incorporation of these tribes took place under Nuerhaqi's son, Abahi (Taizong), who substantially extended the geography of the Manzhou military campaigns.

Abahai's reign was the period of the most active contact by the Manzhous with tribes called Nüzhi-yeren (savage Nüzhi) in Ming records. Sixteenth-seventeenth-century Chinese authors had only the most general information about this group of tribes and did not distinguish between them. The Manzhous likewise had no accurate information about them.

Manzhou campaigns against these distant tribes were undertaken in the period from 1627 to 1644. Sources tell us of numerous instances of these tribes going over to the Manzhous voluntarily. For instance, Manzhou sources say that on February 2, 1628, three persons brought tribute

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See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 4, p. 27b; Chapter 5, p. 11b.

[39] Wuerguchen was situated in the basin of the right-bank tributary of the Ussuri, northeast of Lake Hanka; Mulun (Muling) —in the basin of the river of the same name, a left-bank tributary of the Ussuri northwest of Lake Hanka. See *A Description of Jilin,* Chapter 12, p. 21b.

[40] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 141, p. 14b.

[41] The first *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the White Banner. *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 5, p. 28a.

[42] Zhakuta was situated 120 li west of Hunchun. *A Description of Jilin,* Chapter 16, p. 18a.

[43] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 142, p. 16b.

[44] *Nuerhaqi shilu,* Chapter 3, p. 6a.

[45] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 139, p. 13b.

from the Huerha tribe,[46] and that four Huerha chiefs came to Abahai's court in June and August of the same year.[47]

While receiving defectors, the Manzhous did not cease their campaigns against these tribes. A new campaign against the Warka began on August 29, 1629, and lasted until 1631.[48] "The general Mengatu, who was sent against the Warka," says the *Taizong shilu,* "dispatched ... a messenger with a report on the number of prisoners: 1,219 men, 1,284 women, and 603 boys. There was also much booty: renshen (ginseng) and pelts."[49]

On December 20, 1633, Jisihe and Wubahai, at the head of 300 fighting men, were sent against the Huerha settled on the border of Korea. They were given detailed orders to keep a strict watch over prisoners and to avoid maltreating them, especially women, and to maintain rigid discipline. The efforts of the Manzhous to conquer the tribes living along Korea's borders (chiefly the Warka) invariably evoked protests from Korea.[50]

On June 14, 1634, the generals Jisihe and Wubahai brought Abahai 2,050 prisoners and more than 2,250 pelts.[51]

In the 1630s the Manzhous began to focus their attention more and more on lands of the so-called "Heilongjiang locality" (Heilongjiang is the Chinese name for the Amur). Sources say: "Feiyanggu and Mandai, chiefs of the Sahaercha tribe, came to the court with 46 men, bringing 1,769 sable pelts. They were given 2,630 pieces of cloth."[52] In June 1634 Baerdaqi, a princeling from the "locality of Heilongjiang" went to the Manzhou court with 44 of his subordinates, bringing a tribute of 1,818 sable pelts.[53] Sources do not mention Baerdaqi as belonging to any particular tribe, but later he is called chief of the Suoluongs.

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[46] *Da Qing Taizong Wenhuangdi shilu* (Accurate Records of the Reign of the Taizong Wenhuangdi of the Great Qing), Chapter 3, p. 43a; *Da Qing lichao shilu* (Accurate Records of the Reign of All the Emperors of the Great Qing), Tokyo, 1937 (further—*Taizong shilu*).

[47] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 4, p. 2b.

[48] Ibid., Chapter 5, p. 17b.

[49] Ibid., Chapter 8, pp. 16b-17a.

[50] Ibid., Chapter 16 pp. 16b-17a; Chapter 18, p. 21ab; Chapter 21, p. 12ab; Chapter 28, p. 41b; Chapter 51, pp. 20b-22a.

[51] Ibid., Chapter 16, p. 11ab.

[52] Ibid., Chapter 18, p. 20b.

[53] Ibid.

Thus, valuable gifts and information about innumerable villages and settlements came from the distant Heilongjiang. This attracted the Manzhous.

On January 28, 1635, the Manzhou generals Baqilan and Samshika set out for the "locality of Heilongjiang" at the head of a force of 41 officers and 2,500 troops. This campaign was preceded by the arrival at the court of Abahai of envoys of the Dumong, Nandiyou, Guerjida, Kebei, Guoerdun, and others from the "locality of Heilongjiang" and envoys from the area of the Sungari, who brought gifts of sable pelts. These people were used as guides in the campaign.

The generals received the following injunction from Abahai: "Your road now lies across distant places. You must make every effort to move forward. Do not fear difficulties and do not be remiss. You must calm prisoners with kind words and share your food and water equally with them.

"Then people will shed their doubts and fears and large numbers will come, wishing to join you. Moreover, the people of these places speak a language similar to ours, and if they are brought to you they may prove to be useful to us. Before taking the field you should tell them the following: 'Your ancestors were of the same country as ours (?). This is clearly stated by records in books (?). Formerly, you did not know this and strove to separate from us. Our sovereign had long wanted to send people to you to explain this to you, but was very busy and did not do this. We have now come to you exclusively in your interests.'

"If you announce our command to them in this fashion, will they not come over to us? You, our generals, shall execute our will... Of the road you are to follow you will learn from the guides—they know... You shall leave the persons accompanying you in their native places, telling them that we are returning them to these places because they had gone over to our side. In future they should be even more respectful and obedient. If they go from us, we shall punish them at once.

"If you fail to achieve what you have set out to do, the people of these three settlements must not be left behind; they must be brought here to us. All objects that may prove to be useful, and everything needed by our troops shall likewise not be abandoned."[54]

On that very same day the guides were summoned to the palace and handed the imperial command, which stated in part: "Your home is in remote places and you are ignorant of the count of years (calendar). Would it not be better for you to bring your people here to live in our state and enjoy our glory and culture? We have long desired this and intended to send our man to inform you of this, but we had many affairs of state to attend to and were unable to accomplish our desire.

"Every ruler must be at the head of his subjects. This has always been so. In the past you have been our subjects, and this is recorded in the old books (?). Regrettably, you do not know of this. You have now gone over to us of your own volition. We may, at our discretion, let you stay and live here, and not send you back. But we are confident that you are loyal, and are therefore sending you back. You must guide our troops and accurately indicate all the villages and settlements."[55]

Tangible results were yielded not by diplomacy but by the Manzhou military superiority, as may be seen from a report from Baqilan and Samshika dated May 29, 1635: "Of the total population of 7,302 persons, 2,483 adult males, were ordered to march. We have taken 856 horses, 543 cattle, and eight mules. Also, 116 women and children have been taken captive, and we have seized 24 horses, 17 cattle and also over 3,140 sable and other pelts."[56] By imperial order the booty was divided among the officers of both flanks. All prisoners were given a house, a plot of land, clothes, utensils, food, and so on.[57]

The campaign was successful, but because the subjugated population was "untrustworthy" the Manzhous took them to their own land. The record of this march, given in *Taizong shilu,* says: "The Heilongjiang campaign; all the lands were subjugated; all the prisoners were entered into the register of the population; the troops returned with all of them."[58] Thirty-six of the officers were rewarded and promoted.

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[54] Ibid., Chapter 21, pp. 14b-16a.

[55] Ibid., p. 16a.

[56] Ibid., Chapter 23, pp. 7b-8a.

[57] Ibid., p. 10b.

[58] Ibid., pp. 9b-10a.

Troops under Wubahai and Jingguerdai moved against the Warka tribe on February 8, 1635. Their main objective was the area of Niman, which had a population of over 1,000 persons. Their instructions were to take the strictest precautions. They were particularly warned to guard and look after prisoners; in this connection the dismal example was cited of the generals Dazhuhu, Dongo, and Kuiman, who were killed by Warka prisoners.[59]

The biggest campaign against the Warka tribe commenced on November 15, 1635. Manzhou troops advanced in four columns: the first under Wubahai in the direction of Eheikulun and Eleyuesuo; the second under Duojili towards Yalan, Xilin, and Huye; the third under Zhafuni towards Akuli and Niman; and the fourth under Wushita towards Nuolei and Awan. In this campaign the Manzhous used firearms.[60] Sources tell of the capture of a huge number of prisoners, horses, cattle, and pelts.[61]

Manzhou chronicles speak of repeated Warka risings. In 1637, for instance, a force of 3,700 troops under Nikan was sent to subdue the Warka tribe; after suppressing the rising the Manzhous brought back 12,000 prisoners.[62] But no other major operation was undertaken: most of the Warka had apparently been incorporated in the Manzhou organisation and resettled. Twelve *niurhus* were formed of Warka tribesmen.[63]

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[59] Ibid., Chapter 21, pp. 22a-23b.

[60] Ibid., Chapter 25, pp. 25b-28c; see also *Dongbei bianfang jiyao* (Most Important Records on the Protection of the Northeast Frontier), Chapter 1, p. 14a; *A Description of Jilin,* Chapter 12, p. 23a; *Manzhou yuanliu kao* (A Study of the Origin of the Manzhous), Chapter 8, p. 4b. The rivers Akulihe and Nimanhe are designated in the *Atlas* as right-bank tributaries of the upper reaches of the Ussuri. According to the Qianlong *Atlas* (Section 4, Sheet 3a), Eheikulun and Eleyuesuo were situated to the northeast of these rivers.

[61] Ibid., Chapter 28, pp. 4b-5a, 16b-17a, 41b, 52a; Chapter 29, p. 3b.

[62] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 159, pp. 6a-7a.

[63] The second *niurhu* of the Yellow Banner second regiment; the sixteenth *niurhu* of the White Banner first regiment; the ninth *niurhu* of the first regiment and the seventeenth *niurhu* of the third regiment of the Bordered White Banner; the eighth *niurhu* of the second regiment and the sixth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered Red Banner; the eleventh *niurhu* of the second regiment and the fifteenth *niurhu* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 4, p. 7b; Chapter 5, p. 7a; Chapter 7, pp. 3a, 17a; Chapter 8, pp. 10b, 30a; Chapter 10, pp. 9a, 29b.

During this period the Manzhous were locked in struggle with the Solons.

General Samshika, who had won distinction in the struggle against other Amur tribes, was sent against the Solon chief Bomboguoer in December 1638.[64] This must have been a not very successful campaign. The Solons resisted staunchly.

For the Manzhous the war against Bomboguoer acquired growing significance. In December 1639 Abahai sent another large force against him.[65] This force penetrated deep into Solon territory, reaching the river Humar (Kumara).

In May 1640 the Manzhous launched several assaults and after a bloody siege captured four fortresses—Duochen, Asajin, Yakesa, and Duojin[66]—taking many prisoners and a large number of cattle, horses, and pelts.

Although they suffered heavy losses, the Solons went on resisting. However, the Manzhou numerical and armaments superiority made itself felt. Individual Solons began going over to the side of the enemy. In July 1640, for instance, 337 families of that tribe joined the Manzhous.[67] These were immediately resettled in the Mongolian steppe aimak of Guoerluos. Enough new settlers arrived to form eight *niurhus*.[68]

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[64] Ibid., Chapter 152, p. 17a.

[65] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 51, pp. 8a-10b; *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 152, pp. 13b-18a; *Notes on the Willow Stockade,* Chapter 1, pp. 16-17.

[66] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 51, pp. 8a-10b. Chinese historians identify Yakesa as Albazin, built by the Russians later, and locate it on the northern bank of the Amur; Duojin to the southwest of it on the southern bank; Asajin on the northern bank; and Duochen to the east of it.

[67] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 51, pp. 32a-b.

[68] Ibid., Chapter 52, p. 12b. These *niurhus* are not listed in the Eight Banners. *A Description of the Eight Banners* does not mention them. Sources speak only of one and a half *niurhus* in the Manzhou banners composed entirely or partially of Solons: these are the first (half-strength) *niurhu* of the Bordered Yellow Banner fifth regiment, formed in 1640, and the fifteenth *niurhu* of the Bordered Blue Banner fifth regiment, in which the Solons were only one of the five ethnic groups comprising it. Two other Solon *niurhus* were raised later, in 1662 and 1683. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 3, p. 27a; Chapter 5, pp. 5b, 27a; Chapter 10, p. 29b.

In August 1640 Abahai sent the general Xiteku against Bomboguoer. The latter fled to Mongolia, but Xiteku caught up with him in the vicinity of Qiluotai, capturing his baggage train, wives and children.[69] Another 1,470 Solons went over to the Manzhous in June 1641.

In parallel, the Manzhous warred against the Huerha tribe. Under the dateline March 26, 1640, we read in the *Taizong shilu* of a battle near a place called Wuchikala, where 110 prisoners were taken.[70] In October 1642 the Manzhous raided the Huerhas living in the basin of the Sungari River, where they seized ten villages and over 1,400 prisoners;[71] in the next year 1,619 Huerhas living in this area joined the Manzhous voluntarily.[72] On May 4, 1643, Abahai's troops marched against the Huerhas of Heilongjiang.[73] In a dispatch dated July 10 it is stated that three villages—Boheli, Nuoerker, and Duli—were taken by assault (725 men were captured); four villages—Da Keerdasu, Xiao Keerdasu, Chuokuchan, and Nengjier (324 men and 29 women)—surrendered to the Manzhous. Moreover, the Manzhous seized 317 horses, 402 cattle, four fur coats, and over 1,500 valuable pelts.[74] Eight *niurhus* consisting of men from the "Huerha locality" were listed in the Manzhou Eight Banners.[75] Huerha was the name used by the Manzhous to designate the various tribes, clans, and groups inhabiting a vast territory stretching from the frontier of Korea to the upper reaches of the Amur. Knowing little about these population groups on account of their remoteness and the absence of constant long-term contact with them, the Manzhous called them by the blanket name Huerha, Huerka, or Huerhai, usually with the addition of the name of their locality. In sources we find names like "Huerha tribe of the Eastern Sea", "Huerha tribe of Songalijiang", and "Huerha tribe of Heilongjiang".

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[69] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 53, pp. 20a-b.

[70] Ibid., Chapter 51, pp. 1b-2a; Chapter 52, pp. 5b-6a; Chapter 55, p. 30ab.

[71] Ibid., Chapter 62, p. 22ab; Chapter 64, p. 5a.

[72] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 172.

[73] *Taizong shilu,* Chapter 64, p. 16b.

[74] Ibid., pp. 25b-26a.

[75] The thirteenth *niurhu* of the Bordered Yellow Banner second regiment; the second *niurhu* of the White Banner second regiment; the twelfth *niurhu* of the Red Banner third regiment; the first *niurhu* (half-strength) of the Blue Banner second regiment; the second *niurhu* of the third regiment and the twelfth and fifteenth *niurhus* of the fifth regiment of the Bordered Blue Banner. See *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 3, p. 12a; Chapter 5, p. 8a; Chapter 6, p. 14a; Chapter 9, p. 6a; Chapter 10, pp. 12b, 28a, 29b.

Sources contain no information on the economic links of the Manzhous with the Huerha in this early period. Nuerhaqi and his successor were interested in the Huerha exclusively from the viewpoint of increasing the numerical strength of the Manzhou troops and the population of the Jianzhou area.

Despite the many campaigns against the Huerha, far from all their branches were brought under Manzhou influence. Individual clans remained independent not only in the day of Nuerhaqi and Abahai, but even as late as the first half of the eighteenth century. The names of the towns and settlements of this tribe are met with relatively rarely in historical documents. This circumstance makes it difficult to identify the territory inhabited by the Huerha.

They lived mainly in the basin of the present Mudan Jiang River (which in the period of the Manzhou campaigns was called Huerhahe), to the north of where it joined the Sungari River, the lower reaches of the Sungari and the basin of the middle Amur approximately up to the mouth of the Ussuri.

According to B. O. Dolgikh, in the early second half of the seventeenth century, these regions were densely populated by the Diuchers, kin to the Manzhous.[76] The Huerha spoke a language close to that of the Manzhous and, like the Diuchers, lived a settled life in villages and settlements. There is every reason to identify the Amur Huerha with the Diuchers.

Tribes of another group, the Woji, settled west of the Wula and to the east up to the Ussuri, with the Huifa and two Changboshan tribes (the Neyin and the Zhusheli) as their immediate neighbours in the south. In the southeast some of their lands extended to the basin of the Suifenhe.[77]

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[76] B. O. Dolgikh, "Clan and Tribal Composition of the Peoples of Siberia in the 17th Century", *Trudy Instituta etnografii*, Vol. 55, Moscow, 1960, p. 607.

[77] Some statistics on the Manzhou population of the Suifen area are given in Y. P. Lebedeva, "Settlement of the Manzhou

The Warka were settled compactly in the basin of the Tumenjiang and the upper reaches of the Ussuri, extending east and northeast to the sea coast and offshore islands.

Research conducted by L. Y. Shrenk shows that in the nineteenth century hardly any substantial change occurred in land area settled by a number of tribes of the Maritime Territory, compared with the seventeenth century.[78] Consequently, the Warka of the upper reaches of the Ussuri are the Orochi (Udegei) or their ancestors, while the Woji are probably the ancestors or predecessors of the Nanai (Golds).

For the Manzhous the campaigns against the Solons were the most arduous, and they were extremely costly to both sides in terms of casualties. All the Manzhous got from the Solons after these long wars was the payment of a "tribute", but this hardly compensated for the gifts that had to be made. No Manzhou viceroy or governor was ever appointed to the Solon lands. Up until 1684 the Manzhous built no populated localities or fortifications on these lands. Only a small number of Solons were enlisted into the Manzhou banner forces. Later, when the Manzhous began the conquest of China they ceased all contacts with the Solons (with the exception of irregular receipt of "tribute" and the giving of gifts in exchange). There is no information in sources about the life of the Solons following their nominal subjugation by the Manzhous.

Hardly any mention is found in sources about the lands of the Solons. It was possible to ascertain where the renowned prince Baerdaqi (Baldachi) lived only thanks

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Clans at the Close of the 16th and the Beginning of the 17th Century", *Ucheniye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo instituta im. A. I. Gertsena,* Vol. 132, 1957, p. 78.

However, despite its title, Lebedeva's essay was of little use in identifying these tribes with present-day ethnic groups of the Maritime Territory and the Amur region. It offers important data on the nomenclature of Manzhou clans, but speaks only in general terms about the regions inhabited by them as mentioned in the interesting 1744 Manzhou source entitled *Zhakun gusai manzhusai mukun hala be wuheli ezhehe bitehe* (A General Review of the Manzhou Clans in the Eight Banners). Unfortunately, Lebedeva made no attempt whatever to identify the localities inhabited by these clans with any present-day regions.

[78] L. Y. Shrenk, *On Aliens in the Amur Territory,* St. Petersburg, 1883, Vol. 1, pp. 13-17, 97-125.

to Russian sources. According to conclusions drawn by B. O. Dolgikh, his small fortress was on the Zeya River, half-way between the mouth of the Tom and the mouth of the Zeya. The basin of the Zeya up to its mouth may thus be assumed to have been inhabited by the Daurs, who tilled the soil, while the basin of the Tom was inhabited by the Tungus, who were also subjects of Baldachi.[79] The town of Baldachi had no more than 400 inhabitants. This is evidence that Baldachi had little influence.[80] In Manzhou sources he is called a "chief of the Solons". Hence the "Solons" of Manzhou sources were, in some cases, the Daurs (who were the most active ethnic element of the upper Amur and Zeya, embracing the Tungus and the Diuchers).

The aforesaid enables us, in my view, to draw the following conclusions.

Apart from the tribes of the Manzhou and Hulun unions, the *niurhus* of the Manzhou banner forces included other groups of the population: ancestors of the present-day Nanais (Golds), Udegeis, and Oluochis (Orochis). Manzhou *niurhus* were formed also of non-Manzhou tribal groups close to the Mongols, such as the Solons, among whom there is every reason to include the Sahaercha, the Huyaercha, the Huerha, people from the Zhan locality, and others. Lastly, there is direct evidence that there were some Mongol *niurhus* in the Manzhou banner forces. All these elements were assimilated actively by the Manzhous.

The formation of the Manzhou nation proceeded in the relatively small territory of Jianzhou in direct proximity of the Ming frontier wall in the Liaodong Peninsula, east of the Fushun gate and west of Changboshan. The core of the tribal union consisted of the Jianzhou Nüzhi (Zhuerzhens).

To meet the economic requirements of the lands of the Jianzhou tribal union and the far-ranging military ambitions of Nuerhaqi and Abahai there had to be a much larger population. In this respect, the many neighbouring tribes, all kin of the Manzhous, were a large reserve. The cardinal objective of the distant campaigns against these tribes was to bring them into territory controlled by the Manzhous.

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[79] B. O. Dolgikh, op. cit., p. 585.

[80] Ibid., p. 597.

Manzhou sources give an idea of the geography of these campaigns. The main regions of these campaigns were the basins of the Sungari and its tributaries, the middle reaches of the Amur, and the basin of the Ussuri and its tributaries. In the northwest the Manzhous went as far as the town of Yakesa (later identified as Albazin); in the northeast they reached the Wuzhala area, which probably lay south of the confluence of the Mulinghe and the Ussuri.[81]

Information drawn from Manzhou sources indicates that these areas had a fairly dense population at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the latter half of that century the population diminished visibly as a result of brutal treatment by the invaders and the massive resettlement of prisoners in central regions controlled by the Manzhous, namely those in the Jianzhou area. The Manzhou conquests and the mass resettlement of the population were the cause of the desolation of the Northeast and the long delay in the growth of its productive forces. There can be no question of the Manzhous colonising lands beyond the territorial boundaries of their tribal union. The first attempt at developing outside territory was the conquest of Ningguta in 1610. However, the Manzhous were at the time unable to develop it economically and used it solely as a fortress. From Ningguta they periodically sent military expeditions to the north, northeast, and northwest for captives and loot.

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[81] See *Atlas...*, Section 4, Sheet 2b.

*V. S. MYASNIKOV*

# RUSSIAN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS ON THE MANZHOU CONQUEST OF CHINA

## (1618-1690)

The powerful political and social upheavals set in motion in the Far East and Middle Asia by the Manzhou conquests in the seventeenth century were recorded in many chronicles of that period: the Manzhous themselves and the peoples incorporated into the Qing empire kept such chronicles; moreover, official and semi-official records are extant in neighbouring countries that had diplomatic and commercial relations with the Manzhous. Notable among the latter are Russian archival documents on the history of Russo-Chinese and Russo-Mongolian relations.

The very first Russian mission—it was led by I. Petlin and arrived in Beijing in 1618—brought back to Moscow information on Manzhou raids into Ming China. Petlin's report states in part: "They (the Russian envoys.—*V. M.*) were told that shortly before their arrival Mual people had come by deceit and taken two towns from them (the Chinese.—*V. M.*).[1] Although Petlin calls the invaders "Mual people", in this case he meant not Mongols but precisely Manzhous, who in 1618 mounted a sudden cavalry raid and captured two Chinese towns—Fushung and Kaiyuan.[2]

In the latter half of the 1640s there were two states on the territory of China: the Manzhou Qing empire in the north, which is called the Bogdoi Kingdom in Russian documents, and the remnants of the national Chinese state in the south, which documents call Old China or the Nikang kingdom (from the Manzhou word *nikan*—Chinese).

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[1] *Russian-Mongolian Relations, 1607-1636.* A Volume of Documents, Moscow, 1959, p. 85 (in Russian).

[2] D. Pokotilov, *A History of the Eastern Mongols in the Period of the Ming Dynasty*, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 214 (in Russian).

Russians heard of this for the first time from a ruler of North Mongolia, Ceceng-hang, who in 1645 was visited by I. Pokhabov, son of a Yenisei boyar, and Y. Kulakov, a Tobolsk Cossack. Asked by them about the location of silver deposits, Ceceng-hang replied "he had no silver ore, but there is such ore in the Chinese state ruled by the Bogdoi King, and that it was a month's journey from Cisang-hang to the Bogdoi King. And he said that there is silver ore also in Old China, which is ruled by King Sadui, and that it is mined in a mountain ... and the journey from the Bogdoi King to Sadui takes three months."[3]

The Russian authorities in Siberia at first had no real knowledge about the Manzhou kingdom. The Yakutsk governor D. A. Frantsbekov sent Y. P. Khabarov to the Amur region in 1650, giving him instructions to dispatch "envoys to prince Bogdoi" to convert him "with his clan and tribe and all his bondsmen" into Russian subjects.[4] Khabarov did indeed make an attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the Manzhous, but the mission sent by him in 1652 under T. Y. Chechigin perished on the way.

Trustworthy information on the Manzhou conquest of China was obtained in 1656 during the stay in Beijing of the first official Russian embassy headed by F. I. Baikov. In his report the Russian ambassador wrote: "And the Chinese kingdom at Kangbalike (Beijing.—*V. M.*) is ruled by king Bogda of the Mugal nation,[5] while formerly it was ruled by the king of the Chinese nation, Daibahang[6]; but only 13 years ago the Chinese kingdom was conquered by the Mugals, and this Daibahang hanged himself."[7] The

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[3] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Mongolian Affairs Fund, Inventory 2, 1648, File 1, Sheet 7.

[4] *Syn otechestva* (Son of the Motherland), Book 1, 1840, pp. 104-112. Similar instructions were given by the Siberian Office to A. F. Pashkov, with a mandate to the governorship of Dauriya; moreover, he was instructed to convert the Nikang king into a Russian subject. See *Mandate to Afanasy Pashkov to the Governorship of Dauriya in 1655,* St. Petersburg, 1894, pp. 1-17 (in Russian).

[5] Like Petlin, Baikov calls the Manzhous Mongols.

[6] Distortion of Daiming-hang.

[7] The Ming Emperor Sizong hanged himself on April 25, 1644, when Li Zicheng's insurgent army entered Beijing.

Russians learned also of what happened to the deposed dynasty. "Behind him," Baikov writes, "he left his little son, whom Chinese courtiers took with them when they fled [to Ka]rhakchi, in Old China."[8]

Though sparing of words, this source very accurately characterises the Manzhous as foreign conquerors, who had seized key positions in the land and maintained their rule by force of arms. "There are few Mugals in the Chinese city of Kangbalike," the report continues, "while of Chinese there are great numbers. But the wuwangs,[9] or boyars, to draw a parallel in Russian, and all sorts of officials are of the Mugal nation. On horse and on foot the Mugals are all armed with selemas and saadaks,[10] while the Chinese move about, on foot and on horse, unarmed. Nor are there any Chinese at the state offices. Only the labourers and merchants are Chinese."[11]

For the Russian authorities the sources of information about the situation in China in the 1650s-1660s were not only the reports of ambassadors to the Beijing court but also accounts by numerous merchants—Bukharians (citizens of the Bukhara Khanate.—*Tr.*), Kirghizes, and Kalmyks, who were middlemen in Russo-Chinese commerce and went to Beijing with goods caravans (including the caravans of I. Perfilyev and S. Ablin).

In the 1760s the governor of Tobolsk P. I. Godunov summarised the accumulated documented information about the Qing empire and neighbouring countries in a literary work entitled *Notes on the Chinese Land and on Faraway India.*[12] He tells us that the throne in Beijing passed from the Manzhou Emperor Shunzhi (1644-1662) to Kangxi (1662-1723)—"his second son, who was 14 at the time" and that they were nomads of the "Diuerchit tribe[13] that lives near Siberia, in the land of Dauriya". Further, we learn that after his troops had seized the capital of China "the King drove all native Chinese out of his capital city to other, distant cities, and in their place settled his fellow Diuerchit tribesmen".[14]

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[8] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Russia's Relations with China Fund, Inventory 1, 1654, Book 1, Sheet 127.

[9] From the Chinese *wang,* i.e., a person with the hereditary title of prince.

[10] Swords and bows. *Saadak*—bowcase; *selema* or *sulema*—a short sword worn at the back.

[11] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Russia's Relations with China Fund, Inventory 1, 1654, Book 1, Sheet 128.

[12] This document was last published by P. Y. Skachkov (P. Y. Skachkov, "Notes on the Chinese Land", *Countries and Peoples of the East,* Issue II, Moscow, 1961, pp. 206-19 [in Russian]).

[13] Zhuerzhen.

Although by 1664 the Manzhous had taken possession of continental China, pockets of resistance remained for a fairly long time. Echoes of an anti-Manzhou rising in South and Southwest China, known in Chinese history as the rising of "three vassal princes" (1673-1683) and news of a war of resistance on the sea and of the defence of Taiwan reached Beijing when a Russian trade caravan led by Gavrila Romanov arrived in that city in 1674.

The fighting in the south created a tense political and economic situation in Beijing. Although the Manzhous gave Romanov and his fellow-merchants seven weeks in which to sell their goods, "trade was by far not as lucrative as before", the Russian merchants reported upon their return to Russia. They blamed this failure on the circumstance that the Manzhous "are at war with the Nikang kingdom, and the Nikang kingdom is none other than the old Chinese kingdom. It is now about 30 years since the Tatars conquered the Chinese kingdom and the royal generation fled to distant maritime Chinese lands, which are now called the Nikang kingdom by the imperial Tatars, and they have now mustered the Nikang troops. And the emperor sent two armies of 40,000 men each against them and these were defeated by the Nikangs, and they are now raising a new army and intend to send it against the Nikangs."[15]

The Manzhou officials closely questioned the Russian merchants about the numerical strength of the Russian troops in the Amur region. The Manzhous said they wanted this information because they were planning to send an ambassador to the Russian tsar to "request you, your Majesty, to send a few thousand men from your frontier fortresses to help against the Nikangs".[16] But this talk of assistance was no more than diplomatic artifice. Actually, the Manzhous were concerned about the security of their rear—their domains in Manzhou, Further, Romanov himself noted that "the emperor is now very weak and in great dread of your troops, your Majesty, in great fear of the Cossacks". The talk about a Manzhou embassy to Russia yielded no results, and at the end of the seven weeks the Manzhous ordered the Russian merchants "to leave the country for they were in great confusion over the Nikang war".[17]

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[14] *Countries and Peoples of the East*, p. 212.

[15] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Russia's Relations with China Fund, Inventory 2, 1674, File 1, Part 2, Sheets 158-73.

[16] Ibid., Sheets 173-74.

At the close of the 1670s the Russian ambassador and traveller N. G. Spafari gave the first Russian scientific and literary description of China and neighbouring countries. These contained information gathered by Jesuit missionaries and by the Russian ambassador, himself a well-travelled man—his observations and notes made during his journey to and sojourn in Beijing. The reservation must be made that in his works Spafari did not dwell on the history of the Manzhou conquest of China, referring the reader to M. Martini's *The Tatar War.*[18] But he was an experienced politician and could not close his eyes to such an important aspect of China's life as the reign of a foreign dynasty; his writings offer many interesting sketches that shed light on various aspects of Manzhou rule in China.

In his *Description of Asia*[19] Spafari writes the following about the seizure of the Beijing throne by the Manzhous: "Seeing that there were many traitors in the Chinese kingdom and that the kingdom was divided and ravaged by the Eastern Mungal Tatars and Ayouks, a small and undistinguished people living beyond the Great Wall of the East rose in arms. These are fishermen and they had no khan. They are called Zhuerzhi, known as Zhuchers to us. Tiyi, grandfather of the present khan, went as a predator beyond the Great Wall along an icebound river in winter and after much fighting with the Chinese conquered almost the whole of the Chinese kingdom, and they rule it to this day."[20]

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[17] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Russia's Relations with China Fund, Inventory 2, 1674, File 1, Part 2, Sheet 174.

[18] M. Martini, *De bello tatariko,* Antverpiae, 1654. Spafari calls this work the "Tatar Book".

[19] The full title of this work by N. G. Spafari is *A Description of the First Part of the Universe Called Asia in Which Is the Chinese State with Its Towns and Provinces.* Although the Spafari manuscript was published twice in the Russian language during the past half century, it was an archival rarity for more than two centuries, and for that reason we regard it as an archival source. Quoted from Nikolai Milescu Spafari, *Siberia and China,* Kishinev, 1960, which is the second printing of the copy of the manuscript belonging to F. T. Vasilyev. For other copies of the manuscript see N. G. Spafari, *A Description of the First Part of the Universe...,* Kazan, 1910 (in Russian).

Spafari, like his contemporary Western Sinologists, attributes China's conquest by the Manzhous mainly to her military weakness. In his description of the Chinese army he writes that "they have a great many troops, more than 100,000 of horse and foot, but these are poor troops as is seen from the fact that a small number of Bogdoi Mungals conquered the entire Chinese kingdom . . . For their part, the Bogdoi Mungals, who now rule the Chinese kingdom, have troop formation like the Chinese had, and there are more horse than foot. Further, the Bogdoi people are more warlike than the Chinese because they are, from their youth, not accustomed to farming and other arts, except that they learn to use the bow and to plunder and steal. For they are nomads, for which reason they can bear any burden and any hardship, like the Tatars, and the battles they give are in most cases bold and quick raids rather than open fighting."[21]

When Spafari visited Beijing the war in South China had reached a visible dimension, as may be judged from the observation of the Russian ambassador that "the present emperor has begun making great cannon, which are about seven feet long and very thick, and of these about 300 have been made and sent to the troops fighting the Chinese".[22] Spafari writes also of many risings of the local Chinese population against the Manzhous. Thus, in his description of Shandong Province, he notes: "The Bogdoi troops have ruined that land, for the people are courageous and unsubmissive, and they have risen time and again against the Bogdois, and for that reason many people have been killed and the land lies desolate."[23]

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[20] Nikolai Milescu Spafari, *Siberia and China,* p. 165 (in Russian). Writing, further, that the first Manzhou emperor of China was Shunzhi, who by "Chinese custom decreed a new genealogy and called it Taiqingga", Spafari notes: "The reasons for the war with the Chinese, the battles that were fought, and the conquest of China are described in detail in a special book on the Tatar war" (ibid., p. 165).

[21] Ibid., p. 223.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 252.

In noting the destruction wrought by the Manzhous, Spafari writes that this was caused not only by the war but is also a result of the nationalistic considerations of the Manzhou aristocracy that, as well as destroying the Chinese state, was determined to obliterate all memory of the Ming dynasty. In describing Nanking, the Russian ambassador observed that one of the wonders of the city was "the royal palace, great and magnificent... But when the Bogdois took it, they wantonly ravaged it, thereby wreaking vengeance on the Taiming dynasty, because that dynasty had driven the former Bogdois from the kingdom. These buildings were of great beauty, so much so that they were regarded as one of the marvels of the world. What suffered most were the fine royal tombs, all of which were destroyed by the Bogdois, and the very names were changed, and the title of Khan, and all that was honest and good."[24]

The endless wars waged by the Manzhous depleted the imperial exchequer. While under the Mings the annual revenues of the exchequer, according to Spafari, amounted to the astronomical sum of 150 million gold *chervontsi*, "the present revenues, under the Bogdois, have diminished on account of this continuous fighting, but even now the revenues are still great because from all countries they take one-tenth of all that is produced on the land".[25] The diminution of the imperial revenues correspondingly reduced the profits of the huge bureaucratic apparatus, and the salaries of officials, Spafari observed, "have fallen under the Bogdois to half of what they were because of the unceasing wars, for then they were paid lavishly, and now they are given only as much as will keep body and soul together".[26]

Spafari's report (*stateiny spisok*) contains information given him in Beijing by Jesuit missionaries serving at the Manzhou court. They obviously disliked their new masters, for "under the Nikang kings, they said, they lived peacefully and honourably, but then by God's will the Mongol or Tatar people, the worst and most ignoble, as if the dregs of other peoples and their own subjects, of the Nikangs, having bided their time until many traitors rose against the Nikang kings, and in this manner, together with them, they conquered such a glorious kingdom, and the great wonder of it is that at first they numbered 3,000, but later many traitors gathered around them". The present emperor, the Jesuits said, "is abhorred by the nobles and the people" because he "has become so impoverished that sometimes there is no money to pay even the troops, because the Chinese lands, which were better and rich, had recently surrendered, and they comprised almost half the kingdom. And the war has been going on ceaselessly and only God knows what all this will come to, and they fear they (the Manzhous.—*Ed.*) will be expelled again by the Chinese, and for that reason the Nikangs have been evicted from Beijing so that they do not resort to rebellion and treachery, and they now live outside the city. Also, they fear the Mongols living beyond the Wall, and also the Kalmyks; they envy them because such a small people had conquered such a large kingdom."[27]

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[24] Ibid., p. 264.
[25] Ibid., p. 192.
[26] Ibid., p. 195.

To conceal their weakness and accentuate their supremacy over all the states to whose emissaries audiences were granted, the Manzhou rulers of China made the observance of protocol mandatory for all foreigners arriving at the court. The Jesuit missionaries explained to Spafari that the Manzhous were adamant in insisting on a ceremony humiliating for the Russian ambassador above all in order "to show their Nikang enemies that in spite of the war with them they (the Manzhous.—*Ed.*) were unafraid even of such a great and glorious sovereign and would not alter their custom".[28]

The information brought by Spafari gave the Russian government a rather full picture of Russia's new neighbour in the Far East. For that reason the Russian diplomatic representatives sent to Beijing at the close of the seventeenth century—N. Venyukov and I. Favorov (1686), S. Korovin (1688), I. Loginov (1689), G. Lonshakov (1690), and Isbrant Ides (1692-1694)—were given specific assignments and not required to present a general description of the country. Besides, the very fact of their almost total isolation in Beijing gave them no opportunity to obtain exhaustive information about the political situation in the Qing empire. This is best illustrated by the story told by the Russian envoys N. Venyukov and I. Favorov of their treatment by the Qing authorities: "Nobody is allowed to see us at our inn, we sit behind locked doors, and can get no trustworthy information from anybody."[29]

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[27] *Stateiny spisok* of the Spafari mission is quoted from Nikolai Milescu Spafari, *Siberia and China,* p. 419.

[28] Ibid., p. 486.

As a result, Russian diplomatic documents of the latter half of the 1680s and the early 1690s, i.e., of the period when the Manzhous completed their conquest of China, crushing the remnants of resistance in the south, contain no detailed military, political, or economic information about the Qing empire.

However, G. I. Lonshakov, who visited Beijing in 1690, brought back to Moscow an interesting document that vividly recounts the history of the Manzhou invasion of China and sheds light on their status in the conquered nation. This was the manuscript *Notes About the Chinese Kingdom* by a clerk named Pyotr Khmelev.[30]

Pyotr Khmelev's story is remarkable. For ten years, from 1673 to 1683, he was clerk of the gubernatorial office in Tyumen, and in 1683 he was appointed clerk of the Irkutsk gubernatorial office. In 1682 the Russian possessions in the Amur region were made a province with its centre at Albazin, and when the new governor A. Tolbuzin passed through Irkutsk he took Khmelev with him and appointed him clerk of the Albazin gubernatorial office.[31]

Khmelev was thus an experienced clerk. He was relatively educated and in his official capacity had seen much of life in various Siberian towns. In 1685, when Albazin was seized by the Manzhous for the first time, Khmelev managed to pass the main valuables of the town authorities to the governor A. Tolbuzin: the royal seal, the money from the treasury, and the *Sobornoye ulozheniye* (Synod Code). However, in trying to save the office books and files, he dropped behind the governor, who had left the town, and fell, to use his own words, "into the savage

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[29] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* Russia's Relations with China Fund, Inventory 2, 1685, Column 1; Sheet 326.

[30] Ibid., The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheets 287-89.

[31] Ibid., Sheet 284 (petition from P. Khmelev for his release from captivity).

Bogdoi infidel, hellish, thrice-cursed maw",[32] into Manzhou captivity.

Five years passed. The Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 was signed. It gave the Manzhous the Albazin province among other territories. The number of captive Albazinians in Beijing grew, but the Manzhous categorically turned down the repeated Russian requests for an exchange or the ransom of prisoners. The Lonshakov mission to Beijing was one of the futile attempts to resolve the issue of prisoners and defectors.

The plight of these prisoners was reported to the Siberia Office in Moscow by the Nerchinsk Cossack squadron commanders A. Chichagov and Y. Sudeikin, who accompanied Lonshakov[33] to Beijing: "And about the Russian prisoners and traitors, they live in a special compound in the city. There they have a chapel, and this compound[34] is some three versts from the Embassy. After Grigory Lonshakov and some 20 Russian soldiers arrived they went to meet the Russian people in the compound, and in the chapel the Russian priest Maxim Vorozheikin led them in prayer to St. Nicholas. And Ofonka went with him, Grigory, to the compound and met with all these Russian people. Of Russian people in the compound they counted 48,[35] of whom 44 were captives and three were traitors. Other traitors live in other distant towns. These Russian people—the priest, and soldiers—wear Chinese dress, with only the headman and the sexton wearing Russian dress, and they are allowed to profess their Christian faith. And these Russian people came freely to the Embassy on all days, and these Russian people sent with Grigory Lonshakov to their Majesties the great Tsars a petition and a manuscript report (description or *rospis*) about the various

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[32] Ibid., Sheet 286.

[33] G. I. Lonshakov died in 1691 en route from Nerchinsk to Moscow soon after his return from China. Ibid., Sheets 276-77 (report of the Dauriya Cossack F. Kornilov to the Siberia Office on the death of G. I. Lonshakov).

[34] This compound was situated near the Dongzhimen Gate.

[35] According to Chinese sources there were about 100 captives. More than 30 were taken in 1685, and 72 in 1686-1687. Twelve were allowed to return as messengers with letters to the Russian authorities. The rest were enlisted into the banner troops. See He Qiutao, *Shuofang beicheng* (A Description of the Northern Frontier), Vol. 6, Chapter 47, Sheet 121.

Chinese affairs, and that petition and manuscript were taken by Grigory Lonshakov with him to Moscow."[36] This was *Rospis* (Description)—the Khmelev manuscript report.[37]

The Khmelev manuscript is thus a documented account of the situation in the Qing empire at the close of the 1680s and the early 1690s.[38] It was written, as we have already noted, by a fairly educated eye-witness, who had the opportunity, over a period of five years, to see life in China under the Manzhou yoke and to some extent generalise not only his own observations but also the direct experience of many other Russian captives. Short as it is, Khmelev's account is profound and accurate. The uniqueness of this document and the value of the information contained in it bracket its value with that of such major documents about seventeenth-century China as the *Description* by I. Petlin and the official reports or *Stateiniye spiski* of F. I. Baikov and N. G. Spafari.

The *Description* was written by Khmelev for I. Y. Vlasov, the former governor of Irkutsk (when Khmelev served in Irkutsk), who later was governor of Nerchinsk and an envoy with the Golovin mission at the signing of the Nerchinsk Treaty. Khmelev begins his narration with the words: "I am writing to Your Excellency Ivan Yevstafyevich about the land called China."

The main concern of the Russian prisoners was the security of the Russian possessions in Eastern Siberia. The memory of the armed aggression of the Manzhous in the Amur region was still fresh. Hence, Khmelev's close attention to the military activities of the Qing authorities in Northern Manzhou. "First, if God will, and may He guide our sovereign lords, we should have strength to oppose the Kingdom of China, for on the Amur they have built a town which they call Agul,[39] and it is not more than a

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[36] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheets 279, 281.

[37] Nothing is known of what happened later to Khmelev. Like the other Albazin captives, he was probably not allowed to leave Beijing by the Manzhous.

[38] Khmelev's *Description* is dated from the day the Lonshakov embassy departed from Beijing, i.e., not later than June 22, 1690. See *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheet 301.

[39] The fortress of Aigun, built by the Manzhous.

10 days' journey by river from Albazin. In that town there are about 15,000 troops with 150 or more cannon, and they keep the gunpowder not in the town but outside and this we know for a fact. Just outside is a rise and from that rise it would be convenient to fire from cannon.[40]

Khmelev correctly saw the weakness of the Manzhou army in its social heterogeneity and in the forcible recruiting of troops. "And in that town," he writes further, "there are many exiles, all honest people, and they have been recruited into horse or foot service, and what kind of soldiers will they make? As for the Mangchurs proper, the old and the young, they have long stopped caring for their king."[41]

Khmelev noted that the Manzhou invasion had greatly undermined the productive forces of China's agriculture: "I would say the stocks in the kingdom would hardly last for half a year, because grain is hardly grown near the kingdom capital, and in the years it is grown, the arable land is far away and those who till the soil are from other places. And the kingdom gets no benefit from the grain, because he who tills the land in the summer, spends all the grain for himself and his wives and children by the autumn. In the villages there are none of our, Russian, ways. They have neither sheep nor cattle, they weave no cloth, and they have never produced linen. Their only concern is to fill their bellies with groats and grasses for winter, and to leave some seed for the spring, and thus they drag out their lives. As for the kingdom's grain reserves, they are brought from distant towns. And as I have already said, there is not enough to last for half a year, because this whole reserve is for the troops."[42]

The Russian prisoners probably learned the circumstances of the consolidation of the Manzhou tribes and of their conquest of China from the Manzhous or Chinese. "And those known as Bogdois," Khmelev writes, "were formerly called Chuchars, and they lived in clans, and they were heathens and knew nothing of letters. When they began fighting the Mungals they were helped by the shaitan of their faith, and they conquered the Mungals and won and added to their power, and since then they have learned Mungal letters. And they subjugated the Mungals and began to seize small Chinese towns, and reached Mugdong, and in that city they set up their king and settled in it." [43]

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[40] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheet 287.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

Khmelev recounts a curious story of what induced the Manzhous to conquer China. According to him, a merchant named Li Zicheng seized Beijing but, finding himself unable to manage the country, he invited the assistance of the Manzhous, who established order.

Here is what Khmelev writes: "And after this merchant took the Chinese kingdom by deceit, he coveted the throne, but was unsuccessful. Thus it is written in their Mangchur books. And this merchant wrote to these Mangchurs to come and take the kingdom from his hands, and after they received this letter they came and took possession of this kingdom, and their rule is now in its 53rd year. [44] And now they have begun to call themselves Bogdois, but they are not Bogdois, they are Mangchurs. And those princelings who pledge loyalty are received by the king, and he gives them honours and titles, and his sisters and daughters in marriage, and these become Mangchurs." [45]

Khmelev was a member of the nascent bureaucracy in the Russian feudal state and served for many years in an atmosphere of bureaucratic corruption in Siberian towns. Even so, he was shocked by the burden of oppression imposed on the Chinese by the Manzhous. "And in the whole kingdom the Mangchurs do not comprise one-hundredth part of the population, because this was the kingdom of the Chinese. And now the Chinese are the slaves of the Mangchurs. The lowest soldier has three slaves, the commander of a squadron of 50 men has at least 10, while sotniks and dignitaries have 100, 200, and even 300 slaves, while others have much more, and all these slaves are Chinese, and this is their land, their kingdom." [46]

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[43] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheets 287-88.

[44] He probably takes his count from the year 1636, when Abahai proclaimed himself emperor.

[45] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheet 288.

[46] Ibid.

Association with Chinese residing in the capital enabled the Russian Cossacks to note their anti-Manzhou feeling. Khmelev writes of the possibility of a rising against the Manzhous: "These people believe that if a spark falls from anywhere it will kindle a rising against the Mangchurs that will be joined by the people of all the towns."[47]

The Manzhou conquerors did not encourage commerce and crafts. Khmelev writes: "And those in the kingdom who are merchants and artisans get nothing from the king."

The Manzhou aristocracy entered into marriage only within the narrow circle of their kin. "And he, the king," Khmelev writes, "gives his sisters and daughters in marriage to Mungal nobles, and if a daughter born to such a Mungal from his sister or daughter attracts him, he takes her to wife or makes her a concubine."[48]

Khmelev noted the parasitical way of life of even ordinary Manzhous in China—this marked the beginning of the total disintegration of Manzhou rule in the conquered country and turned the army of conquerors into a caste of sybarites. "All the foot soldiers are serfs,[49] and throughout the kingdom there are numerous cavalry squadrons of 100 men, and each squadron has about 20 foot soldiers. What sort of troops are these? They are not trained for anything: their service consists of clearing the roads wherever the king goes, and guarding and locking gates, and laying matting, and nothing more."[50]

Thus, although the information contained in Russian seventeenth-century archival sources is fragmentary it sheds light on some circumstances of the Manzhou invasion of China and on Manzhou rule in an enslaved country.

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid., Sheets 288-89.

[49] Misspelled in the manuscript.

[50] *Central State Archives of Ancient Acts,* The Siberia Office Fund, Column 544, Part 2, Sheet 288.

*G. V. MELIKHOV*

# MANZHOU PENETRATION INTO THE BASIN OF THE UPPER AMUR IN THE 1680s

Ningguta (the modern town of Ningan) was the advanced Manzhou outpost in the Northeast in the 1680s. In 1674, with the basin of the Middle and Lower Amur being settled by Russians, the Qings began planning a campaign of conquest against the Russian settlements along that river, with Albazin as the main objective.

They needed a springboard for this campaign, a starting point that would be more convenient than Ningguta, which was situated far from the Upper Amur. This made the small town of Jiling-wula (Jilin) on the Sungari River of great strategic importance.

The building of the present town of Jilin was started in 1674. The residence of the governor (*jiangjun*) of Ningguta was moved to Jilin in 1676 and his title was changed to "*Jiangjun* of Ningguta and Other Places".

A shipyard was founded on the site of the future town as early as 1661 specifically to build warships to be used against the Russians.[1] The Jilin naval force, constituted in 1674 to man river vessels, consisted of 319 men (250 sailors and 45 civilian craftsmen—the others were officers and officials).[2] A post road with a great many stations linked Jilin with Mukden and Beijing.

*Notes About the Willow Stockade* tell us that Jilin was a large trade centre outside the empire's borders.[3]

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[1] Yang Bin, *Liubian jilue* (Notes About the Willow Stockade), Shanghai, 1936, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 8.

[2] A. V. Rudakov, *On the History of Chinese Culture in Jilin Province (1644-1902)*, Vol. 1, Vladivostok, 1903, p. 563 (in Russian).

[3] *Notes About the Willow Stockade*, Chapter 1, p. 24.

Despite the considerable activity of the Manzhous in the Northeast, prompted by the Russian advance in the Amur Basin, the vast Ningguta territory and Jiling-wula with its lands were not incorporated by the Manzhous in the Qing empire, continuing to remain external territories.[4]

Such was the status fixed for them by the building of the so-called Willow Frontier or Willow Stockade (Liu Bian), which, in fact, consisted of a line of fortifications and posts surrounding Mukden Province, in other words, the territory actually controlled and officially incorporated at the time in the empire; the Ningguta or Jilin lands were outside this frontier.

The building of this new line of fortifications was assigned to Anzhuhu,[5] the new Manzhou governor of Mukden. He was appointed in 1678. Before beginning the project, he made a tour of inspection of the Northeast and recommended widening the empire's frontier in this region by an average of 20 li.

Further, the source says: "(On lands) extending several thousand li from west to east (Anzhuhu) built a stockade of (willow) stakes (*li mu zha*) with fortified gates. (At these gates) he stationed border garrisons (*she bing fang shou*). He rebuilt the roads, giving them a higher bed."[6]

This was by no means a symbolic frontier. For its day it was powerfully fortified, consisted of a double row of tall willow stakes, the space between the rows being filled with earth. A deep ditch ran along the external side.

The Willow Stockade extended from Shanhaiguan in the southwest, to Weiyuanpu in the north, and in the southeast it substantially widened the territory of the former Ming Liaodong Peninsula, incorporating in the empire the lands of the former Manzhou capital of Xingjing and the territory of the former region of Jianzhou. In the south it ended at the Fenghuangshan Mountains.

Its second line ran from Weiyuanpu to the Fateha Gate (about 345 kilometres long). It was completed by Anzhuhu in 1681, and was also built of willow stakes, hence the name "frontier of willow stakes" (*liutiao bian*). This line

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[4] Ibid., p. 5.

[5] He is mentioned in *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 151, pp. 3b-7b.

[6] Ibid.


Nerchinsk (1654)
Shilka
Argun
Ust-Strelochniy (1650-51)
Amur
Albazin (1651)
Soldatovo
Pokrovskaya (1676-77)
Andryushkina (1676-77)
(Albazikha)
Amurchic
Zeya
Verkhozeisky (1675-76)
Selemdzha
Selemdzhinsky (1677-78)
Zeya
Gilyuiskoye (1676-77)
Humar (Kumara)
Argunsky (1681)
Komarsky (1652)
Tom
Dolon (1674-75)
Bureya
Nunjiang
Aigun (1683)
Argun (Hailar)
Dalai Nur
Mergen (1690)
Amur
Qiqihar (1691)
Sungari
Nunjiang
Mudanjiang (Huerha)
Mulinghe
Ningguta (1636)
Sungari
Girin (Jilin) (1674)
Xiliaohe
Xar Moron
Laohahe
Kaiyuan
Mukden (Shenyang)
Fushun
Liaohe
Yalujiang
SEA OF JAPAN
China's border at the end of Ming rule
The Willow Stockade (construction started in 1678)
Ningguta (1636) ■ Qing strongpoints (year of foundation)
Albazin (1651) ● Russian settlements along the Amur (year of foundation)
120
0
120
240
360 km

Development of the Amur basin in the late 17th c.

separated the territory of the Mongol nomads from that of Ningguta and Jilin.[7]

In this fortified frontier there were guarded gates, through which people travelling to and out of the empire had to pass. Passage was strictly controlled.

According to *A Description of Mukden*, the Willow Stockade was more than 1,300 kilometres long—from Fenghuangcheng to Shanhaiguan and from Weiyuanpu to Fateha. Troops guarding this frontier were stationed near the gates (of which there were 20).[8] Kaiyuanxian was garrisoned in 1680, and Tielingxian in 1690.[9] The territory beyond the Willow Stockade was regarded as external and was called such in innumerable official documents and edicts.

With the stationing of garrisons and guards along the entire length of the Willow Stockade, which demarcated the territory officially incorporated in the Qing empire in the northeast at the close of the 1680s, stricter rules were introduced for persons crossing the frontier. Even Manzhou banner officers and soldiers sent across the frontier to hunt, fish, collect ginseng, or on other missions had to have a special pass signed by the governor of Mukden.[10]

Having thus noted the northeastern frontier of the Qing empire as recognised by the Manzhous themselves, let us trace the advance of the Manzhous in the land lying between the centres settled by them (Ningguta and Jilin) and the lands of the Upper Amur, where Russians had settled by then.

The Heilongjiang lands attracted the Manzhous and were later made a separate administrative unit.

The first efforts of the Manzhous to administer the territory of Heilongjiang date from 1684, when Kangxi issued an edict appointing the first governor of Heilongjiang and the Manzhous began building the town of Aihun. We read the following about this town in the official *Description of Mukden:* "Aihuncheng (is situated) on foreign territory north of the town (of Ningguta). In the 23rd year of his reign Kangxi (1684.—*G. M.*) ordered a town to be built in that locality. A governor and a *fudutong* were appointed to protect it. It is more than 1,000 li away from the frontier. The building of a post road there has not yet been authorised. An imperial edict has yet to be issued to order a thorough survey of the mountains, rivers, and population centres [of this territory].[11] The first governor was the Manzhou Sabsu.[12] Prior to this time official Qing historiography only mentions Heilongjiang as allegedly being within the jurisdiction of the Mukden authorities from the 1st year of Shunzhi (1644)[13] and under the jurisdiction of the Ningguta *amban-zhangjiling* from the 10th year of his reign (1653),[14] but contains no data either of the system of administration, the territory itself, or the administrators, thus casting doubt on the trustworthiness of this information.

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[7] *A Summary of Qing Dynasty Documents*, Shanghai, 1936, Vol. 2, Chapter 182, pp. 6427-6428.

[8] *Shengjing tongzhi* (A Description of Mukden), Beijing, 1684, Chapter 11, p. 6a.

[9] *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 24, pp. 2a-b.

[10] Ibid., Chapter 21, pp. 1a-b.

The Russian diplomat and Sinologist M. D. Khrapovitsky noted in a memorandum: "If these lands (Heilongjiang Province.—*G. M.*) had once belonged to the Manzhou rulers, who governed them? The geography of gubernias, as well as of oblasts, okrugs, and uyezds, published by the government, is clear to the last detail down to the designation of officials; can one assume that this accuracy was not observed solely with respect to lands requiring special attention and distinctness in official documents on account of their contiguity with lands of another state? On the contrary, it must be assumed that in this case the Manzhou government would not have omitted to use the least evidence in favour of its priority and legality in the possession of these lands if only because it found troops of another state in them, used armed force to expel these troops from the localities held by them, and asserted its power instead of that of Russia."[15]

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[11] *A Description of Mukden,* Chapter 10, pp. 20a-b.

Authoritative Qing sources state that the Manzhous were newcomers to the Amur, who first settled there in the 1680s as a result of the aggressive military operations started by the Qing empire against Russian possessions in that territory. For example, *Heilongjiang tongzhi* (A General Description of Heilongjiang) declares: "The Manzhous (*Manzhou ren*) came here (to the town of Qiqiharr in the Amur Region.—*G. M.*) in the 21st year of the reign of Kangxi (1682.—*G. M.*) from Jilin and Ningguta in a military campaign led by the *jiangjun* Sabsu; all the troops were left here in permanent frontier garrisons. Their families were (also) resettled here from Jilin and other places" (*Heilongjiang tongzhi,* Chapter 7, p. 3a).

[12] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 167, p. 18b and others.

[13] See Zhao Quancheng, *Qingdai dili yange biao* (Tables of Alterations in the Territorial-Administrative Division of the Qing Empire), Shanghai, 1955, p. 27.

[14] "Jilin waiji" (Unofficial "Description of Jilin") in *Huangchao fanshu yudi congshu,* Shanghai, 1896, p. 6a.

Nor do sources give any indication that the administration of these lands was turned over by the Manzhous to local clan headmen; this circumstance likewise could hardly be an omission. In *Notes About the Willow Stockade* the Heilongjiang territory is called *jimi zhi guo*, which literally means "lands for the inhibition (fettering) of forces". Sources tell us (this concerns the first half of the 18th century): "The Aihun *jiangjun* has jurisdiction over lands: in the east up to the sea; in the west up to Nibuchu (Nerchinsk.—*G. M.*) and the frontier with Russia; in the south up to the frontier with Ningguta; and in the north up to the sea (! ?).[16] None of these lands (under the jurisdiction of the *jiangjuns* of Ningguta and Aihun.—*G. M.*) *are divided into districts or incorporated in the territory of the empire, while a large part of them are jimi lands* (my italics.—*G. M.*)."[17]

Yang Bin, the Chinese author of *Notes About the Willow Stockade*, lived in the northeast for many years and intimately knew the situation in that territory. He wrote: "The town of Aihun or Aihu in Heilongjiang... On the eighth moon of the second year of the reign of Tianming of Great Qing (September 1616.—*G. M.*) Nuerhaqi ordered Daerhan and Shunkeluo-batulu to march there in battle order. Eleven villages were seized. Later they paid tribute as *jimi guo*."[18]

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[15] M. D. Khrapovitsky, *Some Remarks About the Duration and Legality of the Manzhou Dynasty's Possession of the Left Bank of the Amur*, manuscript, Manuscript Dept., State Foreign Literature Library, Fund 273, Carton No. 22, Storage Unit No. 6, pp. 450a-450b (in Russian).

[16] For the Chinese the Amur and Maritime territories were a blank spot in the true sense of the word. Some Ming maps, notably, *Guang yu tu*, call the territory immediately beyond Korea, north of it, by the name Binghai or Ice Sea, showing it as occupying the entire area north of the Amur. The "frontier" of Heilongjiang was evidently seen as running up to this mythical sea.

[17] *Notes About the Willow Stockade*, Chapter 1, p. 5.

[18] Ibid., p. 16.

It is also indicative that in the edict on the institution of the post of *jiangjun* of Heilongjiang the actual territory of this region is not stated. It was apparently unknown to the Manzhous. The fragmentary mention of this territory, and it is to be found only in *Notes About the Willow Stockade*, dates from a much later period. In our view, the most noteworthy thing is that the source speaks of the territory of Ningguta and Heilongjiang solely as "territory for the inhibition of forces".[19]

By the 1680s Russian development of the basin of the Amur, especially, of the river's upper reaches, was proceeding energetically. This made the Manzhous increasingly anxious about the destiny of their ancestral lands in the northeast, which had been left without adequate military protection because of the need to keep the banner troops on the territory of conquered China.

Albeit incompletely, a Kangxi edict of 1682 gives an idea of the boundaries of Russian settlement: "The Russians have entered the lands of our Heilongjiang... Lately we have learned that they have moved much farther, crossing beyond the Niman and Hengkun and reaching the lands of the Hezhe and Feiyaka tribes."[20]

From this M. D. Khrapovitsky draws the following conclusion: "The edict thus recognises that by that time the Russians were in possession of the entire northern bank of the Amur, for the Niuman (Bureya.—*G. M.*) River joins the Amur far below the town of Aigun or Aihun, while the

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[19] The political content of the term *jimi guo* (inhibition territory) needs a closer examination. Under the Qings it was used to designate lands north, northeast, and northwest of Liaodong, in other words, chiefly the territories on which the Mings had created the so-called Nuergan Administration in the early fifteenth century. Some Ming sources call the districts of this Administration *jimi wei,* meaning districts administered not by the Mings but by local chiefs. The Ming term was used by the author of the *Notes* when he wrote of these lands under the Qings. It may be assumed that this term referred to tribes that were self-administering and had treaty relations with the empire, which, possibly, committed them to behave loyally and protect the borders of their ally against raids by other tribes.

[20] "Shengzu Renhuangdi Shilu (Accurate Records of the Reign of the Emperor Shengzu Renhuangdi)", *Da Qing lichao shilu,* Tokyo, (1937), Chapter 104, pp. 9a-b (further—*Shengzu shilu*); *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 153, pp. 13a-b,

Hengkun (Amgun.—*G. M.*) falls into the Amur from the West, near its mouth."[21]

The boundaries of Russian settlement were not limited to the regions named in the edict. For example, in *A Description of the Eight Banners* there is mention of a Russian village with a large area of arable land and headman named Wa-xi-li (Vasili?) on territory east of the Great Xinggang Range.[22] There, as elsewhere, the Russian settlers were farmers.

Kangxi used military force, chiefly against Albazin, in order to halt further Russian settlement. The Manzhous masked this aggression with the pretext of "protecting" the numerically small ethnic groups inhabiting the Amur region from alleged Russian oppression and tyranny. However, not a single official Qing source contains so much as a hint of any Amur people ever asking the Qings for assistance or protection against the Russians. On the contrary, Qing sources cite innumerable instances of the Manzhous massacring local Amur inhabitants, taking large numbers of them to the south, compelling exchanges, and so forth. The regions where Russian settlements were situated, including the town of Albazin, were unknown to the Manzhous. More, they hardly knew the approaches to them. Before any effective operations could be started it was necessary to thoroughly survey the various localities, ascertain their natural conditions, terrain, system of communications, and so on. And even earlier, they had to have information on the natural conditions of regions situated much closer, for instance, Jilin, and the main waterways of these regions.

Kangxi started his preparations by sending two officials, Lantan and Pengchun, "to the lands of the Daurs and the Solons under the guise of hunting for deer, while actually to spy in the settlements (of the Russians) and reconnoitre". This was in September 1682. The above-mentioned edict on the territory settled by Russians was addressed precisely to Lantan and Pengchun, who were given an audience by the emperor before their departure. Kangxi's instructions to them clearly characterise how much the

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[21] M. D. Khrapovitsky, op. cit., p. 453.

[22] *A Description of the Eight Banners*, Chapter 153, p. 28a.

Manzhous knew of the territories to which they were sending these emissaries:

"Upon reaching the lands of the Solons and the Daurs you will send a messenger to the town of Nibuchu (Nerchinsk) to announce that you have come to hunt deer. Meanwhile, keep a careful record of the distance and go, hunting, by land along the bank of the Amur by the shortest route to the town of Yakesa (Albazin). Thoroughly reconnoitre its location and situation. I think the Russians will under no circumstance venture to attack you. If the Russians offer you food you shall accept it and show your gratitude accordingly. Should the Russians attack you, you will under no circumstances give battle to them. In that case you will lead your people back. For I have my own plan.

"On your way back you will carefully watch for a waterway suitable for vessels sailing from Heilongjiang (?) to Esuli. And when you reach Esuli, from there a straight route (?) leads to Ningguta (!), and some of the *canlings* and *siweis* (senior officers.—*G. M.*) in your party should go with Sabsu and find the way."[23]

In January 1683 Kangxi received a despatch from Lantan and Pengchun. It stated: "We, Your subjects, in accordance with Your Imperial command, went hunting from the border locality of the Dahuli (Daurs?) Molegen. Within 16 days we reached the Russian town of Yakesa. On the way we scrupulously surveyed the terrain. Although there are no impassable mountains, there are dense forests all around... This is the general picture from Xingan to Yakesa. It may be assumed that it is impossible to travel in these places in winter, when snow lies on the ground; in summer there are heavy rains and the way is blocked by drifts. One can move if one travels slowly and has little baggage, but it would be hard with a heavy baggage train. On the way back we sailed with the stream of the Heilongjiang, (the Amur.—*Ed.*), reaching Aigun in 15 days."

Further, the spies reported that there were convenient, level banks, "along which vessels may be hauled": "From the town of Aihun to where the Heilongjiang and the Sungari (Songhuajiang) meet it is a 15 days' journey by horse.

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[23] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 104, pp. 9a-b; *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 153, p. 29b.

From the confluence of these two rivers the journey to the town of Yakesa may be made in one month by horse; by ship against the stream it will take three months. By ship, although the journey is much longer, provisions and heavy guns may be taken directly to Yakesa. Formerly, when the Russians built a town of wood at Wuzhala and lived in it, the Ningguta *fudutong* Haise attacked them, but he was unsuccessful. Later, the Russians built another town at the mouth of the Humar (Kumara) River and the *dutong* Mingandali attacked but did not take it. Since then the Russians have been attaching great importance to the building of wooden towns, believing they can live safely in them... It is our opinion that Yakesa cannot be destroyed without foreign cannon."[24]

Because he was totally unprepared for it, Kangxi had to postpone his campaign. However, an imperial edict explains this delay as follows: "According to the despatch from Lantan and his companions, to capture the Russians would be very easy (?!); not more than 3,000 soldiers would be needed. We believe this to be correct, but it is not a good thing to send soldiers. The operation should be postponed. Troops to the number 1,500 must be moved from Wula (Jilin) and Ningguta, the building of ships of war must be started, and it is necessary to send cannon and instructors. Wooden towns, which would stand against the Russians, must be built at two places—at the Heilongjiang and Humar. And operations must commence at a certain moment. Provisions for the troops must be taken in all the ten korqing banners, and also in the settlements of Xibo and Wula. From there it should be possible to get about 12,000 dans, which should suffice for three years. Furthermore, as soon as our troops arrive they should begin the cultivation of the land so that there is no shortage of food. The town of Heilongjiang will stand near the Solon villages, and it may be reached by a journey of five nights' sleep. And between these points there must be one (?!) post station. With the arrival of our troops at the Jingjiliwula River, the Solons must be told to supply them with cattle and sheep, by which they shall have done a great and useful service. In this manner, the Russians will no longer be able to receive defectors from us, while defectors from their side will go to us in an endless stream. In this event, of course, the Russians will not hold out for long."[25]

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[24] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 153, pp. 13a-14a.

Thus, Kangxi initially believed the Manzhous would easily resolve major logistical problems. However, he had a very inaccurate idea of the distances between the various localities on the Amur and of the potentialities of the Solons to supply the Manzhou troops. It proved much harder to carry out these plans. The problem of supplying troops was particularly difficult.

As we have already noted, troops from Jilin and Ningguta were to be quartered in two localities near the Russians—on the Humar River and at Aigun. Their commander, Bahai, was asked to report what he thought about the plan for the upcoming campaign and the best way of quartering troops after their contemplated arrival on the Amur. Bahai reported that Aigun and the Humar were much too far from Albazin and in the event the troops were divided into two groups the Manzhou forces would be weakened. Further, Bahai reported that Nerchinsk stood behind Albazin, and the Russians could receive assistance from it. He planned to have his troops near Albazin at the close of August 1683 and to attack the town immediately.[26]

Bahai's plan was censured in an imperial edict. His suggestions and ideas were evaluated as lacking common sense. It was pointed out that the troops from Jilin and Ningguta had never seen action and were unable to maintain proper discipline in battle. Bahai was ordered to familiarise himself with the situation upon arrival, and if it was possible to attack to report to the capital and request instructions on how to act.

In that case it was intended to send reinforcements to Albazin—50 picked men from each of the banners stationed in the capital.

The most convenient time to attack, the instructions said, was not the end of August but winter. Bahai was sternly ordered to postpone the assault to a more suitable time.

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[25] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 106, pp. 23b-24b; *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 153, pp. 14b-15a.

[26] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 109, pp. 7a-9a; He Qiutao, *Shuofang beicheng,* Beijing, 1881, Chapter 14, pp. 20b-21a.

Nevertheless, the edict named a new place where preparations were to be made for the siege of Albazin. It said: "The locality of Esuli, situated between Aigun and the Humar, where vessels may be moored and, besides, there are traces of farmland, must be reconnoitred. Upon the arrival of troops a wooden town may be built and the soldiers quartered in it."

Bahai was ordered to remain behind to defend Jilin, and Sabsu and Walihu were put in command of the campaign.[27]

It was now planned to build a post road with four (!) stations between Esuli and the Solon villages. An official from the Lifanyuan[28] was ordered to go to the Solons and take charge of this project.[29] This road remained uncompleted when the Manzhous moved against Albazin.

An indication of what was done to resolve the food and other problems that arose with the movement of a very large Manzhou army to the Amur is given in Kangxi's edict of May 1683: "Our troops have now been moved to Heilongjiang. This must be used to send soldiers from Wuzhumuqin (a Mongolian aimak.—*G. M.*) on the pretext of hunting deer in order to mislead the Russians. One senior official shall be sent to the Solons for military supplies, also on the pretext of hunting deer... The shanshu of the Lifanyuan, Amuhulang, shall proceed to Wuzhumuqin and the *adaha-hafan* Mala shall proceed to the Solons."[30]

In a report dispatched in June 1684 Mala wrote: "We, Your subjects, have repeatedly visited the Solons and have learned all we could about the Russians. It is generally believed that in each of the two towns—Yakesa (Albazin) and Nibuchao (Nerchinsk)—there are between 500 and 600 Russians. They have held on there for many years only because there are more than ten population centres between the mouth of the Argun and Yakesa. Between Yakesa and the mouth of the river Buermafu (?) there is another string of over ten population centres. There the

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[27] *Shuofang beicheng,* Chapter 14, p. 22b.

[28] An office handling relations with the Mongols, and later with the Russians.

[29] *Shuofang beicheng,* Chapter 14, p. 22b.

[30] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 109, p. 3b.

Russians have built houses scattered in various places and till the land to sustain their lives. Sometimes they hunt sables.

"Around Nerchinsk no land is cultivated, and there the Russians receive tribute from the Namiyaer clans. From time to time the Keerke (Halha) and Baerhuta go to Nerchinsk to sell livestock. In addition, the people of Nerchinsk hunt sable and sell the pelts, earning their living thereby (?). As regards Delingbai, not much land is cultivated in the vicinity. Moreover, there is no waterway to this locality, and grain and other products are brought in small quantities by cartage. However, this does not suffice. According to Buhede, who fled from Nerchinsk, newly-arrived and long-resident Namiyaers ... and also the defector Gangtimuer and his people breed livestock in the basin of the rivers Gen and Argun, and other places." [31]

Obtained from Russian prisoners seized by the Daur Beileer, the information that the Albazin fortifications were being repaired and that the garrison had been reinforced seriously alarmed the Manzhous. One of Kangxi's edicts stated: "The military force in Yakesa has been increased. Possibly, the Russians are planning to inflict harm (!) on our people. A letter must be sent to Sabsu and others to instruct them to investigate and act in accordance with the situation." [32]

There is much evidence in Manzhou sources of that period to indicate that unexpected developments in the Amur region were giving Kangxi second thoughts and that even as late as October 1684 he could not make up his mind about the expediency of beginning hostilities against Russia to seize the Amur region and also about the prospects for such a war. Although the Manzhous by far outnumbered the Russians, they decided on investing Albazin only after they were sure that the Russian military force in Dauria was small and after they had completed all their preparations, which they felt would make their victory certain.

This vacillation of the Qing ruler over alternatives of a military clash with Russia was mirrored in the actions of the Manzhou commanders on the Amur: first of Bahai and then of his successor Sabsu—both were repeatedly charged by Kangxi of sitting idle, losing one opportunity for action after another,[33] and even engaging in sabotage. For instance, on March 1, 1685, the Exchequer reported to Kangxi: "The entire herd of draught animals has perished, (and) the farm implements have fallen into disrepair; and this despite the approach of the spring work. An official from the Lifanyuan must be sent together with Mala to buy the requisite number of livestock and send it (to the Amur)." This was followed by an imperial edict: "Sabsu has deliberately ruined the farm implements and let all the draught animals die. His purpose is to delay (the campaign) in every way, for he hopes that he will soon be recalled from Heilongjiang."[34]

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[31] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 109, pp. 10a-11a.

[32] Ibid., Chapter 108, pp. 4b-5a; *Shuofang beicheng,* Chapter 14, p. 25a.

But food remained the main problem. In 1683, simultaneously with the dispatch of the Lantan and then the Mala mission, Kangxi ordered some high-ranking Manzhou officials to investigate the suitability of the Liaohe and the Yitunhe as waterways and find an outlet to the Huntunjiang Sungari-Amur).[35] The *shilang* Geertu was assigned to survey the upper reaches of the Liaohe, and the Jilin *fudutong* Walihu was sent to the mouth of the Yitunhe. Their instructions were, in addition, to explore and map the route to the Sungari.

After receiving the relevant despatches from his officials, Kangxi issued an edict, which said in part: "Establish grain stores in four places: on *internal territory* at Kaicheng on the Juliuhe; outside the *Willow Stockade* at Dengzicun; at Jilin near Yitunmen, and on the Yitunhe . . . Build one hundred vessels for the Liaohe and the Yitunhe for the transportation of food . . . Each vessel is to carry 200 dans of grain."[36]

Moreover, the edict specified the route for the caravans carrying grain to the food depots and the army.

Every year, upon the completion of field work, grain was delivered to the Kaicheng granaries. In the spring and autumn it was taken by boat to Dengzicun, from where it was transported overland to the food depots at Yitunmen. From there it was sent to the Huntunjiang across the mouth of the Yitunhe.[37] This complicated system functioned until 1699, when it was finally abandoned with the development of virgin land by soldiers of the local garrison and by military settlers. Kangxi had initially believed that this problem could be easily resolved.

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[33] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 109, pp. 8a-9a; Chapter 116, pp. 1b-2b, and others.

[34] Ibid., Chapter 119, pp. 10b-11a.

[35] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 24, p. 8a; A. V. Rudakov, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 571.

[36] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 108, p. 5a.

In many of his edicts Kangxi wrote that it was both necessary and important to promote local agriculture. Take, for instance, his edict of 1687, in which he underscored the significance of the food problem for the Amur and of keeping a detailed account of the grain grown there ("we cannot go on supplying it to Sahalian-wula and Meergen forever!"). "If our stock of food proves to be inadequate," the same edict said, "we shall not be victorious, as was the case in the operations against the Russians by Shaerhuda and Tahai ... The Russians are quite capable of acting as follows: gradually gather in groups of one-two or up to ten persons in the vicinity of the Amur and the Sungari, build log forts and entrench themselves in these places. It will then be difficult for us to overmaster them because the Russian troops will be in a position of *masters*, while our military forces will be in a position of *visitors* (*intruders*). If we do not have permanent garrisons in the vicinity of the Heilongjiang we shall not be in a position to hold in subjection the basin of the Sungari and the Amur rivers and the lands beyond them and also the population of these regions" (my italics.—*G. M.*)[38]

These are unquestionably significant statements. Kangxi unambiguously acknowledged that in 1687 there were no Manzhou population centres or outposts not only along the Amur (Amur region), but also the lower Sungari. He made even the possession of the basin of *this river* directly contingent on the consolidation of the Manzhous on the *Amur*. This is further evidence of the total untenability of the Qings' territorial claims on the Russian

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[37] *A Description of the Eight Banners,* Chapter 37, p. 12a; A. V. Rudakov, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 572-73.

[38] *Shengzu shilu,* Chapter 131, pp. 16b-18a.

Amur region. Kangxi recognised that the Manzhou hold on the right bank of the Amur depended on the adequacy of supplies. The edict admits that the food shortage, which increased as the Manzhous went farther from their strongholds in South Manzhou, was very real at the close of 1687 and could compel the Manzhou troops to withdraw altogether from the Amur and the lower reaches of the Sungari, in other words, to abandon the positions they had by then won with such difficulty. This is a clear indication of how weak the Manzhou position was beyond the Willow Stockade.

Lastly, Kangxi clearly saw the possibility of a further Russian advance not only along the Amur but also in the Sungari basin, where in a vast territory extending up to Jilin the Manzhous had no strongholds and hence could not halt this advance. Consequently, this Kangxi edict is a significant admission that before their settlement by the Russians the lands along the Amur and the Sungari and their tributaries were neutral territory, in other words, they were not part of the Qing empire. An edict issued in 1690 spoke of giving the Meergen garrison 2,000 qings of land for cultivation and of the appointment of officers and soldiers to supervise farming around Heilongjiang-cheng and Meergen.[39]

We have touched only on the main stages of the Manzhou preparations for an assault on Albazin. The first and second sieges of the town are dealt with in *A Description of the Eight Banners,* while subsequent events are well known from literature.

The facts cited here eloquently bear out that up to the 1680s the territory of the Heilongjiang (Amur) did not belong to the Manzhous. After the war of 1639-1641 with the Solons the Manzhous made no attempt to colonise this territory. They neither set up any sort of administrative bodies nor left permanent garrisons or even outposts—which would have been mandatory attributes of at least the formal incorporation of this territory in the Qing empire. Later, as a result of a war with China almost all of the Manzhous' links with the Solons and their lands were lost.

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[39] Ibid.

The Manzhou penetration of the Heilongjiang region in the 1680s was prompted entirely by military considerations. The operations against Albazin were undertaken by the Manzhous across unfamiliar and economically undeveloped territory far from the frontiers of their empire.[40]

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[40] Because this essay is confined to a definite chronological framework it does not mention individual Manzhou military expeditions in 1652-1658 against Russian settlers in the Amur basin or against the fortress of Komar.

In the spring of 1652 Manzhou troops under Haise were routed at Achang; in 1655 Mingandali attacked Komar but was defeated; in 1658 Manzhou warships under Shaerhuda defeated a flotilla commanded by Stepanov in the mouth of the Sungari. All these were single operations undertaken by the Manzhous from Ningguta and, as a rule, commanded by the viceroys of Ningguta.

### *I. S. YERMACHENKO*

# THE QING STATE APPARATUS AT THE TIME OF THE CONQUEST OF CHINA

The small numerical strength of the Manzhous, and the backwardness of their social system and state organisation compared to those of China, and also the resistance of the Chinese people to the invaders were the main factors that determined Qing policy towards the state system in the Chinese empire. While fighting a drawn-out war to subjugate the entire territory of China the Manzhous preserved and made active use of various aspects of the superstructure of Chinese feudal society, including the state organisation of the Ming empire, making every effort to enlist the support of and use the Chinese feudal aristocracy in their own interests.

As a matter of fact, the foundations of this policy had been laid much earlier by the first Manzhou rulers Nuerhaqi and Abahai, with the conquest of China's border territories and the Chinese province of Liaodong.

In a study of Manzhou policy towards the Chinese at the early stage of the development of the Manzhou state (1618-1636), the American historian Gertrude Roth offers the conclusion that already then much headway had been made by those aspects of Qing policy that were typical in the period between 1636 and 1900, namely, the preservation of the Manzhous' cultural and organisational exclusiveness, the selective enlistment of Chinese into positions of power, the attraction for Chinese-style values, and the ruthless curbing of anti-Manzhou ideas and actions on the part of the Chinese.[1]

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[1] Gertrude Roth, "The Manchu-Chinese Relations, 1618-1636" in *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth Century China.* Ed. by J. D. Spence and J. E. Wills, New Haven, London (Yale University Press), 1979, p. 4.

The policy of promoting an alliance with the Chinese ruling class and splitting the anti-Manzhou forces was pursued by the Manzhous from the moment the eight-banner army entered Beijing. The Regent Duoergun ordered the War Ministry to issue a manifesto stating: "All district officials of the province of Zhili who come over to our side will be given a promotion and soldiers and civilians will not be resettled . . . All Ming princes who come over to our side will not be stripped of their titles; all officials in the capital and also those who have fled from bandits and are in hiding must each report to the authorities and these will be given work; soldiers desiring to return to farming shall be allowed to do so." [2]

The Manzhou invaders adopted the pose of deliverers of China from the calamities and ruin allegedly brought by the peasant war and contended that their claim to the Ming throne was "lawful".

In all their edicts and appeals to the Chinese people the Manzhou emperors stressed that the eight-banner army had entered China solely to pacify "bandits", [3] that there was no intention whatever to seize political power in China. The edict issued when Shunzhi entered Beijing alleged that the Manzhou emperor had ascended the throne of the deposed Ming emperor only because "the Wangs and the Gongs, senior civilian and military officials, and also army officers (of the Ming empire) in one voice requested us (the Manzhou emperor.—*I. Y.*) to ascend the throne, pleading over and over again". [4]

In parallel with purely declarative statements, the Manzhou rulers launched specific steps to build up the state structure of the empire proclaimed by them as Dai Qing (Great Qing).

The process of adjusting the state machine inherited from the Mings went on for a long time and was completed, in the main, only towards the close of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries.

At the time of their invasion of China the Manzhous had, apart from the eight-banner military organisation, an administrative apparatus consisting of three chambers (*san*

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[2] *Qing shi gao* (Draft Chronicle of the Qing Dynasty), Beijing, 1927, Section *Benji* (Chronicle), Chapter 4, p. 2b.

[3] Meaning, of course, the peasant insurgent armies.

[4] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 4a.

*yuan*), six ministries (*liu bu*), the Chamber of External Relations (*Lifanyuan*), and the Censorship Chamber (*Duchayuan*).[5] In general outline, the structure of this apparatus was a facsimile of the structure of the Ming central state apparatus, and this unquestionably made it easier for the Manzhous to adjust the Chinese state system to their aims.

Their first objective in this direction was to take over the central state institutions of the deposed Ming regime, including the State Chancellery (*Neige*), the six ministries, the Censorship Chamber, and the Judiciary (*dalisi*).

The manifesto issued by the War Ministry as soon as the Manzhou army seized Beijing, stated: "All officials of the State Chancellery, the ministries and departments who served under the Mings shall carry on their business together with Manzhou officials."[6] Although it was a manifestation of the Manzhou policy of enlisting the support of the Chinese feudal lords, the system of parallel appointments of Manzhous and Chinese to the top positions in all the central state institutions of the empire did not in fact lead to a division of political power between the Manzhou and Chinese feudal lords. Based on military strength, the actual political power in the Qing empire was firmly in the hands of the ruling Manzhou dynasty and the Manzhou feudal lords.

The State Chancellery was the highest state institution to which Chinese feudal lords at first had access. It was headed by four chancellors (*daxueshi*) "from among persons specially appointed to help administer and serve as an example"[7]: two were Manzhous and two Chinese. Simultaneously, they headed ministries (*bu shangshu*). The number of their deputies varied from one to two, and here, too, there was an equal number of Manzhous and Chinese.[8] However, the functions of the State Chancellery were purely executive.[9]

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[5] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian* (Code of Laws of the Qing Dynasty Compiled by Imperial Order), 1732, Chapter 3, Section *Ministry of Ranks*, p. 1a.

[6] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 2b.

[7] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 2, Section *Neige,* p. 1a.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

All the most important military and political matters were discussed by the emperor with the Council of Princes and Dignitaries (*yi zheng wang dachen huiyi*), which was also called the State Council (*guo yi*). The Council consisted exclusively of members of the Manzhou nobility; no Chinese feudal lords were admitted.[10]

In the reign of Yongzheng (1723-1736) a Military Council (*Jun jichu*)[11] was formed of chancellors, ministry heads, *shilangs*, and other officials of the capital, both Manzhou and Chinese, appointed personally by the emperor. Originally, it was a provisional military-administrative institution, but subsequently became the supreme state institution handling major military and state affairs and the compilation of imperial edicts.[12] With the formation of the Military Council, the powers of the State Council were reduced to a minimum. The fact that some Chinese dignitaries were admitted to the Military Council was an indication that by that time the Manzhous were feeling secure enough to give the Chinese feudal aristocracy somewhat more extensive powers.

However, throughout the Manzhou reign in China even in such a purely executive body as the State Chancellery, let alone other governmental institutions, the status of Chinese officials was below that of the Manzhous holding posts of the same level.[13]

The principle of numerical equality was not applied in appointments to the highest official posts (not below chancellors and their deputies). On that level there clearly were more Manzhous than Chinese.[14]

The situation was analogous in the six ministries. Each ministry was headed by a Manzhou and a Chinese, each of whom had two deputies—one was a Manzhou and the other a Chinese.[15] However, from three to five Manzhous and only one Chinese[16] headed the chancellery of each ministry. Their functions included the compilation of summaries of documents and reports.

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[10] Jiang Bojian, *Zhongguo shi gangyao* (Essays on the History of China), Vol. 2, Beijing, 1963, p. 283.

[11] *Qianding Dai Qing huidian* (Imperial Code of Laws of the Qing Dynasty), Section *Banli junjichu* (Functions of the Junjichu).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Until the 15th year of the reign of Shunzhi (1659) Manzhou officials of the 1st Class and Chinese officials of the 2nd Class were appointed to the post of chancellor. See *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian*, Chapter 7, Section *Personnel Department for Civilian Ranks of the Ministry of Ranks*, p. 1b.

[14] In the 10th year of the reign of Kangxi (1672), the posts of state secretaries (*xueshi*) were held by six Manzhous, two Chinese military and two Chinese civilians; the posts of senior reporters

This departure from the principle of equal appointment of Manzhous and Chinese enabled the Manzhou authorities to have direct control of all current affairs while maintaining a semblance of equal participation of Manzhous and Chinese in the administration of the state.

The distrust of the Manzhou rulers towards Chinese having access to the highest state institutions is shown by the repeatedly issued instructions forbidding Chinese officials to have charge of the seals of ministries, departments, and chambers. The shortlived departures from this rule in 1660-1662 during the reign of Shunzhi and in 1671-1673 during the reign of Kangxi were followed by the old instructions placing official seals in the hands solely of Manzhous.[17]

In order to ensure the premier role in state administration to Manzhous, the Qing government took steps to limit the number of Chinese officials and to enforce a system of strict selection. One of these steps was the establishment of a system of vacancies.

Under that system a definite number of vacancies for definite posts was established for Manzhou, Mongol, and Chinese officials. Manzhous were appointed to the most important posts in the administration and they also had the right to occupy posts left vacant by Chinese. But Chinese officials could hold only minor posts and were forbidden to occupy posts left vacant by Manzhous.[18] This system was striking evidence of the policy of national oppression

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(*shidu xuexi*) were held by four Manzhous, two Mongols, and two Chinese; the posts of reporters (*shidu*) were held by ten Manzhous, two Mongols, and four Chinese (two military and two civilians). *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 2, Section *Neige,* p. 1a.

[15] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 3, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* pp. 7a-19b.

[16] Xiao Yishan, *Qingdai tongshi* (A History of the Qing Epoch), Vol. 1, Shanghai, 1927, p. 461.

[17] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 9, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* 7, *Procedure for Dismissal, Appointment and Promotion in Mongol Vacancies,* p. 17a.

[18] Ibid., Chapter 8, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* 6, *Personnel Department for Civilian Ranks,* p. 1a.

pursued by the Manzhou conquerors not only towards the working strata of the Chinese people but also towards the section of Chinese feudal aristocracy that had thrown its lot in with the Manzhous.

Moreover, the Manzhous instituted a system of "rejection" (*huibi zhidu*), whose substance was that when a Chinese was appointed to an official position his candidature could be rejected by reason of family relations or by reason of descent.[19] Many instructions were issued forbidding close kin to serve in one and the same institution, namely, grandfathers and grandsons, uncles and nephews, brothers.[20]

The principle of rejection for reasons of descent, the first instructions on which were issued by the Manzhous in 1656, was just as strictly applied throughout the period of Qing rule. Under this principle Chinese officials appointed in the provinces to posts below the rank of imperial viceroys (*zongdu*) and military governors (*xunfu*) were not permitted to serve in the province of their birth.[21] A candidate to the post of district prefect had to submit a petition "in which he had to name the place of his birth and residence and also the districts of neighbouring provinces situated within a radius of 500 li of the place where there was a vacancy to the post of district prefect, and have this petition witnessed by the seal of an official born in the same province and serving in the capital".[22]

The system of rejection, whose basic aim was to prevent strong bonds between the provincial Chinese administration and the local population, was evidence that the Manzhou conquerors feared the Chinese people.

While in the central state institutions the Manzhous could have direct control over Chinese officials of all ranks, in the provinces they had, for many reasons, notably their small numbers, to allow "Chinese to administer Chinese".[23] In the provinces the administrative apparatus practically was not changed by the Manzhous; the exception was the institution of imperial viceroys and military governors, who wielded supreme power in the provinces. Under the Mings viceroys were episodical appointments; under the Manzhous, they and military governors became permanent appointments.[24]

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[19] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 14, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* 12, *Rejection,* p. 26a.

[20] Ibid., p. 27a.

[21] Ibid.

[22] *Qianding Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 47, Section *Ministry of Ranks, Certification of Chinese Officials.*

[23] See Zhao Xiding, "Provincial Administration Under the Qings", *Lishiyanjiu,* Beijing, 1980, No. 3, pp. 163-64.

Viceroys and military governors were appointed by the emperor. In each individual case, as required by a 1672 edict, "a request has to be made for instructions [from the emperor] on the appointment of a Manzhou, a Chinese military, or a Chinese civilian to a given post".[25]

For 50 years under Kangxi, from 1669 to 1719, only Manzhous were appointed viceroys and military governors in the provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi, adjoining the province of Zhili in which the capital was situated. Chinese military were permitted to be appointed to these posts from 1719 onward, but it was not until 1732 that Mongols and Chinese civilians were allowed to be given such appointments.[26]

The efforts of the Manzhou rulers to secure their domination were expressed also in the system of mutual responsibility introduced in state institutions. In the spring of 1649 (a year that witnessed anti-Manzhou risings throughout South and North China) a law was enacted making the highest-ranking officials in the localities responsible for the behaviour and work of the district officials subordinate to them.[27] Officials of central state institutions, who had recommended candidates for the posts of viceroys and military governors, were, under a 1665 edict, punishable together with appointees if the latter were found wanting.[28]

In addition to the above-mentioned steps in the sphere of the state structure of the country conquered by them, the Manzhou rulers established a system of military control over the administrative authority. As of 1644 Manzhou banner garrisons, some of which were reinforced by loyal

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[24] Xiao Yishan, *A History of the Qing Epoch,* p. 486.

[25] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 8, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* 6, *Personnel Department for Civilian Ranks,* p. 2a.

[26] Ibid.

[27] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 18a.

[28] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian,* Chapter 8, Section *Ministry of Ranks,* 6, *Personnel Department for Civilian Ranks,* p. 2a.

Chinese "green banner" troops, were quartered in the largest cities. In the capital province of Zhili, with the exception of a Mongolian garrison in Tianjin, all vacancies were filled by Manzhous.[29] In the provinces of Ningxia, Sichuan, Jiangnan, and Huguang all the higher posts were held by Manzhous, and the lower by Mongols. In Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Zhejiang most of the vacancies went to Manzhous and some to Mongols. Chinese were appointed to the lowest posts and even then only if they had served in the "green banner".[30] In only two provinces, Guangdong and Fuzhou, the vacancies in official posts in the garrisons were filled by Chinese serving in the "green banner".[31]

A special system from which Chinese were excluded was set up to administer outlying territories incorporated in the Qing empire as a result of conquest.

Long before they seized Beijing and established themselves as rulers of China, the Manzhous had instituted a Chamber for Dependent Territories Affairs (Lifanyuan) for the administration of all Mongol tribes.[32] This chamber supervised the promotion and dismissal of officials, awards and punishments, the granting of audiences at the emperor's court and the payment of tribute, court procedures, the translation of documents, and other matters.[33] With the empire's territorial expansion the jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan extended to Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, and Sichuan. It is interesting to note that the Lifanyuan's terms of reference covered relations with Russia, while relations with other foreign countries were in charge of the Department for the Reception of Foreign Visitors (*zhu ke qing li si*) of the Ministry of Ceremonies.[34]

Chinese were not allowed to hold office in the Lifanyuan: all the officials were Manzhous or Mongols with no particular ratio established between them.[35]

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[29] *Yuzhi Dai Qing huidian*, Chapter 114, Section *Military Department*, 4, *Garrisons*, p. 1a.

[30] Ibid., pp. 1a-9b.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., Chapter 104, Section *Ministry of Ceremonies*, 48, *Department for the Reception of Foreign Visitors*, p. 1a.

[33] Ibid., Chapter 221, *Lifanyuan.*

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., Chapter 3, Section *Ministry of Ranks*, p. 21a.

Alongside the old Ming state apparatus the Qings preserved Ming legislation, introducing only a few modifications. The revision of the old laws was started by the Manzhous in the second month of the second year of Shunzhi's reign (March 1645) [36] and completed in the fourth year (1647). [37]

Qing legislation was distinctly feudal: it protected the right of the Manzhou and Chinese feudal aristocracy to exploit the peasants and classified actions against the imperial power, state order, and feudal property as the gravest crimes. The principal modification in legislation was that Manzhous came to enjoy more rights than the Chinese. Ordinary courts had no jurisdiction over persons of Manzhou origin. There were special courts for them, which could also try Chinese. For Manzhou criminals there were special prisons where the conditions were somewhat better than in the usual prisons. Manzhous were allowed to replace one form of punishment by another; generally punishment for Manzhous was lighter than for Chinese. [38]

Confucianism was one of the means for the spiritual oppression of the Chinese people and the cultivation in them of slavish submissiveness to the Manzhou rulers. The moral-ethical doctrine of Confucianism with its preaching of subordination of the junior to the senior, of the people to the authorities, had for many centuries served the Chinese feudal lords as an instrument for keeping the people in spiritual subjugation, of sanctifying their power and that of the emperor.

The Manzhou rulers quickly appreciated this means of influencing the people. Within a few days after the proclamation of the Dai Qing empire it was announced that the "title of continuer of the family of Confucius has been bestowed upon the great sage's descendant of the 65th generation", and that the title of "protector of the five canons" would continue to be conferred. [39]

This meant the recognition of the former role played by Confucianism. In order to gain popular recognition as the legitimate successors of the Ming dynasty the Qing rulers were careful to observe Confucian ritual.

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[36] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 7a.

[37] Ibid., p. 14b.

[38] See Li Xun, *Ming Qing shi* (A History of the Ming and Qing Dynasties), Beijing, 1956, pp. 182-83.

[39] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 4a.

In addition to annulling taxes and granting an amnesty, the imperial edict proclaiming the Dai Qing empire said that the former procedure for the maintenance of the imperial cemeteries would be continued. Further, the edict stated that sacrifices would be offered at all the Ming cemeteries in the spring and autumn. People continued to be appointed to guard and tend the cemeteries. Desecrated imperial graves as well as graves of dignitaries and sages were restored. The grazing of livestock and the cutting of wood continued to be forbidden in cemeteries.[40]

With these steps to sustain the Confucian cult of ancestors the Qing rulers sought to reinforce their own prestige. Many of the edicts of the first Manzhou emperors urging the people to submit to the Qing authorities contained sops to all sections of the population such as a temporary annulment of taxes, an amnesty for political prisoners, the appointment of officials, and so forth, and mentioned awards for exemplary compliance with Confucian moral-ethical precepts: "respectful children, obedient grandchildren, virtuous wives" and so on.

A major factor in the establishment of the Qing dynasty in China and in the strengthening of the feudal system was the restoration by the Manzhous of the Ming system of taxes, which they started as soon as they seized Beijing.

Draught animals (*ding*) and land were the basis of taxes in Ming China. During the peasant war, in areas where the Ming power in fact ceased to exist the tax records were destroyed and for some time the peasants paid no taxes. After proclaiming themselves the legitimate government of China, the Qing authorities had to cancel tax arrears because it was impossible to collect them. At the same time, they used this forced measure (alongside a partial and temporary annulment of taxes) in an effort to weaken the peasant movement that had evolved into a national struggle against foreign invaders. In parallel with these temporary measures, the Manzhou feudal aristocracy sought to ensure the regular receipt of revenue through the state apparatus. To this end and in order to control the levying of taxes in the conquered regions it was necessary to restore the population lists and land registers. So as soon as the Manzhou troops entered Beijing an edict was issued ordering the "higher civilian and military officials to make inventories of the population, monies, grain, soldiers, and horses and bring them to the capital".[41]

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[40] *Qing shi gao*, Section *Chronicle*, Chapter 4, pp. 4a-5a.

But it was impossible to keep an accurate count of the population because of the staunch resistance of the Chinese people, because of the risings that kept erupting in the Manzhou rear. In the third year of the reign of Shunzhi (1646) one more imperial edict was issued instructing "all higher officials to make a more meticulous study and the relevant authorities to compile registers of taxes and duties".[42] The first Qing tax registers were based on the Ming census taken in the reign of Wanli (1573-1620). It is noteworthy that the Manzhous presented this edict, which was a further step towards the restoration of feudal oppression relaxed temporarily by the peasant war, as an indication of their desire to lighten the people's tax burden. The edict stated that the emperor had "in order to give the people a respite, recently abolished the unbearable and burdensome taxes imposed by the last rulers of the Ming dynasty. But avaricious officials hate this as adverse to themselves and are destroying records. For that reason the good intentions of the court are not implemented and the harmful policies of the Mings have not been entirely rectified."[43]

As the territory under their control expanded the Qing rulers used the cover of short-term and partial annulments of taxes to gradually restore the Ming taxation system. In the reign of Shunzhi the Manzhous took the first census of the population and land, established a system under which land was remeasured every five-ten years, and adopted a standard land measure for the whole of China.[44]

In order to have firm fiscal and administrative control in the localities, the Manzhous preserved and reinforced the system of lower administrative units known as *li* and the even smaller ones called *jia*, introduced under the Mings. A *li* was a territorial unit consisting of 100 or 110 families or households. It had an appointed headman, *li*

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[41] Ibid., p. 2b.
[42] Ibid., p. 12a.
[43] Ibid.
[44] H. L. Huang, *The Land Tax in China,* New York, 1918, p. 87.

*zhang,* who managed the community's affairs and was responsible to the district magistrate for the poll-taxes of his unit. The *li* itself was divided into smaller units, *jia,* consisting of ten households under a headman (*jia zhang*). The *li* headman was usually a member of the richest family. Widows, widowers, orphans, i.e. those who could not pay taxes, were not members of the *li.* A system of mutual guarantee operated in the *jia* and the *li.* There were urban, sub-urban, and rural *li.*[45]

The Manzhous used this ramified and, hence, flexible system to control the conquered territories. One of the first Manzhou acts, even before the first Manzhou emperor was proclaimed—in the eighth month of the first year of Shunzhi's reign (September 1644)—was the adoption of a law enforcing the *jia* system.[46] Apart from its fiscal purposes, this law pursued the aim of using these tiny administrative units to institute tight police surveillance over the population in the conquered regions. The Russian ambassador Spafari, who went to China in 1675, wrote: "Their custom (of the Manzhous.—*I. Y.*) is such that under pain of death every person must have over the door of his house a tablet stating the number and rank of all the persons living in the house. Every unit of ten houses is under a headman."[47]

Taking over in its entirety the Ming system of exploiting peasants and artisans and also of strict control of taxation, which had been halted by the peasant war, the Manzhous announced from the very outset that the basic taxes existing under the Mings would be preserved. In an edict issued in the tenth month of the first year of Shunzhi's reign (November 1644) on the occasion of the proclamation of the Dai Qing empire, the people were notified that "the land tax in cash and grain shall correspond exactly to the former Ming estimates and records, and shall be levied and paid in the former amounts as of the first day of the fifth month of Shunzhi (June 5, 1644)".[48]

A widespread means of indulging the Chinese people was the partial and short-term abolition of taxes. In the first edict of the Manzhou emperor it was announced that the Qing government would abolish all the additional taxes introduced by the last Ming.[49] Moreover, the Qing rulers announced the abolition in the capital province of Zhili of "all arrears for the period up to the first day of the fifth month of the first year of Shunzhi (June 5, 1644) on taxes in kind and in cash".[50]

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[45] H. L. Huang, *The Land Tax in China,* New York, 1918, p. 96.

[46] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 3b.

[47] Spafari, *A Description of the First Part of the Universe Called Asia in Which Is the Chinese State with Its Towns and Provinces,* Kazan, 1910, p. 22.

[48] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 4b.

In subsequent edicts addressed to the population of territories still to be conquered, the Qing rulers constantly used these measures as bait to incline the population to cease resistance. Characteristic in this context is an edict issued in 1647, when Qing forces were meeting with reversals in their attempts to conquer the southwestern seaboard provinces. The edict declared that in localities accepting the authority of the Qing government there would be a "full amnesty for all criminals, all arrears on heavy taxes will be annulled, those hiding in forests and mountains will be enrolled into imperial service... and persons over the age of 70 will be given silk and rice".[51]

Tax arrears were annulled not only for political considerations of the Qing government but also because they could not be collected in North China, where a peasant war raged for a number of years and the insurgent armies had released the peasants from taxes. It is interesting that this is noted also in sources. In addition to other instructions regarding taxation an imperial edict issued in 1644 declared: "In the province of Zhili a remission is granted up to the first day of the fifth month of the first year of Shunzhi on all taxes collected in cash and in kind and seized by the insurgents."[52]

Realising that the abolition of arrears and the preservation of almost all the taxes of the Ming empire would hardly attract the peasants, who had paid no taxes of any kind for quite a long time, to the new government, the Qing rulers announced in the spring of 1644 the abolition of taxes for the current year. In localities invaded by the Manzhou army taxes were halved, while in areas where the population went over to the Manzhous taxes were cut by one-third.[53] In subsequent years the Manzhou government repeatedly annulled taxes partially or temporarily when there was an upsurge of the anti-Manzhou struggle. In 1649, for example, when risings broke out in Jiangxi, Hunan, and Shanxi, where the peasant army regained control of over 50 towns, as well as in the province of Gansu, and other districts,[54] arrears and taxes for the current year were abolished.[55] However, in the next year (1650), after the Manzhous had crushed some of the risings and somewhat consolidated their position they announced additional taxes amounting to more than 2,500,000 liang[56] in the provinces of Zhili, Shanxi, Zhejiang, Shandong, Jiangnan, Henan, Huguang, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi, i.e., territories that were by then entirely or partially controlled by the Qing government.

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., p. 14b.
[52] Ibid., p. 5b.

In the following years the frequent abolition of taxes by Shunzhi was made necessary not so much by political considerations as by the destruction of the productive forces in China's agriculture. However, at the commencement of the Manzhou conquest this was mainly a purposeful measure and in combination with other promises of the Qing government it did much to pave the way for the military triumphs of the Manzhous.

It was quite evident that with minor concessions the Manzhou feudal aristocracy sought to give the impression that it was introducing dramatic changes in the question of the head tax, which was one of the main forms of exploiting China's working population. Listing the cases when many taxes were temporarily abolished, an imperial edict in 1644 declared that "the head tax in silver shall be levied as previously".[57] But to create the semblance of some change in this question, the same edict stated that under the Mings, as a consequence of a steady decline of the recorded population, orphans, poor people, the old and the weak suffered greatly because they had to pay taxes. The Qing government therefore promised that after an inspection by the relevant departments old people, children, the sick, and cripples would be exempt from taxes and even provided with food. Special concern was announced for old people: "military and civilians aged over 70" were permitted to "retain one able-bodied person as provider free of labour duty". "Those who are over 80 shall be issued linen, silk, rice, and meat."[58] These and other promises were designed to win the masses over to the Manzhous.

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[53] Ibid., p. 4b.

[54] *Zhongguo nongmin qiui lun ji* (A Collection of Essays on Peasant Risings in China), Beijing, 1954, p. 178.

[55] *Qing shi gao,* Section *Chronicle,* Chapter 4, p. 19a.

[56] Ibid., p. 21b.

[57] Ibid., p. 4b.

Several basic elements can be distinguished in the Manzhou policy relative to the state structure of the Chinese empire. First, they posed as the lawful heirs of the Ming dynasty on the strength of having suppressed the peasant rising. This stand, used as a cover for aggressive ambitions, unquestionably found a response among the Chinese feudal aristocracy. The forced preservation of the Ming state apparatus was likewise used by the Manzhous to establish and strengthen their alliance with the ruling class of Chinese society.

One of the first steps taken by the Qing government following its installation was to bring the Chinese empire's administrative machine under its control and use it to consolidate Manzhou rule.

The anti-people character of the feudal state in China was seen in bolder relief than ever under the Manzhous as a consequence of the Qing policy of armed suppression of popular resistance and its policy of national oppression.

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[58] Ibid.

*O. L. FISHMAN*

# QING POLICY IN IDEOLOGY

In order to win over the Chinese scholar-bureaucrats the Manzhou rulers tried speaking to them in their own language, depicting themselves as the true "heirs" and followers of Confucius. To reinforce their power they used tenets of the Confucian doctrine that had for centuries served as the ideological bulwark of the Chinese feudal regime, and championed the most rigid Confucian precepts regulating not only the people's way of life but also their thinking.

However, under the Qing dynasty Confucian theory came into conflict with practice more than ever before. In theory the Manzhou emperors professed Confucianism, but in practice they constantly acted in contravention of its basic principles. Confucius saw the monarchy, centralised administration, as the guarantee of peace and stability in the country. But he disapproved of an absolute monarchy, of despotism, which he regarded as embodying an unlawful force. The Confucian ideal of a devoted official required a wise counsellor to criticise and admonish a misguided monarch. But in some of their early edicts (1652) the Manzhous, who posed as Confucian reformers of a "declining" China, forbade local officials to address letters and reports to the central authorities or state their views on administrative, military, or civil matters.[1]

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[1] See David S. Nivison, "Ho-Shen and His Accusers: Ideology and Political Behavior in the Eighteenth Century", in *Confucianism in Action*. Edited by David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1959, pp. 209-43.

The isolationist policy of the Qing rulers inhibited the development of commodity and monetary relations. In 1757 an edict closed all ports except Guangzhou to foreigners' trade, and even in Guangzhou it prohibited foreigners from living in the city itself and learning the Chinese language. A Chinese named Li Yabian was beheaded in 1760 for teaching Chinese to foreigners.[2] Chinese merchants were not allowed to build large ships, sail in foreign ships, associate with foreigners, or study foreign languages. In this situation there could be no question of technological progress or of acquaintanceship with Western scientific and technological breakthroughs.

The Qing government was unflagging in its ideological indoctrination of the people. In order to suppress the people's deep-rooted spirit of resistance it set up a system of thought control. Some Chinese scholars and officials were bribed; those who were incorruptible were repressed.

The examination system, which fell to its lowest ebb under the Qings, was one of the key instruments for enlisting devoted servants of the throne from among the scholars of the feudal aristocracy. Whereas under the Tang dynasty, when this system was introduced, the examinees were required to have a knowledge of the laws and the ability to pass judicial or administrative decisions, and whereas under the Song dynasty the subjects of examination compositions were still linked to some extent to the work expected of future officials, the founder of the Ming dynasty ordered the comments on the books of the Confucian canon to be used as the basic material for subjects of examination compositions. Under the Mings the state examinations consisted chiefly of written compositions on the subject of the meaning of classical canons, the "Precepts" of the emperors, and discourses on history and current problems. However, from 1757 onwards, under the Qings,[3] the compositions on subjects linked to administration and economic problems were replaced entirely with scholastic essays based on quotations from classics interpreted in the spirit of neoConfucian dogma. By that time the cosmogonic theory of Zhu Xi and the theory of cognition were emasculated of all elements of dialectics. The commentary and critique section of Zhu Xi's theory and the programme of the country's administration that underlay the feudal way of life predominant in the Song epoch prior to the establishment of contacts with the West were accentuated and became the official philosophy of feudal Qing-ruled China. A contributing factor was unquestionably that neo-Confucian theory became an element of the programme of state examinations. Under the Qings the basic subject of official examinations at all levels was the *bagu wenzhang* or "octonary essay" on an abstract subject from the comments on Confucian canons. Each of its eight sections had to consist of a strictly limited number of characters.

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[2] Zhang Decheng, "Qingdai yapian zhanzheng qianzhi zhong xiyanhai tongzhi (China's Maritime Trade With the West Under the Qing Dynasty Prior to the Opium Wars)", *Qinghua xuebao,* 1935, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 117.

[3] See Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese Gentry. Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society,* University of Washington Press, Seattle-Washington, 1955.

In terms of practical knowledge the long years of preparation for these scholastic examinations gave nothing to the claimants to posts in the state and administrative apparatus. The candidates were isolated from real life, from life's needs and requirements.

Even the Jesuit missionaries who arrived in China at the close of the sixteenth century and were, on the whole, very impressed by the system of examinations, noted that the study of Confucian canons and training in the writing of "octonary essays" ultimately inhibited the development of technical and natural sciences.[4] One of them, Matteo Ricci, who resided in China at the close of the Ming dynasty's reign, wrote: "It is evident to everyone here that no one will labor to attain proficiency in mathematics or in medicine who has any hope of becoming prominent in the field of [Confucian] philosophy... The study of mathematics and that of medicine are held in low esteem, because they are not fostered by honors as is the study of philosophy, to which students are attracted by the hope of the glory and the rewards attached to it."[5]

The answer as to who the natural sciences made no progress under the Qings is given by Liang Qichao, an eminent progressive scholar, political figure, and publicist of the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. He wrote that in that epoch scholars "concentrated their energies on exegesis of old classics". In the natural sciences "discoveries ... were shrouded in an atmosphere of mystery ... for instance, in the medical field, many [methods of] diagnosis and prescription were lost because of the secrecy". Liang Qichao believes that the main reason for this lack of interest in the natural sciences during the Qing period was that inventions and discoveries were not made public, discussed by scientists, or reported in the press.[6] In other words, the traditional system of education was based exclusively on the traditions of Confucian scholarship, and hence instead of being encouraged, the natural sciences were relegated to the background.

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[4] See H. Bernard, *Matteo Ricci's Scientific Contribution to China*, Peiping, 1935, p. 20.

[5] *China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610*. Translated from the Latin by Louis J. Gallagher, Random House, New York, 1953, pp. 32-33.

A scientific degree that went with the passing of official examinations was indispensable to an aspirant for an official or military post. But since there were fewer posts than aspirants, the examination system gave rise to fierce competition. Aspirants had recourse to bribery and string-pulling. The Qing emperors themselves fostered corruption. No examinations were required of the sons and grandsons of influential dignitaries and of persons who gave large sums of money to the government. This placed the big feudal clans and rich landowners at an advantage. Academic degrees and lower official posts were sold under the Mings and, to a larger extent, under the Qings. An edict issued by Kangxi in 1677 permitted the sale of office for a term of three years. In 1691 permission was granted for the sale of academic degrees, posthumous titles, and honorary ranks. Under the emperor Qianlong the sale of office was made official twice, while in the reign of Jiaqing this form of enriching the court clique acquired scandalous proportions.[7] In 1745 as many as 27.8 per cent of the newly-appointed district magistrates purchased their office; the number of officials who received a degree by passing examinations was only a little bigger than the number of those who bought degrees.[8]

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[6] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period* (*Ch'ing tai hsüeh-shu kai-lun*), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, p. 121.

[7] See *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXII, "Notes and Queries", Shanghai, 1887, p. 100.

In theory persons of all strata (except members of the families of actors, prostitutes, brothel-keepers, and servants) were eligible for examinations, but in fact all the advantages were on the side of wealthy and well-connected persons who could give bribes and of persons who could afford to spend many, sometimes tens of years to prepare for the examinations.

The Hungarian Sinologist and historian Etienne Balazs quite rightly noted that flourishing "demagogy, handled with a consummate art ... would make believe that the peasant is the crown of creation and that everybody is anxious for his well-being. In any case there is no possible comparison between the nobility of agriculture, the 'fundamental occupation' as it is called, and every other profession which is secondary, especially that of the merchants, the baseness of which the Confucians never ceased to trumpet. Actually, there was an understanding between the scholar-officials and the merchants at the expense of the peasantry. And it was far easier for a merchant than for a farmer to climb the social ladder."[9]

Persons who passed examinations and received degrees became members of the *shenshi* (gentry) and enjoyed many privileges (they and their families were exempt from labour conscription and corporal punishment, had the right to absent themselves from litigation, and so on). Despite edicts, many of the gentry paid no land tax with impunity. In 1661 it was found that 13,517 members of the gentry in five regions were paying no taxes. Collecting taxes from the peasants, the gentry gave the government the poorest of the grain and kept the best for themselves.[10] Naturally, everybody who had the means sought to become a member of this privileged stratum of the feudal clan.

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[8] See Tung-tsu Ch'ü, "Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing", *Harvard East Asian Studies*, September 1962, p. 20.

[9] Etienne Balazs, "The Birth of Capitalism in China", in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. III, Part 2, E. J. Brill-Publishers, Leiden, August 1960, p. 202.

[10] Robert M. Marsh, *The Mandarins. The Circulation of Elites in China, 1600-1900,* The Free Press of Glencoe, A Division of Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, Illinois, 1961, pp. 185-87.

Formally, the way to this lay through official examinations.

Liang Qichao writes: "...The civil service examinations and the students' curriculum to prepare for them engaged the attention of all the nation; students needed only to learn this kind of dubious and imitative language in order to be ready to jockey for position, wealth, and reputation. The whole nation indulged in it prodigally and one man after another neglected his learning and the use of his mind. Therefore, the defects of neoConfucianism ... were just like those of Christianity in Europe during the Middle and Dark Ages. At its worst, it could completely block a man's ears, eyes, mind, and heart, making them useless, and dissipate his independent and creative spirit to the zero point."[11]

The West German Sinologist Wolfgang Franke, who researched the reform and abolition of the system of civil service examinations, notes that prior to the establishment of the Southern Song dynasty examinees could still expound their own thoughts within the general framework of Confucian ideology. But after the canonisation of the writings of Zhu Xi the neoConfucian interpretation of Confucian doctrines was adopted as state dogma and deviation from the orthodox interpretation meant failure at the examinations. "In this way ... an unparalleled uniformity of thought was enforced not only among the officials but throughout the whole leading class. The examination system served simultaneously to recruit loyal civil servants of a standard type and to guarantee a thorough indoctrination in the Confucian ideology among the whole educated class."[12]

Long Qirui (1814-1853), a Chinese scholar who was at one time an examiner at the civil service examinations, wrote: "Gather the men in the market and pick an outstanding one; get hold of a man on the street and give him office; his quality of loyalty and trustworthiness, his ability to observe and discern would probably equal the scholars' and even surpass them. What he lacks is the unimportant training in literature, rhyming, and ceremonial observation. But literature, rhyming, and ceremonial observation do not help one in administration, and the administrators probably are not good at it either. What is the difference between such an administrator and a man in the market or a man on the street?" [13]

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[11] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op. cit., p. 28.

[12] Wolfgang Franke, *The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System.* Published by the Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 13.

Another means of bribing scholars and diverting their attention from current problems was the encouragement, by the Qing government, of compilation, imitation of antiquity, and abstract study. To this end the first Qing emperors took steps to systematise and collect the literary heritage of the past. Hundreds of scholars were paid well by Kangxi to compile voluminous encyclopedias (*Tushu jicheng, Yuanjian leihan*) and dictionaries (*Kangxi zidian, Peiwen yunfu,* and others); Qianlong ordered the compilation of additions to encyclopedias of preceding epochs (*Xu Tongzhi, Xu Wenxian tongkao, Xu Tongdian*), new encyclopedias (*Qing Tongzhi, Qing Wenxian Tongkao, Qing Tongdian*), and a catalogue of the famous collection of books in the Imperial library (*Siku quanshu uzongmu*).

The steps taken by the Manzhou authorities to collect and systematise the literary heritage of the past were accompanied by the destruction of everything considered seditious. In essence, this was a revision of the entire literary heritage: every expression of free thought or disparagement of the Manzhou rulers was deleted from the works of Chinese writers. Everything that could appeal to the national self-awareness or evoke a sense of national dignity was destroyed. To obliterate memories of China's past, the Manzhou court burned old censuses, destroyed all genealogical records, reports of court counsellors, and many documents relating to dynasties that preceded the Qings.

Persecution of Chinese writers began as early as the reign of Kangxi. The affair of the historian Zhuang Tinglong is very much a case in point. After acquiring the book *A History of the Mings,* written by the historian Zhu Guozhen (died in 1632), who took part in the struggle against eunuch Wei Zhongxian, Zhuang Tinglong assembled a group of distinguished scholars to review Zhu's work and continue his narration to the end of Ming rule. This resulted in a work entitled *A Concise History of the*

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[13] Chung-li Chang, op. cit., p. 182.

*Ming Period.* The district magistrate wrote a denunciation of Zhuang Tinglong, charging him with spreading anti-Manzhou propaganda. Zhuang Tinglong had not recognised the legality of the Manzhou rulers' imperial title, for he had in his work called them by name and not by the motto of their reign as in the case of the Ming emperors. Moreover, he had condemned the Ming warlords Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming for surrendering to the Manzhou invaders. Zhuang Tinglong died (in 1660) before the investigations were completed (1663). But this did not prevent the Manzhou government from passing the death sentence on him (posthumously) and the other compilers of the *Concise History,* the members of their families, the publishers, the book dealers, and those who had purchased the book. Zhuang Tinglong's body was exhumed, hacked to pieces, and burned. His father died in prison, his younger brother was executed, and the family's property was confiscated. Altogether some 70 persons were executed.[14]

In the reign of Kangxi another writer, Dai Mingshi, was also accused of disloyalty to the Qing government on the grounds that in his works he mentioned the years of the reign of Ming emperors. Dai Mingshi was quartered (1713) and his family and the friends who wrote the forewords to his works were executed.[15]

The works of the historian Lü Liuliang (1629-1683), who refused to serve the Manzhous and mourned the fall of the Ming dynasty, were banned under Yongzheng. In 1733 his remains were exhumed and hacked to pieces, and his disciples and the members of his family were executed.[16] Fifty years later all extant copies of Lü's works were burned.

In 1731 Yongzheng ordered all Chinese scholars to state their view of the charge of treachery against Lü Liuliang. The writer Qi Zhouhua (1698-1768) fearlessly wrote that Lü's descendants did not deserve to die. When the local authorities refused to forward Qi Zhouhua's letter to Beijing, he went to the capital himself and lodged a complaint against the local officials with the Chamber of Punishments. He was convoyed back to Zhejiang, where he was kept in custody and tortured. He refused to declare that he had been beside himself when he wrote the letter. He was declared mad and sentenced to imprisonment for life. In 1736 he was released under a general amnesty granted by Qianlong upon the latter's ascent to the throne. In 1767 he managed to have some of his works printed. Among them was his letter on the Lü Liuliang affair and also an epitaph in which he compared Lü to Meng-zi. Other works contained mention of the forbidden name of the emperor Yongzheng and pronouncements against the Manzhou invaders. In 1768 Qi Zhouhua was quartered and all his writings were prohibited. [17]

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[14] See Luther Carrington Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung,* Waverly Press, Inc., Baltimore, 1935. This book by an eminent American Sinologist of the older generation contains much information on the literary inquisition in Qing China and takes a more serious and objective approach to facts than many other books.

[15] Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 77-79.

[16] Ibid., pp. 22-23, 84-87.

This persecution of writers reached its largest proportions in the reign of Qianlong. The latter's very first edicts on the collection of copies of books for the Imperial library listed books subject to total or partial destruction.

An edict of December 1767 stated: "But in case the [volumes sent] include books by Ming authors which opposed our house, they are to be set aside for destruction by fire." [18]

In 1782 a commission under the chairmanship of Ying Lian submitted a report to Qianlong in which they set down the rules for provincial officials taking part in the hunt for banned books and a list of books to be destroyed. In essence, this was the first index of prohibited books. [19]

The books made subject to destruction (total or partial) included those which referred to Qing emperors by name (instead of by the motto of their reign), contained attacks on the Manzhou court or on non-Chinese dynasties that reigned in China and were regarded as kin to the Qings (Liao, Jin, Yuan), discussed national defence or border policy, mentioned the political groupings of the close of the Ming period (Fushe, Jishe, Donglin), mentioned banned authors (Jin Bao,[20] Lü Liuliang,[21] Wang Xihou,[22] and many others), contained forewords, poems, letters, afterwords, and so on by them, or articulated heretical views about Confucian canons.

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[17] Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 97-99; *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period.* Edited by A. W. Hummel, 2 Vols., Vol. I, Washington, 1943, pp. 123-25.

[18] Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., p. 34.

[19] Ibid., p. 36.

For example, the poet Shen Deqian (1673-1769) was executed for having written the following: "Although you simulate red, you are nonetheless not really red; you are of a different colour so how can you call yourself the king of flowers."[23] These lines were interpreted as a hint that although the invaders had conquered China they were still foreigners and should not rule the nation.

In the works of the poet Hu Zhongzao the emperor Qianlong found the following line: "My emotions ponder on the corrupt and pure." The character for "pure" was the same as for the name Qing and was positioned immediately after the word "corrupt" (it could thus be read as "corrupt Qing"); this was enough for Hu Zhongzao to be beheaded (1755) and his family to be deprived of all their property and land.[24]

Qianlong ordered the execution also of the poet Xu Shukui after the following lines were found in one of his poems: "I move aside the jar of wine, wishing to see you again after tomorrow" and "Tomorrow morning I shall spread my wings and reach the capital of the Qings with one flap"—this was seen as hope for the restoration of the Ming dynasty and the overthrow of the Qings.[25]

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[20] A work on history by Shi Hong was banned for mentioning the name of Jin Bao in the preface. See Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 141, 149.

[21] Zhao Xianke's treatise on medicine was banned because the comments were written by Lü Liuliang. See William Hung, "Preface to an Index to Ssu-ku-ch'uan-chu tsung-mu and Wei-shou shu-mu", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,* Vol. 4, May 1939, No. 1, pp. 47-58.

[22] Wang Xihou's crime was that he abridged and amended the dictionary *Kangxi zidian.* See *Essays on the History of China.* Edited by Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959, p. 528 (Russian translation).

[23] Ibid.; see also Shang Yue, *Zhongguo ziben zhuyi guanxi fasheng ji yanbiandi chubu yanjiu* (A Study of the Rise and Development of Capitalist Relations in China), Peking, 1956.

[24] *Essays on the History of China.* Edited by Shang Yue; see also Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

[25] The character for "tomorrow" (*ming*) is also the name of the dynasty. It may be read as: "The house of Ming will spread its wings and in one flap sweep away the capital of the Qings." (*Essays on the History of China.* Edited by Shang Yue, pp. 528-29.)

Matters reached a point where even mention of sadness or tears in poems was punished by exile (a fate that befell Shi Cheng and other poets).[26]

A book by Chen Yubi, a historian of the close of the sixteenth century, was banned on the grounds that it contained a "biassed" mention of the *History of the Yuan Dynasty* and spoke of abuse of the law by officials in the Ming period.[27]

It is noteworthy that Qianlong saw himself as the guardian of orthodox neoConfucian ideology. He suppressed a number of books attacking orthodoxy. An instance of this is an edict of 1741 banning the works of Xie Jishi (1689-1756) for mocking at orthodox Confucian philosophers, the brothers Cheng and Zhu Xi. "Sheng-tsu [i.e., K'ang-hsi], moreover, made Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi.—*Ed.*) one of the ten sages, and especially singled him out for veneration. In all China there is no one who does not regard him as one to pattern after. But the school of Hsieh Chi-shih (Xie Jishi. —*Ed.*) express different opinions..." the Qianlong edict stated.[28]

Twelve books by Li Zhi were banned as conflicting with official ideology.[29]

In the section of Buddhist books in the Imperial library, *Siku quanshu*, the authorities permitted the inclusion of only 13 titles, while in the Taoist section they permitted only 44 titles, in other words, less than 2 per cent of the known books of Buddhist and Taoist canons that hold a significant place in the history of Chinese culture.[30]

The Manzhou rulers Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong issued a series of edicts forbidding officials to attend theatrical performances, banning the publication of "lewd novels", and ordering the destruction of "The Creeks", "Jin, Ping, Mei", "The Western Wing", and other splendid works of Chinese literature.[31]

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[26] Shang Yue, *A Study of the Rise and Development of Capitalist Relations in China,* p. 253.

[27] Luther Carrington Goodrich, "On Certain Books Suppressed by Order of Ch'ien-Lung During the Years 1772-1788", *Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Orientalists,* Vol. V, Moscow, 1963, p. 72 (Russian translation).

[28] Luther Carrington Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung,* p. 90. A decree couched in a blunter language was issued in 1894: "Henceforth no opinion shall be expressed that conflicts with the opinion of Zhu Xi" (*A History of Philosophy),* Vol. IV, Moscow, 1959, pp. 451-52 (in Russian).

[29] Luther Carrington Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition...,* pp. 57, 79.

[30] See William Hung, op. cit.

There are various estimates of the number of books banned and destroyed in the reigns of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong as a result of the literary inquisition introduced by the Manzhous. Professor Goodrich, for instance, places the figure at 2,320 books banned totally, 342 banned partially, and three with passages deleted.[32]

Xu Xudian, the contemporary Chinese historian, says that 1,335 books were banned entirely and 260 prohibited partially, and that no information is available as to what happened to 1,054 books.[33]

Shang Yue, another well-known Chinese historian, gives the following figures: "Between the 39th and 47th years of the reign of Qianlong (1774-1782) there were 24 burnings of books, with 13,862 titles relating to 538 branches of literature thrown into the fire."[34]

In some cases the contents were falsified by order of the Manzhou court: passages lauding the Manzhous were added to the text; the spirit of submission to foreign conquerors was introduced even into ancient books. It is noteworthy that words to the effect that a tyrant cannot count on the loyalty of his subjects were deleted from new editions of Confucian classics.

Progressive thought and enlightenment were suppressed by the Qings; all gatherings of members of the Chinese academic community and bureaucratic estate were forbidden and all societies were closed. The Manzhou government inhibited the development of national science and culture in China and insulated China from European culture and the culture of other Asian countries. The lack of links with the outside world held up the development of the exact sciences and technology in China.

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[31] For more information see *Yuan Ming Qing sandai jin hui xiaoshuo xiqu shiliao* (Information on Prohibited and Destroyed Works of Literature and Dramaturgy Under the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties), Beijing, 1958.

[32] Luther Carrington Goodrich, op. cit., p. 51.

[33] See Luther Carrington Goodrich, *On Certain Books Suppressed by Order of Ch'ien-Lung During the Years 1772-1788*, p. 72.

[34] *Essays on the History of China*. Edited by Shang Yue, p. 530.

Constant memorising of traditional Confucian moral principles (in their most dogmatic and idealistic—neoConfucian variant) and the writing of "octonary essays"[35] kept Chinese scholars so occupied that "they had little time for independent thought and study".[36]

A sort of classicism predominated in literature (with the encouragement of Qianlong, who wrote poems in the traditional (style): a literary work had to laud the monarchy; in form prose had to imitate the classics, and poetry could not go outside the norms of early Tang poetry.

The historical progressive character of classicism in some West European countries (laudation of the ideal of statehood, of the nation's consolidation, the triumph of the sense of duty to country over feelings of love and friendship) was not inherent in the Chinese literature of this period. Manzhou absolutism in China was not a progressive force; it was reactionary. That explains why, unlike the European literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the classicism fostered by it lacked the drive towards the consolidation of a nation state. Wanting a patriotic content, Chinese classicism glorified the principle of monarchy in the shape that it took during the Qing period, aesthetically asserting the rights of a foreign dynasty hostile to the Chinese people and pursuing anti-people policies. Hence the ideological hypocrisy of this literature, its striving to turn away from the urgent problems of the people, to hide in the labyrinth of abstractions, to segregate itself from realities, and speak of the problem of monarch and people regardless of time and space. Hence the dogmatism and the pedantic preoccupation with form, crude imitation of the ancients, the elaboration of rigid canons and rules founded on a barren outward imitation of patterns that had once won renown. Hence (in individual cases) the gravitation towards mysticism, the attempts to ignore realities entirely.

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[35] As a result of the strict regulation of the style of the examination compositions, the development and interpretation of the subject (evocative of the "rules" of the French classicists), persons preparing for the examinations studied the compositions of the most successful aspirants instead of studying Confucian classics and the works of ancient scholars and poets. This explains the wide circulation of editions of anthologies and readers of examination essays.

[36] Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese Gentry*, p. 198.

To illustrate. The poet Wang Shizhen (1634-1711) treated poetry as a mystical, spiritual harmony appealing to the senses and the imagination much more than to reason. There is not a hint of the realities of his day in the verses of Wang Shizhen, who regarded the writing of poetry as a mystery. A proponent of the revival of the spirit of antiquity in poetry, he popularised the work of the Tang poets who, like him, had a detached view of reality and its contradictions, and formulated his understanding of poetry in his *Poetics,* whose main propositions boil down to the following:

1. "Classicism"—the use of words and expressions met with in the works of ancient authors.
2. "Remoteness"—choice of words that do not directly and exactly convey the author's ideas but only hint at them from "afar".
3. Special attention to the melody, rhythm, and rhyme of verse.
4. Refinement.

Indicatively, in his *Poetics* Wang Shizhen makes no ideological analysis of the works considered by him, confining himself to the examination of form.

Wang Shizhen's views were enlarged upon by the poet Shen Deqian (1673-1769), who regarded form consistent with the rigid laws of the genre as basic in a work of poetry. He urged the "revival of antiquity", believing that only those poems were meritorious that could be compared to the works of poets of the Tang period; he held that poetry should be a continuation of the moral code of ancient thinkers and the style of the Tang epoch; poetic means should be traditional, borrowed from the classics; novelty only destroyed poetry.

Shen Deqian categorically refused to see literature as an instrument of political struggle. Poetry, he wrote, had to be free of satire and of accusations. Verse should express "sorrow", not "anger", and it had to be moderate, gentle, and restrained; if there was criticism in poems it had to be discreet, not direct, expressed by hints, inferred and not pronounced bluntly. Denying the value of folk creativity, Shen Deqian accorded recognition only to works not linked to folk literature (neither in form nor in content).

A similar stand was taken by Fang Bao (1668-1749), founder of the officially supported Tongcheng school of writers, and by his fellow townsmen (of the town of Tongcheng) Liu Dakun (1698-1779) and Yao Nai (1731-1815), whose ideal was the "ancient literary style".

Members of this school saw their principle of unity of the ideological and artistic conception of a work of literature only in formal terms (this was also a characteristic of French classicist poets); they wrote their poetry strictly in accordance with the laws of symmetry, and hence their penchant for the "octonary essay" form. They condemned subjective lyricism and emotionality, advocating impassive, dry presentation. As compilers of several anthologies of *bagu wenzhang* or "octonary essays", they themselves wrote quite a few models of this sort of essay, which enjoyed considerable success at the time.

Fang Bao urged a "revival of antiquity", the use of *guwen,* the language and form of ancient classics such as *Zuozhuan* and *Shiji,* the essays of Han Yu and Liu Zongyuan. Fang Bao said that in antiquity literature and ethical standards were inseparable, in other words, that the content of a work of literature (Confucian) and its form (classical) were a coherent whole; but subsequently they separated. Fang Bao believed that it was his and his associates' mission to attain the literary perfection whose criterion is the fusion of traditions of a brilliant form with an orthodox (neoConfucian) content. He and his followers rejected the idea of the development of literature (they regarded it as having congealed), failing to understand that each epoch makes its own contribution to literature, modifies its forms and genres that grow obsolete with the passage of time. They avoid writing about actual events, isolating themselves from life. The Tongcheng school represented an orthodox trend in the literature of the Qing epoch.

Alongside such adherents of absolutism, who praised the Qing monarchy in their writings, there were other writers, ardent patriots, persecuted all their lives for refusing to serve the Manzhous. They include the great enlighteners Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Zhen. Also, it should be remembered that during the Qing period Chinese authors wrote remarkable novels of social protest, including *A Dream in a Red Tower, An Unofficial History of Confucians*. The people extolled the patriotism of their national heroes in their songs and created works of genuine poetry. These processes developed despite the will of Manzhou rulers, who implanted dogmatism in all areas of ideology, destroyed priceless works of Chinese thought, and falsified the cultural heritage of the past.

*P. M. USTIN*

# PU SONGLING: ACCUSER OF THE MANZHOU CONQUERORS

The anti-Manzhou motifs in the writings of Pu Songling (1640-1715) continue to be debated in Chinese literary criticism to this day. The absence of uncensored publications of his works has prevented a scientific study of his work and made it impossible to give an accurate assessment of the anti-Manzhou, accusatory character of his writing. However, a hitherto unknown manuscript of the writer[1] was published in 1955 and it confirmed the surmises of those who saw in his works a satire of the society of those times even in censored publications.

In the heat of the polemic, while presenting well-founded evidence of the writer's attacks on the Manzhous, Chinese literary critics sometimes offered formal arguments that did not stem from a concrete analysis of Pu Songling's literary heritage. For example, on the basis of an identical phonation of two different characters, they contended that in describing foxes (*hu*) Po Songling meant the Manzhous (literally, northern barbarians—*hu*).[2] Other students of Pu Songling's works prefer to say nothing of their anti-Manzhou slant.[3] Of course, it is very hard to research patriotic motifs in Pu Songling's short stories on account of the literary inquisition under Kangxi and Qianlong. Nevertheless, if they are brought to light they will help to form a more profound idea of the writer's worldview. A third group of Chinese literary critics refuse to concede that Pu Songling had anti-Manzhou sentiments. The most rabid spokesman of this school is Lan Ling, who, in his analysis of the pronouncements of the proponents of "national self-awareness" in the Pu Songling's short stories, finds their arguments untenable and the examples given by them far-fetched.

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[1] Pu Songling, *"Liao zhai zhi yi" shougao* (Manuscript of "Liao zhai zhi yi"), Beijing, 1955, Vols. I-IV.

[2] See Ren Fangqiu, "'Liao zhai zhi yi' di sixiang he yishu" (Ideas and Literary Skill in "Liao zhai zhi yi"), in *Zhongguo gudian wenxue yanjiu lunji* (Studies of Chinese Classical Literature), Wuhan, 1956, p. 56.

[3] See Liu Shide, "Gu hou shi, Lei kuai chou" (A Story of Demons and Foxes, A Mound of Wrath), *Guangming ribao*, July 30; August 6, 1961; Deng Tan-zhou, "Lüelun 'Liao zhai zhi yi'" (Brief-

"At the outset of the Manzhou dynasty," Lan Ling writes, "the character of some peasant risings and mass organisations was anti-Manzhou, and this is an objective historical fact. However, the short stories of Pu Songling did not reflect the anti-Manzhou substance of these risings and mass organisations or the revolutionary spirit of the peasants." [4] Thus, Lan Ling sees no evidence in support of Pu Songling's patriotism.

Lan Ling is not alone. For instance, the Chinese philologist Hu Nianyi writes: "The long and short of it is that the short stories contain no serious evidence of national self-awareness." [5] Wang Wensheng likewise maintains that Pu Songling's writings were not directed against the Manzhou emperor. [6] There is a sociological negation of Pu Songling's literary heritage also in articles written by Zhu Shiying, [7] Ma Zhenfang, [8] and others.

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ly About "Liao zhai zhi yi"), in *Zhongguo gudian wenxue lungao (Chinese Classical Literature)*, Changsha, 1957, pp. 136-37; Tao Junqi, "Guanyu 'Liao zhai zhi yi' di yanjiu" (A Study of "Liao zhai zhi yi") in *Wenxue yichan* (The Literary Heritage), Issue 1, Beijing, 1957, pp. 370-80.

[4] Lan Ling, " 'Liao zhai zhi yi' di minzu sixiang zainali?" (Wherein Lies the National Self-awareness of "Liao zhai zhi yi"?), *Guangming ribao,* February 5, 1956.

[5] Hu Nianyi, "Guanyu gudian wenxue yanjiuzhong sixiangdi zhenglun wenti" (To the Debate on National Self-awareness in Classical Literature), *Guangming ribao*, July 28, 1957.

[6] Wang Wensheng, " 'Liao zhai zhi yi' ji qi zuozhe Pu Songling" ("Liao zhai zhi yi" and Its Author Pu Songling), *Guangming ribao*, July 3, 1954.

[7] Zhu Shiying, " 'Liao zhai zhi yi' di suminglun sixiang yingdang pingan" (The Fatalism in "Liao zhai zhi yi" Should Be Criticised), *Guangming ribao,* October 20, 1964.

[8] Ma Zhenfang, "Shilun 'Liao zhai zhi yi' di jinghua yu zaopo" (The Kernel and the Husks in "Liao zhai zhi yi"), *Guangming ribao,* July 11, 1965.

Let us consider some of the stories in which Pu Songling castigates the Manzhou invaders. Lan Ling says that Pu Songling's story *The Monster* is "bizarre" and lacks an "active content".

If we do not attentively follow the subject's development, do not ponder on the motivations of the characters' actions, and make no attempt to see the inner meaning of the author's assessments, which look neutral at first glance, we shall indeed find only a bizarre tale. It tells of events that are supposed to have taken place during a rising against the Manzhous led by Yu the Seventh. A villager was making his way home and came across a "great" army.

The word "great" in the story is a "substitute" for the Manzhou army. The peasant fears to be seen by it, and hides among corpses to avoid meeting soldiers of that army. Then Pu Songling introduces a creature whom even the mangled corpses fear. They rise as if by a signal, groaning: "What shall we do? A monster is upon us!" The brain is pervaded by this atmosphere of horror compounded by the appearance of a fantastic creature with a human body and the face of a dog, who at once begins "crunching" the heads of the corpses. Frightened by the Manzhou army, the hero of the story hides amidst the corpses; horrified by the unworldly creature he digs deeper under the corpses. The reader involuntarily associates the monster with the invaders. This story can on no account be termed bizarre and lacking an "active content". More, the terse phrases about the peasant making his way across mountains "during the rising of Yu the Seventh, when people were cut down like hemp in the field", convey the tragedy of those days. Lan Ling ignores the specifics of the epoch—the language of allegory in the story can be explained by the reign of terror established by the Manzhous. Had Pu Songling been more direct, his life would have ended with this story.

*Gongsun the Ninth* is described by Lan Ling as a fantastic story of a romance between a man and a woman-devil. The background is the same rising under the leadership of Yu the Seventh, to be more exact—the consequences of this people's action. Breaking out in 1649 in the province of Shandong, near Pu Songling's birthplace, the rising lasted nearly 14 years and was finally put down in

1662. The events in the story unfold 13 years after the rising was crushed. With infinite sorrow Pu Songling writes of the thousands who were executed or arrested. "A particularly large number of those executed in connection with the affair of Yu the Seventh came from the districts of Qixia and Laiyang. Several hundred persons were arrested there daily and beheaded. Blood flowed down the executioner's block, and bodies were piled high to the sky. Out of mercy and compassion the authorities presented coffins, and the coffin-makers in the town of Jinan ran out of wood, their storehouses stood empty."

The reader is kept constantly aware of this tragedy of the people and the author's reproach to the authorities, who dealt so brutally with the insurgents. The subject of the story develops mainly in the nether world, where only one living person figures—a student from the district of Laiyang. The other three died tragically during the rising. However, as Gongsun the Ninth says, these were not the sole victims: in the other world whole villages of Laiyang and Qixia were populated with the souls of those who died in these terrestrial districts.

Formally, this beginning is the introduction to a fantastic subject, to a love story. Outwardly, the author accentuates the problems of love, match-making, and marriage between a human being and a spirit. However, the great compassion shown by the author for these "homeless souls" indicates that he sides with those who rose against the foreigners. A bitter fate befalls one of the characters, a 15-year-old girl, who was arrested because her father had taken part in the rising. The girl's betrothed likewise dies very young. The life of the second character of "Gongsun the Ninth" also ends unhappily: she commits suicide. Throughout the story the only living character worries about a funeral service for those who were executed. In his search for the remains of his beloved, he sees only "thousands of graves".

Pu Songling's next story, *Sister Chou,* is qualified by Lan Ling as "having a most commonplace subject". But a comparison of the censored publication with the original manuscript totally refutes this view. In the censored publication we find the following: "Envy was consuming Wei. Full of malice, he sought an opportunity to cause pain to the family of Chou. The affair of a hardened bandit, who fled to distant lands, came to light at the time. Wei defamed Lu, declaring that the latter hid loot. Lu was exiled beyond the Great Wall."

In the manuscript this passage reads differently: "Envy was consuming Wei. Full of malice, he sought an opportunity to cause pain to the family of Chou and persuaded a bannerman deserter to say that Lu kept loot and hid the deserter. When the new dynasty ascended the throne the laws were stiffened and Lu was banished beyond the Great Wall." This is a reference to the brutal laws used by the Manzhous to consolidate their rule. A Chinese could be accused of a crime at any time and punished without actually being guilty of any crime.

On the far side of the Great Wall, Lu takes service with a general and among the latter's slaves meets his father Zhong, who had been captured by bandits. In the censored publication we read: "At first the bandits compelled him [Zhong.—*P. U.*] to tend horses, but when they were scattered Zhong found himself beyond the Great Wall and there he became a servant of the general." In the manuscript, this passage reads somewhat differently: "At first the bandits compelled him [Zhong.—*P. U.*] to tend horses, and when they surrendered to the authorities and took service with them they sold Zhong to the general. He followed his master, who was quartered beyond the Great Wall."

Obviously, the body of the story likewise underwent some modification. Whereas in the censored publication Zhong became a servant of his own free will, in the manuscript he had no choice, for he was sold to the general. The word "bannerman" is everywhere changed to "general". The censors were aware of how dangerous the story was and deleted precisely those words that could be taken as referring to the ruling Manzhous.

There are analogous textual discrepancies in the story *Zhang Cheng*. The censored story begins with the words: "The ancestors of Zhang, who was born in Yu, came from Qi. A great disturbance began in Qi. His wife was seized and led away by soldiers of an army sent to put down the rebellion."

In the manuscript this passage runs as follows: "The ancestors of Zhang, who was born in Yu, came from Qi. A great disturbance began in Qi towards the end of the Ming dynasty's rule, and his wife was seized and led away by soldiers of the northern army." The "great disturbance" at the close of Ming rule was the war against the Manzhou invaders, who saw women, young and old, as legitimate prizes.

This story relates the misfortunes of the Zhang family that was forcibly separated by the conquerors. After losing his wife and property, Zhang settled in Henan, married, and begot a son, whom he named Na. Many years later Na met his half-brother, the son of his father by the wife taken away by soldiers.

The following is a fragment of a conversation between the brothers, who still knew nothing of their kinship (from the censored text): " 'How did you come to live in Henan?' the elder brother asked. Na replied: 'My father's first wife was seized by soldiers. After the ravages my father was left without property. He used to trade in the West, and he therefore settled there.' " In the manuscript, to the question how they came to live in Henan, Na replied: "In the reign of the Ming dynasty the Manzhou army overran our native town and took my father's wife with them. After the ravages, my father was left without property and without his family."

After realising that he was talking to his half-brother, Na asked to see his father's first wife, who upon meeting him related the following (in the censored version): "For three years I was your father's wife, then we were separated, and I found myself in the North, where I was taken by the commander. Half a year later your elder brother was born, and then after another half a year the commander died; your brother inherited his rank, although he has now retired. I often spoke to him of our birthplace, and he decided to have his name struck out from the new register and entered into the former register." Let us now turn to the manuscript: "For three years I was your father's wife, then we were separated and I found myself in the North. I was taken into the house of a Black Gushan. Half a year later your elder brother was born, and then after another half a year the Black Gushan died. Your brother inherited this rank from him, although now he has retired."

Comparing the two texts, we see that everything relating to the Manzhous was deleted, while the military rank of *gushan* (an officer in the eight banners)[9] is replaced with the word "commander". The rank of Zhang's eldest son, *biejia*, which under the Manzhous was equivalent to assistant provincial governor, was replaced with the Ming rank of *qianhu*, or commander of a thousand soldiers. Withdrawal from the register of a Manzhou family and return to the family register of his father meant that the elder son renounced affiliation to the Manzhou banner troops. Thus, despite the privileges that went with affiliation to the Manzhou banners, one of the story's characters renounces them and returns to the family of his forefathers. The author thereby indirectly extolled patriotism.

In *Banished Chang E* Pu Songling shows the bitter lot of slaves under the invaders, who humiliated their prisoners and kept them in inhuman conditions. In the censored text we read: "'After our separation we,' replied the girl, 'went to the South. My old mother was near the end of her life; but I was seized by a wicked man and sold to a rich house, where I was beaten, shamed and starved . . . I cannot even speak of it.'

"Zong wept, the tears falling in large drops to the ground.

"'Can you be redeemed?' he asked.

"'I don't think so. I'm afraid it will mean a lot of trouble and expense, but in the end you'll do nothing for me.'"[10]

Instead of the words "but I was seized by a wicked man and sold to a rich house", the recently published manuscript says, "but I was seized by a wicked man and sold to Manzhous". Consequently, everything that follows—"beaten, shamed, and starved . . ." is an accusation of the Manzhous. The absence of the words "I don't think so" in this text gives the story a more definite touch.

Pu Songling's feelings against the Manzhous are expressed most distinctly in stories deleted from the censored volume. One of the publishers, Zhao Qigao, wrote that they not only changed individual phrases but dropped stories that in the view of the publishers "were not of special interest". Let us consider some of the deleted stories.

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[9] Lin Mingjun, "'Liao zhai zhi yi' suo biaoxiandi minzu sixiang" (National Self-awareness Reflected in "Liao zhai zhi yi"), *Sichuan daxue xuebao* (Sichuan University News), 1955, No. 2, p. 150.

[10] Pu Songling, *Charms of a Fox*, Moscow, 1955, p. 206 (Russian translation).

*Demon Messengers* is the story of two soldiers who luckily met with demons and, with their help, escaped death at the hands of soldiers of the Northern army. The misfortune of many people was that they were in the path of the "Northern army" and were killed because of that. In this story Pu Songling exposes the brutality of the Manzhou invaders. It is based on a historical event that took place in January 1639, when the population of the town of Jinan was massacred by the Manzhou army.

Pu Songling openly tells of the cruelty of the Manzhous, whose coming to power was accompanied by mass murder and barbarous suppression of popular risings, when tens of thousands of people (*Small Coffins*) were executed, and everybody who fell into the hands of the Manzhous after the besieged town was taken, was destroyed. Nor was this lot avoided by those who were opposed to the Mings (*An Exile in Liaoyang*).

Manzhou atrocities are dealt with in some other stories by Pu Songling. For example, in two stories under the heading *Separations in Troublous Times* he tells of what at first glance was a happy meeting of kin and members of one family. The first is about a girl captured by the Manzhous. She was taken captive by a *niurhu,* a unit commander. This *niurhu* also seized a youth. Having no children of his own, he decided to adopt the youth and marry the captive girl to him. The youth turned out to be the girl's betrothed before her capture, and everything ended happily, but it might have been otherwise, and this is the grim message intended by the author.

The second narrative in this story concerns events of a later period—the rising led by Jiang Xiang. A Chinese official lost his family. After the rising had been suppressed, he sent people to find his family but it turned out that not a single smoking chimney was to be seen for hundreds of li. One day the official set out on business to the capital and took with him a servant, who was a widower. "At that time the great army had returned in triumph, with captive women too numerous to count. With labels on them they were put on display in the market as though they were buffaloes and horses."

Out of pity for his old servant the official gave him money to buy a wife. When the servant brought her home the official recognised his mother. In token of gratitude the official rewarded the servant with a larger sum of money. The old man decided to buy another woman, and when he brought her home it was found that she was the official's wife.

In these two stories the writer conveys the great grief of a nation. Pu Songling writes of the people's pain not indifferently but with anger and anguish; he shows angrily how Manzhous made women an item of sale, humiliating their dignity and outraging their honour (*Mrs. Lin*).

Pu Songling witnessed the execution of many innocent people. This underlies the emotional impact and sorrow of his accusative stories.

He created unforgettable images of ordinary people who fought the foreign invaders bravely. The story *A Woman from the Family of Zhang* opens with the words: "Wherever it went the great army brought more misery than bandits and thieves. Bandits could be bridled, but not the army."

In this story Pu Songling painted the portrait of an ordinary woman, who is courageous and intelligent. When the Manzhou invasion began she refused to hide in the fields and remained in her home. At night, together with her husband she dug a hole under the house and made a bed over it. When two Manzhou soldiers broke into the house and wanted to rape her she managed to lure the men into the hole, after which she set fire to the house. To the question why there was a smell of burning flesh, she replied that she was roasting "two pigs" which she did not want to leave for the invaders. After this she made her home on the road side and continued to destroy Manzhous one by one.

In another story Pu Songling shows two young girl riders armed with sharp daggers fighting with a veteran and courageous Manzhou commander named Peng (*The Heresy of the "White Lotus"*). Arriving at the head of a large unit of the "Great Army" to suppress an uprising, he fights with them, as with equals, for three whole days, from morning to night: none gains the upper hand. On the fourth day Peng's strength ebbed—"he died of exhaustion". True, despite the bravery of the girls and other people, the rising was crushed. From questions asked of those who took part in the fighting it turns out that the daggers of the girls were made of wood, and that the low benches on which the girls sat astride were taken by the troops for horses. In this way Pu Songling conveys his belief that patriotism, the defence of one's home and honour gives strength even to the weak.

Pu Songling ends the story *The Heresy of the "White Lotus"* with the words: "The weapons and horses, which were not real, brought about the death of a real general. This is indeed astonishing!" Also interesting is that in this story Pu Songling presents the image of the head of a sect, Xu Hongru, who, having started a rising against the Manzhous, seemed to be going in the wrong, "left" direction, and yet gathered many people: "Within a few months he gathered tens of thousands around him."

Pu Songling's patriotism, expressed in a sympathetic attitude towards the Chinese dynasty and hatred of the Manzhous, may also be seen in the story *The Owl*, a mockery of a bureaucrat, who, under the umbrella of the Law of the Great Qings, unscrupulously robbed the people. The author contrasted this Law of the Great Qings with Zhu Yuanzhang, the first Ming emperor, who with sword in hand punished venal officials who were robbing the people.

In this story the accuser is an owl that laughs sardonically at a bribe-taking official. In the afterword the author stresses that although people dislike the owl, regarding it as harbinger of disaster, its laughter is in this case like the "singing of a miraculous bird".

Thus the stories deleted from the volume by editors make it clear that Pu Songling despised the foreign invaders, who sowed evil, robbed, killed, and enslaved.

While in *The Heresy of the "White Lotus"* Pu Songling indirectly expresses his admiration of those who resisted the Manzhous, in *The Equerry Wang* he lauds his hero, whose very name strikes terror in the Northern army. Unlike many of his stories, this story makes no mention of the time of action. Judging from the content, the equerry was one of the Chinese generals protecting the country's northern frontier. By military stratagems he inspired such fear in the Manzhou soldiers that even in his old age he was able to cow a Qing army merely by appearing before it. The author tells the reader, as it were: the army of the invaders is not as terrible as it seems. It can be resisted if one uses his wit and is loyal to one's people.

These stories are a call for active struggle against the Manzhous, and laud people of courage and devotion.

In 1713 the artist Zhu Xiangling painted a portrait of Pu Songling and presented it to the writer, who soon afterwards made two inscriptions on it. One reads: "In the ninth moon of the year of *guisi* (1713.—*P. U.*) Zhu Xiangling painted this portrait as a gift to me. In it I am shown in fashionable dress. It was not my will to have dressed in this manner. In the centuries to come my dress will, perhaps, be called strange, and I will be censured and scoffed." In the portrait the writer is painted in Manzhou mandarin dress. What reproaches did he fear from coming generations? Not the reproach of treachery?! In the inscription he poured out the sorrow of a person who was subjugated but had not relinquished the hope of liberation.

Pu Songling called the volume of his stories a "book of lonely anger".[11] The existing orders, the bureaucrats, the bribe-takers aroused his indignation, but he could not speak of this even among friends.

A contemporary of Pu Songling, a man named Nancun, made the following note on one of the copies of the stories: "Now, when I read his book I can see that in eight or nine out of every ten words there is a hidden meaning."[12] One of the authors of the foreword to the stories, the writer Yu Rongshang, revealed his subtle understanding of them, seeing the heroes not as demons or foxes, but people "whose cruelty sometimes surpassed that of beasts and werewolves".[13] There is not the shadow of a doubt that Pu Songling was a patriot. This is borne out by the tendentiousness of his publishers, who refused to publish works containing open condemnation of the invaders.

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[11] Pu Songling, "My Story", in *Literature of China and Japan*, 1935, p. 292 (Russian translation).

[12] Quoted from Yang Rengkai *"Liao zhai zhi yi" yuan gao yanjiu* (A Study of the Manuscripts of "Liao zhai zhi yi"), Shenyang, 1958, p. 72.

[13] Yu Rongshang, *Foreword* in Pu Songling, *Liao zhai zhi yi* (Notes About Strange Things from the Study of a Talkative Man), Vol. I, Shanghai, 1962, p. 6.

In Pu Songling's exposures of the Manzhou "assumption of the throne" there is a definite set of views identical with the views of those who fought the invaders with arms in hand and with the words of anger belonging to the patriots and enlighteners Huang Zongxi (1610-1695), Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692).

*B. M. NOVIKOV*

# THE RISING OF 1787-1788 ON TAIWAN

A major milestone of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Qing regime on the borderline of the new epoch was the rising of 1787-1788 on Taiwan, known as the rising of Lin Shuangwen. For Taiwan this was one of the most conspicuous risings of the period of Qing rule on the island. It attracts special attention because it was the first mass armed action under the leadership of the secret Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui),[1] a militant anti-Manzhou organisation that played a big part in many subsequent popular movements in South and East China.

The Taiwan rising of 1787-1788 was part of a powerful wave of anti-Qing actions of the Chinese peasants and of ethnic minorities that swept across the country at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. This wave was precipitated by an intensification of all forms of national oppression and feudal exploitation accompanied by a nascent internal crisis of the Qing empire. A characteristic feature of the general situation in China at the time was the sharpness of ethnic and class conflicts. This was most pronounced on Taiwan, where the situation was extremely complex.

Taiwan held a special place in the Qing empire. Its insularity determined many aspects of the life of its population and the forms of its links with the mainland. Its geographical isolation gave rise to two important features of the Qing regime on the island. First, it seriously hindered and weakened Qing control. References to these difficulties are to be found in many official documents of the period. "The main inconvenience of Taiwan", says, for instance, a report of the governor of Fujian to the throne in 1810, "is its isolated location across the sea. It has nothing approaching the communications and mutual support of the mainland." [2]

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[1] This name of the society mainly comes from the circumstance that its members revered Heaven as the Father, and the Earth as the Mother. See *Tiandihui wenxian lun* (Records of Documents of the Tiandihui), Chongqing, 1943, p. 9. The society had other names, for instance, Sanhehui (Triple Harmony Society) and Hongmen (Brotherhood Hong).

Second, the conditions on the island were conducive to abuse of office by the local authorities. The opportunities for uncontrolled actions and undisguised pillage and money-making made Taiwan a gold mine for avaricious officials, who engaged in savage infighting for office on the island. [3]

Moreover, Taiwan's historical past worried the Qing rulers. The island was the last base of the Chinese people's struggle against the Manzhous in the latter half of the seventeenth century and was subjugated by the Manzhous only in 1683. Hence the measures taken there by the Qing court to prevent resistance from the population.

Formally, with the establishment of Qing rule, Taiwan was in terms of administration incorporated in Fujian Province as a region (*fu*) consisting of at first three and then (from 1723 onward) four districts and one independent district (*ting*). [4] But the regime was harsher on the island than on the mainland. In order to tighten its control of Taiwan the Qing court filled all the administrative posts exclusively with officials from the mainland, and these were changed every three years. The island's large garrison (nearly 13,000 troops on the eve of the rising of 1787-

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[2] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi* (A General History of Taiwan), 1st printing, Taibei, 1918 (in Japanese); 2nd printing, Chongqing, 1946, p. 142.

[3] Ibid., pp. 92, 139, and others.

[4] These districts were: Taiwan (now Tainan; the centre of this district was also the regional centre), Fengshan (now Gaoxiong), Zhuluo (now Jiayi), Zhanghua and the *ting* Danshui (north of the island; the *ting* centre was Zhuqian, now Xinzhu). This administrative division of the island remained until 1810. See *Qing shi gao* (An Outline History of the Qing Dynasty), Beijing, 1927, Section *Dilizhi* (Geographical Description), Chapter 18, p. 1b; F. A. Toder, *Taiwan and Its History (19th Century)*, Moscow, 1978, p. 47 (in Russian).

1788) came from the military districts of the mainland part of Fujian Province and most of the officers were Manzhous. It, too, was changed every three years.[5]

Relative to the island the Qings pursued a policy of maritime restrictions. Up to the mid-nineteenth century Taiwan's trade with mainland China was limited, and this created difficulties for the island's population, who needed many products from the mainland.[6] The casting of metal and the manufacture of hardware were forbidden almost entirely.[7] The Qing authorities tried in every way to discourage mainland Chinese from settling on the island; migration to Taiwan was permitted only from a few seaboard areas (chiefly from the districts of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in Fujian and of Chaozhou and Huizhou in Guangdong). Resettlers had to have recommendations from the local authorities, while men migrating to the island were not allowed to bring their families for a period of tens of years.[8] However, these restrictions failed to halt mass migration by destitute people from the seaboard provinces, who in their search for a livelihood ignored the threat of punishment and went secretly to Taiwan. The island's Chinese population increased rapidly in the eighteenth century.[9] Actually, the ban on resettlement and trade only created additional opportunities for bribe-taking by local officials and gave an added incentive to the growth of anti-Qing feeling on the island.

Relations between the ethnic groups on the island (between the native Gaoshan tribes and the Chinese [Hans], and also among the Chinese from various parts of mainland China) were very complex indeed.

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[5] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian* (Collected Works of Statesmen of the Ruling Dynasty), compiled by He Changling and Wei Yuan, Shanghai, 1836, Chapter 8, p. 63a; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji* (Notes About Imperial Wars), 1842, Chapter 8, p. 34a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 41, 92, 205.

[6] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 46a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 370.

[7] Liu Danian et al., *Taiwan lishi gaishu* (Essays on the History of Taiwan), 2nd printing, Beijing, 1962, pp. 33-34.

[8] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, pp. 48a-b; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 39, 107-08.

[9] Lian Heng's estimate is that in 1683 there were some 200,000 Chinese on the island, while the official statistics for 1811 give the number (probably somewhat overstated) as over two million. See Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 106, 109; F. A. Toder, op. cit., pp. 49, 294-95.

The Manzhous distinguished the native Taiwanese as "savage" (shengfan) and "civilised" (huafan).[10] These two groups differed substantially from each other in terms of status, occupation, and the official attitude to them (the former, whose development was at the stage of stone implements and hunting, were forced to live in the mountainous areas; the latter, who lived in agricultural communities, figured in the lists of the population and paid taxes). Both groups were separated from the Chinese by territorial, language, religious, and other barriers. This hindered their unity with the Chinese in the anti-Qing struggle and made the native tribes a neutral and, in some cases, alien force in this struggle.

At the close of the eighteenth century the island's Chinese (Han) population consisted entirely of people from the nearest mainland districts of Fujian (60-70 per cent) and Guangdong (30-40 percent).[11] In their new places of residence they maintained their fellow-countrymen's links, forming narrow, territorial groups on that basis. Parochial exclusiveness and alienation, typical of the peasants of the feudal epoch, generated dislike and, in many cases, undisguised hostility between people from Fujian and Guangdong, and even between people who came from different districts of one and the same province (for instance, between Fujianians from the districts of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou).[12] The discord and sometimes armed clashes erupting on this basis were fanned and, in the long run, used by the Qing authorities and local landowners to further their own interests along the principle of "divide and rule"; invariably, the opposing groups of peasants were the sufferers.[13]

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[10] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 41, 93.

[11] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 16a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, p. 109; F. A. Toder, op. cit., p. 49.

[12] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 23, pp. 20a-23b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji*, Chapter 8, p. 28a; F. A. Toder, op. cit., p. 53.

[13] There was bloodshed between people from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in, for example, 1782, when the conflict involved nearly 200 villages of the Zhangzhua district, where the Lin Shuangwen rising later commenced. This clash between the Chinese themselves resulted in several thousand dead, more than 10,000 wounded, the burning of many dwellings, and the looting and destruction of a

Important as the above-mentioned circumstances were, the overriding cause of the tense situation on Taiwan was the ruthless feudal exploitation of the working population.

At the time Taiwan was subjugated by the Qings agricultural production was only beginning to develop. A more intensive economic development of the island was started in the eighteenth century. The enlargement of cultivated areas was accompanied by brutal feudal exploitation, by the growing absorption of newly-developed land by the feudal landowners. This was fostered by the Manzhou practice of obtaining private ownership of virgin land, by the system of so-called "persons responsible for developing virgin land" (*kenshou*).

An official document of the beginning of the nineteenth century gives an idea of how land was seized: "The incomes from newly-developed land goes, essentially, to the *shenshi*. Wherever there is land suitable for cultivation, they make haste to petition the district, get the ownership of the virgin land as *kenshou*, and then lease it to the new households (*kenhu*). The *kenshou* does not spend a single *qian*: he only files a petition and after the land is ploughed receives an annual rent." [14]

The degree of land concentration on the island in the mid-eighteenth century is graphically shown by an official named Fang Chuansui of the district of Danshui: "Thousands and tens of thousands of people ploughed the land, which was inherited by a few scores of persons. The title per person was possibly to over a thousand *jia* of virgin land." [15] Thus, the Qing authorities on Taiwan helped to

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mass of material values. In most cases, with the aid of servants and dependants the well-to-do managed to evacuate or dependably conceal movable property and thereby avoid serious loss, while many ordinary peasants, caught working in the fields, had to flee and leave their villages to be looted and destroyed by the attackers. These refugees—both of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou origin—deprived of homes and the means of livelihood, joined the ranks of Taiwan's dissatisfied population on the eve of the Lin Shuangwen rising. See Sasaki Masaya, *Shinmatsu-no himitsu kessya. Zempen, Tentikai-no seiritsu* (Secret Societies of the Close of the Qing Period, Part 1, *The Formation of the Heaven and Earth Society*), Tokyo, 1970, pp. 94-98.

[14] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, p. 124.

[15] Ibid., p. 122. *Jia*, a local land measure on Taiwan, equal approximately to 11 mu (or 0.73 hectare).

form large holdings, whose owners were the social mainstay of their power.

In addition to landowner exploitation, the population was burdened by taxes. Until the 1730s the official land and head taxes on the island were more than double those in the adjacent mainland districts.[16] Afterwards the taxes were formally reduced, but this concession was soon more than compensated by the introduction of innumerable additional feudal tributes. At the close of the eighteenth century about 10 "overland travel taxes" (*luxiang*) and also 14 "water taxes" (*shuixiang*) were added to the existing "dues for the loss of silver in smelting" (*huohao*) and the "mountain pass transit tax" (*aizu*).[17] This enormous tax burden was compounded by abuses by officials—from the island's governor down to the petty officials of district *yamens*.

The unrestrained feudal exploitation, the merciless oppression, and the harassment triggered open resistance from the population time and again.

During the first century of Qing rule on the island there were six rebellions, of which the most violent was the rising of 1721 headed by Zhu Yigui. At the close of the 1780s the island again became the scene of a fierce struggle against the Qings.

The rising of 1787-1788 was initiated by the leaders and members of the Tiandihui, a secret society bent on overthrowing Manzhou rule and restoring the Ming dynasty as the symbol of Chinese rule.[18] In the primitive form usual for popular movements of the time this society advanced the slogans of justice and equality and fostered the principle of mutual assistance among its adherents.[19]

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[16] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, pp. 107, 121. The practice of levying a uniform per head-land tax was spread to Taiwan in 1747.

[17] Ibid., pp. 334, 339.

[18] The slogan *Fan Qing fu Ming* (Down with the Qing, Restore the Ming) that expressed this idea not only had an anti-Manzhou content but also mirrored the naive monarchist illusions of the people.

[19] It is not the purpose of this essay to go into particulars about the character and history of the Tiandihui. This has been researched by Soviet and foreign scholars, for instance: *Secret Societies in Old China*, Moscow, 1970; B. M. Novikov, "On the History of the Anti-Qing Secret Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui)" in *Historiography and Source Study of the History of Asian Countries*, Leningrad, 1965, pp. 56-71; *The Anti-Qing Secret Heaven and Earth*

Operating in the mainland districts of Fujian Province, the Tiandihui society extended its influence to Taiwan. According to sources, Yan Yan, Tiandihui leader arrived on Taiwan in 1783 from Pinghe District, Fujian Province, and began to recruit people into the society.[20] One of his first associates was Lin Shuangwen, who was to lead the rising.

There is little recorded data about Lin Shuangwen. It is known that he was a fellow townsman of Yan Yan, moved to Taiwan in 1773, and settled in the foothill village of Daliyi, Zhanghua District; he came from a prosperous family, was the headman of the village self-defence unit, and enjoyed the esteem of his fellow villagers and countrymen.[21] After joining the society, Lin Shuangwen drew his kinsmen and friends into it, setting up the first Taiwan Tiandihui group, which elected him its leader.[22]

Soon there were members of the society in all of the island's Han population centres. Their numerical strength on the eve of the rising is estimated differently by Qing authors—from a few hundred to 10,000.[23] The organisation was structured chiefly on the basis of associations of fellow-countrymen, and for that reason most of its members were people from Zhangzhou; the Tiandihui's influence among people from Quanzhou and Guangdong was much weaker.[24]

In the social composition the secret society was fairly broad and heterogeneous. Many of its members were people whom Qing sources call *wulai* (vagrants), *wangming* (refugees, homeless), *bucheng* (misfits), or *luohanjiao*,[25]

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*Society (Tiandihui): Origin and Early Activities,* Thesis for the Degree of Candidate, Leningrad, 1976 (all in Russian); Sasaki Masaya, op. cit; Dai Xuanzhi, "Origin of the Heaven and Earth Society", *Dalu zazhi,* Vol. 36, No. 11, June 1968, pp. 1-14.

[20] Wang Xianqian, *Donghua xulu* (Continuation of Notes at the Donghua Gates), 1887, Section *Qianlongchao* (Reign of Qianlong), Chapter 104, p. 3a.

[21] Ibid., Chapter 105, p. 1a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 553, 558.

[22] *Ping tai ji* (Notes on the Pacification of Taiwan) in Deng Zhicheng, *Zhonghua erqian nian shi* (A History of China Over a Period of 2,000 Years), Vol. 5, Part II, Beijing, 1958, p. 259.

[23] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 15a; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 28a.

[24] *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 1a; *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 16a.

[25] Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 28b; Deng Zhicheng, *Zhonghua erqian nian shi,* p. 259.

i.e., people having no permanent means of a livelihood, isolated from the usual conditions of life, ruined toilers, resettlers who found no home, fugitives from justice, and so forth. The members of the secret society included also so-called "persons with property" (*zhichan*), some junior employees, and, possibly, a few landowners.[26] But the Tiandihui society's social base was the Taiwanese peasants,[27] who, to use a phrase borrowed from a contemporary Chinese feudal lord, "shouted in unison with rabid rebels".[28] Support from the vast majority of the peasants was what injected determination into the actions of the secret society and turned it into an insurgent organisation.

At first secrecy enabled the as yet numerically few Tiandihui members to keep out of the local officials' field of vision. But as the membership increased the society grew more and more active. It began to go over to acts of open disobedience and, naturally, became the objective of repressions. Investigation gradually brought the Qing administration to the district of Daliyi, where the society had its headquarters headed by Lin Shuangwen.

In January 1787 the administrator of Zhanghua District set out with 300 soldiers to wipe out the "bandit nest". However, fearing serious resistance in Daliyi the troops halted a short distance away from it and as an act of intimidation set fire to several neighbouring villages and dealt summarily with their inhabitants.[29]

Spurred by the people's wrath at the brutality of the Qing authorities and by the need for instant resolute action, Lin Shuangwen called upon the members of the society and the population of Daliyi to rise. On the night of January 15 the insurgents led by him suddenly attacked the camp of the punitive detachment and destroyed it.[30]

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[26] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, pp. 553, 554.

[27] We believe that the society did not have strong positions among the numerically small urban population of Taiwan. Evidence of this is, for example, that during the rising the rural districts remained the strongpoints of the insurgents, while many of the towns took the side of the Qings.

[28] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian*, Chapter 84, p. 15a.

[29] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng* (Notes Lauding the Military Exploits of the Reigning Dynasty), 1792 Chapter 4, p. 16b.

[30] Ibid., Chapter 4, p. 16b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji*, Chapter 8, p. 28b; *Donghua xulu*, Section *Reign of Qianlong*, Chapter 105, p. 3a; *Qingshi gao*, Section *Liezhuan* (Biographies), Chapter 116, p. 5a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, p. 554.

The rising developed swiftly, enabling the insurgents to break the resistance of the Qing garrison within a short span of time. After this first victory, Lin Shuangwen marched to the district centre of Zhanghua and seized it on the next day. Then, forming themselves into groups, the insurgents advanced against the neighbouring districts. West of Zhanghua they seized control of the nearest sea port, Lugang, in the north they captured Zhuqian, the residence of the *ting* Danshui, on January 19, and on January 24 they entered the district centre of Zhuluo.[31]

In parallel, at the close of January, Tiandihui members organised an armed action in the south of the island under the leadership of Zhuang Datian.[32] On January 31 the southern group of insurgents captured the district centre of Fengshan. The swift advance of the insurgent units was facilitated by the fact that, unlike the towns in mainland China, the towns on Taiwan had no walls, encircled only by moats and a bamboo stockade.[33]

Thus, within a fortnight the rising had spread to almost all the western, Han-populated districts of Taiwan. By early February the Qing officials in the administrative centres had control only of the regional capital, from where requests for reinforcements were sent continuously to the mainland.

The rising owed its advances chiefly to the situation in which it broke out: spontaneous dissatisfaction had come to a head and it very quickly acquired a mass character, although on account of parochial alienation and other reasons the degree to which the various groups of Taiwan peasants were involved was dissimilar.[34] However, as a

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Like Lin Shuangwen, Zhuang Datian came from Pinghe, Zhangzhou District; on Taiwan he lived in the village of Zhuzigang, Fengshan District. He was rich but was known as a just man who helped needy compatriots. He joined the secret society before the rising and maintained contact with Lin Shuangwen. See Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 554.

[33] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 21b; *Qingshi gao,* Section *Biographies,* Chapter 116, p. 5b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 29a.

[34] The rising had its largest response among people from Zhangzhou, while a big proportion of the people from Quanzhou and Guangdong held aloof; there was hardly any support from the native communities. See *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 1a; *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 16a.

Qing record notes, in the places through which the insurgents passed "the villages in the vicinity, big and small, joined [them], and they were followed by tens of thousands".[35]

A large role in spreading the rising was played by the organised actions of Tiandihui adherents in the different parts of the island in support of the armed struggle started by their co-members. Better trained and linked by a certain amount of discipline, they comprised the core of the insurgents from the outset.

Within days of the start of the rising, the insurgent camp was institutionalised organisationally and politically. Following the seizure of Zhanghua, Lin Shuangwen was proclaimed *Shuntian mengzhu* (Leader of the Society of the Obedient to Heaven).[36] Although this did not mean he had assumed an imperial title, he proclaimed the motto of the years of his reign—*Tianyun* (Ordained by Heaven),[37] rejecting the accepted chronology based on the years of the reign of the Manzhou emperor (Qianlong).

The Tiandihui produced other leaders of the rebellion, who distributed various duties among themselves. Zhang Datian, leader of the southern insurgent group, proclaimed himself the "great captain helping the state in the southern direction" (*Nanlu fuguo dayuanshuai*), acknowledging Lin Shuangwen as the chief.[38]

In terms of social status the leaders of the rising were as heterogeneous as the secret society's membership: Lin Shuangwen and Zhang Datian were probably members of the rural rich; Yang Zhenguo, the "mentor of the army" Dong Xi, and some others had been minor employees; Wang Zuo, the "great captain conquering the North", and Chen Pan, the "left *dudu*", belonged to what the Qing authors classified as *bucheng* or declasse elements.[39]

The insurgent apparatus was largely modelled on the traditional military-administrative system of feudal China

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[35] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 15a.

[36] "Lin Shuangwen gaoshi (Manifesto of Lin Shuangwen)", *Shixue yuekan,* 1959, No. 7, p. 26.

[37] *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 9b.

[38] Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 554.

[39] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 17a; *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 3a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 553, 554.

(rank, subordination, and so on) and, at the same time, adapted to the organisational pattern of the Tiandihui (for instance, the election of officials by "the brotherhood of the secret society").[40] But whatever the outward forms of the insurgent administration it was essentially an anti-Qing administration of peasants and other lower strata of the Taiwan population, who were the driving force of the rising.

The transition to a mass armed struggle required the leadership of the rising to proclaim its objectives publicly. The ideas expressed in the slogans "Down with the Qing, Restore the Ming" and "We Shall Bring Justice By the Will of Heaven" underlay the "programme" of the rising. The first manifesto of Lin Shuangwen stated in part: "All the Qing officials now administering Taiwan are avaricious and dishonest. They are wronging the people. I am impatient to execute them and thereby save my people. [We] mustered troops to defend justice, and before Heaven we have sworn alliance: may the inhuman and unjust perish by tens of thousands of swords."[41] The idea of destroying the power of the Manzhous was thus presented by the insurgent leader in the Tiandihui spirit of "defence of justice".

Moreover, in accordance with the secret society's principles Lin Shuangwen announced the restoration of the practices and customs of the Ming dynasty, but this aspect of the Tiandihui programme was evidently confined to a formal proclamation.

In the towns taken by them the insurgents executed all the officials who fell into their hands, confiscating their property, opening government storehouses and, leaving small garrisons, moved on.

From the start of the rising its leaders warned against spontaneous, uncontrolled action by the insurgents: "I have announced to the troops in strict terms that they are to take nothing unnecessary without permission," stated the first manifesto of Lin Shuangwen.[42] Attention to discipline and efforts to curb any action prejudicial to the population characterised Lin Shuangwen as a leader of the people in the true sense.

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[40] Deng Zhicheng, *Zhonghua erqian nian shi*, p. 259.

[41] *Manifesto of Lin Shuangwen*, p. 25.

[42] Ibid.

In early February 1787 units led by Lin Shuangwen and Zhuang Datian converged on the regional centre from north and south respectively, but failed to capture that last stronghold of Qing rule.

A series of circumstances adversely affected the actions of the insurgent army at the regional centre. One of these was that by this time "volunteer" detachments formed by local Chinese landowners and *shenshi* had begun to help the regular Qing troops against the insurgents. These fairly large forces played an important part in the defence of the regional centre. They were active in the rear of the insurgents. Taking advantage of the concentration of the main insurgent forces for an assault on the regional centre, the landowner-led detachments in the north of the island seized Zhuqian and forced the insurgents out of Zhanghua for a time.[43]

Moreover, in concert with Chinese landowners and *shenshi* the Qing officials turned the discord among the Taiwan population to their advantage. They recruited "volunteer" detachments of natives and incited them against the Hans; in some areas people from Guangdong were roused against Fujianians and took a hostile stand against the insurgents.[44] In Lugang, where most of the population was from Quanzhou, there was a rising against insurgent rule in mid-February.[45] As a result, the insurgents lost a sea port, which soon afterwards was used by punitive Qing troops arriving from the mainland.

The first punitive detachments landed at the close of February in the regional centre port and Lugang. In this situation the insurgents lifted the siege of the regional centre and concentrated their forces in the districts of Zhanghua, Zhuluo, and Fengshan.

Although the insurgent army failed to take the administrative centre of Taiwan and lost Lugang and Zhuqian, the position of the Qing forces remained serious. Although the troops that arrived from the mainland were assisted by the landowner units they were unable to win any noteworthy victories. Their only success was the seizure of the district centre of Zhuluo in early March.[46] But on the whole, their actions were contained by the insurgents. The Manzhou military leaders who came to the island were confined to the regional centre and Lugang.

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[43] *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 5a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 555, 559, 563, 564.

[44] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 16a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 563.

[45] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 20a; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 29b.

The temporary weakening of the insurgent offensive did not signify a general decline of the rising. On the contrary, there was a gradual strengthening of the positions of the insurgents since March 1787. To some extent this was due to the anti-feudal and other actions taken by leaders of the rising that brought reinforcements to the insurgents.

According to evidence given by the insurgent leaders Lin Shui and Liu Tianci, who were subsequently seized by the Qing troops, after Lin Shuangwen returned to the north he sent them to the rural parts of the districts of Zhuluo and Zhanghua to "collect taxes in cash from rich households in all the villages... If any of the rich families resisted, these were to be immediately punished."[47] The money taken from rich people was used by the insurgents to supply their army and help the poor. According to some members of the Qing punitive detachments, "Lin Shuangwen and others are unusually cunning. They keep distributing the money and food seized through robbery to win the sympathy of people, with the result that hungry and homeless people join the bandits."[48]

Further, the insurgent leaders tried to put an end to alienation and hostility between the various national groups inhabiting the island. Lin Shuangwen spoke of this acute problem in his manifesto. "And then I learned," the manifesto said, "that certain brothers, left by me to guard public buildings, started a quarrel with ordinary people from Guangdong. This cannot be tolerated... When the army returns from the campaign, I shall investigate the facts and pass judgement... I have always been just and have no mercenary motives. The people from Fujian and Guangdong should not entertain mistrust, and peaceful relations should not be broken... We cannot allow petty grudges to lead to fights and murder, to trouble in which you undo your own lives."[49]

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[46] *Qingshi gao,* Section *Biographies,* Chapter 116, p. 5b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 29a.

[47] From documents in the Central Archives of the People's Republic of China. Quoted from Wang Liangzhi, "The Rising of Lin Shuangwen", *Lishi jiaoxue,* 1962. No. 11, p. 4.

[48] Ibid.

Lin Shuangwen's condemnation of parochial strife, his calls for unity of the entire working population under anti-Qing banners, and the anti-feudal changes introduced by him yielded some results. Between March and May 1787 the insurgents succeeded in winning over some of the villages inhabited by people from Quanzhou to their side, and the "Vendée" districts inhabited by settlers from Guangdong began to waver.[50] Some success was also achieved in enlisting the native population to the camp of the insurgents: small units of Gaoshans appeared in the insurgent army, and individual native communities began to assist the rebels.[51]

The failure of the first punitive expedition on Taiwan seriously alarmed the Qing court. The generals commanding this expedition were replaced and punished. Chang Qing, the Manzhou viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was appointed commander of the punitive campaign, and he arrived in the regional centre of Taiwan at the head of 10,000 troops at the close of April.

But even the arrival of these large reinforcements did not change the situation on the island in favour of the punitive forces. According to a contemporary Qing author, "in two or three months, while the government troops were being moved from neighbouring provinces to Fujian and, having waited for a fair wind, sailed [to Taiwan], their number [on Taiwan] increased only by 10,000, while the numerical strength of the bandits increased by more than 100,000"[52].

In mid-May the insurgents resumed a broad offensive. This time their thrust took them in two directions: the main forces under Lin Shuangwen moved to recover Zhuluo, while Zhuang Datian, supported by several detachments of the northern group, again encircled the regional centre.

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[49] *Manifesto of Lin Shuangwen,* p. 25.

[50] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 20a; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 30a; *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 16a-b.

[51] Wang Liangzhi, *The Rising of Lin Shuangwen,* p. 4.

[52] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 18a.

In the vicinity of the regional centre the government troops and the "volunteers" were unable to contain the pressure of the insurgents and their position soon became critical. However, at the decisive moment one of the leaders of the southern insurgent group, Zhuang Xishe, and the detachment commanded by him went over to the side of the Qing forces. This betrayal, whose roots lay in the social heterogeneity of the insurgent command and the parochial hostility among the rank and file,[53] demoralised the attackers. Zhuang Datian led his men back to his strongpoints in Fengshan District, and other chiefs siding with him, from the Lin Shuangwen group, also withdrew their contingents.

The insurgents thus again missed the opportunity of capturing the regional centre and lost the military initiative in the south of the island. By the end of May the centre of the armed struggle had shifted to the vicinity of Zhuluo, where Lin Shuangwen continued the offensive, seeking to break the resistance of the government troops and landowner units holding the district centre.

Situated between the northern and southern regions of the island, Zhuluo was a strategic stronghold, to which both sides attached great significance. For that reason there was particularly heavy fighting for the town.

In the course of May and June Lin Shuangwen's forces stormed Zhuluo seven times, but each assault was beaten back: after the Qing troops seized the town they had strongly fortified in (deepening the moats, building earthern walls on which cannon were mounted, and so on); moreover, the town's encirclement was not complete and the defenders received assistance from outside.[54] In July the insurgents cut Zhuluo's lines of communication with the regional centre and other Qing strongpoints. A long siege began. This demanded the mustering of all the strength of the insurgent army, which led to a general decline of the rising.

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[53] According to Lian Heng, Zhuang Xishe, who had joined the Tiandihui just before the rising, came from a wealthy family in Quanzhou and his detachment consisted entirely of men from that province. See Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 556.

[54] *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, pp. 17a, 20a; Chapter 106, p. 15b.

At the close of July the fighting for Zhuluo went on day and night. The besieged faced the threat of starvation as their food supplies began to run out. The Qing generals themselves expected Zhuluo to fall at any time. But despite all the efforts of the insurgents, they failed to take the town.

The fact that Zhuluo held out was by no means due to the regular Qing troops. The main force in the town's defence consisted of the landowner armed detachments led by the *shenshi* Huang Dianbang and Chen Zongqi, and the "volunteer" detachments that during the siege numbered nearly 40,000. [55] In many imperial edicts mention is made of the large contribution that was made to the defence of Zhuluo by the urban *shenshi* and merchants, "by loyal people from among the population of the town and its vicinity". [56] Recognition of the special services of the landowner-*shenshi* elements of Zhuluo against the insurgents was the official renaming of the town, in October 1787, to Jiayi (Praiseworthy Loyalty). [57]

In the fighting for Zhuluo the insurgents were unable to counter the combined forces of the government troops and the local feudal lords with close unity. In the summer active interaction between the southern and northern insurgent groups virtually ceased. After retreating from the regional centre Zhuang Datian's detachments gradually went over to isolated actions in the south of the island.

Despite the many setbacks, Lin Shuangwen did not change his plan of operations, doggedly pursuing his objective of taking Zhuluo. The siege of this town continued and pinned down a large part of the insurgent army. In the fierce fighting the insurgents sustained heavy losses, and many of the leaders, veteran members of Tiandihui were killed. As a result, by the winter of 1787 the forces of the northern insurgent group had been perceptibly weakened, discipline waned, and evidently the insurgent detachments had begun to lose some of their strength through desertions. [58]

On the other hand, the strength of the government forces on Taiwan increased: beginning with the summer of

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[55] Ibid., Chapter 105, p. 20a; Chapter 106, p. 16a.

[56] Ibid., Chapter 106, pp. 9a, 20b; Chapter 107, p. 12b.

[57] Ibid., Chapter 106, p. 15a.

[58] Ibid., p. 14a.

1787 the Qing court sent reinforcements from the mainland in an almost uninterrupted stream. The Taiwan officials and *shenshi* recruited more and more detachments of "volunteers" among the native population and of Han people who did not participate in the rising.[59]

However, the decisive turn in favour of the government troops occurred only with the arrival, in mid-December 1787, of a large new punitive army on the island. It consisted of many Manzhou units, picked troops from different provinces, and also a large group of *baturs,* officers of the imperial guard. The Manzhou general Fukanan, who had crushed the anti-Qing Muslim rising in Gansu Province (1781-1784), was appointed the new commander of the punitive campaign on Taiwan.[60]

As soon as he landed in Lugang, Fukanan moved his forces to relieve the beleaguered town of Zhuluo. The very first clashes of the insurgents with his fresh and well-armed troops near Lugang showed the latter's obvious superiority. Nevertheless, Lin Shuangwen did not reconsider his tactics and continued the siege of Zhuluo, with the result that the insurgent army found itself unprepared to resist the government troops advancing in its rear. The final stage of the rising commenced.

At the close of December, after a series of setbacks in the fighting against Fukanan's forces at the approaches to Zhuluo, the insurgents had, in order to preserve their strength, to retreat to the north and thus lift the nearly six-month siege of the town.[61] The northern insurgent group, having gone over entirely to defensive tactics, found itself in a rapidly deteriorating position. As early as during the first ten days of January 1788 Lin Shuangwen's detachments, which had suffered further defeats and heavy losses, were surrounded by government troops in the village of Dailyi, a Tiandihui strongpoint.

At this critical moment Lin Shuangwen requested assistance from Zhuang Datian, commander of the southern insurgent group, but the latter refused to send any forces on the grounds that the "northern direction was unimportant".[62] On January 13, after desperate resistance, the insurgents surrounded in Daliyi were crushed by numerically superior punitive forces.[63]

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[59] Ibid., Chapter 105, p. 24a; Chapter 106, pp. 2a, 3b-4a, 5b, 6b, 8b.

[60] Ibid., Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 105, p. 24a; Chapter 106, pp. 3b, 8b, 17b; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* pp. 557, 560.

[61] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 19a; *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 106, p. 19b.

With 2,000 men Lin Shuangwen managed to escape to the mountainous district of Jiji, but was obviously unable to win sufficient support from the local Gaoshan community, and was again defeated at the close of January. After this defeat Lin Shuangwen and a few score of men loyal to him fled higher into the mountains, where at the close of February he was seized by Qing troops. He was taken to Beijing in a cage and executed there.[64]

With the northern insurgent army crushed, the punitive forces concentrated their attention on the group under Zhuang Datian. The morale of the southern insurgent detachments had significantly declined by then, and defections commenced.[65] As had been the case in the north, the insurgents were no longer in a position to withstand the huge government army and, after suffering defeat, retreated to the island's southernmost tip. There, completely surrounded, they were broken at the close of March. Zhuang Datian shared the fate of the leader of the northern insurgent group.[66]

Sporadic resistance continued for some time in the mountains, but the small and scattered insurgent units were finally exterminated. The suppression of the rising was accompanied by savage repressions against rebels and the population; Manzhou sources admit that "in their pursuit of the bandits, the government troops burned, robbed, and killed tens of thousands of people".[67]

The nature of the peasant movement of the feudal epoch objectively doomed the uprising to failure. However, there were some subjective factors that contributed to the government forces' victory.

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[62] Wang Liangzhi, *The Rising of Lin Shuangwen,* p. 7.

[63] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, pp. 19a-b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 31b; *Qingshi gao,* Section *Biographies,* Chapter 118, p. 5a.

[64] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 19b; Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 32a; *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 107, pp. 3b-4a, 8b; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi,* p. 557.

[65] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 19b.

[66] Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji,* Chapter 8, p. 32a; *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 107, pp. 11a-b.

[67] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian,* Chapter 84, p. 18b.

These included the inadequacy of the specific anti-feudal demands and of practical steps taken by the insurgent camp. The Tiandihui society, which headed the rising, had a fairly clear programme of anti-Manzhou actions, but owing to its primitive organisational structure and heterogeneous composition it was hardly able to relate this programme to the spontaneous anti-feudal aspirations of the peasants and other lower strata of the Taiwan population. This gave rise to dissatisfaction among most of the participants in the rising, fettering their struggle against the landowners and the *shenshi,* who were the mainstay of Manzhou power.

A negative factor was the fragmentation and estrangement of the various ethnic groups on the island. As a consequence, far from all the anti-Manzhou forces joined the rising, while the Manzhous managed to enlist the support of a large section of the population and use it against the rebels.

A major circumstance hastening the defeat of the rising was the absence of the sufficient unity in the insurgent camp itself, notably among its leaders. The social heterogeneity and the influence of local discord resulted in individual leaders defecting to the enemy. A crucial factor was the fall-out between the rising's principal leaders, Lin Shuangwen and Zhuang Datian; this was noticed even by the Qing authorities.[68] The mutual dislike between them cut short the earlier interaction between the northern and southern insurgent groups, seriously weakening the insurgent camp and enabling the punitive forces to deal with the insurgent army piecemeal.

The tilt of the balance of forces in favour of the government camp was largely facilitated by the military miscalculations and mistakes of the insurgent leadership. The most costly was leaving the port of Lugang under Qing control and the drawing out the siege of Zhuluo. The first mistake allowed the government forces to use Lugang for the disembarkation of troops from the mainland almost throughout the duration of the rising. The second miscalculation deprived a considerable portion of the insurgent army of its initial mobility and initiative, and exhausted its forces.

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[68] Zhao Yi, *Huangchao wugong jisheng,* Chapter 4, p. 19b; *Donghua xulu,* Section *Reign of Qianlong,* Chapter 106, p. 7b.

Lastly, a glaring weakness of the rising was its purely local character, its restriction to a relatively small territory. Of course, to a large extent this was due to Taiwan's insularity. However, the national links of the insurgents to the mainland, especially through the secret society, provided a realistic foundation for the spread of the rising to neighbouring mainland regions. From the very outset this seriously disturbed the Qing rulers, and they repeatedly instructed their officials in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong to take precautions.[69] But the insurgent leaders did not even try to extend the anti-Qing struggle territorially.

Despite its local character and relatively short duration (14 months) the Taiwan uprising of 1787-1788 struck hard at the Qing regime. To suppress it the Qing court had to send to Taiwan more than 100,000 Manzhou and Chinese troops from seven provinces, and the punitive operation itself cost over a million liangs, or one-third of the annual revenue of the imperial exchequer.[70] After pacifying the island the Qing authorities took steps to reinforce their military and administrative control; among other things, they enlarged the bureaucracy, built fortified settlements, and erected walls around the towns. On the other hand, they had to make some concessions to the population—partial release from taxes, the measurement and partial confiscation of land concealed by landowners, the punishment of the most avaricious and cruel officials, and so on.[71]

The rising was closely linked to the activities of the Tiandihui society, being the latter's first important test of strength in the anti-Qing struggle. It reflected the ideological and structural weakness and primitive character of this peculiar people's organisation and, at the same time, strikingly demonstrated its anti-Manzhou spirit. Small wonder that the Qing rulers immediately saw it as a dangerous enemy. A special order from the emperor to Fukanan, the butcher of the rising, instructed the latter "to uproot the remaining weeds of sedition on Taiwan", with particular attention to the capture and execution of surviving members of the secret society.[72] In 1792 the outlawing of the Tiandihui society under penalty of death or lifelong exile was recorded in the Qing criminal code.[73] However, neither persecution nor repression could destroy this anti-Manzhou organisation, which had deep roots among the people. Beginning with the rising of 1787-1788 up to the Xinhai revolution members of this secret society time and again stirred the peasants and urban poor to rise against the Qings in many regions south of the Yangzi River.

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[69] *Donghua xulu*, Section *Reign of Qianlong*, Chapter 105, pp. 1a-b; Chapter 106, pp. 1a-b.

[70] Ibid., Chapter 106, pp. 3b-4a, 8b, 26b; Deng Zhicheng, *Zhonghua erqian nian shi*, p. 259.

[71] *Huangchao jingshi wenbian*, Chapter 84, pp. 30a-b; *Donghua xulu*, Section *Reign of Qianlong*, Chapter 105, pp. 3b, 5b; Chapter 106, pp. 16b, 23b; Chapter 107, p. 19a; Lian Heng, *Taiwan tongshi*, pp. 47, 131, 561.

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[72] *Donghua xulu*, Section *Reign of Qianlong*, Chapter 107, p. 19a.

[73] *Daqing luli*, (Laws and Regulations of the Great Qing), Beijing, 1892, Chapter 23, p. 5b.

*Y. B. PORSHNEVA*

# POPULAR RELIGIOUS SECTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE QING DYNASTY

In the latter half of the eighteenth century there was a visible invigoration in China of the activities of popular religious sects that were, along with the secret societies,[1] an effective form of opposition to the established order.

The main social function of these sects was in all cases determined by their relationship to the religious structure in China, but by virtue of the fusion of "mass" religion with the concrete historical situation the social character of sectarianism was also seen in actions of a direct socio-political nature.

The Qings were aware of the danger from these sects and as early as 1646 issued an edict banning the oldest and most influential popular religious doctrine, Bailianjiao, which was professed by many sects, each of which had its own name. An analogous edict was issued in 1656. However, the White Lotus sect continued to exist and in 1718 one of its members proclaimed himself a descendant of the

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[1] In modern Sinology the term "sect" is used to denote religious societies interpreting traditional dogmas in their own way and adhering to their own distinct doctrine in opposition to the official religious-ideological system. The best known sects in ancient and medieval China were the Taipingdao, Milejiao, Mingjiao, and Bailianjiao. As for the secret societies as largely political organisations whose formal religious character was only a tribute to tradition, they began to spring up on the borderline between late medieval and modern history. Both forms strongly influenced each other. The typological distinction between religious sects and secret societies is dealt with in Li Shiyu, "Qingbang, Tiandihui, Bailianjiao", *Wenshi zhe,* No. 3, 1963; Sawada Mizuo, *Hokan no*

Ming dynasty. He mustered many supporters in Hunan Province and led a rising against the Qings[2]. This sect continued to be active politically, especially in the 1750s, until the outbreak of the most significant rising of the followers of the Bailianjiao doctrine in 1796.

The Manzhous were totally indifferent to religion, but they used Buddhism and Taoism to consolidate their power. What made them anxious was not the religious doctrines of the sects as such but the potential political threat implicit in these doctrines. This has been mentioned by N. Y. Bichurin: "Apart from the religions tolerated by laws, there was a blanket ban on the introduction of new religions because the name of some religion was usually used for the formation of secret political societies whose clandestine actions were aimed at overthrowing the dynasty now reigning in China." [3]

In an analysis of the causes of the Muslim (Donggang) rising against the Qings in the mid-nineteenth century, K. A. Skachkov, who was a member of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing, wrote: "I believe that in rising against the Manzhous the Donggangs were motivated not by religious fanaticism but by the very same reason that risings against Manzhou rule... are undertaken by the Chinese in all the provinces of their vast empire—the universal discontent of the Chinese with the privileges and cupidity of the Manzhous." [4] Hostility for the Manzhous

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*kenku,* Nagoya, 1963; Naquin S. Millenarian, *Rebellion in China. The Eight Trigram Uprising of 1813,* New Haven and London, 1976; D. Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion. Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China,* Cambridge, 1976; M. Topley, "The Great Way of Former Heaven. A Group of Chinese Secret Religious Sects",—*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* No. 26, 1963; T. H. Barrett, "Chinese Sectarian Religion", *Modern Asian Studies,* London, 1978, Vol. 12, No. 2; V. P. Ilyushechkin, "Secret Societies and Dissenting Sects in Mid-19th-Century China", in *Secret Societies in Old China,* Moscow, 1970 (in Russian); Y. B. Porshneva, "The Concept of Religious Sect or Xiejiao", *Ninth Scientific Conference on Society and State in China,* Moscow, 1978 (in Russian); Y. B. Porshneva, *The White Lotus Doctrine: Ideology of the Popular Uprising of 1796-1804,* Moscow, 1972 (in Russian).

[2] Wang Zhulou, "Yiqijuiliu yibalinwu nian di bailianjiao da qiyi", in *Zhongguo nongmin qing lun ji,* Beijing, 1958, p. 325.

[3] N. Y. Bichurin (Yakinf), *A Statistical Description of the Chinese Empire,* St. Petersburg, 1842, p. 80 (in Russian).

[4] K. A. Skachkov, *Beijing During the Taiping Uprising. From the Notes of an Eye-Witness,* Moscow, 1958, p. 29 (in Russian).

and the orders established by them in the country were such an overriding feature distinguishing all secret societies, including religious ones, that, to quote A. V. Rudakov, their members "regarded that the first and chief evil that broke the normal course of the historical life of the Heavenly Empire was the ascent, in 1644, to the 'dragon throne of the Son of Heaven' of the foreign Manzhou dynasty that was not in accord with the national traditions and pride of the Chinese people." [5]

The slogan "Fan Qing, Fu Ming" ("Down with the Qing, Restore the Ming") had been advanced in the period preceding the commencement of the open actions of the proponents of Bailianjiao in the 1770s. [6] It was then that the sect's leader Liu Song and his disciples spread the practice of proclaiming one of their members (usually a relative of the leaders and heresiarchs) the *niuba* or *niuzu*. The former title was formed by fragmenting the character *zhu*, designating the clan name of the first Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang; the latter is an abbreviation of the characters "ancestor of Zhu". In other words, the meaning of both was identical. [7] According to Wei Yuan, "scoundrels belonging to the Bailianjiao society made believe they were healing diseases and fasting; they printed false sacred books and incantations". Exiled after an anti-government conspiracy was uncovered in 1776, Liu Song and his closest disciples—Liu Zhixie and Song Zhiqing—continued preaching their doctrine and the number of their supporters in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Hubei grew frow day to day. "The sect members said that [a time of] calamity was coming, and proclaimed a certain Fasheng, a fellow sectarian from the clan of Wang, residing in Luyi, a descendant of the clan of Zhu [from which originated] the Ming dynasty, and instigated vagrants and other rabble to sedition." [7a]

Chan Hok-lam, who has studied the Bailianjiao doctrine, writes that in that period members of the sect preached that "when the Buddha Maitreya is reborn, all who believed their doctrine would be rewarded after the *niuba,* aided by the Buddha, would have the possibility of expelling the Manzhous and restoring the Ming" [8].

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[5] A. Rudakov, *The Yihetuan Society and Its Significance in the Latest Events in the Far East,* Vladivostok, 1901, p. 3 (in Russian).

[6] Wang Xianjian, *Donghua xulu. Jiaqing chao,* 1899, Chapter 119, p. 13b.

[7] Ibid.; Wang Zhulou, op. cit., p. 326.

[7a] Wei Yuan, *Shengwuji,* 1849, Chapter 9, pp. 3a-3b.

Prior to and during the uprising of 1796-1804 the Bailianjiao society spread rumours of the appearance of the *niuba,* i.e., a descendant of the Ming dynasty, proclaimed an anti-Qing slogan, and nominated a candidate to the throne, but from approximately the year 1800, when the insurgency weakened, the anti-Qing slogans were gradually muted.

Clearly-determined anti-Manzhou objectives were pursued by secret societies, but not by religious sects, and this is the main reason for the scarcity of records about the anti-Qing propaganda conducted by the protagonists of Bailianjiao. The absence of any mention of the anti-Manzhou slogans in available sources can be partly attributed to deliberate hushing-up. This was such a ticklish matter for the Qing authorities, that the very mention of it in official documents or the writings of the authors of those times was regarded as tactless and undesirable. There is no comment in sources even of a significant event such as the attempt of the leaders of the insurgent Bailianjiao sect to contact Wang Fasheng, the young candidate for the throne, who was living in exile. This attempt worried the Manzhous very much. The emperor issued a special edict without mentioning that Wang Fasheng had been nominated by the sect to the imperial throne as a descendant of the "lawful", truly Chinese Ming Dynasty.

That in the eighteenth century the anti-Qing orientation was still faint in the sects' propaganda and organisational activities was due to the nature of the popular religious movement, which had yet to come under the influence of the nationalistic ideas of the various political societies and trends.

The anti-Manzhou edge was much more pronounced in later developments, for instance, the Tianlijiao (or Baguajiao) uprising early in the nineteenth century, or in the period after the opium wars, when the process of the growth of the national self-awareness was accelerated.

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[8] Chan Hok-lam, "The White Lotus-Maitreya Doctrine and Popular Uprising in Ming and Ch'ing China", *Sinologica,* 1969, Vol. X, No. 4, pp. 218, 219.

The words inscribed on the banners, on the white flags the Tianlijiao supporters were to hang on their houses during the 1813 uprising, and on records seized during searches were "We follow Tao by the will of Heaven". This was the motto of the first Ming emperor.[9] A banner with the words "Li, true monarch [of the Tianshun period] of the great dynasty of Ming" was found alongside the body of one of the leaders of the uprising, Li Wencheng, who died together with some of his men.[10] Indirect testimony of anti-Manzhou feeling among the supporters of Bailianjiao is a description of the uprising in an article published in the journal *Son of the Fatherland* in 1815. Its author was in Beijing when the insurgents tried to seize the imperial palace. He gives the following dialogue that was supposed to have taken place between the captured leader of the insurgent sect Lin Qing and the emperor, who interrogated him: "When the emperor asked the rebel Lin Qing what motivated his rebellion, he replied: 'It was the will of Heaven.' 'Where are your comrades?' 'Had I been fortunate there would not have been a single person in the empire who would not be my comrade.' 'You are impertinent. Did you hope to take the throne?' 'Not I alone; you, too, have taken it.' "[11] This reply, which implied that the Manzhous had usurped the Chinese throne, was a particularly gross insult to the emperor. The authenticity of this conversation is questionable, but stories and rumours of this kind were probably rife in the city. As an indication of the socio-psychological tenor of the events, the very tone of the dialogue is eloquent enough even if it is assumed that it contains an element of invention and exaggeration.

At approximately this period members of Shouyuanjiao, one of the sects in the Bailianjiao movement, circulated among rural inhabitants manuscripts and books containing statements against the dynasty. For instance, one of the proclamations ended with the words: "Let us defend the state and reinstate the Ming dynasty."[12] A document dating from a later period of the Bailianjiao's activities, namely, the uprising led by Song Jingshi (1861), is written in the same vein. This was an appeal from Song Jingshi, stating that the "Northern barbarians" (i.e., the Manzhous) have taken possession of the Heavenly Kingdom and been ruling it for more than two hundred years. This was the cause of the bitter privations suffered by the ordinary people. Further, the Manzhous are denounced as having seized the highest posts and thinking of nothing but money, as seeking to uproot the Bailianjiao doctrine, as seeing it as a heresy and a grave crime. [13]

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[9] *Qingding pingding jiaofei jilue,* 1817, Chapter 1, pp. 8b, 14b; Chapter 13, p. 12a and others.

[10] Ibid., Chapter 22, p. 1a.

[11] "Rebellion in China", *Son of the Fatherland,* No. 8, 1815, p. 129.

[12] *Chuxie jilue,* 1805, pp. 3b, 5b.

However, these distinct signs of anti-Manzhou feeling, which grew visibly during the century since an exponent of the Bailianjiao doctrine was nominated as a claimant to the throne, had no direct connection with the religious ideas and aims of the folk sects. For that reason the inclusion of anti-Manzhou slogans and "hints" in the preaching and appeals of the sects have the trappings of being something alien to the ideology of religious sectarianism.

Nevertheless, the complex process of the formation of national self-awareness, in the course of which there inevitably were changes in the traditional forms of spiritual culture and social psychology, unquestionably affected the folk sects, determining, in particular, their relationship to the secret societies. Under the latter's influence the sects became increasingly mindful of politics and sought to synthesise the various dogmas of their beliefs with anti-Qing feeling. For their part, understanding the social significance and value of religious, sacral factors, the secret societies grew more and more eager to have contact with them. The high level of motivation of the members of religious movements and their exceptional communicativeness, the "unity through something supernal" implicit in any religious community, were not only seen by the secret societies as compensating for the military weakness of the sects but were admired by them. Tao Chengzhang, a republican democrat, wrote as of an example worthy of emulation that the leaders of the Bailianjiao sect could control the members of their sect for hundreds of miles around as easily as the brain controlled the fingers of the hand. [14] He wrote an article on the problem of the relationship between secret societies and religious sects.[15]

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[13] *Song Jingshi Dangchan shiliao*, Beijing, 1959, p. 31.

[14] Xiao Yishan, *Jindai mitie shehui shiliao,* Shanghai, 1931, Vol. 2, p. 3a. To understand the reason for this high evaluation of the experience of religious sects it is important to bear in mind

To return to the ways anti-Manzhou feeling manifested itself in the folk religious movement of the eighteenth century, let us try to trace how patriotic, anti-Qing ideas were incorporated in sectarian doctrines.

Although from the 1770s onward the slogan of "Fan Qing, Fu Ming" figured among the slogans used by the sects to rouse the people to rebel, it still had little independent strength. An indication of this was that in almost all cases it was used in tandem with some variant of the slogan of the rebirth of the Buddha Maitreya, which was more organic and traditional to the Bailianjiao ideology and, at the same time, more consistent with the thinking of the peasants, with their ability to believe in the reality of a religious ideal. As regards the "Fan Qing, Fu Ming" slogan itself, the negative first part calling for a struggle against Qing rule could be to some extent appreciated by the peasants and even coincide with their anti-feudal feeling. As the highest landed aristocracy, holding the main leading posts in the bureaucratic machine, the Manzhous could be the concentrated object of the social, class hostility of the masses.

Moreover, for a section of the members and supporters of the Bailianjiao sect, who were conscious, albeit vaguely, of the injustice and brutality of ethnic discrimination, the slogan possibly had a purely national appeal as a call to fight the domination of foreign invaders, who were non-Hans by origin and had forcibly imposed rulers on them. In this context let us recall that Chinese revolutionary democrats (Sun Yat-sen, Tao Chengzhang) thought highly of the sectarian associations as the bearers of national and revolutionary traditions. As Tao Chengzhang wrote, the actual ideology of the sects was nationalism, but they used religion as a means of deceiving the people.[16] A critical analysis of this evaluation by the Singapore scientist Dai

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that Tao Chengzhang was himself not only a militant of the revolutionary-democratic movement but also the leader of Gelaohui, a quasi-religious secret society.

[15] Tao Chengzhang, "Jiaohui yuanliu kao", *Xinhai Geming,* Vol. 3, Shanghai, 1957.

[16] Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 99.

Xuanzhi does not allow making such a sweeping conclusion.[17]

At the close of the eighteenth century patriotic feeling among the peasants, the common people, was not so high as to let hatred of a foreign dynasty rouse them to an open armed struggle.

As regards the latter part of the "Fan Qing, Fu Ming" slogan, calling for the reinstatement of the Ming dynasty, it is contradictory and quite plainly has two aspects.

In the direct sense, as a call for the restoration of the Ming dynasty, against which the Bailianjiao proponents had militated for two and a half centuries, it had little meaning. True, the Ming were the last Han dynasty and in this context its name could perform a purely symbolic, "patriotic" role.

The fact that this slogan was accepted and even had a measure of advocacy among the sect members was due sooner to the legends about the "peasant emperor" Zhu Yuanzhang (Chu Yuan-chang), founder of the Ming dynasty, who was a peasant by origin and came to power when a popular movement overthrew Mongol rule. Upon ascending the throne Zhu Yuanzhang somewhat eased the condition of the peasants, on the basis of which and not without his personal intervention, official Ming historiography portrays him as a "people's", a "peasant" emperor. It is not to be excluded, therefore, that the call for the restoration of the Ming dynasty may be regarded as a call to place "another Zhu Yuanzhang" on the throne.

The "Fu Ming" slogan may thus be seen as a symbol with, possibly, a certain patriotic content but, above all, a naive-utopian belief that with a Heaven-sent "good" emperor on the throne it would be possible to achieve universal equality and prosperity.

The fact that the sham descendants of the Mings named by the sects as claimants to the throne had nothing to do with the imperial family was an open secret and a tribute to feudal-monarchical traditions. It never occurred to the peasants that their vital needs and aspirations could be met other than through the will and with the hands of their "own", "peasant" emperor. And in this sense, the "descendant of the Ming" as the personification of this hope and as the executor and deputy of Maitreya in his mission could serve as a symbol of struggle for insurgent peasants.

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[17] Dai Xuanzhi, "Bailianjiao di benzhi", *Shi Daxuebao,* Taibei, No. 12, 1967, pp. 119-24. The idea of the sects having been an embryonic form of nationalism had earlier been questioned in H. Serruys, "Chinese in Southern Mongolia During the Sixteenth Century", *Monumenta Serica,* 18, 1959, pp. 34, 38, 40. This work contains compelling evidence of the sect leaders' readiness to appeal for assistance to Mongolia when that was required by their religious interests.

The entire range of the value orientations of the peasant participant in the religious movement was determined by the basic tenets of his religious belief as set forth in sacred texts and retold by the preachers and leaders of sects. In the canonical books of the sects the most essential element was the doctrine of three "world stages" or "three suns": as foreordained by Wushenglaomu, the supreme deity, the entire path of life on earth was divided into three stages or eras with the welfare, moral and physical standards of people directly related to them.[18] The past, or first, stage was the time of the "blue sun", when the world was governed by the Buddha Kashba, whose throne was the blue lotus. The present is the stage of the "red sun" with the world governed by the Buddha Shakyamuni sitting on a red lotus. The last stage, the future, would be the time of the "white sun". The world would be governed by the buddha of the future, Maitreya, with the white lotus as his throne.[19] With the ascent of Maitreya there would be celestial order on earth—universal justice, equality, prosperity, health, and longevity. However, according to the Bailianjiao doctrine, before the coming of Maitreya people would have to live through "calamities" of the stage of the "red sun", after which there would remain only the righteous and devout adherents of the sect. The idea of "calamities" springs from the belief, according to which, Wushenglaomu, who created the Universe and all human beings, that were thereby her children, never expected that their material essence would divert them to the road of vice, and having learned this was filled with wrath and became determined to send "calamities" to the earth. And only when her anger had been mollified did she send people "kindness' and "truth" in the shape of the Bailianjiao doctrine as a chance of salvation from "calamities" for those who had not entirely steeped themselves in sin and had not lost the ability to perfect themselves.[20]

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[18] *Poxie xiansheng yaoti baojiuan,* 1698, pp. 5a, 13b; *Zhengxin chong wuxie zheng jizai baojiuan,* 1698, p. 8a.

[19] Huang Yupian, *Poxie xiangbian,* 1834, Chapter 1, pp. 15a-15b; Chapter 2 (*Introduction*), p. 1a.

How widespread the doctrine of "three suns" and the corresponding three lotuses was among the people may be judged from the fact that during the preparations for the uprising of 1796-1804 people were saying that "the time of calamities of the red sun is expiring". During the uprising the peasants supporting the insurgents called government troops the "troops of the blue lotus", while the "rural volunteer corps" formed to fight the insurgents were called "troops of the red lotus".[21]

Despite the efforts to make people believe that the "tolerant" Qing government and its troops were fighting not against the adherents of the sects but only against rebels and "bandits", all official sources and even the imperial edicts indicate that the authorities were in no doubt that there was a link between dogma and the idea of a popular uprising.

The peasant protest against the society that had doomed them to hopeless bondage, ruin, and poverty found an outlet in the Bailianjiao postulates about the injustice of the prevailing system and the divine predestination of the struggle against it.

Acceptance of the sect's dogma generated the inspiring illusion of divine sanction of an open armed uprising, of the destruction, foreordained by Wushenglaomu, of the existing kingdom of inequality, evil, and vice. The direct signal for the uprising was also the "sign from above", news of the coming of Maitreya or of the appearance of a *niuba* sanctified by him. The religious thinking of the adherents of the Bailianjiao doctrine found the sect's leaders' decision to fight the Manzhous increasingly more acceptable and urgent. The rule of foreign emperors was easily perceived as a generalised symbol of the embodiment and focus of the evil and of the sinfulness of the prevailing system. The divinely ordained *niuba,*[22] the "descendant" of the last Chinese dynasty, was miraculously identified as the peasants' "own" emperor designated by Maitreya to rule the country in the period of universal happiness and justice.

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[20] Yang Kuan, "Taolun Bailianjiao tiedian", *Guangming ribao,* March 15, 1961.

[21] Lü Zhenyu, *Dianming zhongguo tongshi,* Beijing, 1959, p. 919.

Under the conditions prevailing at the time the religious tenets of the Bailianjiao doctrine were the sole medium through which the people could understand the changes that were taking place on the socio-psychological level and that lent them new features. The non-conformism of dogma and the preaching of equality inevitably fostered a heightened self-awareness, including national self-awareness, and a sense of personal responsibility for the selected socio-political stand. As a form of public consciousness, folk sectarianism largely determined the Chinese people's attitude to various ideological and political doctrines and theories of Western origin in later periods.

Lastly, the popular religious movements in Qing-ruled China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries allow to identify some phenomena of the social consciousness in its extreme forms and thereby complement the general picture of the ideology that created the socio-psychological background enabling the people to grasp the significance of the changes and upheavals in modern China.

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[22] Of course, the proclamation of any person as the embodiment of a deity can arouse the suspicion of deliberate deceit on the part of the sect leaders playing on the religious feeling of believers to further their own ambitions. However, regardless of how frequently this was the case it would be more correct from the standpoint of history to look for the secret of these "conversions" in that the peasants were inclined to believe in the supernal. They eagerly awaited a miraculous sign, a mark of divinity, and precisely because of that they always found what they looked for. It was sometimes a mark on the body of a person ("mark of the Buddha"), or a heightened nervous lability, the ability to go into a trance, into a state of exaltation—this was most likely to be seen among the families of sect members, in an atmosphere heavily charged with mysticism and religious belief. In such cases unusual physical marks or an unusual psychical frame of mind was seen as a sign of divine favour or of supernatural power.

*I. A. OGNETOV*

# A GLORIOUS PAGE IN VIETNAM'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

In Vietnam the principal developments of the eighteenth century are linked to one extent or another with the great Teishon (Tay Son) peasant uprising (1771-1802), which brought to a close an epoch of class actions that shook feudal society.

This uprising broke out in the spring of 1771 in the Teishon Mountains, from which it takes its name. It was organised and led by the three Nguyen brothers: Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Hue, and Nguyen Lu. Their family lived in North Vietnam.

"The Teishon uprising of 1771-1802," writes Truong Chinh, member of the CC Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam, "was a nation-wide peasant revolutionary movement directed against the reactionary feudal landowners in (Le, Trinh, Nguyen) and outside (Manzhous) Vietnam."[1] In fact, all sections of Vietnamese society, including the more far-sighted members of the ruling class, were involved.

The anti-feudal struggle, which developed into a movement for the country's unification, was linked directly to the resistance of the Teishons to the attempts of foreign feudal lords to seize or influence part of Vietnamese territory. It was a vivid chapter of Vietnam's history, witnessing the total defeat of a huge Qing army that invaded Vietnam from the north. A *History of Vietnam*, published in 1971, at the height of the Vietnamese people's struggle against imperialist aggression, gives the following evaluation of the Teishon victory over the Manzhous and its significance for Vietnam's future: "The historical significance of this victory in the war of resistance to invaders was that within a short span of time the Vietnamese people were able to display maximum spiritual strength, muster all their material resources, and frustrate the designs and predatory ambitions of the Manzhou dynasty, which joined hands with the reactionary feudal lords in the country in order to plunder Vietnam. One of the strongest and most dangerous expansionist attempts of the feudal lords from the north relative to Vietnam was utterly smashed as by a shaft of lightning".[2]

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[1] Truong Chinh, *Ban ve cach mang Viet Nam*, Hanoi, 1956, Book 1, p. 30 (in Vietnamese).

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In this period the situation in Vietnam revolved around the fact that since the fifteenth century the country had been ruled nominally from the capital city of Thang Long (now Hanoi) by the Le dynasty. But the actual rulers were the Trinh family of big landowners that rose to prominence in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. Members of this family became hereditary regents under the Le imperial dynasty. The rivalry between the Trinhs and the powerful Nguyen family, residing in the south, fuelled an unceassing internecine war and led to the country's virtual division in the sixteenth century into two warring principalities—of the Trinhs (in the north) and of the Nguyens (in the south). The Le dynasty continued to be regarded as the ruler of the entire country, and its defence was the pretext often used by the warring feudal groups, particularly the Nguyen family.

In this situation the Teishon uprising broke out. By the mid-1780s the Teishons were in occupation of the whole of present-day South Vietnam, from Cape Ca Mau in the south to Phu Xuan in the north, forming an independent state with its capital in Quy Nhon. They united this territory under their rule as a result of successful campaigns against the Nguyens, the rulers of South Vietnam, in 1771-1784, and the latter's expulsion from the country. By that time the Teishon state had grown so strong that the elder brother and leader of the uprising Nguyen Nhac proclaimed himself emperor (1778). In 1786, after having spent several years in consolidating their possessions, the Teishons marched north to overthrow the power of the Trinhs.[3] It is characteristic that in starting this war against the northern group of feudal lords, the Teishons used the battle-cry of the Nguyens: "Destroy the Trinhs, restore the rule of Le!" Within less than ten days the army of the Teishons, under the second Nguyen brother, Nguyen Hue, defeated a Trinh army of 30,000 men and liberated territory extending to the Gianh River. Thus, the whole of south and central Vietnam (Nam bo and Trung bo) came under control of the insurgent peasants.

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[2] *Lich su Viet Nam,* 1971, Hanoi, Book 1, p. 357 (in Vietnamese).

The brothers demarcated the regions they would henceforth govern. "Nguyen Nhac proclaimed himself emperor of the Centre, Nguyen Hue was proclaimed the *vuong* (ruler) of the North, and the youngest brother, Nguyen Lu was proclaimed ruler of the southern regions."[4]

At the close of 1787 Nguyen Hue sent an army to the Red River delta to suppress separatist actions, and then in mid-1788 headed a punitive army to the north to pacify risings and restore law and order. Upon learning that Teishon forces were approaching the capital, the emperor Le Chieu Thong, who had initiated the anti-Teishon conspiracies, fled to the Chinese frontier. From there he appealed to the emperor Qianlong for help against the Teishons. He meant to cling to power even if he had to betray the nation, which he eventually, did.

Vietnamese and Chinese chronicles portray the clash between the two countries at the close of the eighteenth century differently, giving divergent replies to the question of whether this was an aggression by Manzhou feudal lords in Vietnam or only a form of assistance "from a big country to a small one".[5] The history of relations between

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[3] Van Tang, *Cach mang Tay Son,* Hanoi, 1957, p. 57 (in Vietnamese).

[4] Ibid., p. 79.

[5] The response of the Beijing court to the request of the emperor Le, who was expelled from the capital, Qianlong's vacillation before finally deciding what to do, the character and form of the assistance to Le Chieu Thong, and the international legal "basis" of Manzhou intervention in Vietnam's internal affairs are discussed in G. F. Murasheva, *Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in the 17th-19th Centuries,* Moscow, 1973, pp. 71-107 (in Russian).

Vietnam and China is replete with examples of successful resistance of the Vietnamese people to China's attempts to subjugate Vietnam. Three centuries before the Teishon uprising, a popular movement led by Le Loi put an end to Chinese occupation of North Vietnam that lasted from 1407 to 1428. Although in the course of three hundred years each of the Le emperors received his investiture from the ruler of the Celestial Empire by tradition, this act increasingly acquired a purely symbolic character. "The Vietnamese government consciously accepted formal recognition of its dependence on the Manzhou emperor, seeing this as a tactically advantageous form of links to China. In the period under review (eighteenth century) it counted on obtaining the support or non-intervention of its suzerain, Qing China, against rivals." [6]

While formally proclaiming Vietnam its "foreign possession", Qing China had to recognise its sovereignty, the evidence of this being the protracted diplomatic struggle over disputed frontier areas, the work of a joint "Vietnamese-Chinese frontier commission for establishing possession of land and demarcating the frontier", in which Vietnam was sooner an independent country than a vassal. In many official Qing documents of the 1720s Vietnam is often referred to as a foreign country, a neighbour, with whom it was desirable to have "friendly relations". [7] In the eighteenth century, as a result of the expansion of its territory to the south, Vietnam became the most influential power in Indochina. However, torn by feudal internecine strife, it was not a formidable force. It was only as a result of the actions of the Teishons, who drove the southern Nguyen separatist faction out of the country, destroyed the northern usurpers (Trinhs), and overthrew the Le dynasty, that Vietnam became a close-knit entity.

It did not suit Beijing to have on China's southern frontier a united and strong Vietnam led by persons determined to achieve genuine independence. The long history of relations between the two countries provides incontrovertible evidence of how the rulers of the Celestial Empire persisted in going to all lengths, including armed invasion, to turn Vietnam into a sphere of their influence in Indochina.

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[6] Ibid., p. 70.

[7] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

On this occasion, too, the Qing court did not refuse to use a convenient pretext to demonstrate its influence in Vietnam. Le's request permitted the Manzhous to make yet another attempt to instal a puppet emperor in Thang Long and take advantage of the successful Teishon uprising to spread Chinese influence throughout united Vietnam. Actually, Le's envoy requested the Manzhous not to send troops to Vietnam but to extend "moral support" by massing Chinese troops along Vietnam's frontiers in order to intimidate the Teishons.[8]

But in the Celestial Empire they thought differently. General Song Shiyi argued: "In the past An Nam (Vietnam.—*I. O.*) belonged to the Han and Tang dynasties... The time has come for us to recover that country."[9] A member of a rabidly expansionist school, Song Shiyi recommended the following to the emperor Qianlong: "Now when Le is calling for help, our dynasty should give that help... If after Le is restored to the throne the army is left in that country we will kill two birds with one stone: ensure Le's safety and recover control of An Nam."[10] Chinese chronicles, notably *Daiqing lichao shilu,* characterise Qianlong's stand as restrained, stressing that the emperor believed it would be futile to send Manzhou troops to Vietnam.[11] However, referring to chronicles and Wei Yuan's *Sheng wu ji,* Nguyen Luong Bich and Pham Ngoc Phung, authors of *The Military Genius of Quang Trung,* published in Haoni in 1966 and 1971, are of different opinion about Qianlong's attitude to an invasion of Vietnam.

Upon receiving Le Chieu Thong's request for assistance, Qianlong with Song Shiyi's help drew up a plan whose main points were: 1. Reinforce the frontier to check the Teishons in the event they tried to cross into China in pursuit of the emperor Le; 2. Issue a manifesto which officials loyal to the emperor Le could circulate in Vietnam, enlisting the people against the Teishons and encouraging the feudal lords to muster an "army to save the emperor"—*can vuong*—that would operate together with invading Manzhou troops; 3. Order the tribal chief Zhang Yidong and the princes of the Le dynasty—Le Duy Chi and Nguyen Dinh Mai—to begin mustering a volunteer army on the frontier with the Vietnamese province of Cao Bang. This army, called "loyal and mighty", was to be a vanguard for the Manzhou regular forces invading Vietnam; 4. Transfer large regular forces for the occupation of Vietnam. These forces were to consist of units stationed in the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou, and of the naval units of the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.[12]

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[8] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* Hanoi, 1964, p. 322 (in Vietnamese).

[9] Hoa Bang, *Quang Trung, anh hung dan toc,* Hanoi, 1951, pp. 202-04 (in Vietnamese).

[10] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 332.

[11] G. F. Murasheva, op. cit., pp. 9, 81.

This plan was quickly put into effect. The relevant manifesto was sent to Vietnam, and the remnants of the feudal forces defeated by the Teishons were hastily mustered into the "army to save the emperor". In Thai Nguyen in the north, units numbering a total of over 10,000 men were formed of Chinese, who were eager to join the "loyal and mighty" army of Zhang Yidong that was poised to march into Cao Bang. Qianlong and Song Shiyi said they had put together an army of half a million[13] for the invasion of Vietnam. Modern Vietnamese scholars tend to regard this an exaggerated figure intended to strike fear into the Teishons. Most Vietnamese scholars put the Manzhou land forces sent to the Vietnamese frontier at 200,000 men (these do not include the army under Zhang Yidong, Le Chieu Thong's "army to save the emperor", and the sailors and soldiers of the flotillas of Guangdong and Fujian).

Qianlong made sure his forces had adequate supplies. Immediately after the Manzhou seizure of Thang Long, more than 70 transit bases supplying the army of invasion were set up along the two main roads from China to Vietnam, from Yunnan and Guangxi. In only the section from Muc Nam-quan to Thang Long the Manzhous set up 18 food and equipment depots.[14] Qianlong's instructions on energetic and thorough preparations for the campaign are evidence that in sending an army to Vietnam the Manzhous were pursuing their expansionist ambitions in that part of Southeast Asia, aiming to reassert Chinese influence in Vietnam in one form or another, in other words, they were continuing the annexationist policies of the feudal lords of the Celestial Empire relative to its southern neighbour. Contemporary Vietnamese historians are unanimous pointing out that Qianlong and Song Shiyi were determined to reduce Vietnam to the status of a vassal.[15]

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[12] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, *Tim hieu thien tai quan su cua Nguyen Hue,* Hanoi, 1971, pp. 187-88 (in Vietnamese).

[13] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 336.

[14] Van Tang, *Cach mang Tay Son,* p. 135.

Attention is attracted by the method the Manzhous intended to use to suppress the Teishons and achieve their aims in Vietnam. One of the instructions jointly issued by Qianlong and Song Shiyi said: "There must be no haste. The first step is to issue the manifesto to demonstrate our might, and then the supporters of Le should return to the country to fight Nguyen Hue. If Hue retreats, Le's army should go in pursuit, and our great army will follow. In this way we shall succeed with small losses, and this would be the best outcome. If in that country half of the population supports Hue and if he does not retreat, the naval forces from Fujian and Guangxi should sail and strike at Thuan Hoa and Quang Nam, and the land army should advance only after that strike. When Nguyen Hue is hit in the chest and the back he will naturally have to submit. In this case we shall preserve both sides. We shall give the territory in the south from Thuan Hoa to Quang Nam to Nguyen Hue, and the territory north of Nghe An and Thanh Hoa to Le. Our army shall be quartered in that country to subdue it. Other measures may be taken later."[16]

Underlying the Manzhou designs was the man-hating principle of "destroying Vietnamese with the hands of Vietnamese" and thereby emaciating Vietnam. However, Song Shiyi, who was perhaps the most aggressive of the Manzhou emperor's aides, quite easily persuaded Qianlong that Le could not fight the Teishons single-handedly. They could only be crushed by a "great army" and therefore the advance to Thang Long should be started without delay. The Manzhous obviously underestimated the strength of the Teishons and did not believe that Nguyen Hue could raise an army big enough to repulse the invaders. This, among other things, was why Song Shiyi rejected the assistance of naval forces so presumptiously. The entire Qing land army concentrated on the Vietnamese frontier crossed into Vietnam on November 25, 1788. The main Manzhou force under Song Shiyi moved in the direction of Thang Long via Lang Son. The second column, commanded by Zhang Yidong advanced via Cao Bang to Thai Nguyen and further to Thang Long. The third column with Wu Daqing in command marched from Yunnan in the direction of Son Tay via Tuyen Quang.

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[15] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., p. 189.

[16] *Dai Nam chinh bien liet truyen,* Book 30, p. 35 (in Vietnamese).

In North Vietnam the situation was unfavourable to the Teishons. After the emperor Le fled from the capital in the summer of 1788, Nguyen Hue returned to the southern part of his possessions, to Phu Xuan, with the main body of his troops. According to Manzhou figures, no more than between 8,000 and 9,000 Teishon soldiers remained in the north.[17] When Ngo So, Nguyen Hue's emissary in North Vietnam, informed his master that the Manzhous were preparing an invasion Nguyen Hue ordered the troops in the north to repulse the invaders without counting on speedy assistance from the main forces. At the same time, he started active preparations for a war against the Qing feudal lords in the event the latter occupied Vietnam. Despite being outnumbered, the Teishon commanders were able to put up a resistance to the Manzhous to win time, as planned by Ngo Van So, to concentrate all the army units quartered in the north around Thang Long. This resistance was seen in the battles near Lang Son in direct proximity to the frontier, and the fighting along the Thi Cau River where 1,000 troops under Phan Van Lam tried to block the way for the attacking invaders in order to give the Teishon forces in Thang Long the opportunity to retreat in order from the capital to the Tam Diep Mountains.[18]

Ngo Van So realised that at this early stage of the hostilities, when the preponderance of strength was on the side of the Manzhous, it was vital for the Teishons to preserve their strength and prepare for determined resistance to the invaders. "We shall now muster all our forces and retreat without losing a single arrow", he told his subordinates. "Let them (the Manzhous.—*I. O.*) stay overnight, after which we will drive them out."[19] Nguyen Hue approved of Ngo Van So's tactics. He wrote to him: "You were able to avoid their arrows, separating to protect the weakest and most dangerous sectors. On the one hand, this inspires our army and, on the other hand, gives the enemy a sense of self-confidence and self-satisfaction. Your plan is correct."[20] These tactics had effect. In their retreat the Teishons destroyed bridges, fords, and boats. Small wonder that it took the Manzhous 20 days to march from Lang Son to Thang Long,[21] in other words, they did not advance more than five kilometres a day.

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[17] *Daiqing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu,* Book 1312, p. 26, in *Nghien cuu lich su* (further—*NCLS*), 1974, No. 154.

[18] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., pp. 198-207.

[19] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 342.

On December 17, 1788, the Manzhou army entered Thang Long, from which the Teishons had withdrawn. Success intoxicated the invaders. Their commander-in-chief, Song Shiyi, spoke with scorn of the Teishons. Informed of the capture of Thang Long, Qianlong praised his general, calling him a "talented noble", a person "who assumes immense responsibility, commanding troops in accordance with instructions and for that reason having won victory in less than a month; a person, who is truly worthy of the powers vested in him by his sovereign".[22] The emperor granted Song Shiyi the rank of prince of the first degree. Every soldier was rewarded with one or two months' wages.[23] Since the lunar New Year festival was approaching, Qianlong ordered the traditional bunting hung in all of China's towns and villages with New Year greetings and dicta to carry as their main theme the "pacification of An Nam."[24]

Song Shiyi did not plan to stay in Thang Long for any length of time, counting on advancing further south into Vietnam. The chronicle *Daiqing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu* says that the Manzhous intended to build 123 fortified supply-transfer posts on the road from Thang Long to Quang Nam, and for this Song Shiyi requested another 200,000 auxiliary troops.[25] The Manzhou general wanted to march to the south immediately after the New Year festival. Completely underrating the potential of the Teishons, he ordered preparations for the festival, saying that he

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[20] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 361.

[21] *Lich su Viet Nam,* Book 1, p. 349.

[22] *Daiqing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu,* Book 1318, Sheet 21, quoted from *NCLS*, 1974, No. 154.

[23] *NCLS*, 1974, No. 154, p. 5.

[24] Ibid., p. 14.

[25] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

"was looking at everything with his hands in his pockets, for there was nobody" he should fear: "It is now festival time, and everybody is resting... We shall wait for the new moon to begin hostilities—and we shall not be late" to strike "at the very heart of the bandits and destroy Nguyen Hue".[26]

The main body of Manzhou troops was encamped along both banks of the Red River. Outside Thang Long they built a system of strongpoints, the key of which was Ngoc Hoi (at the small town of Thuong Tin in Ha Tay Province). The troops commanded by Zhang Yidong were likewise stationed near Thang Long, in the small town of Khuong Thuong (now Dong Da, a district in Hanoi), and held defensive line southwest of Thang Long. The troops under Wu Daqing made their camp in Son Tay, northwest of Thang Long. Yet another group of Manzhou troops took up a position in Hai Duong, 50 kilometres east of Thang Long. Thus, Thang Long and a large part of the Red River delta were occupied by the Manzhous. The assurances given by Qiang Long, Song Shiyi, and other Manzhou dignitaries before the start of the campaign that all they wanted was to restore the Le dynasty to power remained empty words Song Shiyi in fact gave free rein to his soldiers, who "committed any crime they were capable of"; looting and murder became habitual; brutality became a norm of relations towards the local population; the Manzhou soldiers, the chronicle says, "calumniated honest people in order to kill them and take possession of their property. Matters reached a point where people were robbed in the markets and on the roads; women were dishonoured without fear of retribution".[27]

The predatory designs of the Manzhous were similarly obvious in their attitude to the emperor Le Chieu Thong, who entered Thang Long "catching at the heels" of the invaders. To give the semblance of "legality" to the presence of the Manzhous in Thang Long, Song Shiyi handed Le Chieu Thong his investiture on behalf of the Manzhou emperor in accordance "with the ancient traditional relations between Vietnam and China".[28] Actually, Le Chieu Thong who received the title of *An-Nam quoc vuong* (emperor of the pacified south.—*I. O.*) had no power even in Thang Long, let alone in the outlying regions where the Manzhous were supreme. His sole function was to make the people provide food for the huge army of invasion. For this purpose he used the "army to save the emperor" formed on Manzhou initiative. Every day, accompanied by an escort he went to the Tay Long palace, the residence of the Manzhou commander-in-chief. There were days when he was refused an audience. These visits, insulting to the national feeling of the Vietnamese, were demonstratively organised by the Manzhous in full view of the people of Thang Long, who bitterly said: "There have been countless *vuongs* in our country, but never before has a ruler been so demeaned and humiliated."[29] Contemporary Vietnamese historians wrote that the behaviour and actions of the Manzhous "finally opened the eyes of those who were mistaken about what the invaders actually wanted. Le Chieu Thong and bigoted feudal lords were the only ones who continued clinging to the invaders".[30]

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[26] *Cuong muc,* Book 47, p. 37b; *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 6.

[27] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* pp. 348, 350.

[28] *Dai Nam chinh bien liet truyen,* Book 30, p. 32.

While the invading army, revelling in its initial successes, was preparing to celebrate the New Year, the Vietnamese troops under Nguyen Hue began intensive preparations for an offensive in the north to drive out the invaders. On December 12, 1788, Nguyen Hue, who was in Phy Xuan, received a dispatch from Ngo Van So about the situation in the north of the country. This finally made him decide to proclaim himself emperor, under the name of Quang Trung, in order to head the struggle of the population of North and Central Vietnam against the uninvited foreigners. The motivations for this step are sated in his "Edict on the Ascension to the Throne": "We are ordinary people from the Teishon Mountains, and we have not a single inch of land nor anything that would allow us to call ourselves emperor. All we have is the sincere desire to end the troubles that have filled our lives, and we have decided to proclaim ourselves emperor in order to restore tranquillity to the people. We therefore consider we must muster soldiers of justice and don a cloak of palm leaves in order to set out on a long march across mountains and forests to help the great *vuong*.[31] We are thinking of sending horsemen to drive out those who are sowing sedition, and save the people from calamity... We have twice tried to restore the Le dynasty, but it is unable to save and defend our country; Le fled, leaving his country. The population of Bac Ha (North Vietnam.—*I. O.*) no longer turns its gaze to the Le dynasty; it is looking at us."[32]

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[29] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi*, p. 348.

[30] Nguyen Khak Vien, *Histoire du Vietnam*, Paris, 1974, p. 88.

[31] Meaning Nguyen Nhac, emperor of the Teishons.

Quang Trung had a dilemma on his hands. When the Manzhous were getting ready for the invasion, he was apprised that Nguyen Anh, former ruler of the south whom the Teishons had expelled, had landed with troops in South Vietnam. Consequently, he had to decide where to fight—in the north or the south? He decided correctly: he sent a messenger to the south with instructions to resist Nguyen Anh, and prepared for a war with the Manzhous, who had already invaded Vietnam, for he saw them as the greatest threat to the country's independence. In Phu Xuan Nguyen Hue had only 60,000 troops. He had to increase his army's numerical strength significantly and train it as soon as possible. On December 26, 1788, Quang Trung arrived in Nghe An, which had actually been turned into the centre training the Teishon army. He ordered every third male registered in the provinces of Thanh Hoa and Nghe An to be enlisted in it. The population responded to his call and several tens of thousands of men joined the army within the very first few days. The army's strength rose to 100,000.[33] As Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the CC Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam, writes, the Teishon army "grew from units of armed peasants into a people's and then a national army".[34] By the time it was ready to march to the north it consisted of foot soldiers, cavalry, units of fighting elephants, and a fleet.

Quang Trung depended heavily on the fighting elephants. Since the Manzhous had no experience of facing such units, the elephants were to be used as the main strike force in storming enemy fortifications. Moreover, Quang Trung introduced an innovation in the equipment of these units, greatly enhancing their fighting capacity: in addition to the soldiers armed with "fire-throwing pipes" sitting on the elephants, cannon was mounted on the backs of the animals. The Teishon fleet consisted of a large number of combat and transport vessels. According to foreign missionaries, Quang Trung had vessels big enough to carry fighting elephants, or 60 24-pounders, or 700 soldiers.[35] At the time of the preparations for the offensive in the north and during the fighting the fleet played a crucial part in transporting troops and enabling them to move quickly. In particular, it gave Quang Trung the opportunity of landing troops in the rear of the Manzhous retreating from Thang Long.

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[32] *Lich su Viet Nam,* Book 1, p. 350.

[33] Nguen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[34] Vo Nguyen Giap, "Vu trang quan chung cach mang va xay dung quan doi nhan dan", *NCLS*, 1974, No. 154, p. 7 (in Vietnamese).

While giving his attention to training and equipping the army, Quang Trung was aware of the importance of morale and made sure that all the commanders and soldiers understood the justice of the struggle to which the Teishons were calling the people. The greatest achievement of Quang Trung and the Teishons was that under the banner of struggle against the Manzhous they united the overwhelming majority of the population of Bac Bo (North Vietnam). At a military parade in Nghe An, Quang Trung addressed the troops, saying: "The Manzhou army has overrun our country, and they are now in Thang Long, are you aware of that? Every star in the heavens sees our country of the south and the northern empire living separate lives... Since the reign of the Han dynasty, hordes from the north have invaded our country time and again, looting and plundering. But we never submitted, always seeking to drive them out. In the epoch of the Han dynasty this was done by the heroic Trung sisters.[36] In the epoch of the Song dynasty Dinh Tien Hoang[37] and Le Dai Hanh[38] fought for this. In the reign of the Yuan dynasty the struggle against the invaders was led by Tran Hung

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[35] *NCLS*, 1974, No. 154, p. 8.

[36] The sisters Trung Trac and Trung Nhi are national heroines of the Vietnamese people. In the years 39-42 they led a rising against an invading Chinese feudal army.

[37] Dinh Tien Hoang (Ding Bo Linh), founder of the Dinh dynasty (968-981), who united the country and strove to create an independent state.

[38] Le Dai Hanh, founder of the first Le dynasty (979-1009), who successfully repulsed a Chinese invasion, decisively defeating the invaders in 981 on the Bach Dang River.

Dao,[39] and in the epoch of the Ming by Le Thai To.[40] These heroes did not sit meekly and watch the invaders commit atrocities, and for that reason they fired the hearts of people, rousing them to fight, won victories in battle and turned the invaders back to the north. In those times, too, the north and the south were separated from each other, and there was tranquillity on the border ... Beginning from the reign of the Ming dynasty to the present our people have not been dependent on another state, just as they have not been a dependent country in ancient times... And now the Manzhous have come to seize our country of the south and make it a vassal. They have forgotten the bitter lessons of the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties. And we shall therefore move the army to expel them."[41]

He declared that the Manzhou invasion was not accidental, that it was a logical outcome of the foreign policy doctrines of the Qing dynasty, part of the expansionist plans harboured by the rulers of the Heavenly Kingdom: "Ever since Qianlong ascended the throne the Manzhous have been planning to expand their possessions: they have already seized territory in the west, and have now moved to the south.[42] Hence his call to every Vietnamese to devote all his strength to the struggle against the foreigners, for the moment had come when "the greatest responsibility we have ever known now devolves upon all of us".[43] The chronicles note that the oath-taking ceremony organised by Quang Trung in Thanh Hoa (after the troops marched out of Nghe An) was a powerful factor reinforcing the unity and stimulating patriotic feeling of the army. He called upon the commanders and soldiers to do their duty to their country. We are given a description of this ceremony in the chronicle *Le Qui Ky su:* "Hue finished his speech. The officers responded: 'We will do our duty!', the words filling the air as thunder, shaking the mountains and valleys;

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[39] Tran Hung Dao, a national hero of Vietnam. In a battle on the Bach Dang River in 1288 he defeated an invading Mongolian army, which included the Chinese garrisons of Yunnan Province.

[40] Le Thai To (Le Loi), founder of the second Le dynasty (1428-1789). In 1418-1428 he led a people's rising that drove a Chinese army of invasion out of Vietnam.

[41] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 359.

[42] Phan Huy Le, "Chien thang Ngoc Hoi—Dong Da", *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 13.

[43] Hoa Bang, op. cit., p. 184.

the sky and the earth blended. And then with the copper battle drum beating, the army marched swiftly in a northerly direction."[44]

On January 15, 1789, after passing across Thanh Hoa Province, the Teishon army encamped in the Tam Diep Mountains. There Quang Trung planned the details of the attack on Thang Long. Underlying this plan was a sober consideration of all the strong and weak points of the Teishons themselves and of the Manzhous. Quang Trung proceeded from two basic factors. The first was that the Manzhous outnumbered the Teishons two to one. The second was that immediately after the Tet (New Year) festival Song Shiyi intended to march from Thang Long southwards. In this situation Quang Trung felt that success could only be achieved by speed, by striking at the enemy where he was most vulnerable and at a time when he least expected it. He realised that the Teishons had to destroy the enemy in one major battle, in which they "have to fight with determination so that not even fragments of enemy shields remain and not a single enemy chariot can return. The invaders must be made to understand that the country of the south is a country of heroes and that it has its own masters."[45]

The Manzhou troops were stationed at the time in Son Tay, Thang Long, and Hai Duong. Although separated, the Manzhou groups had contact with each other and if necessary could send reinforcements from one camp to another. This deployment gave the advantage that in the event they moved to the south they could successfully advance also against the main defensive works of the Teishons in the Tam Diep Mountains and in Bien Son. The Manzhou commanders remained confident and carefree. Discipline was falling. Song Shiyi was indifferent to cases of his soldiers quartered in fortified posts "absenting themselves without leave from the garrisons... There were some who went many miles (a Vietnamese mile is equal to 432 metres.—*I. O.*) to gather fuel, and others who went to the market to sell things. They left early in the morning and returned late at night... Meanwhile, the generals whiled the time away in amusement and feasts, and nobody worried about military matters. To those who did speak of the enemy, they replied: 'It's in a dungeon already, and will soon breathe its last. It is not worth talking about it'."[46]

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[44] *NCLS*, No. 154, p. 9.

[45] *Lich su Viet Nam*, Book 1, p. 353.

During the preparations for the march to the north Quang Trung took steps to blunt the Manzhous' vigilance. For instance, when he marched out of Nghe An he sent a messenger "with a letter to Song Shiyi informing him that the Teishons were prepared to surrender. The letter was worded modestly and in respectful tones".[47] Upon receiving this message Song Shiyi strutted about with more arrogance than ever, and sent Quang Trung an order "to take the army to Thanh Hoa (to the south.—*I. O.*) and there await the settlement of the dispute."[48] However, Song Shiyi did not exclude a Teishon advance on Thang Long. Therefore he ordered that three large fortified posts with strong garrisons should be organised 60 miles (26 kilometres) to the south of the city: Ngoc Hoi (the present Thuong Tin district of Hanoi), Nhat Tao (Duy Tien, Nam Ha Province), and a post on the northern bank of the Nguyet Quyet River (Thanh Liem, Nam Ha Province).[49] Apprised that the Teishons were already in Thanh Hoa, the Manzhou commander-in-chief ordered reinforcements to be sent at once to the garrisons manning defensive works ("all troops are to guard all vulnerable places in all directions") and also the building of a new post south of Thang Long.

Thoroughly informed of the enemy's defensive works, Quang Trung ordered an offensive to the north, dividing his army into five groups. The first, the main assault group commanded by Quang Trung himself (and also the generals Ngo Van So and Phan Van Lam), consisted of foot soldiers, cavalry, and fighting elephants. It was to strike at the main Manzhou defensive fortifications south of Thang Long. The second group under Nguyen Van Tuyet was ordered to reach Hai Duong (the eastern wing of the Manzhou positions) in boats along the Luc Dau River and destroy the units of the "army to save the emperor" stationed there. Following this operation Tuyet was to harass the left flank of the Manzhou forces deployed along the

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[46] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 354.
[47] *Cuong muc,* Book XX, p. 61.
[48] *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 10.
[49] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 350.

Red River and assist the main force and other units attacking Thang Long. The third group, under Loc, was to advance together with the second group and, upon reaching the Luc Dau River, rapidly gain control of the Phung Nhan, Lan Giang, and Yen The districts in order to cut the Manzhou road of retreat. The objective of the fourth group, commanded by Bao and consisting of fighting elephants and cavalry, was to march secretly southwest of Manzhou stronghold of Ngoc Hoi, join the main Teishon forces in attacking this stronghold, and engage the Manzhous in the southern part of Thang Long and in the vicinity of the headquarters of Xu Shiheng, the Manzhou deputy commander-in-chief. The fifth group, under Long, likewise containing units of cavalry and fighting elephants, was to make a sudden assault on Thang Long and enter the city without waiting for the other columns in order to sow confusion among the enemy fighting around Thang Long. This group was to move in the direction of Son Tay and then turn abruptly towards Khuong Thuong where Zhang Yidong's forces were holding Thang Long in the southwest. After defeating these forces Long was to break into the city from the west and, clearing it of the enemy, strike at the main Manzhou headquarters at the Tay Long palace and also prevent enemy troops from Ngoc Hoi and other southern strongholds from entering the city.[50]

On December 25, 1789, the eve of the Tet festival, Quang Trung ordered the attack on enemy posts. Before the assault he told his officers: "We should be celebrating Tet today. But we will wait for the seventh day of the first moon of next year; when we take Thang Long we shall have a great feast. Remember my words, and you will see that I speak truly."[51] That same night the Teishons forced the Gian River and attacked and captured the forward fortifications of the Manzhou army. The retreating troops were pursued to Phu Xuan (Ha Tay Province) and "nobody escaped".[52] In the early hours of January 28, 1789, the Teishons secretly surrounded the large enemy post at Ha Hoi, situated only 20 kilometres away from Thang Long. Not all of the main forces took part in this operation. However, the suddenness of the assault and the surrender demand caused panic in the enemy garrison, "all trembled with fear and said they were ready to surrender".[53] Without losing a single man, the Teishons seized this important strongpoint with its large stocks of weapons and food. After this victory Quang Trung ordered a halt to wait and see what the enemy would do.

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[50] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., pp. 230-31.

[51] Nguyen Khak Vien, op. cit., p. 89.

[52] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi*, p. 363.

The stronghold of Ngoc Hoi blocked the road for any further advance. On January 29 the Teishons reached this stronghold, which was surrounded on all sides by earthworks, traps, and pitfalls. The garrison numbered 30,000 soldiers. The Manzhous were already informed of the Teishons' seizure of Ha Hoi and feared a battle, saying that the Teishon "general has descended from heaven, and the army has grown out of the ground".[54] The Manzhou commander-in-chief ordered reinforcements to Ngoc Hoi and continuous reports on the situation. However, Quang Trung did not attack Ngoc Hoi; instead, he waited for Long's forces to engage the enemy in Khuong Thuong, in the southwestern part of the city. Throughout January 29 small advance units of the Teishons were engaged in ceaseless skirmishes with the entrenched enemy. Quang Trung achieved his objective: the besieged were in a state of constant tension, in total ignorance of where to expect the main assault. These tactics by the Vietnamese general reassured Song Shiyi and his staff that the Teishons would not venture to attack a powerful stronghold like Ngoc Hoi, let alone, Thang Long. His deputy Xu Shiheng boasted: "When that army attacks again tomorrow you will see us smashing the Annamites."[55]

The Teishons began the assault of Ngoc Hoi just before dawn on January 30. Several Vietnamese detachments attacked the enemy fortifications from the south. Quang Trung committed 100 fighting elephants, each carrying 13-14 soldiers armed with "fire-throwing pipes". Xu Shiheng sent picked cavalry units, but their attack petered out and the Manzhou horsemen retreated in disorder into the stronghold.[56] An assault force of 600 Teishon soldiers reached the Manzhou defence works under cover of the fighting elephants. Divided into 20 groups, it moved between the ranks of elephants. Each group had the cover of a huge wooden shield, which they pushed before them. The shields were covered with a thick layer of wet straw, so that enemy fire could cause them no harm. They breached the Manzhou fortifications and the main forces poured into the breach. Subsequent Chinese chronicles say that in the battle of Ngoc Hoi "the enemy army (the Teishons.—*I. O.*) was as numerous as a horde of ants and when it advanced it swept everything before it as a river in flood".[57] Ngoc Hoi was taken. The remnants of the garrison retreated in disorder, while Xu Shiheng, commander of the fortified line south of Thang Long, committed suicide.

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 365.

[55] *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 21.

[56] *Cuong muc,* Book XX, p. 62.

With each man left to fend for himself, the surviving Manzhou soldiers tried to reach Thang Long by the shortest route and escape the main Teishon forces pursuing them. However, their retreat was cut off by the Vietnamese troops under Bao. The manoeuvre planned by Quang Trung succeeded. Marching across country roads west of Ha Hoi and Ngoc Hoi, Bao's men reached advantageous terrain in good time in a region known as the Muc swamp. They took the remnants of the Manzhou garrison in a pincer movement, driving them into the swamp and destroying them. Thus, notes a modern Vietnamese historian, in the course of the "single morning of the fifth day of the first moon of Cy Dau (January 30, 1789.—*I. O.*) the Teishons smashed the Ngoc Hoi post and destroyed its entire garrison either in the post itself or in the Muc swamp. They quickly demolished the enemy's principal fortification south of Thang Long and thereby opened the road for the capital's liberation."[58]

When the main Teishon forces began the assault of the Ngoc Hoi post, a unit under Long (he was also called General Dong) suddenly attacked the Manzhous in Khuong Thuong, southwest of Thang Long. The Manzhous had built no fortifications in this area. They were encamped in a wide plain surrounded by hills commanding the approaches, especially the roads to Thang Long. This force consisted of several tens of thousands of men. Under cover of the morning mist, Long sent cavalry and elephants across the To Lich River and stormed the hill on which Zhang

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[57] *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 23.

[58] Phan Huy Le, op. cit.; *NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 26.

Yidong, the commander of this force, had his headquarters. The Teishons quickly repulsed the poorly organised Manzhou counter-attacks and put 6,000 enemy troops out of action. Zhang Yidong fled from the battle-field to a small fortified post and there awaited reinforcements. Seeing that the tide of battle was going against the defenders and that Song Shiyi desisted from sending reinforcements, Zhang Yidong committed suicide. His example was followed by several hundred men.[59]

In Khuong Thuong the local population joined in the fighting. At the time Zhang Yidong fled from the camp a circle of fire formed around the Manzhou positions, cutting off the enemy's retreat. The poet Ngo Ngoc Du describes this action, in which the Teishons were helped by the local population: "As the Teishons attacked Thang Long, the population of nine small districts collected straw, laid it around the Manzhou camp, and poured oil on it. Set alight, it surrounded the enemy as though it were a fire-breathing dragon."[60] With the assistance of the local population, Long routed the enemy holding the posts of Yen Duyet and Nam Dong, and broke into Thang Long.

Confusion reigned at the Manzhou headquarters. Song Shiyi believed that the main fighting was taking place south of the city and waited for a suitable moment to send reinforcements there. It therefore came as a complete surprise to him to hear the rumble of fighting in the southwest at daylight on January 5. Soon a messenger brought a despatch saying that the post of Ngoc Hoi had fallen to the Teishons. Then news came of the fall of Khuong Thuong. Song Shiyi's confusion was seen in his despatch to the emperor Qianglong, in which, justifying himself, he wrote that "the enemy is numerous" and the Manzhous "are surrounded on all sides".[61] Without putting on armour, Song Shiyi mounted a horse and with his bodyguards sped across a pontoon bridge to the northern bank of the Red River, leaving his troops to the mercies of the enemy in the city.[62]

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[59] *Cuong muc,* Book XX, p. 62.

[60] *NCLS,* 1969, No. 119, p. 22. The enemy left several tens of thousands dead on the battlefield. These were piled on top of each other and covered with earth. This was the burial custom in many Eastern countries. It served a dual purpose: first, to leave a monument marking a victory to be revered by descendants; second, to serve as a warning to enemies. Altogether there were 12 such mounds (*NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 29).

[61] *Dai Qing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu* (*NCLS,* 1974, No. 154, p. 29).

The Manzhou soldiers panicked. There was no question of resistance. They fought among themselves at the fords, each trying to cross the Red River as soon as possible. Fearing pursuit by the Teishons, Song Shiyi ordered the destruction of the pontoon bridge (the Chinese author Wei Yuan writes of several pontoon bridges), with the result that "troops fell into the water. Tens of thousands drowned their bodies damming the river" (Wei Yuan writes: "More than ten thousand men... threw themselves into the river to swim to the northern bank, and all of them died").[63] The fate of the remainder of the Manzhou army in Thang Long was sealed. Those who resisted were cut down. In the course of ten days after the battle, Manzhous appeared from the villages and hamlets around the city to surrender. At noon on January 30 the population of Thang Long filled the streets to welcome the Teishons with Quang Trung at their head.

In Thang Long, Quang Trung ordered measures to restore peace and order. It was decided not to pursue the Manzhou group under Wu Daqing retreating from Son Tay, but to crush the main Manzhou force fleeing from the capital. This mission was assigned to the troops commanded by Loc. While Quang Trung and the generals Long and Bao had been engaged at Thang Long, and Tuyet had been advancing on Hai Duong, Loc's forces had entered the area north and northeast of Thang Long and blocked the road from the capital to the Nam-quan pass on the Vietnamese-Chinese frontier. This was why in his flight from Thang Long Song Shiyi could not follow the same road along which the Manzhous had come to Vietnam. He had to make his way to the frontier along paths far from population centres. He was pursued by units commanded by Loc. The French missionary M. Bissachère, who was in Vietnam at the time, wrote that in his flight across the jungles and mountains of North Vietnam Song Shiyi was accompanied by "only between 40 and 50 men".[64] The sorry plight of the utterly defeated Manzhou general is described by one of his associates: "Together with the general (Song Shiyi.—*I. O.*) I went hungry and thirsty, and did not know where to find food and water. We pressed on for seven days, and reached Trans Nam-quan (on the Vietnamese-Chinese border.—*I. O.*) on the seventh night."[65]

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[62] *Hoang Le nhat thong chi,* p. 365.

[63] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., pp. 238-39.

[64] Ibid., p. 250.

In his hasty departure from Thang Long, Song Shiyi left the puppet emperor Le Chieu Thong to the mercies of fate. By the time the latter reached the Red River the pontoon bridge had been destroyed. He stole a boat from a fisherman and after crossing the river was able to catch up with the commander of the army of invasion only at Nam-quan at the Vietnamese-Chinese frontier. To save their skins both hurried across the frontier.

The Manzhou invasion of Vietnam in the eighteenth century thus ended ingloriously. Official Chinese chronicles quote Qianlong, who blamed Song Shiyi for failing to lead the Manzhou troops out of Vietnam in spite of his, Qianlong's orders. The Qing emperor claimed he "did not desire" to rule Vietnam. Explanatory material was prepared on instructions from Qianlong, but the facts give the lie to this material.

Modern Vietnamese historians note that the victory of the Teishons "consolidated Vietnam's independence and put an end once and for all to the threat of conquest by the northern feudal lords, a threat that had hung over the Vietnamese people for several thousands of years".[66] The southward expansion conceived by the Manzhou feudal lords and approved by the emperor Qianlong thus came to nothing.

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[65] *Lich su Viet Nam*, Book I, p. 356.

[66] Nguyen Luong Bich, Pham Ngoc Phung, op. cit., p. 252.

*A. S. MARTYNOV*

# SOME ASPECTS OF QING POLICY IN TIBET AT THE CLOSE OF THE 18TH CENTURY

## (Pre-History of the Manzhou Invasion of Nepal in 1792)

What was the impact of the Manzhou invasion on China's destiny? What was the character of Manzhou rule of the peoples inhabiting that huge empire? To answer these general questions we must research different areas of social life in the Manzhou empire. The purpose of this paper is to show on the example of a specific case—the conflict between Tibet and Nepal—some aspects of Manzhou domination in Tibet. [1]

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[1] Nine periods may be identified in the process of Tibet's subjugation by the Manzhous.

1) 1630s-1660s. The establishment of Manzhou-Tibetan relations; Tibet's nominal recognition of Manzhou suzerainty, which in fact was a mutually-beneficial political alliance.

2) 1690s. War between the Manzhous and the Junggars (Dzungars). Tibetan support for the Junggars. Disintegration of the Manzhou-Tibetan alliance and the beginning of political pressure on Lhasa by the Qing court.

3) 1705-1710. Armed struggle for power in Tibet between the Huoshut khan Lhabzang and the regent Sangzhe-dzhampo. Qing support for the Huoshuts. The first attempts by the Manzhous to bring Tibet into the sphere of their administration.

4) 1717-1723. In 1717 Tibet was overrun by the Junggars. In 1720 the Junggars withdrew and Manzhou-Chinese troops entered Lhasa. In 1721-1723 the Tibetan government was subordinated to the commander of the Qing garrison in Lhasa.

5) 1723-1727. Qing troops withdrew from Lhasa.

6) 1727-1728. Civil war in Tibet. Qing troops returned to Lhasa. Tibet was brought under permanent control of two resident ministers and a garrison of Chinese bannermen.

7) 1750-1751. An atempt by Zhuerme Namiye to shake off Manzhou control. Zhuerme Namiye was murdered by the Qing resident ministers. Anti-Qing unrest swept across Lhasa. Qing troops march-

A conflict broke out between Tibet and Nepal in the 1720s, the underlying cause being economic tension, the historical dependence of the Tibetan money system on the Nepalese. The conflict erupted into an armed clash, and the Tibetan-Nepalese war became a war between Manzhouli and Nepal.

In this paper we shall consider mainly two points, namely, the extent the Manzhou administration was involved at the different stages of this conflict and a comparison between the Tibetan-Nepalese and the Manzhou-Nepalese conflicts. Accordingly, we shall try to trace the history of the Tibetan-Nepalese fallout up to the moment the Manzhou administration became involved in the conflict and explain why this happened precisely then and not earlier or later, and show the character of the Manzhou intervention.

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The dependence of the Tibetan money system on the Nepalese was the main cause of the discord between Tibet and Nepal. The reason for this dependence was that until the mid-eighteenth century Tibet did not mint its own coins and used the Nepalese mohar.

The use of foreign coins was quite common in some periods of feudalism.[2] Under feudalism commodity-money relations developed in most instances "from without and from top to bottom".[3] Such was the case in Tibet, and this development from without brought foreign coins. For a number of reasons these proved to be Nepalese coins, which penetrated Tibet chiefly along the channel of foreign trade. The spontaneous penetration and assertion of the mohar in the Tibetan market led to wholesale purchases of coins

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ed against Lhasa for the third time. The Manzhou administration in Tibet was reorganised and reinforced with the resident ministers receiving wider powers.

8) 1789-1793. A conflict flared up between Tibet and Nepal. Qing troops marched into Nepal. Steps were taken to reorganise the Tibetan administration, bringing it under the direct control of Qing resident ministers.

9) 1793-1912. Qing control of Tibet remained without essential modifications.

[2] See Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. III, Moscow, 1971, p. 899.

[3] See F. I. Mikhalevsky, *A History of Coins and Money Circulation,* Vol. I, Moscow, 1948, p. 19 (in Russian).

minted in Nepal. This compels us to regard the use of Nepalese coins in Tibet not as an accidental and non-essential fact, but as a phenomenon with a specific socio-economic background. We have to consider the dependence of the Tibetan money system on the Nepalese as an intrinsic element of the system of commodity-money relations in this region.

Nepalese coins came into circulation in Tibet as a result of market practice, in other words, that sphere of society's life where the supreme factor consisted of spontaneous economic laws and not authoritarian interference. For that reason some time passed before this phenomenon attracted the attention of the Tibetan, much less the Manzhou, administration despite the fact that it unquestionably was the cause of a drain of silver from Tibet.

The Malla princes of Nepal sought to retain control of the Tibetan coin market at all costs, for it brought vast profits. They managed to do this until the 1720s, when the coins exported from Nepal in exchange for silver bars were of such a low silver content that the exchange rate fell almost to half.[4] The refusal to buy mohars stimulated the appearance of a Tibetan coin proper.[5] Its appearance in the latter half of the eighteenth century threatened the Nepalese princes with the total loss of the Tibetan coin market.

The Gurkhas, who in 1769 united the Nepalese principalities, found this a bitter pill to swallow. Bitter, because the then young Nepalese state was short of money.[6] Naturally, the Gurkhas meant to mend their affairs with revenues from trade with Tibet and from the minting of coins for that country. But they found they had to contend with obstacles. One of these was that after uniting Nepal the Gurkha ruler Prithang Narhayang took all the old coins out of circulation and had them reminted into new coins with a larger silver content,[7] while the old Nepalese coins with a larger admixture of copper was still in circulation in Tibet.[8] No exchange rate was fixed for the old and new coins, and this hindered trade and nourished all sorts of coin profiteering.[9] The Nepalese claimed that for this reason trade came to an almost total standstill between Tibet and Nepal at the close of the 1780s.[10]

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[4] La Couperie, "The Silver Coinage of Tibet", *Numismatic Chronicle*, III Series, Vol. I, London, 1881, p. 344.

[5] *Qinding guoerka jilue* (A Collection of Documents on the War With Nepal. Printed by Imperial Permission), Chapter 11, p. 2a. Deng Yanlin dates the collection at 1795—Deng Yanlin, *Zhongguo bianjian tuji lu* (A Description of Sources About the Frontier Regions of China), Shanghai, 1958, p. 209.

[6] Clements R. Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London, Trübner and Co., 1876, p. 129.

The Nepalese believed that the simplest way out of the difficulty would be to introduce their new coins to Tibet, for this would return to Nepal the revenues it had been receiving from the minting of coins for Tibet and would normalise the terms of trade between the two countries. Soon after the kingdom of Nepal was proclaimed an embassy was sent to Tibet with a large quantity of the new coins. However, the Tibetans showed no desire to accept this money.[11] Undiscouraged by this first setback, the Nepalese undertook a few more attempts of this kind.

In 1787 a pertinent message was sent to Qing Lin, the Manzhou government resident in Lhasa, through the headman of the Nepalese merchants in the city. Qing Lin gave it to Tibetan officials to be translated. The latter, after reading it, recommended that it should not be forwarded to Beijing on the grounds that it was not properly worded.[12]

In the summer of 1788 the Gurkhas wrote to the Tibetan Dalai-lama, suggesting a differentiated exchange rate for the new and old coins: one liang of silver for six new coins or for 12 old ones.[13] The Tibetans found this unacceptable and left the Nepalese suggestion unanswered.

The Gurkhas then decided to compel the acceptance of their terms by force, and a month after their letter to the Dalai-lama was dispatched a Nepalese army invaded South

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[7] F. B. Hamilton, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal,* Edinburgh, 1819, p. 214.

[8] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 3, p. 11b.

[9] Ed. Thomas, "Useful Tables" in J. Prinsep, *Essays on Indian Antiquities.* Ed, and add. by Ed. Thomas, John Murray, Vol. II, London, 1858, p. 32.

[10] W. Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal,* London, 1811, p. 340.

[11] Clements R. Markham, op. cit., p. 129.

[12] Erich Haenisch, *Dokumente aus dem Jahre 1788 zur Vorgeschichte des Gorkha-Krieges,* Munich, 1959, p. 40.

[13] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 3, p. 12a; Chapter 20, p. 6b; Chapter 47, p. 15a.

Tibet, seizing the towns of Nilam, Zhuongha, and Zhirhong.[14]

With the cessation of wholesale purchases of minted coins in Nepal and the appearance of Tibetan coins, the Tibetan-Nepalese conflict went beyond a purely economic clash and entered the framework of foreign policy. But this did not defuse the situation, for diplomatic talks could in principle produce no mutually-acceptable solution. The trouble was that while it was in full control of the circulation of money in its own country, the Nepalese government presented its demands to the Tibetan government proceeding from the belief that in Tibet, too, the circulation of money was a government monopoly. But there the situation was entirely different. For that reason, whatever the terms suggested by the Nepalese government for the introduction of new coins in Tibet, the government of the Dalai-lama could not accept them for it was unable either to remove the old coins from circulation or ensure the circulation of the new coins under the forced rate of exchange. The only thing it could do was to preserve the status quo in the system of money circulation and permit the new Nepalese coins to circulate in Tibet under the exchange rate fixed in the market.[15] But this was exactly what the Nepalese could not accept.

This difficulty might have been easily settled by the Qing central administration. All it had to do was to organise the minting of silver coins in Tibet in quantities sufficient to serve the market fully and to take a firm stand on this issue in the talks with the Nepalese. However, the Manzhou administration did none of these things. One might well ask why. Why did the Manzhous not intervene in the conflict between Nepal and Tibet in good time and settle it? The answer is to be found in the orientation of Manzhou policies in Tibet and in the character of Manzhou control in that country.

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The year 1639, when the Manzhou ruler Abahai received a letter from the two Tibetan Grand Lamas, is usually regarded as the commencement of Manzhou-Tibetan relations.[16] The situation was uneasy in Tibet at the time. The Gelugpa sect was only gathering its forces and had strong rivals in the person of the local Tibetan and Mongol lay feudal aristocracy.[17] Each of the rivals was looking for a strong patron and trying to enter into close relations with the Manzhous. For their part, the latter also wanted contact with Tibet for they counted on the influence of the Lamaist church on the Mongols to give them military and political hegemony. This mutual interest quickly led to close contact between Lhasa and the Manzhou court.

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[14] Ibid., Chapter 18, p. 9b.

[15] *Weizang tongzhi* (A Description of Tibet), pp. 194-95. Quoted from *Congshu jicheng*, 1939.

In 1644, when the Manzhous occupied Beijing, the Dalai-lama and the Pancheng-lama sent a mission to congratulate them.[18] In reply the emperor sent an embassy to Tibet in 1648 with an official invitation to the two Grand Lamas to visit Beijing.[19] The Dalai-lama Agwang Luobusang accepted the invitation and arrived in Beijing in 1652.[20] A special imperial edict clearly spelled out the purpose of this visit: Halha had not been subjugated at the day of the emperor Taizong, and since the Outer Mongols obeyed only the lamas, the Dalai-lama was invited to Beijing.[21]

The emperor Shunzhi probably had in mind something in the nature of a conference of Mongol princes with the participation of the Dalai-lama.[22] But Agwang Luobusang declined this, declaring he could not stay in Beijing because the climate was bad for him.[23] The Dalai-lama evidently realised that the Manzhous only wanted him as an instrument of their influence on the Mongols and decided to play his role not in Beijing but in Lhasa where he could be more independent in his actions and thereby have more political leverage in the eyes of the Manzhous.

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[16] Wei Yuan, *Shengwuji* (Notes on the Holy Wars). Quoted from *Sibu beiyao,* Chapter 5, p. 104.

[17] See G. Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas,* Leipzig, 1958, pp. 224-33; W. W. Rockhill, *The Dalai-Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations With the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644-1908,* Leyden, 1910, pp. 7-8; H. E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History,* London, 1962, pp. 34-42.

[18] *Qing Shigao* (Preliminary Variant of a History of the Qing Dynasty), Chapter 8, p. 3a.

[19] *Dai Qing lichao shilu* (Chronicle of the Great Qing Dynasty by Reigns), Tokyo (1937); *Shizu chao* (The Reign of Shizu), Chapter 37, p. 17b.

[20] G. Schulemann, op. cit., p. 246.

[21] *Shizu chao,* Chapter 68, p. 15.

[22] Ibid., Chapter 71, p. 20a.

[23] Ibid.

The Dalai-lama's visit to Beijing clearly showed the direction in which the new dynasty was planning to develop its relations with Tibet. It became increasingly obvious what political role the Manzhous were according to Lhasa in Mongolia. True, the Manzhous did not get all that they wanted out of Agwang Luobusang, but the establishment of relations with Lhasa soon yielded tangible results. In 1654, thanks to the Dalai-lama the Manzhous were helped by the Huoshuts to suppress a Muslim uprising in Gansu, while in 1667 Agwang Luobusang persuaded the Mongols holding arable land along the frontier of China proper to return to the steppe.[24]

However, it would be wrong to believe that Tibetan-Manzhou relations were determined by the drawing together of the two sides on the basis of a complete identity of their interests. These relations were much more intricate and tended to become contradictory.

Relative to Mongolia the sides pursued antipodal political aims. For the Qings Mongolia was, until the Junggar Khanate was crushed in 1755-1759, a constant threat to their rule in China. Academician B. Y. Vladimirtsov believes that in that period Mongolian feudalism was characterised by two conflicting features: the fragmentation of feudal possessions and the weakening of the central power, and a tendency of the feudal lords to unite around a strong authority.[25] Naturally, the Qings feared that the latter tendency could bring to the fore a powerful Mongol claimant to the Chinese imperial throne. To maintain their hold on China the Manzhous therefore sought military and political control of Mongolia.

This overall orientation of Manzhou policy did not suit the higher Lamaist clergy ruling Tibet. The Tibetan leaders had much more influence in the Mongol steppes than at the Qing court (unlike the Manzhous, the Mongols were

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[24] V. Uspensky, "The Land of Kuke-nuor or Qinghai", (*Notes of the Russian Geographical Society*), 1880, pp. 164, 170 (in Russian).

[25] B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *The Mongol Social System*, Leningrad, 1934, p. 135 (in Russian).

Lamaists), and they could not, of course, afford to have the Lamaist zealots lose all chances of recovering the imperial throne in China and fall completely under Manzhou rule. Once the Mongols succeeded in replacing the Manzhous in China, the lamas would be in a stronger position in the empire than under the Manzhous. This simple political calculation made Lhasa a staunch ally of the strong Mongol khans against the Qing dynasty and underlay the anti-Manzhou orientation of Tibetan policy. This was, so to speak, the "offensive" strategic aim. But interests of a "defensive" character likewise compelled Lhasa to act in this direction. The Tibetans realised that they could play an independent role in Central Asia only as long as the Mongols maintained some degree of political independence of the Qing government. This made the Tibetans immutably hostile to the Manzhous.

This tendency was felt as an undercurrent in Tibetan-Manzhou relations from the outset. We have already noted that the Dalai-lama V preferred to keep aloof from the conference of Mongol princes planned by the Emperor Shunzhi and hastened his departure from Beijing.

However, all the other outward indications were that the Lamaist clergy was drawing closer to the new, Manzhou dynasty. Such was the state of affairs until the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when the situation underwent a dramatic change.

At the close of the 1670s there was a significant strengthening of the western Mongol Junggar Khanate, especially after it seized Eastern Turkestan.[26] This success enabled the Oirots (Junggars) to set their sights on uniting the whole of Mongolia.[27] Halha was the first objective on this road. The pretext for attacking it was the failure of a convention of local princes in 1686. Using the circumstance that the representative of the Junggars Khanate was affronted at this convention,[28] Galdang ordered the commencement of hostilities. In 1688 the Oirot army entered Halha.

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[26] I. Bichurin, *A History of the Oirots and Kalmyks from the 15th Century to the Present,* St. Petersburg, 1834, p. 129 (in Russian).

[27] Galdang wrote of this in no uncertain terms in a letter to the south Mongol princes (Henry A. Howorth, *History of the Mongols. From the 9th to the 19th Century,* Part I, *The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks,* London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1876, pp. 629-30).

[28] I. Bichurin, op. cit., p. 69.

The Halha princes were defeated in a battle at Lake Oluogoi and fled, seeking the protection of the Manzhou emperor.

With the Junggar Khanate growing stronger, it seemed that Mongol unity was becoming feasible. The Tibetan Lamaist clergy did all they could to make this a reality.

The Dalai-lama V died in 1682. The regent, a perspicacious statesman named Sangzhe-dzhampo, kept his death secret.[29] This allowed Galdang to begin his conquests in Mongolia with the personal prestige of the late Lamaist hierarch as his banner. The Mongols were told that the Dalai-lama V had himself prophesied the success of Galdang's war in the East.[30] Moreover, to signal its support for the Zhungeers, Lhasa sent one of the most senior lamas of the Tibetan hierarchy, the hutuhta Zhirhong, to the Oirot headquarters. It was his mission to pray for Galdang's victory in the battle with the Manzhous at Ulan-Butun. The hutuhta's prayers did not help. The Junggars were defeated. Nonetheless, his efforts proved to be useful in mediating an armistice.[31]

Lhasa was instrumental in welding an alliance between Galdang and the Kuke-nuor Oirots. Sangzhe-dzhampo personally arranged a marriage between Galdang's daughter and one of the Qinghai princes.[32]

The Manzhou court was infuriated upon learning that the Tibetan regent had denied the Manzhou ambassadors an audience with the Dalai-lama, did not permit the Pancheng-lama to go to Beijing as was demanded by the emperor, refused to surrender the hutuhta Zhirhong to the Manzhous, and told the emperor's ambassadors that he regarded the Oirots as the main proponents of the "yellow doctrine" and hoped to have their assistance if he needed it.[33]

This resulted in a drastic deterioration of the relations between the Qing court and the Tibetan government. Matters reached a point where in a message to the Tibetan regent the Emperor Kangxi hinted that there might be an invasion of Tibet.[34] But Galdang's death in 1697 defused the tension, and the Manzhous felt they need not send troops to Tibet for the time being.

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[29] W. W. Rockhill, op. cit., pp. 21-27.

[30] *Shizu chao,* Chapter 71, p. 7a.

[31] *Qing Shigao,* Chapter 8, p. 4b.

[32] Henry A. Howorth, op. cit., p. 519.

[33] *Shizu chao,* Chapter 71, p. 14b.

The first Manzhou-Junggar war had made the Qing government realise that under certain conditions Tibet could easily become the spiritual centre of an anti-Manzhou movement in Mongolia instead of remaining an instrument of Manzhou policy. For the Manzhous this meant that a key aim of their policy—subjugating Mongolia in order to preserve their hold of China—had to be augmented with the subjugation of Tibet.

This idea matured in the war with Galdang and the Manzhous defined in general outline how they would subjugate Tibet. It was obvious that solely diplomatic pressure would not make Lhasa pursue the course wanted by the Qings: there had to be real, i.e., in the conditions of the times, military and political control. It was felt that such control would, above all, regulate Tibet's relations with the Mongol world.

The history of Tibet's subjugation by the Manzhous has been dealt with quite exhaustively in special literature.[35] We shall only note that this was a fairly long process and that the form of control sought by the Qing government since the war with Galdang took final shape only in the mid-eighteenth century. The central elements of this control were the government residents (ambans) in Lhasa and the Manzhou garrisons. One of the amban's duties was to monitor Tibet's relations with the Mongols. No relations were permitted with Junggariye. With the garrisons and the postal and courier service directly subordinated to the Manzhou amban, the latter exercised real authority and strongly influenced the political situation in Tibet.[36]

Since the Qing government's policy in Tibet was determined by its policy in Mongolia, the last Manzhou war against the Junggars quite naturally affected Manzhou-Tibetan relations. The final defeat of the Junggar Khanate at the hands of the Manzhous in 1755-1759 fundamentally changed the situation in Central Asia. The conquest of Mongolia was completed. As a result, Lhasa lost its political significance for the Manzhous—it could no longer serve as the spiritual mainstay of anti-Qing actions by the Mongols and was no longer needed as an instrument for the subjugation of the latter, for domination over them was now ensured by Manzhou military strength. The new political situation reduced the intensity of the relations between Beijing and Lhasa to the extent that from the 1750s to the close of the century no developments of note occurred.

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[34] Ibid., p. 17a.

[35] See Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century. History of the Establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in Tibet,* Leiden, 1950.

[36] Ibid., pp. 198-216, 231-32, 236-39, 255-62.

Naturally, this general shift also affected the nature of Manzhou control in Tibet. The stabilisation of the situation in Mongolia and Tibet, resulting from the conquest of the Junggar Khanate, diminished the aim of Manzhou policy in this region to nothing more than maintaining the status quo. Accordingly, the main function of the Manzhou amban in Lhasa was to supervise the "maintenance of law and order".

This task no longer required much effort and the amban, having practically nothing to do, began to lose his influence in Tibet. By the end of the eighteenth century he had ceased to wield any real authority.[37] However, since at the time the Qing court did not set its administration in Tibet any new tasks, the military-political character of Manzhou control in Tibet remained unchanged.

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The aforesaid allows us to draw the conclusion that the conflict between Tibet and Nepal could command the notice of the Manzhou administration only when it erupted into war. This is precisely how it is first mentioned in official Manzhou documents.[38] The Manzhous persisted in regarding it first and foremost as a military dispute until the Nepalese again invaded Tibet.

When the Gurkhas attacked Tibet at the close of the summer of 1788, the Tibetan government renewed its talks with Nepal. Beijing reacted to the Tibetan-Nepalese border conflict by sending a mission under a senior Manzhou official named E Hui[39] to take part in the negotiations. Begun in the first half of 1789 in southern Tibet, these now became tripartite talks.[40] They developed in two separate directions that had no link whatever with each other.

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[37] *Congshu jicheng*, p. 177.

[38] *Shizu chao*, Chapter 1309, pp. 48a-50a; Chapter 1310, pp. 7b-9a, 10b-11b.

The main issue of the talks between the Tibetans and the Nepalese was that of the indemnity to be paid by Tibet. Initially, the Nepalese demanded 1,000 silver bars annually.[41] This, the Gurkhas declared, would compensate for the losses incurred by Nepal from the decline of its commerce with Tibet and cover the cost of the military expedition.[42] The Tibetan delegation was told that if they refused this demand they would be convoyed to Katmandu.[43] After hard bargaining the Tibetans brought the tribute down to an annual of 300 bars of silver. For their part, the Nepalese pledged to return to Tibet all the territory they had seized.

Danjinbanzhuer,[44] who led the Tibetan delegation, later gave a lively account of how the agreement was concluded. The text of the agreement was drawn up twice. The first text was written by the lama Shamaerba, who while formally acting as the mediator in fact represented the Nepalese.[45] Fearing Shamaerba, Danjinbanzhuer was at first inclined to accept this text as final, but then realising that Tibet could not afford such a large annual tribute, he insisted on a reconsideration of the terms. It was agreed that the tribute of 300 bars of silver would be for a period of three years,[46] after which it would be halted or reduced to 100 bars of silver. A new text was also drawn up by the Nepalese. Danjinbanzhuer wavered. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on him by the kinsmen of the Dalai-lama and of the Pancheng-lama, who wanted peace as soon as possible. Similar pressure was put on him by Ba Zhong, who headed the Manzhou mission. He had no alternative to accepting the Nepalese terms.

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[39] Ibid., Chapter 1312, p. 22a.

[40] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 38, pp. 9a-10b.

[41] Ibid., pp. 10a-b.

[42] W. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 342.

[43] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 38, p. 10b.

[44] Most of the Tibetan and Nepalese names given here are based on their Chinese transcription.

[45] Shamaerba was a younger brother of the Pancheng-lama. After the Pancheng-lama's death in Beijing in 1780, he quarrelled with his other brother, the hutuhta Zhongba, over the inheritance and went to live in Nepal, where he made powerful friends at the court (*Congshu jicheng,* p. 244; *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 8, pp. 1a-2a).

[46] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 20, p. 8b.

The talks ended with the signing of the relevant bilateral agreement.[47]

The Manzhou-Nepalese talks followed a different course. The Manzhou mission did not go to Zhirhong, where the Tibetans and Nepalese were negotiating, but stopped evidently in Xiegeer,[48] from where Ba Zhong sent the Nepalese two messages. In the first message he demanded "obedience" from the Gurkhas, and in the second commanded them to sign an agreement with Tibet, return conquered land, and never again violate the frontier.[49] Relative to the specific terms of the agreement, Ba Zhong showed little interest, only prodding the Tibetans to complete the talks as early as possible.[50] To this end he sent his representatives to Zhirhong to facilitate the success of the negotiations. In Zhirhong these officials declared that the actual terms of the agreement were the business of the negotiating sides, i.e., of the Tibetans and the Nepalese.[51] This was evidently the stand taken by Ba Zhong when the Manzhou delegation met with Danjinbanzhuer and representatives of the Nepalese to consider the terms of the agreement.[52]

There was a simple explanation for this seemingly strange posture on the part of Ba Zhong. His mission pursued an independent aim, that of making Nepal a vassal of the Manzhou empire. Manzhou-Nepalese contacts continued to develop in this direction.

About a month after the talks in Zhirhong, the Manzhous and the Nepalese had another official meeting in Laza, a small town in southern Tibet.[53] The terms of the Tibetan-Nepalese agreement did not get prominence at these talks.[54] The principal question was that of a Nepalese embassy to the Manzhou court. At this meeting it was decided that a Manzhou official named Yang Tingliang would be sent to Katmandu finally to settle this question.[55]

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[47] Ibid., Chapter 38, pp. 10b-11a.
[48] Ibid., Chapter 20, p. 7b.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., Chapter 38, p. 11b.
[51] Ibid., pp. 11b-13a.
[52] Ibid., Chapter 27, pp. 6a-b.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., Chapter 20, p. 9a.

That same month Yang Tingliang went to Nepal where he was received by the regent, Batuer Saye.[56] According to one of the participants in the talks, Yang Tingliang tried to persuade the regent to pay a tribute to the Manzhou imperial court, while what worried Batuer Saye most was that the Tibetans should go on paying Nepal a regular tribute. Yang assured the regent that if Nepal paid a tribute regularly to the Manzhous, the Tibetans would pay unfailingly.[57]

Here was a curious situation of a Manzhou diplomat using Tibetan money to make Nepal a vassal.[58]

The Yang Tingliang mission achieved its goal. That same year a Nepalese mission went to Beijing, where the Manzhou emperor gave their rajah the title of *wang*.[59]

Manzhou diplomacy of this period may be characterised as follows: by a successful invasion of Tibet the Gurkhas obtained an agreement from the Tibetans to pay them a tribute, while in parallel talks with the Manzhous the Nepalese ruler received the title of *wang*.

The receipt by the Nepalese rajah of the title of *wang* in 1789 did not resolve any outstanding issue and that is why, as the side interested in changing the status quo, the Nepalese soon initiated a resumption of diplomatic contacts. In the latter half of 1790, a Nepalese mission led by an official named Subida Duolalam arrived in Tibet.[60] Discord flared up at the time in Tibet between the ambans Pu Fu and Shu Lian,[61] making it necessary for the imperial viceroy in Sichuan, E Hui, to go to Tibet. For that reason, when the Nepalese ambassadors arrived in Tibet, they called on the viceroy and informed him that the Nepalese rajah Lateng Batuer was collecting treasure in Katmandu and intended to send it as a tribute to the Qing emperor with the Manzhou official accompanying the Nepalese embassy to the Qing court; they had themselves brought not very much. E Hui was displeased with this breach of the rules of bringing gifts and, using the opportunity that a member of the mission was returning to Nepal, he sent a message with him to the effect that when "foreign barbarians" paid tribute to the Manzhou court the value of the gifts was not of consequence for the tribute was a token of sincere submission. But whatever the tribute was it had to consist of the traditional "nine kinds" and had to be brought by a special emissary: this was the only procedure for presenting gifts to the Manzhou emperor.[62]

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[55] Ibid., Chapter 27, pp. 6b-7a.

[56] Ibid., Chapter 27, p. 8a.

[57] Ibid., Chapter 27, p. 8b.

[58] The vassal system is discussed at length in J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *Ch'ing Administration. Three Studies,* Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

[59] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 1, p. 9a

[60] Ibid., Chapter 38, pp. 13b-14a.

[61] Ibid., Chapter 46, p. 12a.

It was at this time that the aforementioned Yang Tingliang left Katmandu for Tibet with Nepalese gifts for the Manzhou emperor. Learning en route that the imperial viceroy of Sichuan was in Tibet, he sped to Lhasa to discuss personally with him the question of the Nepalese embassy.[63]

In Lhasa he turned over everything he brought to the Nepalese ambassadors and went to make his report to E Hui. Together with the Manzhou ambans, E Hui and Yang Tingliang discussed what to do about the Nepalese embassy. Opinions differed. Yang Tingliang recommended sending Duolalam to Beijing, but E Hui insisted that in this case there had to be a special Nepalese ambassador, arguing that there were grounds for believing that those who had come were ordinary traders and, consequently, lacked the authority to take gifts to Beijing.[64] Moreover, the Manzhou officials were disturbed because only four kinds of gifts had been brought, and they saw this as a clear infraction of the rules.[65] It was decided not to accept the gifts, to await a special Nepalese ambassador to the court,[66] and to delay reporting to the emperor.[67]

Besides, the Manzhous were astounded by the Nepalese demands: Duolalam called on the amban and conveyed the Nepalese ruler's request to the Qing emperor that he give him either money or land[68] on the grounds that Nepal was now a vassal of the Manzhous.[69] Pu Fu told the Nepalese that the "celestial dynasty was lavishing favours on its vassals over and above all measure", granting them titles and giving them gifts, but there were much too many vassals and no rules requiring them to be given money or land.[70]

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[62] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 46, pp. 12a-b.
[63] Ibid., p. 13a.
[64] Ibid., pp. 13b, 20b; Chapter 48, p. 6a.
[65] Ibid., p. 15b.
[66] Ibid., p. 16a.
[67] Ibid., p. 15a.

The Gurkhas subsequently declared that these demands had been prompted by the hutuhta Shamaerba.[71] But in this case there was most probably a misunderstanding of the procedure of bringing tribute to the emperor; the Nepalese were inclined to view their vassalage as similar to the conventional relations between a lord and a vassal in a feudal society, relations making them eligible to receive land or money "for services".

Quickly realising that they would hardly derive any material benefit from their new status, the Nepalese lost interest in talks with the Manzhous. They later wrote that in this connection the hutuhta Shamaerba said that if neither money nor land was forthcoming there was no point in sending a gift-bearing mission (*xie en*) to Beijing.[72] It was probably the opinion not only of Shamaerba.

The ambans Pu Fu and Ya Mantai were so confident of the early arrival of a special Nepalese mission with gifts for the Qing court that they delayed writing their report to the emperor about the Duolalam embassy until that mission arrived.[73] This cost them dear—the emperor saw this delay as inexcusable negligence.[74] The Nepalese gifts (15 leather sackfuls) to the Manzhou emperor remained for several years with the headman of the Nepalese merchants trading in Tibet.[75] Nobody came from Nepal to take them ceremoniously to Beijing.

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[68] Ibid., Chapter 38, p. 15a.

[69] True, the documents of this embassy, found later, contained no request for land (*Qinding guoerka jilue*, Chapter 43, p. 17a), but it may be assumed that there was such a request, for it is mentioned in accounts by other persons (*Qinding guoerka jilue*, Chapter 38, pp. 15a, 20b).

[70] *Qinding guoerka jilue*, Chapter 38, p. 20b.

[71] Ibid., Chapter 37, p. 21a.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., Chapter 46, p. 17a.

[74] *Congshu jicheng*, pp. 295-96.

[75] *Qinding guoerka jilue* Chapter 46, p. 17b.

From this it may be concluded that the fruitless Manzhou-Nepalese talks revolved around the same issue as before, namely, the establishment of regular relations between Nepal and the Manzhou imperial court, with Nepal acknowledging itself a vassal of the "celestial dynasty".

As regards the Nepalese-Tibetan talks, these, as previously, pursued a course of their own, the principal issues being the circulation of money and, notably, the exchange rate of the new Nepalese money in Tibet.

In all likelihood, some agreement was reached in Zhirhong, but it is hard to ascertain the actual terms. According to E Hui, the imperial viceroy, the Tibetans and the Nepalese finally agreed that one liang of silver would be exchanged for six new or 12 old Nepalese coins.[76] Danjinbanzhuer, however, wrote that the new exchange rate was one new coin for one and a half old coin.[77] The Tibetan merchants disregarded the terms of the Zhirhong argeement and made no distinction between the old and new Nepalese coins.[78] The Nepalese mission was determined not only to get the Tibetans to accept an official exchange rate of two old for one new coin[79] but also to induce the government of the Dalai-lama to enforce the new rate.

At these talks, too, the Tibetans rejected the Nepalese terms. This intractability sprang not only from the unprofitability of the suggested exchange rate but also from the fact that at the time the government of the Dalai-lama was hardly in a position to enforce a coercive rate for the minted coin.

The Nepalese met with another setback in the discussion of the second issue. The Tibetans refused to pay the upcoming tribute, arguing cleverly that since the Gurkhas had themselves become "vassals of the celestial dynasty" there could no longer be any question of Tibet paying a tribute.[80]

This was an attempt by the Tibetans to make their diplomatic talks in some way dependent on the talks the

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[76] *Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 3, p. 12a.

[77] Ibid., Chapter 38, p. 14a.

[78] Ibid., Chapter 3, p. 12a. This must be regarded as trustworthy for there is analogous information on this practice in subsequent years (*Qinding guoerka jilue,* Chapter 54, p. 5b).

[79] Ibid., Chapter 38, p. 20a.

[80] Ibid., Chapter 20, p. 10b.

Manzhous were conducting with the Nepalese. However, the Tibetan government did not stick to this attitude for long. Fearing that the total failure of the Duolalam mission would seriously aggravate Tibet's conflict with Nepal, it sent two missions to the Nepalese border. This round of talks yielded results for the Gurkhas. The latter made the Tibetan delegation pay them 180 bars of silver as an advance on the tribute.[81] However, this partial success did not calm them. In a message to the Tibetan government in early 1791 they raised the selfsame unresolved issues: the tribute and the exchange rate of the new Nepalese coin. The message got to the amban Bao Tai, who put the matter in the hands of the Tibetan ministers. The Tibetans tried to conceal the essence of the matter from Bao Tai, telling him that it concerned old trade debts. Failing to ascertain what it was all about, the amban replied that he was not very clear about the meaning of the Nepalese message and was therefore suggesting that the Gurkhas send a new delegation to Tibet to talk it over.[82] It would seem that Bao Tai's involvement in the matter should have ended the drawn-out Tibetan-Nepalese diplomatic duel and made the talks trilateral. But nothing of the kind happened. A new Tibetan delegation arrived on the Tibetan-Nepalese frontier in July 1791. The meeting with the Nepalese was not a long one, for Batuer Saye ordered Danjinbanzhuer to be seized and taken to Katmandu.[83] This was done. Virtually a few days later that Nepalese troops crossed crossed the frontier and began an advance deep into Tibet.[84] A conflict that could not be settled by diplomacy thus exploded into war.

The aforesaid indicates that in the Tibetan-Nepalese conflict diplomacy moved steadfastly along two channels. The Tibetan-Nepalese talks dragged on for more than ten years independently of the negotiations between the Manzhous and the Nepalese. More, they gave rise to the Manzhou-Nepalese talks when the conflict between Tibet and Nepal developed into an armed collision.

The anti-people aims and character of Manzhou control in Tibet were the reason why the Tibetan-Nepalese disagreements drew the attention of the Manzhou administration only after hostilities had broken out. The Manzhous failed to see the economic essence of these disagreements and, accordingly, their diplomacy was geared to exacting obedience from the violator of peace. This task obscured everything else. The conflict with Nepal was striking evidence of the inability of the Manzhou administration and Manzhou diplomacy to resolve what amounted to easily surmountable economic difficulties, because the hallmark of Qing rule in China was reliance on military supremacy. This primacy of the military element in Manzhou policy made their control in Tibet one-sided and their diplomacy ineffective.

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[81] Ibid., p. 11b.

[82] Ibid., Chapter 23, pp. 14a-15b.

[83] Ibid., Chapter 16, pp. 5a-7a; Chapter 24, p. 26a.

[84] Ibid., Chapter 24, p. 25b.

*L. I. DUMAN*

# THE QING CONQUEST OF JUNGGARIYE AND EASTERN TURKESTAN

After subjugating the whole of China, the Manzhou conquerors turned their attention to the Mongols, notably the Western Mongols (Oirots), who were their most powerful neighbours. By the 1670s-1680s the Oirot-Junggar Khanate, situated in the northern part of the present Xinjiang-Weiwuer (Uigur) autonomous district of the PRC, had established its rule in Eastern Turkestan (the southern part of the same autonomous district) and reduced it to the status of a tribute-paying vassal while leaving the local administration intact.

In the 1730s-1740s the struggle between the Junggar Khanate and the Qing empire proceeded with alternate success, bringing neither side a decisive victory. After Galdang Cerheng died in 1745 the internecine strife among the Oirot khans for the throne significantly weakened the Junggar Khanate. The Qing emperor bided his time. In the autumn of 1754, Amuersana,[1] one of the claimants to the Junggar throne, requested military assistance from the Qings.

Eager to put an end to the independence of the Junggar Khanate, the Qings responded to this request quickly. This was consistent with the traditional policy of the Chinese emperors: a policy of "suppressing barbarians with the hands of barbarians". In an edict issued in mid-1754 the emperor Qianlong made no secret of the fact that he was looking for an opportunity to intervene in the internecine struggle of the Oirots. "Furthermore, their tribes (the Oirots) have been fighting each other for the past several years. And they are having trouble with the Kazakhs, which is what is sowing discord [among] their people. This is the opportunity we must use. If we lose it without planning [anything else], their position will gradually grow stronger within a few years... Next year I intend sending troops in two directions and reaching Yili."[2] Preparations for a war were started, and by August 1755 the Qing troops had made short work of Dawaqi, Amuersana's rival, and greatly undermined the once strong Oirot-Junggar Khanate. For his services Amuersana was given the title of prince of the first degree (*qinwang*) and came to be regarded as second in command of the army (*fu jiangjun*).

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[1] Amuersana or Amuer Sanang (as he is known in Russian archival documents) was a *noion* (prince) of the Hoits, who belonged to the Oirot tribal group.

It was not the Qings' intention to restore the one-man rule of the Junggar Khan and simply replace Dawaqi with Amuersana. They were determined to carve up the once strong and united khanate into four possessions, putting four khans in power and subordinating each to themselves. This was put quite plainly as early as during the struggle with Dawaqi in an edict dated March 1755. "This time we have sent troops specifically to pacify the Junggars. In future we shall grant the title of khan to Amuersana and three other Oirots."[3]

In another edict—to the State Council (*Junjichu*)—issued also in March it was specified that four Oirot *taizhis* would be installed as khans.[4] At the close of 1756, during the war with Amuersana, Qianlong issued an edict in which he returned to this question, noting that his original intention was "in keeping with their (the Oirots) four parts (i.e., tribal groups—Hoit, Chuorhos, Huoshout, and Cerbet.—*L. D.*) to have four different khans in order to keep their forces divided. Each must be made to look to his defences. While obedience to the edicts of the Middle Kingdom would express [their] subjugation."[5] This plan did not suit Amuersana, who wanted to be the supreme ruler of the united khanate. In approximately September

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[2] *Ping ding zhungeer fanlue* (A Description of the Pacification of the Junggars), 1772, *Zhengbian, Main Part,* Chapter 2, p. 26.

[3] Ibid., Chapter 7, p. 2.

[4] Ibid., p. 11b.

[5] Ibid., Chapter 34, p. 21b.

1755 Amuersana organised a rising against the Qing empire, but far from all the Oirot princes responded to his call to drive out the conquerors and restore the independence of the Oirot state: some defected to the Qings, while others remembered their old grievances and kept aloof. At first the insurgents were successful because the main body of the Qing forces had been recalled to China and a relatively small force was left in Junggariye under General Ban Di.

In early 1756 a large Qing army was dispatched to Yili, and in March of the same year it smashed the insurgents. In the summer of 1756 Amuersana fled from Junggariye to the Middle Ruz, where at first he enjoyed the support of the Kazakh sultan Ablai. In Junggariye the Qing troops began a methodical massacre of the helpless Oirot population, and this brought against the Qings even those who had formerly withheld their support for Amuersana for one reason or another. The insurgency was joined by the taizhis who had earlier defected to the Qings.

The fighting against the Manzhous entered a new phase at the close of the autumn of 1756, when Amuersana returned to Junggariye after a stay of almost half a year with the sultan Ablai. Making his base in the Taerbahatai Mountains, he mustered an army and, at the same time, tried to join forces with the Halha insurgents led by the Huotuogoit prince Cenggongrab. In 1756 Amuersana had managed to establish contact with the latter. But the rising in Halha was suppressed by the Qings before Cenggongrab could join his forces with those of Amuersana. The Qings had recourse to their favourite tactics, enlisting the support of Mongol feudal lords and even the Lamaist clergy, who urged the cessation of the rising.[6]

Amuersana sought Russian assistance against the Qings. In January 1757 he sent the *zaisang* Dawa to St. Petersburg with a letter to the empress Yelizaveta, requesting assistance in his struggle for power over the Oirots and also against the Qing forces. Reluctant to become embroiled in a military conflict with the Qing empire, the Russian government denied Amuersana's request but stated that it would guarantee his safety and a welcome on Russian territory should he desire to seek asylum. Further, the Russian reply noted that Russia would raise no obstacles to Amuersana's ascension to the throne in Junggariye.[7] While the talks were going on in St. Petersburg, hostilities resumed in Junggariye. In March 1757 a Qing army under Zhao Hui defeated the Oirots near Wulumuqi (Urumchi), but did not halt the insurgency led by Amuersana. Meanwhile, other Oirot contingents joined the struggle against the Qings. Thus, the Chuorhos khan Gelcang Duorzhi, Dashichereng and others entered the struggle in March of the same year.[8] However, the Qing army's overwhelming numerical and armaments superiority made itself felt: it continued overrunning the country, massacring insurgents and the civilian population alike. In a letter dated July 17, 1757 Deleg-gelong, a senior lama who crossed into Russia from Yili, wrote that the Qing troops were killing everybody on sight—men and women, the aged and children.[9]

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[6] *A History of the Mongolian People's Republic,* Moscow, 1954, pp. 161-62 (in Russian).

After suffering a series of defeats, the insurgents led by Amuersana were finally broken at the close of July 1757. Amuersana arrived in Semipalatinsk on July 28 seeking asylum. He was sent to live in the environs of Tobolsk, where he died of smallpox in September 1757. But even in death Amuersana was a threat to the Manzhous: they demanded the extradition of his remains in order to desecrate them. The correspondence between Beijing and St. Petersburg over the extradition of Amuersana's remains went on for two years after his death—1757-1759.

The Junggar Khanate was crushed by the Qings in 1757, but clashes with remnants of the insurgent forces went on until 1759. In suppressing the insurgency the Qing troops annihilated almost the entire population of Junggariye. According to estimates, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, they killed more than a million people.[10] Another Chinese source places the population of Junggariye at 200,000 families, or 600,000 persons,[11] of whom only several tens of thousands survived, mostly by fleeing to Russia. The brutality of the Qing troops is noted by modern Chinese historians, who write that "this victory was won by the most ruthless, almost total extermination of the population of Junggariye." [12]

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[7] I. Y. Zlatkin, *A History of the Junggar Khanate (1635-1758)*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 457-58 (in Russian).

[8] Zhao Erxun, *Qing shigao* (An Outline History of the Qing Dynasty), Beijing, 1927, Chapter 12, p. 4a.

[9] I. Y. Zlatkin, op. cit., p. 458.

[10] Jakinf, *A Description of Junggar and Eastern Turkestan*, St. Petersburg, 1829, p. 165 (in Russian).

[11] Wang Xiangqian, *Donghua xulu* (A Continuation of the Chronicle of the Donghua-Manzhou Dynasty), Beijing, Chapter 20, p. 35.

After destroying the Junggar Khanate, the Qings reinforced their position in Halha, which they had conquered at the close of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the way was cleared for the conquest of Eastern Turkestan. There, too, the Qings resorted to provocation, using the discord between the Belogor and Chernogor groups of the ruling class—the huozhas or feudal lords. The struggle between these groups, which outwardly assumed the form of religious discord, had a long history of almost two centuries. It subsided when the sides reached a compromise or when the Oirots intervened to compel one of the sides into submission.

During the internecine strife in the Junggar Khanate and especially after the khanate was destroyed by the Qings, there was an exacerbation of the struggle between the Belogor and the Chernogor huozhas, particularly with the return of the descendants of the Belogor Huozha, Ahmed, who was exiled more than 40 years previously. These were the brothers Buerhang-ad-Ding and Hang-huozha. The Qings planned to split the Moslem camp in Eastern Turkestan and weaken the Chernogors, who had by that time united almost the entire country under their rule. The Chernogor huozhas proclaimed a *gazavat*, a holy war, against unbelievers, with the country's independence as the ultimate aim.

The Qings sought to use others to set them up in Eastern Turkestan, relying on the strength of the Belogor huozhas and sending them a small mixed Chinese-Manzhou force, which included Oirots. This occurred at the close of 1755, and early next year the Belogors defeated the Chernogor huozhas and power was seized by the brothers Buerhang-ad-Ding and Hang-huozha. The Qing government believed that the brothers would serve them faithfully, but they miscalculated. The Belogor huozhas prepared for a war with the Qings for the independence of their country.

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[12] *Essays on the History of China.* Edited by Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959, p. 549 (Russian translation).

In July-August 1757[13] the Belogors took the field against the Qing troops but until 1758 the Qing government did nothing to subjugate the Belogors.

The reasons for this were, first, that the Qing troops were still fighting in Junggariye and, second, the Qing government was hoping to gain control of Eastern Turkestan peaceably by enlisting the support of the beks, the rulers of some of the towns. This was indicated by a Qianlong edict dated March 5, 1758 addressed to the beks of the towns of Yeerqiang, Keshigeer (Kashgar), Kucha, Aksu, and Huotang. It said that the rising in Eastern Turkestan had been instigated by Huojinzhang (Hang-huozha), and that this example had been followed by Boluonidu (Buerhang-ad-Ding). Further, the edict intimidated the beks of these towns: "We have this time sent troops specially [to subjugate] Huojinzhang. If you seize and bring him to us, you will most certainly continue to live in peace and enjoy special favours eternally. But, if in delusion, you submissively follow the instructions of the insurgent leader, we will, when the great army comes, no longer have the opportunity to separate the good from the bad, and everybody will have to be destroyed."[14]

In a number of imperial edicts, notably the edict of February 3, 1758, the responsibility for the assassination of the Manzhou officials sent to Eastern Turkestan and for organising resistance to the Qing troops was imputed to Hang-huozha, while his brother Buerhang-ad-Ding was told that he could atone for his "guilt" and even get a reward if he seized his brother and turned him over to the Qing authorities.[15]

Calculated to sow differences among the defenders of Eastern Turkestan, this manoeuvre had no success. However, the Qing government did not retreat from its intentions. After the failure of its first attempt to engineer a quarrel between the brothers, it decided to put a stake on the support of a group of feudal lords ruling some towns in Eastern Turkestan. The feudal nobility of these towns had been to some extent independent of the despotic khans of Eastern Turkestan and because of their geographical location were more under the influence of neighbouring states than the Keshigeer and Yeerqiang khans or huozhas. Such was the situation when the Junggar Khanate was in existence, and it persisted after the khanate was destroyed. The Qing government got the support first of the hakimbeks, the rulers of Kucha (Odui and his son Osimang), Baicheng (Kaidamat and his son Abuduermat), Wusha (Huodis), and other towns. These sided with the Qings to whom they rendered inestimable assistance in the conquest of Eastern Turkestan. This struggle went on from the close of 1757 to the close of 1759.

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[13] L. I. Duman, *Qing Agrarian Policy in Xinjiang at the End of the 18th Century*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1936, p. 89 (in Russian).

[14] *Ping ding zhungeer fanlue, Main Part,* Chapter 49, p. 18a.

[15] Ibid., Chapter 47, p. 30b; *Donghua xulu,* Chapter 16, pp. 51-52.

All means were used: a section of the feudal nobility was bribed, any attempt at resistance brutally crushed, some Uigur feudal lords were set against others, and national strife whipped up among various ethnic groups (Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Oirots). But the local population resisted staunchly, especially at Yeerqiang, where the Qing troops, who had been laying seige to the town, were beaten and made to retreat in March 1759. However, the arrival of reinforcements allowed the Qing army to consolidate its lines and then mount an offensive. Finally, in October 1759, the fighters for the independence of Eastern Turkestan were crushed at Lake Issyk-Kul. This was the closing act of the tragedy. The Belogor huozhas, the brothers Buerhang-ad-Ding and Hang-huozha, fled to Badakshang, where they were put to death by the local sultan. The only survivor was Salimusak, one of Hang-huozha's sons.[16]

The territories conquered in the far west (Junggariye and Eastern Turkestan) were incorporated in the Qing empire. This brought the empire's frontiers close to those of Russia not only in the north and northeast but also in the west. Thus, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century the Qings gradually conquered more and more territory and people. The incorporation of Junggariye and Eastern Turkestan brought economic benefits and strengthened the Qing empire's political standing among the Mongolian, Tibetan, and Central Asian states. The Qing empire began the penetration of Central Asia. Having formed a military springboard far in the west, it became a menace to the independence of the Kazakh and Kirghiz peoples.

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[16] V. V. Grigoriev, *A Geography by K. Ritter. Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, translated with critical comments and additions from sources published over the past 35 years by V. V. Grigoriev, Professor of the Department of Oriental Studies, St. Petersburg University,* Issue 2, St. Petersburg, 1873, p. 438; M. Hartmann, *Der Islamische Orient,* VI-X, Berlin, 1905 p. 340.

In Junggariye and Eastern Turkestan the Manzhous set up a military and civilian occupation administration, which maintained the traditional local oppressive feudal methods of government. This was particularly visible in Eastern Turkestan, where apart from the relatively small casualties and few exiles, the local population (Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and people from Central Asia) was untouched. The situation was different in Junggariye, where most of the population was put to the sword, some fled to Russia, and only a small number of people survived. After its conquest Junggariye was turned into a western military outpost guarding the approaches to Eastern Turkestan from the north as well. Also, it became a fringe territory of the Qing empire and was used as a place of exile for criminals and political prisoners.

Almost entirely depopulated in the 1760s, Junggariye had large expanses of free land, and this allowed resettling people from Eastern Turkestan and China proper. Forty thousand people, including troops, and also a military and civilian bureaucracy, were sent to this region. The troops consisted of Manzhous, Chinese soldiers of the green banner, Sibins, Solons, and Chahaers. These formed military settlements (*bing tun* and *qi tun*) to cultivate free land. Moreover, 6,000 families of the former adherents of the huozhas, known in literature as Taranchi, were exiled to Junggariye from Eastern Turkestan. From 1773 onward they built nine settlements (Moslem settlements or *huai tun*), where they worked the land and paid a tax in grain.[17] As of others, the land of these settlements belonged to the government. Those who worked it—exiles from Turkestan—had the status of semi-serfs or serfs. They were forcibly attached to the land, which was government property, and paid the government a tax. They cultivated the land partially with their own means of production (for example, draught animals purchased from the government on credit, seeds) and partially with means of production owned by the government (for example, farm implements). The exploitation rate was very high: the surplus product appropriated by the government amounted to between 40 and 71 per cent of the harvest (it was established not in shares of the harvest, but as a fixed amount of grain, namely 16 dans per family regardless of the harvest). This was much higher than the rent paid by government-dependent or free peasants in China proper. The necessary product remaining in the hands of the Turkestan settler gave him no more than a semi-starvation existence,[18] while the surplus product went to maintain the Qing troops. In addition to the tax in kind, the Turkestan settlers had feudal duties to the government in building towns and repairing roads: for instance, in 1762 they used time free from farming to help the soldiers build towns.[19]

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[17] L. I. Duman op. cit., p. 156.

The Turkestan (Moslem) settlements were administered by Moslem officials: these were headed by a hakim-bek. This was a fairly important office, and members of the Turkestan nobility were appointed to it. In Yili territory the office of hakim-bek was hereditary as distinct from the offices of local officials in Eastern Turkestan. Although by his status the hakim-bek was the senior administrator, he was nevertheless a subordinate of the Qing authorities, as we shall discuss in some detail below.

Apart from exiles from Turkestan, Junggariye was settled by people from China proper: Chinese, Manzhous, and Dungans. All received land from the government and paid a rent on terms that depended on the fertility of the land. The most intensive colonisation of Junggariye by these people took place in 1763-1808. In Chinese sources their villages are called *hu tun* or homestead villages.

In these villages the holders (not proprietors) of the land were juridically free: people who had come voluntarily from China proper, or exiles whose term of exile had expired, or independent members of soldiers' families. There were two main kinds of these villages—large merchants' estates and small peasant households. Although both these groups were not landowners (the land belonged to the government, which leased it), there were striking property and class distinctions between them from the outset.

Let us take a few examples. First, the size of the plots differed greatly. Strictly speaking, the land rented by merchants cannot be called plots: these were large estates leased for a long term and could be sub-leased. In this case the size of the leased land depended on the property status of the lease-holder. The size of a merchant's holding (regrettably, sources do not contain differentiated statistics on each holding) averaged over 1,000 mu (1 mu = 1/16 hectare); for instance, a group of 32 households headed by a merchant named Zhang Ziyi, grew wheat on 39,618 mu of land in the period from 1763 to 1808.[20] Obviously, to cultivate such a large area much money that only wealthy people could afford had to be spent on the purchase of implements, livestock, and seeds, and also on the hire of labour. But there were merchants who leased an average of 50 plus mu[21] on which vegetables and rice were grown. This land brought a much larger income than land sown to wheat. In the peasant villages each family had 30 mu of land, while exiles—former criminals who had served their sentences and recovered their rights—each cultivated 12-15 mu.[22] The merchants did not, of course, work the land themselves. An ordinary family could not by itself cultivate a thousand mu of land. In China no peasant family had more than 100 mu. The merchants leased (in effect, sub-leased) the land or used hired labour to work it, in other words, they were landowners. Regrettably, sources give no exact statistics on this score.

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[18] See Ibid., pp. 162-63.

[19] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue* (Imperially Approved Description of Xinjiang), 1821, Chapter 6, pp. 31-32.

Like the merchants, who cultivated land leased from the government, the peasants paid rent to the government. Whereas the cash rent (from the merchants) was from 5 fen to one qian per mu (for vegetable and rice fields), the rent in kind (from the peasants) was from 7 to 9 sheng per mu, depending on the harvest. While the tax paid by the merchants depended on the fertility of the land, a higher tax (1 qian per mu) had to be paid by other settlers during the first three years because they received livestock and food from the government on credit repayable in instalments over a period of three years; after the debt was paid the tax was halved and amounted to 5 fen. The taxes, both in cash and in kind, amounted roughly to 10, and in some cases to 20, per cent of the harvest. The taxes were thus not uniform: exiles from Turkestan, who worked the *huai tun* land, paid 3-5 times more than other groups of settlers.

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[20] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue*, Chapter 6, p. 5b.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 6; Song Yun, *Xichui zongtong shilue* (A General Survey of the Western Territory), 1808, Chapter 7, p. 4.

Another conclusion to be drawn from this is that a sharp stratification was to be observed in agriculture from the very outset of the colonisation of Junggariye, particularly in Yili territory. There the land was unevenly distributed: 4.3 per cent of the private households had 65.7 per cent of the land (in the 1820s).[23] This was indicative of the glaring social inequality and deep-going class contradictions. In the three other districts of Junggariye (Wulumuqi, Kuerkarhau, and Baerkul), where 20,900 peasant familes settled in the course of 40 years (towards the beginning of the nineteenth century) and developed over 950,000 mu of virgin land, the land was also distributed unevenly.[24] With the further colonisation of Junggariye and the growth of land cultivation and ownership, the process of property differentiation and class stratification deepened significantly by the mid-nineteenth century, even if we consider only the settlers and leave out the holdings of the bureaucracy and the landowners.

In order to round off the picture of the social relations in Junggariye we have to look into the status of the military settlers in Xinjiang. Military agricultural settlements were set up to grow food for the troops stationed in Xinjiang. There were two main groups of settlements: military settlements proper (*bing tun*) in which the land was worked by Chinese (green banner) and other soldiers (there were no Manzhous among them); and settlements of bannermen (Manzhous) known as *qi tun* (banner settlements). It cannot be assumed that all the food for the army was provided by these military settlements. This was far from being the case. Many Chinese sources note that in Junggariye the army was maintained at the expense of rent or taxes collected from the civilian settlers. For instance, in 1760 the *banshi-dachen* (administrator) Agui reported that 300 Turkestanis, who that year sowed 300 dans of grain, could feed not only themselves and their families and leave a supply of seeds, but also have a surplus enough to feed over 1,000 government troops and auxiliaries for several months.[25] By and large, in Xinjiang every peasant farmer fed three Qing soldiers.

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[23] L. I. Duman, op. cit., pp. 171-72.

[24] Ibid., p. 174.

Military settlers (Chinese and others, with the exception of Manzhous) were soldiers, who were replaced every five years. Some drilled, and others worked the land. A military farming settlement had a hundred soldiers. The number of these settlements fluctuated, depending on the time, while the number of soldier-settlers differed in the various districts, but the largest number was in the Wulumuqi and Yili districts. In the former there were 5,350 soldiers in 1780. In 1761 there were in Yili district 10 military settlements with a total of 1,000 soldiers; in 1815 this district had 20 settlements and 2,000 soldiers, who cultivated 40,000 mu of land. Thus, each soldier worked 20 mu of land.[26] In four districts of Junggariye (Wulumuqi, Baerkul, Kuerkarhau, and Taerbahatai) there were in 1780 a total of 7,748 soldiers, who cultivated 166,744 mu of land (a little over than 20 mu per each soldier).[27] There were military settlements also in Eastern Turkestan proper (the districts of Hami, Tuerfang, Harhashaer, Wusha, and Aksu). Apart from Tuerfang district, where such settlements were in existence for two years (1759-1760), the other districts had 1,057 soldier-settlers in 1780. These cultivated 26,890 mu of land, each soldier tending from 10 (district of Aksu) to a little over 40 mu of land (district of Hami). In the other two districts (Harhashaer and Wusha) each soldier worked 20 mu of land.

In the military settlements (with the exception of the Manzhou settlements) labour was forced, and the settlers had the status of dependants of the government. This is indicated by the entire process of labour, by the way it was organised in the settlements. The entire crop was delivered to government granaries. The harvest quota averaged 15-fold, and soldiers who produced more were given a cash bonus (the equivalent of a month's food ration in silver for those who gathered 18-fold, and the equivalent of a two months' ration for 28-fold). Those who failed to produce the average quota were punished. This was the situation in 1770.[28] Earlier, 11-fold was regarded as the average crop, and those who produced 11 dans of grain (using one dan of seeds) could expect a reward.[29] However, the 1766 report from the *banshi-dachen* Agui recommended denying a reward to those who, though gathered 11 dans, could not feed three soldiers in addition to themselves. The food quota per soldier at the time was 8 ge 3 shao of grain; thus four men needed 12 dans of grain.

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[25] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 6, pp. 28, 34.

[26] Ibid., p. 4.

[27] *Qinding Huanyu xiyu tongzhi* (Imperially Approved Description of the Western Territory (with Maps), 1782, Chapter 32, p. 6.

Like the civilian settlers (Chinese and Turkestanis), every military settler had to grow enough food for himself and three other soldiers. This underlay their semi-serf status.

In cultivating government land the military settlers did not have their own means of production: the government provided them with implements (a set consisting of a wooden plough, two sickles, a pick, a hoe, two spades, and a complete harness, etc.—total of 15 items) and livestock. The government issued one set of farm implements for every three soldiers and between 80 and 100 cows and horses per 100 persons (i.e., per settlement).

Like the Turkestani settlers, the military settlers had, in addition to their work in the fields, labour duty, chiefly in the building of towns. As a rule, this duty was performed in the time they were free from agricultural work.[30]

To sum up. The military settlers were subjected to extra-economic compulsion, in other words, they were not owners of land; and as direct producers they were counterposed by the Qing government as the owner of land and as the proprietor laying down the terms of labour. The military settler was not free: he was forcibly attached to the land, and escape was punished by law.[31] The soldier-settler had no household of his own; he worked as a member of a collective (settlement). The entire product of his labour was turned over to the government, while for the reproduction of labour power he received payment in kind, sometimes in cash (necessary product), which from the economic standpoint cannot be qualified as wages. Actually, the military settlers were a sort of feudal serfs. Like the other direct producers, the peasants, they were on the lowest rung of the social ladder in the Qing empire, in other words, they were part of the exploited class. However, they were also part of the Qing apparatus of coercion, and thus a privileged estate relative to the local population. But in considering the class relations and political situation in the country, it must be borne in mind that under certain conditions the military settlers could be in opposition (as they indeed were) to the state system.

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[28] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 6, p. 3.

[29] Ibid., pp. 33, 34.

[30] Ibid., Chapter 6, pp. 31, 32.

[31] *Hubu zeli* (Code of the Chamber of Finances), 1831, Chapter 94, p. 53. Here it is stated that an attempt to escape being sent to Wulumuqi, Yili, or other place as a replacement for those cultivating the land was a punishable offense: the five-year term of farm work was replaced by more arduous work at flour mills.

The Manzhou banner troops were in a different position—they enjoyed greater privileges than other (Chinese, Chahaer, Eliewut and other) troops. First, the Manzhou troops were paid better than others. Second, up to 1802 they were not obliged to till the land, and they were accorded preferential treatment in socio-political matters.

Early in the nineteenth century Manzhou bannermen were put to work on the land on account of the growing expenses for the upkeep of the army in Xinjiang, expenses which the central Qing government could not meet. The Qing financial resources were drained by the innumerable foreign wars and the punitive operations against ethnic minorities and peasant risings in the country itself.

As early as the 1780-1790s many imperial edicts were issued, stressing the need for Manzhou military-agrarian settlements. But for a number of reasons (the inability of the Manzhou soldiers to cultivate the land, the absence of water for irrigation, and so on) the formation of these settlements was postponed. One of these edicts, issued in 1790, contains interesting information on why the question was raised of Manzhous cultivating land. It stated: "In Yili there have been Manzhou troops for a long time. Their number is growing steadily. Of course, they must be fed. But the government has limited fiscal and food [material] resources and it is unable to provide more [supplies]."[32] Further, the edict temporarily permitted increasing supplies for another 400 soldiers, but warned that this would not be allowed in future. Then followed a recommendation for a way out of the difficulty caused by the numerical growth of the Manzhou population and by the limit on the resources available for its upkeep. "In Yili there is much arable land. Since the Manzhou bannermen do not know how to cultivate land this land may be divided and allotted to them so that they may hire people to work [the fields]. They would then have an income and acquire the means of subsistence."[33]

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[32] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 6, p. 9.

The first Manzhou military-agrarian settlements (*qi tun*) were set up in 1802 near the towns of Huiyuancheng and Huiningcheng, and a canal was dug to irrigate the fields. At first, because the Manzhous knew nothing of farming, the land in the banner settlements was cultivated collectively. But later, because labour productivity was low, the land was allotted to individuals and regarded as hereditary property (each person received between 30 and 40 mu of land). The means of production were the property of the settlers, but they were acquired on credit received from the government. In the beginning, when the settlements were formed, the settlers used draught animals free of charge, but subsequently they had to buy these animals. In 1804 the State Council decreed that the land in the banner settlements would be cultivated not by the Manzhou soldiers but by persons free of duty (in other words, by members of their families). The motivation for this was that Xinjiang was militarily important and that it would be ill-advised to divert soldiers from military duty.[34] While at first exiled Turkestanis were hired to help the bannermen, later this practice was halted. In 1812, Jin Chang, the military commander and viceroy of Yili territory, requested permission to lease bannermen's land on the grounds that there was a shortage of labour. This request was turned down, the reason given was that this could lead to secret mortgaging and sale of land and thereby undermine the welfare of the Manzhou troops and bring about a decline of labour discipline and the demoralisation of the bannermen.[35]

Although the land was regarded as the hereditary property of the Manzhou bannermen concerned, it could not be leased, sold or mortgaged, the penalty being its confiscation and transfer to other families. Thus, the government was the ultimate owner of the land and actively intervened in the right of hereditary possession granted to Manzhous. All the same, the Manzhou settlers were to some extent independent owners of land and disposed of the products of their labour at their own discretion. The direct producers (they also were the proprietors of the terms of labour) often violated various restrictions and interdictions. In 1814, i.e., two years after the publication of the ban on leasing banner land, it was found that "all the land in military settlements, notably of the eight banners, was leased to local inhabitants (private persons), and that of public[36] [land] many fields sown to wheat and rice lay abandoned".[37]

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 13.

[35] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

This is an indication of the fact that banner landownership was in a state of latent disintegration, the process accelerated by the development of commodity-money relations and of trade-usury capital.

Banner landownership cannot be regarded as having been undifferentiated. There were land cultivation by the eight-banner officers and (actual) land tenure by the rank-and-file. True, we have no full information on Xinjiang, but if we consider the pattern of banner agriculture in China proper we can draw the following conclusions. First, there was considerable differentiation: rank-and-file soldiers had land plots of 30 mu, while senior officers had as much as 180 mu under vegetables alone. Members of the high command—*wuxungs* or princes of the blood—each had several thousand mu of arable land, while some owned as much as 150,000 mu.[38]

Second, it must be borne in mind that while rank-and-file bannermen (or members of their families) worked the land themselves, in other words, they were direct producers, the officers were proprietors of the terms of production and exploited the selfsame rank-and-file bannermen or members of their families, or the Moslem population.

But even with the differentiation in Manzhou banner agriculture and with the existence of class distinctions between the officers and rank-and-file bannermen, the Manzhou soldier-settlers were a privileged estate relative to Chinese military settlers, let alone relative to the Turkestan population. As owners of land in banner settlements, even rank-and-file bannermen entered into rent relations and received rent, i.e., the surplus product. Moreover, Manzhou settlers enjoyed benefits: they were exempt from taxes and labour duty.

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[36] Land worked collectively and not distributed to individuals.

[37] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 6, p. 20.

[38] L. I. Duman, op. cit., p. 155.

They acted as masters in a conquered country, for they were the mainstay of Qing authority, the monarchy's principal and most reliable force politically and militarily.

While in Junggariye the conquerors set up a new military-administrative apparatus and devised new forms of landownership, in Eastern Turkestan they pursued a different policy. There the Qings hardly modified the administration, only removing the old officials and appointing as beks persons who they believed would be the most loyal to them. However, the top civilian and military authority was concentrated in the hands of the Manzhous, who were the senior officials of districts and towns.

Together with the other big landowners, the Turkestan beks comprised the ruling class of feudal landowners. For their services to the Qing monarchy they were rewarded with grants of land, the size of which depended on the posts held by them and also on their rank. On this also depended the number of peasant serfs or *yanqi* (*yangchi, angchi, yindzhu*) attached to the beks to cultivate their land. Two hundred beks owned roughly 208,000 mu of land, i.e., an area for sowing 7,845 batmangs of grain seeds.[39] To cultivate this land, 3,080 *yanqi* were attached to the beks.[40] The land possessions of the beks ranged from 132.5 to 5,300 mu, while the number of bonded *yanqi* ranged from one to 100.[41]

The other group of feudal landowners in Eastern Turkestan consisted of titled Turkestan aristocrats. They included former hakim-beks, who had significantly helped the Qings to conquer the country and been granted princely titles—*junwang*, *gong*, *beile*, and *beizi*. Their land holdings were hereditary. A special status was enjoyed by the rulers of two districts (Hami and Tuerfang), which were joined to the Qing empire much earlier than other parts of Xinjiang. These rulers, raised to the rank of prince of the second degree (*junwang*), differed from the ordinary hakim-beks in that, first, this was a hereditary rank and, second, the entire population was in serf dependence on them. A Chinese record of the Tuerfang district notes: "Tuerfang is the residence of prince (*gong*) Suleiman, son of Eminghuozha, who governs the following six Turkestan towns: Tuerfang, Pichang, Lukechong, Singim, Tuokesong, and Karha-huozhuo. All the inhabitants of these towns are *albatus* (serfs) of Suleiman, who is a hereditary *tusi* (native ruler), as distinct from all the other towns of Turkestan, where officials are appointed for a specified term."[42] According to the same Chinese record this was also true of the Hami district.[43] It is hard to judge the forms and extent of the dependence of the population of these two districts (which were semi-independent principalities) on their titled rulers, because sources are silent on this point. However, the very word *albatu*, by which the people of these district were called, means a person bound by duty: the feudal lords usually owned the *albatus*, much as cattle and other property.[44]

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[39] In Eastern Turkestan the land was measured in sowing units (batmangs). From 1760 onward one batmang was equal to five dans and three dou. Land measurement is discussed in L. I. Duman, op. cit., p. 182.

[40] Moreover, in Yili territory the families of 323 *yanqi* were bonded to the beks (L. I. Duman, "The Feudal Institution of Yanqi in Eastern Turkestan in the 18th Century", *Notes of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR*, 1935, Vol. III, p. 90.

[41] L. I. Duman, "The Feudal Institution of Yanqi...", p. 92; *Qing Agrarian Policy...*, pp. 178, 228-30, (Supplement No. 6).

Unlike the inhabitants of other districts in Turkestan, the inhabitants of Tuerfang and Hami paid a rent in kind and performed a labour duty to their titled feudal masters and not directly to the Qing authorities. But this did not make the lot of the direct producers any easier. The following, for example, is from Chinese records on the Hami and Tuerfang districts: "The inhabitants (of Hami) number not more than 2,000 families, and all are so poor that they cannot support themselves."[45] "There are many inhabitants only in Tuerfang, but a general census (in all the towns of the district) will not show more than 3,000 households, and of these most are (so) poor that they cannot feed themselves."[46] This background accentuates the wealth of the Tuerfang *junwang* Suleiman, whose possessions extended from Pichang to Tuokesong and amounted to 14,700 mu of arable land.[47]

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[42] *Xiyu wen jian lu*, Chapter 2, p. 1b; *Xinjiang wai fan jilue*, Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 13.

[43] *Xiyu wen jian lu*, Chapter 1, p. 4; *Xinjiang wai fan jilue*, Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 4.

[44] B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *The Mongol Social System. Mongol Nomad Feudalism*, Leningrad, 1934, p. 159 (in Russian).

[45] *Xiyu wen jian lu*, Chapter 1, p. 4b; *Xinjiang wai fan jilue*, Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 4.

In addition to the beks and the titled nobility, the ruling feudal class consisted of members of the clergy, who had large land holdings, landowners unconnected with officialdom, and other sections linked to landownership (for instance, merchants). Unquestionably, this class included Manzhou and Chinese senior officials, some of whom had large land possessions, in other words, they were landowners.

Apart from the *yanqi,* the peasant class included small landholders who paid a rent to the government. This section of the peasantry, comprising the majority of the population, may be divided into two basic groups: metayers renting government land, and small traditional landholders, paying a tithe to the government.

Metayers worked "government" land, which earlier belonged to the local population but was confiscated by the Qings and turned into government property. This land was leased out, the rent amounting to half the harvest. The reason for this high surplus product rate was that the government supplied the leaseholders with seeds, livestock, and farm implements. Under these conditions the metayers could not independently reproduce the agricultural process and had to have recourse to help from the government. This gave rise to a vicious circle, from which the metayer could not escape. What remained to him after he paid the rent was barely enough to keep him and his family alive. This is illustrated by the following computations. Chinese sources tell us that a metayer and his family cultivated 30 mu of land, which he sowed with 1.5 dans (about 90 kilos) of seeds. A harvest of between 10-fold and 15-fold (which was the average for practically the whole of Eastern Turkestan) gave him 15-22 dans. After paying the rent he was left with 7-11 dans (420-650 kilos) for a family of four or five persons. In other words, in a family of four each person had a daily ration of from 287.5 to 445 grams of grain, while in a family of five this ration fell to only 230-356 grams provided the metayer spent the entire amount he was left with for food for his family. But this was impossible to do because part of the harvest had to be spent on other requirements.

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[46] *Xiyu wen jian lu,* Chapter 2, pp. 1b-2a; *Xinjiang wai fan jilue,* Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 13.

[47] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 3, p. 81. In 1779-1780 Suleiman's land possessions were confiscated and turned over to military settlers when his crimes were exposed.

Most of the peasants in Eastern Turkestan were traditionally smallholders, who for centuries cultivated small plots of land. No significant change occurred in their condition, as in agriculture as a whole, when the country was conquered by the Manzhous. The bulk of the peasants remained in possession of the small holdings they had when the country was ruled by the huozhas. The exceptions were those who had fought the Qing army. The peasants had to pay the government a tax in kind amounting to one-tenth of the harvest. Moreover, they had to perform labour duties—help to repair roads, build new roads, dig irrigation canals, and so on. A decree of the Lifanyuan (Chamber for External Relations) says: "A close watch must be maintained on irrigation canals, and in the event of [their] destruction the Turkestanis of whole villages (communities) must be ordered to repair them without delay." [48] This decree was dated 1814, but the maintenance of the irrigation system, as other public works, was practised earlier.

A special official was appointed to each village to supervise the collection of taxes and the performance of feudal duties: "In each [village] there is a *youzibek* to supervise the collection of taxes and the performance of duties. Also, there is a *kokbashi* to supervise the cultivation of land." [49]

The taxes levied on peasants were not limited to the tithe: there were other dues that were paid not only in food but also in items of household crafts and the products of primitive mining: cloth, cotton, silk, copper, sulphur, lead, saltpetre, and items of everyday use—shawls, knives, pelts, and so forth. Consequently, the surplus product exacted by the Qing government consisted of products of farm and industrial labour.

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[48] *Qinding huijiang zeli,* Book 3, p. 37.

[49] *Xiyu wen jian lu,* Chapter 7, p. 17; *Xinjiang wai fan jilue,* Book 2, p. 16.

The Xinjiang peasants were exploited not only by feudal landowners but also by usurers. The premier usurers were the Qing government and its officials. In Xinjiang usury developed on a "legal foundation". It took the form of government aid to the direct producer. For example, in spring the peasants of Wulumuqi and other districts were loaned seeds from the public granaries, and in autumn they had to repay the loan with a 10 per cent addition, while the actual interest on the loan was much higher on account of abuses by officials.[50]

Thus, after Junggarie and Eastern Turkestan were incorporated in the Qing empire, the peasants were reduced to dependants of the government and serfs of the ruling, feudal class, whose interests were furthered by the Qing government. Since, in their own interests, the Manzhou and Chinese landowners saw the Turkestan feudal gentry as their allies, they had to surrender part of the surplus product to the latter. The labour of military settlers was used to maintain a considerable number of military and civilian officials, who administered the country, and also a huge army that was the instrument not only for external expansion and the pillaging of neighbouring peoples but also for the oppression of the Xinjiang population and the suppression of local resistance.

According to incomplete figures (evidently, they concern only Junggarie or even only Yili district), the military settlers and exiled Turkestanis had to feed over 1,400 civilian officials (Hans and Manzhous), officers of the Sibin, Solon, Chahaer, and Eliewut battalions, and more than 19,000 soldiers.[51] Their upkeep required an annual amount of over 678,900 liangs of silver for victuals and 135,000 dans of food.[52] It must be noted that the metayage collected annually throughout Eastern Turkestan from the peasants—small landholders (amounting to one-tenth of the harvest)—was enough to meet only half the grain requirements. The other half had to be obtained from private landowners in Junggarie (with the exception of military settlements). This makes it plain that by its labour the population of Xinqiang maintained the Chinese and Manzhou bureaucracy, the army officers, and also part of the Qing troops. The other part of the Qing army was fed by soldier-settlers. If we are to speak specifically of the above-mentioned officials, officers, and soldiers, according to sources, the grain for them came from five government granaries in the towns of Huiyuancheng, Huiningcheng, Yining, Suiding, and Taleqi. Grain was delivered to these granaries by Turkestanis (exiled to Yili territory) and green banner soldier-settlers.[53]

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[50] L. I. Duman, *Qing Agrarian Policy...*, p. 215.

[51] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 8, p. 1a.

[52] Ibid., p. 1b.

An interesting picture is obtained by a comparison of the salaries of officials and the incomes of the peasants. Senior Manzhou and Chinese officials received, like the officers of the Manzhou troops, salaries in silver and grain. The Sibin, Solon, Chahaer, and Eliewut officers, the hakim-beks, the *tuoergout wangs,* and the *gongs* received a salary only in silver. The highest military and civilian administrator in Xinjiang, the *jiangjun* (military governor-general), annually received, to "keep him incorruptible", 3,000 liangs of silver and 9,000 jins of grain (one jin=596.8 grams). The second most important person, the *canzan dachen,* received 1,000 liangs of silver and 4,680 jins of grain. The most junior official received a salary of 31.5 liangs, and over and above that, to "keep him incorruptible", 300 liangs of silver and 2,880 jins of grain.[54] If we compare only this payment in kind with the annual incomes remaining to the metayers after they had paid the rent, it will be found to be from two to four times larger. Even the most low-paid Manzhou soldier, the infantryman, received much more than a metayer. This soldier annually received 12 liangs of silver plus an addition of 4.4 liangs in lieu of 352 jins of grain and other food.[55]

The exploitation of the local population in Eastern Turkestan and also of the exiles and soldier-settlers in Junggariye was augmented with ethnic oppression and various discrimination against non-Manzhou peoples. This discrimination, possibly to a lesser extent, was extended to the Chinese population of Xinjiang.

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[53] *Qinding Xinjiang shilue,* Chapter 8, p. 1a.

[54] Ibid., Chapter 8, pp. 7, 8, 10.

[55] Ibid., p. 15.

*V. P. ILYUSHECHKIN*

# ANTI-MANZHOU EDGE OF THE TAIPING PEASANT WAR

The Taiping peasant war (1850-1864) spread to much of China and was the most powerful armed action of the Chinese masses in the nineteenth century against feudal oppression and Manzhou power. It was generated by a sharp exacerbation of the class and national contradictions between the peasants and the feudal landowners, and also between the bulk of the Chinese people and the Manzhou aristocracy ruling the country. It was thus an anti-feudal and anti-Manzhou movement.

In Chinese feudal society contradictions were aggravated since the end of the eighteenth century by the steadily deteriorating material condition of the peasants. More and more land was concentrated in the hands of the feudal landowners with the resulting dispossession of the peasants and the growth of feudal oppression and taxes. The political spurs deepening and aggravating class and national contradictions were the privileges of the Manzhous in the Qing empire, the concentration of state power in the hands of the Manzhou aristocracy, and the regime of brutal oppression and arbitrary rule established by it. The ruthless treatment of Chinese patriots who ventured to act against Manzhou rule[1] inevitably outraged the Chinese masses. This outrage was fueled by memories of the atrocities committed by the Manzhous when they conquered China and by the humiliations inflicted on the Chinese people with the enforcement of some Manzhou customs that were alien to the overwhelming majority of China's population. Because of the peasants' low level of political and class consciousness national contradictions often obscured class contradictions, while Manzhou rule personified the entire system of feudal oppression.

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[1] Under Qing laws action against Manzhou rule in China was one of the most heinous crimes. It was punishable by the death not only of those actually involved but also of their families.

An immense role in bringing class and national contradictions to a head was played by the aggression of the capitalist powers against the Qing empire in the 1840s, especially the First Opium War of 1840-1842, which laid the beginning for China's conversion into a semi-colony of international capitalism and greatly undermined the prestige of the Manzhou rulers in the eyes of the Chinese people and their belief in the omnipotence and invincibility of the Manzhou armed forces.

The armed struggle of the masses against the government spread with the deepening of the internal contradictions in Chinese feudal society. While for the period 1814-1839 Qing chronicles registered some 30 armed risings, in the period from 1841 to 1849 there were as many as 110 popular risings in different parts of the country. In 1847-1850 the most vigorous struggle of the people was to be observed in the southern province of Guangxi, where there were several scores of risings. The insurgent movement in Guangxi embraced much of the province, and although the actions of the insurgents were local and fragmented they nevertheless paved the way to the Taiping peasant war.

The Taiping rebellion was an independent movement of the peasants, and it was joined by people of other oppressed strata and also by some anti-Manzhou landowners, merchants, and officials. The rising was evidence that the destruction of Manzhou suzeraignty and the restoration of Chinese national statehood were undertaken at grass-roots level, since the educated and propertied sections of Chinese feudal society were unable to set themselves this aim because of their close links to the Manzhou feudal aristocracy. This community of class interests proved far stronger than their community of national interests with the main mass of the Chinese people.

What distinguishes the Taiping rebellion from the many other popular risings of the period of Manzhou rule was not only its duration and enormous scale. It was, one may say, the zenith of the peasant movement in feudal China—from the standpoint of the organisation level of the peasant masses and of the development of their independent political ideology. The Taipings were the first in China's history to clearly formulate the idea of "peasant communism", the idea of building a just social system based on the principle of egalitarianism in production and consumption. The insurgent peasants, downtrodden and disunited only a short while before, created their own state, and their own disciplined army, produced their own talented military leaders, and time and again displayed staunchness, courage and heroism, winning many brilliant military victories over the forces of feudal reaction and at times bringing Manzhou rule to the brink of total collapse.

Breaking out in the summer of 1850 in Guangxi, the Taiping rebellion was at first local, although it differed from many other local actions by its more thorough preparation and better organisation. A disciplined insurgent army was formed, hostilities were conducted against Qing troops in a number of the province's countries, and the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping-tianguo) was proclaimed. During the operations in Guangxi, which lasted with alternate success until the spring of 1852, Hong Xiuquan, Yang Xiuqing, Xiao Chaogui, and other leaders gave much of their attention to fostering the fighting morale of the Taipings, reinforcing their unity, organisation, and discipline, and educating them in a spirit of hatred for the "Manzhou devils". This contributed enormously to the successes of the rising and to turning it into a national peasant war.

Early in the summer of 1852 the Taipings moved into the southern districts of the neighbouring province of Hunan and started preparations for a drive northward, to the country's central regions. They took steps to inform the population of the imminent offensive. To enlist the support of the people Yang Xinqing and Xiao Chaogui issued joint appeals under the headings: "Manifesto on the Need to Destroy the Northern Barbarians (Manzhous.—*V. I.*), Save the World, and Calm the People by the Will of Heaven" and "Manifesto on the Salvation of All Chinese Born and Bred by Heaven".

These documents, permeated with ardent patriotism, anger and outrage, described how the Manzhou "barbarians" and "devils" piratically seized power in the country, enslaved the Chinese people, forced their orders and customs on them, sucking their lifeblood, reducing them to poverty, and dealing savagely with them.[2]

"All the bamboo groves in the Nanshan Mountains", says one of these manifestos, "would not suffice to recount their dirty deeds on our land. The turbulent waters of the Eastern Sea would not suffice to wash away the traces of their enormous crimes and evil deeds that shut out the sky."[3] The manifesto noted: "Now, fortunately, the way of heavenly truth has been reopened for people. There is hope of China's rebirth ... A campaign is beginning that will bring the barbarians inevitable extermination. The Manzhou scum, which have ruled for two hundred years, are doomed, their fate is sealed".[4] "We," it proclaimed, "are raising the sacred banner of struggle for justice, in order, by the will of Heaven, to punish those who are deceiving Heaven and deliver China from suffering and shame. With hope and confidence we await the day when the stench disperses and all people have the joy of great peace."[5]

Seeing Manzhou rule as the basic cause of all the misfortunes and sufferings of the Chinese people, the Taiping leaders urged all Chinese, regardless of their social status, to rise against the Manzhou "barbarians" and "devils" in order to give new life to China and restore the "Heavenly principles of relations among people".[6] "Whoever you are, an official or an ordinary person, do not delay raising the banner of struggle for justice. The strong and the weak, men and women, put on your armour and go forward with arms in hand, motivated by universal anger. Vow to destroy the eight banners[7] and bring tranquillity to the sacred land."[8] Further, they urged all Chinese "who have by mistake found themselves in the camp of the devils and are helping them to fight Heaven" to "turn their spears and, at the call of Heaven, to use them against the devils in order to fulfil the will of Heaven".[9]

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[2] See "Manifesto on the Need to Destroy the Northern Barbarians, Save the World, and Calm the People by the Will of Heaven", *The Taiping Uprising,* Moscow, 1960, pp. 21-22 (in Russian).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 23.

[5] Ibid., p. 24.

[6] Ibid.

[7] The imperial eight-banner army.

[8] *The Taiping Uprising,* p. 24.

In these appeals, which had a religious slant, Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui preached Christianity, urging the people to cease praying to "false gods" and "evil spirits", to break out of the "net of the cunning devil", and believe in the Christian "true God". "Our Heavenly Kingdom," they wrote in the first of the above-mentioned manifestos, "belongs to God, not to the northern barbarians. We are given food and clothes by the Lord God, not by the northern barbarians. All people—men and women—are children of God, and do not belong to the northern barbarians."[10] And further: "You have long experienced misfortune and unhappiness by the will of the Manzhous, so how will you respond to the mercy of the Lord God if you continue to remain idle, if you do not join your hearts, and by common effort do not sweep away the Manzhou evil."[11]

In order to convince the people that the destruction of the power of the Manzhou feudal lords was necessary, inevitable, and close at hand, they made use of the then widespread Confucian idea of attributing political upheavals to the "will of Heaven", which did not tolerate outrages against the people by rulers, divested the unworthy of the "Heavenly mandate" to rule, and turned this mandate over to more worthy rulers. "A real ruler (Hong Xiuquan—*V. I.*)," one of these manifestos declared, "has appeared in the Heavenly Kingdom. The countless crimes of the barbarians have angered Heaven, and the Lord God has ordered our sovereign, the Heavenly prince (Hong Xiuquan.—*V. I.*), in the name of Heaven, to raise the holy banner (of the uprising), put an end to the crimes of the Manzhous, cleanse the Heavenly Kingdom, and become the instrument of the divine punishing hand."[12] "If China rules unclean barbarians," said the other manifesto, "this means that a master rules slaves. This is looked upon with favour by Heaven. If it itself comes under the rule of unclean barbarians, this means that slaves have deceived the master. This is looked upon with disfavour by Heaven...

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[9] Ibid., p. 28.
[10] Ibid., p. 21.
[11] Ibid., p. 24.
[12] Ibid., p. 23.

The Lord has now favoured us, showing us Heavenly grace. He has sent the Heavenly prince to earth, ordering him to govern the land of great peace..".[13] Know, declared a third manifesto, that the Manzhou devil, the emperor Xianfeng "is already condemned by Heaven and that inevitable destruction awaits him".[14] However numerous the Manzhou devils were and however great their cunning was, they were helpless against the "will of Heaven", which supports the "true ruler", the Heavenly prince Hong Xiuquan.[15]

The Taipings made no distinction between the Manzhou feudal lords—the Manzhou aristocracy ruling China—and the rest of the Manzhou population. Because of their low class and political consciousness, they saw all Manzhous as oppressors of the Chinese people. They therefore called for the extermination of all "Manzhou devils", regardless of their social status. "Those of you," they told the people, "who seize and bring a dog of Xianfeng or cut off and bring his head, those who seize and behead all Manzhou barbarians will be granted high rank."[16]

Contrary to the assertions of some bourgeois scholars, the anti-Manzhou ideas, views, and calls of the Taipings did not boil down to an "ethnic problem of the attitude of the Chinese to non-Chinese peoples" inhabiting the country.[17] They were a key component of their political ideology. The Taipings did not urge hostility towards other non-Chinese peoples in the country. More, members of some of these peoples were active in the Taiping rebellion, in the armed actions of traditional secret societies, or rose independently against the Qing dynasty. The vast scale of the armed struggle of the popular masses and oppressed ethnic minorities against the Manzhous was evidence that the need to rid the country of Manzhou feudal rule and oppression was the most acute political issue in China at the time.

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[13] *The Taiping Uprising*, p. 28.

[14] Ibid., p. 25.

[15] Ibid., p. 26.

[16] Ibid., p. 24.

[17] See, for instance, Vincent Y. C. Shih, "The Ideology of the Taiping T'ien-Kuo", *Sinologica*, 1951, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 9; Eugene Powers Boardman, *Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1952, p. 34.

There is no point at all, as some bourgeois authors are doing,[18] to look for the roots of the anti-Manzhou views and calls of the Taipings in the ancient sayings of Confucius, who lived at a time when nobody knew anything about the Manzhous, or in the anti-Manzhou writings of some Chinese scholars, adherents of the Ming dynasty, about whom, according to all the evidence, the leaders of the uprising knew nothing about, or, lastly, in the ideology of secret societies with which, where possible, the Taipings preferred to have nothing to do.[19] These roots must be sought mainly in the condition of the mass of the Chinese population under Manzhou rule, in the widespread hatred for the Manzhous in China.

Despite the view of many bourgeois scholars, who unwittingly ignore or deliberately reject its anti-feudal character, the Taiping peasant war was by no means solely a struggle against the Manzhous, solely a "national and religious revolution" with no class content.[20] We have already noted that it was an anti-feudal war. However, it is not our purpose to develop this thesis.

The Taipings mercilessly killed all Manzhous, and also the Chinese officials and landowners who were actively involved in suppressing the rising. The money and movable property of these persons were confiscated by the insurgents and turned over to "holy treasuries", from which the money came for the upkeep of the Taiping army. Towards landowners and wealthy people who did not act openly against them, the Taipings pursued a restrained policy: while, as a rule, not destroying them physically, they exacted contributions from them in kind and in cash and made them pay a heavy tax.

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[18] See Vincent Y. C. Shih, op. cit., p. 2.

[19] The attitude of Hong Xiuquan, the principal leader of the Taipings, to traditional secret societies may be gauged from, for instance, the following pronouncement:

"Though I never entered the Triad Society, I have often heard it said that their object is to subvert the Tsing and restore the Ming dynasty. Such an expression was very proper in the time of Khang-hi, when this society was at first formed, but now, after the lapse of two hundred years, we may still speak of subverting the Tsing, but we cannot properly speak of restoring the Ming. At all events, when our native mountains and rivers are recovered, a new dynasty must be established. How could we at present arouse the energies of men by speaking of restoring the Ming dynasty? There are several evil practices connected with the Triad Society, which I detest; if any new member enter the society, he must worship the devil and utter thirty-six oaths; a sword is placed upon his neck, and he is forced to contribute money for the use of the society. Their real object has now turned very mean and unworthy." *The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection.* By the Rev. Theodore Hamberg, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York-Washington-London, 1969, pp. 55-56.

[20] This view is propounded in, for example, the works of Jian Youwen, a leading bourgeois expert on the Taiping rebellion.

The anti-Manzhou and anti-landowner policy proclaimed by the Taipings brought them wide and active support of the peasants and the urban lower strata. Thanks to this support the Taipings, having begun an offensive against the Qing forces in August 1852, gained—at the close of 1852 and early 1853—a strong strategic position along the middle reaches of the Yangzi: the triple city of Wuhan, consisting of the towns of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang.

The Manzhou government was stunned and frightened by the military successes of the insurgents. What it feared most was a possibly similar swift of Taiping advance from Wuhan to Beijing. There were grounds for this fear. During its advance from southern Hunan in the direction of Wuhan the Taiping army's ranks swelled several times over with volunteers from among the local population. This drastically changed the balance of military strength and the military situation in central China in favour of the Taipings. The Qing banner troops in this area found themselves inferior in numbers and fighting capacity; moreover, they were dispersed. There were individual groups of troops in some threatened regions. Had the huge Taiping army, concentrated in a single fist, taken advantage of this and, abiding by its former tactic of swiftly moving all its forces in one direction, undertaken an offensive towards Beijing from Wuhan, this offensive would probably have been successful. The group of Qing forces barring the road to the imperial capital was numerically small and would hardly have been able to stand up against the insurgents.

But this did not happen. Instead of using its military superiority and the confusion in the enemy camp to try to seize Beijing and at once end Manzhou rule, the Taiping leadership decided to use all its forces for an offensive to the east of Wuhan down the Yangzi in order to capture Nanjing, the largest city in central China. Marching out of Wuhan on February 9, 1852 and sweeping away all obstacles, the Taipings appeared at Nanjing's walls within 28 days. On March 19, after a short siege, they took the city and massacred almost all the Manzhous in it: high-ranking officials, officers and soldiers of the local garrison, and their wives and children (altogether, nearly 20,000 persons).[21]

According to the "Evidence of Li Xiucheng", the Taipings heeded the advice of an old sailor, who in early 1853 was said to have persuaded Yang Xiuqing to abandon his planned campaign in Henan and make his headquarters at Nanjing, this "only real cradle of government".[22] However, judging from reliable reports of other authors who witnessed the Taiping uprising, this was not an accidental choice and it was made long before early 1853.[23]

Soon after the capture of Nanjing, the insurgent leaders renamed the city Tianjing (Celestial Capital) and proclaimed it the capital of their Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping-tianguo).

It seems that Beijing (Northern Capital), capital of the Qing empire, never interested the Taiping leaders—who were southerners by birth, dialect, and some other attributes—as their possible headquarters. Seeking to restore the Chinese national state, they preferred to have the capital at Nanjing (Southern Capital), which in the past had often been the residence of Chinese national dynasties and, besides, was close to the geographical centres of China proper.

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[21] Thomas Taylor Meadows, *The Chinese and Their Rebellions,* London, 1856, pp. 168-69.

[22] "Evidence of Li Xiucheng", *The Taiping Uprising,* pp. 198-99.

[23] For example, evidently basing himself on the interrogation of prisoners and defectors, Zhang Dejian, who took part in the struggle against the Taipings, writes that the Taiping leaders had, as early as the summer of 1852, planned to seize Nanjing and make it their main base (Zhang Dejian, *Zei Qing hui zuan* [Reports on the Situation in the Insurgent Camp], *Taiping-tianguo* collection [The Taipings], Shanghai, 1952, Vol. 3, p. 291). Another Qing author writes that Yang Xiuqing had planned this even earlier, in the spring of 1852, when the Taipings entered Hunan (Ming Xin, *Fa nie chu ji* [Notes on the Outbreak of the Rising of the Longhairs], *The Taipings,* Vol. 4, p. 458).

In parallel with proclaiming Nanjing the Celestial capital, Hong Xiuquan damned and renamed Beijing in the capital province of Zhili. In a special manifesto he wrote: "If services are rendered, they must be rewarded, and if crimes are committed, they must be condemned. I have now given the place Beiyan[24] the name Lair of Devils, for it is now being defiled by devils. If the devils are guilty of crimes, the place is for that reason also guilty of crimes. On that basis I have condemned the province of Zhili, giving it the name of province of Zuili (i.e., province of slaves from the families of criminals.—*V. I.*). In the Heavenly Kingdom there cannot be two rulers and two capitals; apart from the Celestial capital no place may be called the capital ... Although I have now given Beiyan the name of Lair of Devils, after the (Manzhou.—*V. I.*) devils are destroyed the name of Beiyan will be returned to it. And may it be known that although I have now condemned the province of Zhili, giving it the name of province of Zuili, as soon as this province realises its crimes, repents, and begins to revere the Heavenly Father, the Lord God, the name Zuili will be changed to the name 'province of Qianshan' ('province converted to good'.—*V. I.*)."[25]

In selecting Nanjing as the capital of their state, the Taiping leaders unquestionably followed the example of Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming dynasty, who took up residence in Nanjing, making it his base and capital and, relying on it, gradually crushed the Mongol invaders and established his rule throughout the country. However, they overlooked the fact that Zhu Yuanzhang acted in an entirely different historical situation and that he was giving much of his attention to practical issues of socio-economic policy and to uniting under his banners all people dissatisfied with the rule of foreign conquerors. The Taipings, however, acted as though they were convinced that it was enough to proclaim Nanjing with its glorious historical past, first-class fortress, and convenient geographical location as the capital of the Taiping state for everything else to fall into place, since they had accomplished the main thing—"laid the everlasting foundation".[26]

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[24] Beiyan—the ancient name of a district of Beijing.

[25] "Xian yaoxue wei Zuili lun" (Discourse on the Condemnation of the Devil's Lair by Renaming It the Province of Zuili). *The Taipings*, Vol. 1, p. 283.

However that may be, the proclamation of Nanjing as the capital of the Taiping state was important for the further development of the peasant war. It signified that the rising was entering the decisive stage of struggle with feudal reaction for power in the country. Moreover, it signified that the Taipings, who earlier had not been concerned with winning and holding territory, were now giving this serious attention, that the Taiping state, which until then had existed not so much in reality as in the minds of the insurgency's leaders, had begun to acquire flesh and blood. All this gave a powerful impetus to the mass armed struggle throughout the country for the overthrow of the political rule of the Manzhou feudal lords.

Further, this development caused the Taipings to modify their military strategy radically, and this had far-reaching consequences. They were now bound to the Nanjing area and had to make its defences secure: they deconcentrated their forces and abandoned the tactic of a swift advance by all their forces in one direction, a tactic that had given them the military initiative and enabled them to strike crippling blows at the Manzhous. In short, Nanjing's conversion into the capital at a time when the main forces of the opponent were still intact put the Taipings at a military disadvantage. Having decided to make Nanjing their headquarters, the insurgents gave their attention first to reinforcing its defences. At the same time large Taiping forces were sent to neighbouring regions to seize strategically important strongpoints at the approaches to the city. All this consumed much time.

The staggering military successes of the Taipings in the Yangzi valley and, especially, their rapid seizure of the strongly fortified city of Nanjing alarmed the feudal reaction, which feared an immediate Taiping advance on Beijing. "Beijing," wrote Palladii (Kafarov), head of the Russian ecclesiastical mission, in early May 1853, "is in turmoil: on the one hand, here is the threat from the insurgents, and on the other, it is feared that there may be unrest in the capital itself any day. Wealthy families, especially those of Chinese officials, are fleeing Beijing one after another as from a doomed city. Business has declined and there is a shortage of everything. It is believed there are many southern insurgents or their sympathisers in the capital. Mysterious inscriptions, made by unknown persons, appear on people's houses; all small shopkeepers and homeless people have been expelled from the Manzhou inner city, and private persons are doing everything to acquire all sorts of weapons." [27] Many Chinese, Palladii wrote in conclusion, "believe the Manzhou dynasty will inescapably fall and await this convulsion quite indifferently." [28]

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[26] We find this view also in a collection of panegyric judgements by various persons published at the time in Nanjing under the title "Jian Tianjing yu Jinling lun" (Discourses on the Institution of the Celestial Capital at Jinling), *The Taipings*, Vol. 1, pp. 249-80.

The emperor Yizhu anxiously (an anxiety shared by the ruling Manzhou élite) prayed to the gods to help him exterminate the insurgents. [29]

However, placing little reliance on help from divine and other spirits, the Qing government hastily did all it could to save itself. In April 1853 two orders were issued on strict measures against suspicious persons in Beijing, [30] on surveillance on beggars and tramps and the capture of Taiping spies. [31] Further, the government feverishly mobilised all its forces and resources and hastened the dispatch of troops from all parts of China to Nanjing and to areas where the insurgents might advance.

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[27] *Report from Palladii to the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 25 (May 7), 1853,* Archive of Russian Foreign Policy, Index Main Archive 1-5, File 1, Record 51, Sheets 533-34.

[28] Ibid., p. 536 (back).

[29] For instance, in early March 1853 Yizhu issued a special manifesto informing his subjects that within the next few days he intended personally to go to the temple and, after a night's vigil and fast, reverently offer deeply felt prayers to the supreme divinity and humbly ask for his country's deliverance from the vicious monsters (*The North-China Herald,* April 9, 1853). In another manifesto, issued in June of the same year he lamented that a demoniac influence had spread disorder from Guangdong to Huguang and from Huguang to Jiangnan, so that the situation could hardly be worse... He had personally prayed nine times for divine grace and each time he went to the altar, keeping vigil and fasting, he thought of this unpacified rebellion and felt more grief and shame than ever before. Finally, on the seventh day of the "present moon" he went to the altar again to pray for rain and, remembering his omissions, could not reproach himself enough (*The North-China Herald,* December 23, 1853).

[30] See *Xing bao,* 3rd day of the 3rd moon of the 3rd year of Xianfeng (April 10, 1853).

[31] See Ibid., 22nd day of the 3rd moon of the 3rd year of Xianfeng (April 29, 1853).

Feeling that the regular army was not strong enough to cope with the Taipings, the Qing government ceaselessly appealed to the local authorities, the *shenshi,* the landowners, and the merchants to unite, act together, and everywhere form self-defence units in support of the regular troops. Six such edicts were issued in only the period from March 18 to Apirl 1, 1853.[32]

The Taiping leaders began a northward thrust only in May 1853. They planned to seize Beijing and overthrow the Qing dynasty. However, the time and the situation were now largely unfavourable for such an offensive. While the insurgents were reinforcing the Nanjing area and preparing for a march to the north, Qing troops were being brought from Manzhouli, Mongolia, and the northwestern provinces to the region north of the Huanghe to block the Taiping army's advance to the capital. In all these areas the Chinese *shenshi* and landowners speedily formed self-defence units. To make it difficult for the insurgents to cross the Huanghe, which was a major natural obstacle on the road to Beijing, the Qing authorities ordered all boats to be moved from the southern to the northern bank. All this created additional difficulties for the northern march of the Taiping army.

Besides, Yang Xiuqing, who headed the Taiping government, obviously underestimated the difficulties of the planned march and also the strength of the enemy. Instead of moving most of the Taiping army against Beijing, he assigned only between 20,000 and 30,000 troops for the campaign.[33]

The failure of this march was thus inevitable. The Manzhou rulers were given the opportunity to reinforce their positions.

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[32] See Ibid., 9th, 11th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 23rd days of the 2nd moon of the 3rd year of Xianfeng (March 18, 20, 24, 25, 26; April 1, 1853).

[33] The question of the numerical strength of the Taiping forces in the northern march remains unresolved to this day. In their reports in May and June 1853 the Qing generals estimated the number differently: from 2,000-3,000 trained troops (see *Imperially Approved Documents on the Suppression of the Guangxi Rebels,* Chapter 37, p. 5 and Chapter 43, p. 2) to 1,000 "real rebels" and

After the failure of the northern march, which was the culminating point of the Taiping attempts to overthrow Manzhou rule, hostilities raged for many years mainly along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi. Although the Taipings won some important victories, even there they were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. Their ineffective strategy of "outspread fingers" was evidently one of the reasons for their setbacks.

The heroic Taiping peasant war powerfully activated the traditional secret societies, drawing them into the armed struggle against the Manzhous, and invigorated the liberation movement of the ethnic minorities. Simultaneously with the Taiping rebellion and unquestionably under its influence there were, in many parts of the country, innumerable popular anti-Manzhou risings headed by leaders of secret societies, and risings by a number of ethnic minorities. The largest of these were the partisan war of the Nianjuns in the central and northern regions of Anhui in 1852-1864, the rising of the Small Swords societies in Shanghai and Fujian in 1853, the popular risings in Guangdong and Guangxi in 1854-1855, the rising led by Li Yunhe and Lan Chaoding in Sichuan in 1859-1862, and the risings of the Miao people in Guizhou and of the Pangtai people in Yunnan in 1855-1872.

These and many other local risings embraced a huge territory far larger than the Taiping state; the number of their participants—many hundreds of thousands—was likewise greater than the numerical strength of the Taiping army. The suppression of most of these risings required a large effort and considerable resources from the Qing government, preventing it from concentrating on the destruction of the Taipings.

However, the Taiping movement did not unite with the other anti-Manzhou risings, the main motive force of which was the selfsame oppressed peasantry. With rare excep-

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20,000 new recruits (Ibid., Chapter 38, p. 7). Different figures are given in various histories of the Taipings. For instance, the figure 6,000-7,000 is given by L. Brine (*The Taiping Rebellion in China*, London, 1862, p. 184); an estimate of 20,000 is given by Dai Yi (*Zhongguo jindai shigao* [Essays on the New History of China], Beijing, 1958, p. 230) and Mou Anshi (*Taiping-tianguo*, Beijing, 1959, p. 129); and Fan Wenlan (*A New History of China*, p. 184) writes that there were 50,000 troops.

tions, the Taipings did not even try to establish contact and cooperation with the leaders of other popular risings. In turn, these leaders (likewise with few exceptions) made no effort to cooperate with the Taipings, preferring to act independently. Deep-rooted parochialism and clannishness, and also the disunity typical of the way of life of the feudal peasantry prevented them from uniting and jointly fighting their common enemy. A major factor here was the class narrow-mindedness of the feudal peasants, a narrow-mindedness that prevented them from understanding the need for unity among all the anti-feudal and anti-Manzhou forces. Using the discord in the insurgent camp, the Manzhous were able to crush many popular risings one after another, thereby undermining the strength of the Taipings.

In their struggle to overthrow Manzhou rule the Taipings tried appealing to patriotism of the Chinese landowners, especially to the educated section of the Chinese feudal aristocracy, the *shenshi.* In one of the manifestos we have mentioned they appealed specifically to scholars, declaring: "In every province there are tens of thousands of people who are strong in spirit, there are many eminent scholars and valorous persons. We would like to see them raise the banner of rebellion on high and, devoting themselves to vengeance against the accursed enemy, accomplish feats of courage for the glory of the king (Hong Xiuquan.—*V. I.*)."[34]

Later, in 1861, one of the Taiping leaders (Hong Rengan) published the "Manifesto on the Extermination of Devils", in which he appealed to the people and troops, including Qing soldiers and officers, officials and *shenshi,* to help the Taiping army in every way to stamp out the "Manzhou devils" and go over to the side of the insurgents.[35] It was approximately then that he published the propaganda pamphlet entitled "Return to the True Way",[36] in the form of a conversation with an official who supposedly defected from the camp of the Manzhous, he tried to show the superiority of Taiping ideals, orders, and institutions over the Qing ones, and the need for all Chinese to take the "true way" of active support of the Taiping movement.

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[34] *The Taiping Uprising,* p. 28.

[35] See "Zhu yao xiwen" (Manifesto on the Extermination of Devils), *The Taipings,* Shanghai, 1954, Vol. 2, pp. 619-28.

[36] See *The Taiping Uprising,* pp. 157-87.

The Taipings compelled *shenshi* and landowners to sit for Taiping state examinations for academic degrees, appointed many of them to posts in their administration, and gave them official ranks and titles. They did this partly because there was a need for educated people and partly because of their adherence to the traditional system of state examinations for academic degrees. However, the vast majority of the Chinese landowners and *shenshi* had long ago reconciled themselves with Manzhou rule and had linked their destiny firmly with the Manzhous. They were loyal to the Manzhou dynasty, which protected their class interests and defended them against insurgent peasants. In cases where landowners, *shenshi*, and Qing officials had to cooperate with the insurgents in one way or another, they usually did so under duress, to save their skins. However, where possible they engaged in sabotage and, at the first opportunity, rejoined the Qing camp.

Among the Chinese feudal aristocracy there was no more or less considerable body of people with anti-Manzhou feeling. In turn, the Taipings themselves were naturally alienated from the Chinese landowners by their own anti-landowner socio-economic policy.[37] As a result, it did not prove possible for the Taipings to form an alliance with any significant section of the Chinese feudal aristocracy. This greatly strengthened the hand of the Manzhous against the Taipings.

The Taiping rebellion failed for a number of reasons: the gross military-strategic miscalculations of the insurgents, the superiority of the feudal reaction's material and manpower resources, the close unity between the Manzhou aristocracy and the Chinese landowners in the face of their common class enemy—the insurgent peasants—and the lack of unity among anti-Manzhou forces in the country, to name a few. A particularly large role was played by the undisguised interference of British and French troops and also American adventurers in the civil war on the side of the Qings.

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[37] See V. P. Ilyushechkin, "Taiping Agrarian Policy", *Narody Azii i Afriki,* No. 4, 1962.

The suppression of the Taiping rebellion, which was the largest popular movement in China in the nineteenth century against feudal oppression and Manzhou rule, emasculated popular opposition to this rule for a long time, helped to consolidate the forces of feudal reaction, prolonged the existence of the corrupt Qing regime, and to a certain extent halted socio-economic and political progress in the country.

The heroic Taiping peasant war against oppressors is enshrined in the memory of the Chinese people and continued to inspire their struggle for liberation.

*A. A. MONINA*

# THE "MISSIONARY QUESTION" IN QING POLICY

## (The Zongliyamen Memorandum of February 9, 1871)

On February 9, 1871 the Zongliyamen sent the representatives of foreign powers in Beijing a memorandum, which has become known as the "Memorandum on Christian Missions".[1] Following the "opium wars" this was the first independent foreign policy action of the Qing rulers relative to the Western powers. Prior to this, all of the Qings' foreign policy actions were carried out under pressure from these powers, which in these cases pursued their own mercenary aims. Thus, under British pressure the first Chinese diplomatic mission was sent in 1866 to European countries, but this was an empty gesture because the Manzhou official leading this mission had no authority to conduct talks or sign agreements.[2] Two years later another diplomatic mission was sent, this time under pressure from the USA and Britain; it was headed by the former US minister to China Anson Burlinghame.[3]

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[1] The Chinese text of the memorandum was published in *Chouban yiwu shimo* (Materials on China's External Relations), Beijing, 1930, Chapter 82, pp. 14-25. There are English and French translations of this memorandum ("Memorandum on Christian Missions Addressed by the Chinese Government to the Treaty Powers", Tientsin, 1892; "Le Mémorandum chinois, ou violation du traité de Peking, exposé et réfutation par un missionaire de Chine", Rome, 1872). The author has used the Chinese text of the memorandum.

[2] The story of this mission is given at length in W. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire,* Vol. 2, London, 1918, pp. 186-88.

[3] Arriving in the USA, Burlinghame signed on behalf of China the "Supplementary Articles ot the US-Chinese Treaty of 1858", one of which was an article legalising the contracting of "yellow slaves" by American businessmen. Britain and France were displeased

In 1868-1869 the Qing rulers made no attempt to raise the question of changing the humiliating articles of the treaties concluded with foreign powers in 1858 despite the fact that a provision of these treaties stated that at the expiry of ten years they could be reconsidered on the demand of any of the signatories.

Talks on re-examining the articles of the former agreements were begun at the insistence of the British minister in Beijing Sir Rutherford Alcock. In effect, the Qings made no proposals of their own and in the long run agreed to sign an "Additional Convention to the Treaty on Trade and Navigation", which gave Britain new privileges (a reduction of customs tariffs for a number of goods, the opening of more ports for trade, and so on).[4]

Without basically renouncing their traditional notions about the superiority of the Middle Kingdom, China, over the rest (barbarian) world, and the foreign-policy views of the "epoch of isolation", the Manzhou rulers stepped over these traditions in 1871 and for the first time proposed settling the question of missionaries. What motivated them?

China's defeat in the "opium wars" and the signing of unequal treaties with foreign powers were followed by an intensive penetration of protagonists of Christianity—Catholic and Protestant missionaries from the USA and European countries.

They were the advance detachment of imperialist colonialists and, performing the most diverse functions—spies, traders, and teachers bringing up young people in their schools in a spirit of submissiveness to aggressors—paved the way for merchants, industrialists, and officials of the colonial administration into China. From the very beginning the missionaries in China were exploiters and oppres-

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with Burlinghame's activities in the USA and expressed this displeasure in notes to the Zongliyamen (*Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 68, pp. 16-18). After this incident the conservatives in the Zongliyamen declared that diplomatic actions only led to additional difficulties for China and, consequently, any initiative relative to foreigners brought harm rather than benefit (Ibid., Chapter 68, p. 20).

[4] The campaign to have the treaties reconsidered is described in A. Sargent, *Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1907; Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office.* Published under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations by the King's Crown Press, New York, 1948.

sors of the masses. For the needs of their churches and missions they arbitrarily seized land and buildings, sought to form a privileged pro-imperialist group made up of Chinese converted to Christianity, who were to become another stratum of exploiters in the Chinese countryside, and insulted the national feelings and traditions of the Chinese people.

The activities of the foreign missionaries affected the interests of a section of the ruling feudal class in China—the bureaucracy and the *shenshi*. The latter saw the propagation of Christianity by the missionaries as undermining the Confucian system, which was the ideological foundation of their power. The suspicions of the *shenshi* were aroused by the fact that some of the teachings of Christianity had been used by the leaders of the Taiping rebellion, that had shaken China only recently. The conduct of the missionaries and Chinese Christians affected the local *shenshi* and officials most directly. The missionaries appropriated to themselves unchallenged influence over their flocks, and using their protection the Chinese Christians refused to pay taxes, perform labour duties, and abide by the orders of officials and the arbitration of the local *shenshi*. The local administration and the *shenshi* were in fact losing their power over a section of the population.

The missionaries undertook the functions of local officials and appropriated many external attributes of their power: they used special seals, in addressing their flocks and the authorities they assumed the titles of higher officials and dignitaries, refused to abide by provisions of ceremonial protocol upon visiting yamens and to reckon with the existing subordination in the relations between senior and junior officials, which was meticulously observed in China. Moreover, they usually addressed themselves directly to the Zongliyamen in circumvention of the provincial administration. The missionaries and, in their footsteps, the diplomatic representatives of foreign powers in China often insisted on the Zongliyamen removing various officials they felt were obnoxious to them, or in the event of anti-missionary actions demanded the execution of negligent members of the local administration who failed to prevent these actions, or at least demanded the payment of large compensation for damage to the property of missionaries or Chinese Christians.

Many instances of such behaviour by missionaries were given in the Zongliyamen memorandum to the diplomatic representatives of foreign powers.[5]

"Thus," the Zongliyamen concluded, "the missionaries not only appropriate to themselves functions of ordinary officials, but demand the same authority wielded only by the emperor."[6] This situation was intolerable for the Qing rulers. For nearly 250 years the Manzhou emperor was the supreme lord and master of his Chinese subjects, and now it turned out that he and his administration could not compel obedience from foreign missionaries and from Chinese Christians enjoying the latter's protection. However, having permitted missionaries to work in China, the Qing government hesitated to oppose them. Action against them was taken by the Chinese people. Soon after religious missions were set up in towns and villages there were spontaneous anti-missionary actions, during which churches and mission schools were set on fire and foreign priests and Chinese Christians were manhandled.

The people's risings against missionaries worried the Manzhou rulers, who feared they could grow into anti-government actions. Small wonder that the Zongliyamen memorandum of February 9, 1871 singled out as "especially serious" the unrest of 1870 in the province of Guizhou, where after a local magistrate handed down a verdict in a dispute between a Christian and a non-Christian in favour of the latter the Christians "seized the *yamen* and compelled the local authorities to reconsider the verdict".[7] For the Qing government it was also of no little significance that the anti-missionary actions were a constant source of friction and conflict with foreign powers, which invariably took the side of the missionaries and backed their demands. The Qings, who had shown their total helplessness during the "opium wars", could not refuse to satisfy these demands. However, this constant acquiescence to foreigners infuriated the masses and a section of the feudal aristocracy and *shenshi* and eroded the government's prestige. For that reason, with the growth of anti-missionary actions, the "missionary question" began seriously to worry the Qing government. In 1868 there were volatile actions in Jiujiang

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[5] *Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 82, pp. 21, 23.

[6] Ibid., p. 23.

[7] Ibid., Chapter 82, p. 23.

(January), Taiwan (April), Yangzhou (August), and Wuchang (December). In Yangzhou, for instance, proclamations began to be circulated in early August calling for a rising against missionaries. Although the missionaries requested protection from the town authorities, the latter took no action. A rising that according to various sources involved from 10,000 to 20,000 persons began in the town on August 22.[8]

After the events of this disquieting year, the Qing dignitaries Prince Shun and Wo Ren submitted memoranda to the emperor, emphasising the harm the missionaries and their flocks were inflicting on China and recommending prohibiting missionary activity in the country.[9] The emperor forwarded these memoranda to the Zongliyamen. This resulted in a secret memorandum to the emperor in which the Zongliyamen pointed out that of all the issues the missionary question was the most difficult, but noted at the same time that any steps to restrain the missionaries could bring China into conflict with foreign powers, a development that was described as extremely undesirable in the obtaining circumstances. No specific measures to resolve the problem were suggested by the Zongliyamen.[10]

In 1869 there were more massive and nation-wide actions against the missionaries. The high point of these actions was the popular rising in Tianjin in 1870 against Catholic missionaries.[11] The Qing rulers accepted the humiliating demands made by France in connection with the damage caused to the Catholics in Tianjin. The government pledged to send to France a special embassy with an apology, to punish the Tianjin officials, pay a huge compensation, and execute 16 persons allegedly guilty of attacking foreigners and killing some of them. The anti-missionary wave subsided after the suppression of the Tianjin rising. However, many censors and dignitaries were worried that among the bureaucracy and the *shenshi* there was mounting disaffection with the Qing government's tractability to foreign powers in the settlement of the Tianjin conflict. They wrote to the emperor and the Zongliyamen, warning that the situation in the country was growing tense and recommending either forbidding all activity by foreign missionaries in China or limiting that activity and placing the missionaries and their Chinese flocks under effective government control.[12]

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[8] See M. Guinness, *The Story of China Inland Mission*, London, 1894, p. 123.

[9] *Chouban yiwu shimo*, Chapter 71, pp. 18-20.

[10] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[11] The Tianjin events of 1870 are described at some length in the author's article "From the History of the Tianjin Events of 1870", *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta narodov Azii*, 1962, Issue 55, pp. 32-44.

Taking this opinion into account, the Zongliyamen in early 1871 produced the "Memorandum on Christian Missions", which was sent to the diplomatic representatives of the treaty powers in Beijing.

The memorandum consisted of a fairly long note stating the motivations that made the Qing government undertake to settle the "missionary question", eight articles formulating and substantiating the Zongliyamen's main proposals, and a short conclusion.

The note repeatedly made the point that the unlawful activities of the missionaries, the behaviour of the Chinese Christians, and the ceaseless anti-missionary actions in the country had created a situation that was fraught with the danger of a repetition of the rising such as took place in Tianjin: "Even in provinces where clashes have not yet occurred, there is strong suspicion of and hostility for missionaries... Disorders, such as those in Tianjin and even on a larger scale, may be repeated at any moment."[13]

This was perhaps the first time that in a foreign-policy document the Qing government admitted that it could no longer keep the Chinese people in check:

"The Grand Prince[14] and members of the Zongliyamen sincerely fear that following the settlement of the Tianjin conflict ignorant Christians will behave with more hostility than before and the people's hatred of them will grow. The hostility and hatred that have thus piled up may cause a sudden eruption and lead to catastrophe. The local authorities, the provincial governors, and even the Zongliyamen are unable to prevent this. In the event of a general rising in China, the emperor may appoint dignitaries and order them to march out with troops, but even the sternest measures will not help if the people rise in anger and there are people who will refuse to obey... There are times when even the supreme authority is helpless."[15]

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[12] See, for instance, the memoranda of Zeng Guofan and Ding Richang in *Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 76, pp. 20-22.

[13] *Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 82, p. 15.

[14] Grand Prince Gong (Yi Xing) headed the Zongliyamen from the moment it was set up in 1861.

Possibly, in this instance the Qing government exaggerated, counting that its "warning" would make the foreign powers accept some of the Zongliyamen's proposals for preserving the prestige of the Qing dynasty in the eyes of the Chinese people. From the Qing experience of cooperating with foreign powers in suppressing the Taiping rebellion and the Nianjuns it was obvious that these powers likewise mortally feared the popular movements in China. Not intended for publication, the memorandum quite faithfully reflected the weakness of the Manzhou dynasty and the shakiness of its hold on the Chinese people.

In the note accompanying this document the Qing government expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects of the activities of the missionaries—with the fact that unlike the missionaries of the past the Christian priests concentrated on getting converts among the poor instead of among the propertied classes, violated some Chinese traditions, ignored the Chinese authorities, and encouraged their converts to disobey the local administration. However, it did not demand the total cessation of missionary activity (such demands were made in the course of popular anti-missionary risings). "If in creating their religious institutions and preaching their doctrine," the memorandum stated, "the missionaries avoid methods that evoke the dissatisfaction of the *shenshi* and the people, suspicion will vanish, giving way to mutual confidence and constant accord. If they disregard the advice of Chinese Christians and do not interfere in the affairs of the local administration they will be able to live in full harmony with the people, and the authorities will always safeguard their interests."[16]

The Zongliyamen did not suggest any modifications in the wording of the articles of the treaties with foreign powers where they concerned the rights and privileges of missionaries. Fearing to impinge upon the interests of the treaty powers in China, it only wanted to put some limit on missionary activity so that it did not overly wound the prestige of the Manzhou government.

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[15] *Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 82, p. 16.

[16] Ibid.

The Qing rulers felt that the interests they had in common with foreign powers required missionaries to renounce forms of activity that clashed hardest with traditional Chinese philosophies and evoked the displeasure of the *shenshi*. The Qing court was vitally interested in maintaining its alliance with the *shenshi*. Thus, the second article of the memorandum forbade women to attend church services together with men.

Five of the memorandum's eight articles (1, 5, 6, 7, 8) contained proposals that would give the Qing government more detailed information on the activities of missionaries. In all likelihood, the Qing government saw this as a possibility of taking steps in advance to cut short outbursts of anti-missionary actions and, in the event of conflict with missionaries, giving detailed explanations to foreign diplomatic representatives and absolving local officials of blame.

In article 6 it was proposed that foreign missionaries should inform the local authorities once a month or once in three months of the number of people they had converted to Christianity (so that "criminals and troublemakers" would be unable to seek the protection of the Christian church), and also should allow government officials to inspect religious missions.

The same was proposed relative to orphanages set up by missionaries: it was suggested that these orphanages be registered with the local authorities and that a strict account be kept of the number of children in them. The reason for this proposal was that the Qing government regarded the orphanages run by the missionaries as one of the principal causes of the anti-missionary actions.[17]

Missionaries could purchase land and buildings for the needs of the churches only with the permission of the local authorities and in cases that were not seen as offensive by the people (Article 8).

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[17] In their drive for converts, the missionaries often practised the purchase of emaciated children from poor parents, and also accepted seriously sick children in their orphanages. Moreover, they made small children work for 10 hours a day in the mission workshops and fields (M. Venyukov, *Essays on Modern China*, St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 64). For that reason the mortality rate at the mission orphanages was very high; this caused rumours to spread to the effect that in the orphanages children were killed to prepare "fiendish medicines" and in many cases gave rise to anti-missionary unrest (*Jindai shi jialiao*, No. 4, 1956, p. 3).

Article 5 provided for stricter passport control of the movements of missionaries in the country but did not question their right to travel freely to even the remotest parts of China.

Lastly, in article 7 it was stressed that missionaries should not appropriate to themselves official badges of distinction and that in dealing with government institutions they should abide strictly by established protocol: "Missionaries must abide by Chinese customs... They should not use seals, the right to which is given only to officials. They should not send messages to the yamens however important they may be. If an address to a yamen is imperative, it must state only the essence of the matter and be in the form of a petition. Upon calling on dignitaries, they must perform the relevant ceremonies. They must not wilfully break into a yamen and upset legal proceedings."[18]

The other articles (3 and 4) concerned a question that was not less important for the Qing government, namely, the legal status of Chinese Christians.

In demanding the subordination of foreign missionaries to the local authorities, the Zongliyamen accentuated that "Chinese Christians must likewise abide by operating laws, with the exception of the payments for religious requirements, perform all duties, including labour duties, and pay all the taxes due from them. Without sufficient grounds they cannot refuse to pay their local land tax and rent" (Article 3).[19]

Also, an attempt was made to restore the Qing government's jurisdiction over Chinese Christians: "The examination of disputes between Christians and the rest of the population is an inalienable function of the local authorities... Missionaries should not defend Christians and justify their unseemly actions" (Article 4).[20]

In the closing part of the memorandum the Zongliyamen wrote that the proposed articles "are the final expression of our firm desire to protect the missionaries."[21]

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[18] *Chouban yiwu shimo,* Chapter 82, p. 23.

[19] Ibid., p. 19.

[20] Ibid., p. 20.

[21] See Ibid., p. 21.

It may seem that in its memorandum the Qing government made an attempt to limit the activities of foreign missionaries in China in the interests of the Chinese people. In reality, however, all it wanted was that the activities of the missionaries should not undermine the prestige of the Manzhou dynasty, that the Qings should "save face" in their relations with foreigners. It did not try to close China to missionaries and did not object to their exploitation of peasants and artisans in mission-run farms and workshops, to their seizure of land, and to their flouting the country's sovereign rights. The Qing government reconciled itself to the aggression of foreign powers and to the activities of the Christian missionaries, who were making it possible for the capitalist powers to penetrate China ideologically, for its main objective was to remain in power, to maintain its rule over the Chinese people. Precisely this was the position from which it tried to settle the "missionary question".

The response of the foreign powers to the 1871 memorandum was sharply negative. They categorically refused to discuss the Qing government's proposals.

Meeting with this rebuff, the Qing government did not insist and thereby demonstrated its total helplessness in the face of the foreign colonialists.

The only real obstacle to the activities of foreign missionaries in China was the anti-missionary struggle of the masses, a struggle that grew in breadth despite repressions by the government and the treaty powers.

*M. S. KORSUNSKAYA*

# QING CAPITULATORY POLICY IN THE FRANCO-CHINESE WAR OF 1883-1885

The struggle for colonies intensified in the 1880s with the further development of capitalism and the transition of some industrialised countries to the stage of imperialism. France stepped up its colonial policy in 1882-1887. During this period it gained possession of Tunisia and Madagascar and came to grips with Britain in Egypt, the Sudan, Nigeria, and elsewhere.

The French big industrial and finance bourgeoisie sought to penetrate China's southern provinces—Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong—in order to create a sphere of influence in opposition to Britain and thereby facilitate the conquest of North Vietnam, which in turn was projected as a springboard for aggression against China.

France's aggressive actions were resisted by the Vietnamese people and posed China with the acute question of protecting its southern provinces, helping Vietnam, and repulsing aggression.

The French aggression in North Vietnam in 1880-1883 evoked growing anger among the Chinese population of the provinces bordering on Vietnam. This anger was expressed in anti-missionary and anti-foreign actions that rocked the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Fujian and spread to Zhejiang, Shandong, Zhili, and some other provinces. The people set fire to churches, manhandled missionaries and Chinese Christians, and circulated anti-missionary leaflets. Some missionaries were killed. Chen Yuying, the viceroy of Guizhou and Yunnan, reported that in the night of March 27, 1883, in the county of Lanqiong, Yunnan Province, 200 persons broke into a church, killed a French missionary named Terras and 14 Chinese Catholics, and burned down the church.[1] In Fujian Province even the local shenshi[2] joined in the movement against foreigners and Chinese Christians. A German missionary named Anser, who held a French passport, was attacked in May 1883 in Jiaozhou County, Shandong Province. At the same time popular actions against foreigners grew more frequent in the cities of South China. There was an explosion of outrage among the Chinese when two Chinese were killed by foreigners in Guangzhou in July. On August 12, 1883, a large crowd (nearly 2,000 persons) gathered in Guangzhou at the pontoon bridge separating the foreign quarter of Shamian from the rest of the city. They chased away the guards, broke into Shamian, and began setting fire to the houses of foreigners (customs officers, missionaries, doctors, and others). Soldiers were sent to pacify the incensed population. In the clashes one resident was killed and 20 soldiers were wounded. Fourteen houses, belonging to Englishmen, Americans, Germans, and Frenchmen, were gutted by fire. These actions against foreigners and missionaries vividly demonstrated the attitude of the Chinese people to French aggression in Vietnam and exercised strong pressure on the Qing government.

One more circumstance of no little significance influenced the stand of the Qing government. French aggression in North Vietnam led to a division of the feudal-bureaucratic élite (the bureaucracy in the capital and the provinces, the military, the landowners, and the *shenshi*) into two large hostile groups. In European literature they are called the party of war and the party of peace; Chinese literature calls them the group of resistance and the group of capitulation. The proponents of resistance to French aggression consisted of members of different sections of the ruling class—from the Manzhou aristocracy (Prince Zhong and others) to small Chinese landowners. They included officials of the central state apparatus and dignitaries in the provinces—districts and counties—(Zhang Zhidong, Zuo Zongtang), some diplomats (Zeng Jize), military (Feng Zicai), censors, *shenshi,* and others. Their ideological inspirer was Zeng Jize, whose firmness during the Franco-Chinese war, that broke out soon afterwards, was noted by foreigners. The group of capitulation was very large. It consisted mainly of compradores and warlords from the Huai feudal-landowner clique headed by Li Hongzhang. The struggle between the groups was diplomatic, military, political, and ideological. In this struggle the groups sometimes sacrificed national interests. The advocates of resistance insisted on the Chinese government organising a rebuff to the French aggressor. On December 8, 1881, the Qing government requested the viceroys of the provinces of Zhili (Li Hongzhang), Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui (Zuo Zongtang), Guangxi and Guangdong (Zhang Shusheng), Guizhou and Yunnan (Lia Yu) and others for their view of the Vietnamese question.[3] Most declared that Vietnam should be defended against French aggression.[4]

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[1] See *Qing Guangxu chao zhong fa jiashe shiliao* (Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled), Beijing, 1932, Chapter 3, p. 42; Chapter 5, pp. 16-18; Lloyd Eastman, "The Kwantung Anti-Foreign Disturbances During the Sino-French War", *Papers on China*, Harvard University, Vol. 13, December 1959, Cambridge, Massachussetts, pp. 53-54.

[2] *Qing ji jiaoan shiliao* (Materials on Anti-Foreign Actions at the Close of the Reign of the Qing Dynasty), 1937, pp. 107-09; Li Shiye, *Jindai zhongguo fan jangjiao yundong* (Anti-Foreign Movements in China in the Period of New History), Beijing, 1958, p. 54.

Meanwhile, the proponents of resistance gained the upper hand in the government. A factor of no little significance was the Chinese people's growing resentment of French aggression. Under the influence of these factors and in connection with the French seizure of Hanoi on April 25, 1882, the Qing government had to define its stand. As early as 1881 it had begun to help North Vietnam, sending small contingents of Chinese troops on the pretext of driving gangs of Chinese bandits from its territory. But this was episodic assistance. Now, after the seizure of Hanoi, the Qing government took steps to organise systematic resistance to French aggression. The governors of the southern provinces were ordered to prepare to defend the frontiers; units of the Guangxi army were ordered to cross the frontier and take up positions at the strongpoints of

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[3] *Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* Chapter 2, p. 4.

[4] Ibid., Chapter 3, pp. 1-2, 9-11, 13-14; Chapter 2, pp. 9-10, 17-18, 22-23, et al.

Beining (Baknin) and Shanxi (Songtai); a special government official was to contact the army of Black Flags;[5] Chen Yuying, the viceroy of the provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan, was instructed to extend material assistance to the Black Flags, and then cross the border into Vietnam at the head of the Yunnan army and act jointly with the Guangxi army. Pen Yulin was appointed imperial commissioner for the defence of Guangdong. Lastly, on November 16, 1883 the Chinese government issued an official communique stating that in the event the French attacked the Chinese garrisons at Beining and Shanxi China would respond with hostilities. The Qing government believed that France would not venture to begin a colonial war because it had only a relatively small expeditionary corps that had been battered in the fighting in Vietnam. Thus, at the initial stage of the French aggression in Vietnam (1880-1883) it seemed that the Qing government was determined to offer risistance to the French.

However, further developments were accompanied by a quick change in the policy of the empress Cixi's government. In December 1883 the French launched offensive operations in the Red River delta. The Chinese army surrendered one strongpoint after another: Shanxi, Beining, Taiyuan (Thainguen), Xinghua (Thanhoa), and others. This caused confusion in the Qing government. Both groups used the situation to pressure the government. The advocates of resistance believed that the defeats were proof that there had to be serious preparations for the continuation of the war with France.[6] The advocates of capitulation saw them as evidence of China's military weakness, of the impossibility of resistance, and urged an armistice.[7]

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[5] The army of Black Flags was formed of armed detachments of Taiping insurgents who crossed into North Vietnam in 1867 after the uprising was defeated. Maintaining their combat capacity, the Black Flags increased their numerical strength and numbered more than 13,000 effectives when the French aggression commenced. They controlled navigation along the Red River. The Vietnamese government invited Li Yongfu, the commander of the Black Flags, to serve under it, permitting him to collect and keep customs dues. The Black Flags were based at Baoshan near Laokai. A strong material and territorial base, constant combat readiness, and relative freedom of action made the Black Flags one of the main forces of resistance to French aggression.

[6] *Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* Chapter 14, pp. 11-12, 15-19, 20-21; Chapter 15, p. 38.

In the entire subsequent period (December 1883-August 1884) up to China's declaration of war on France, the Qing government's actions were uncommonly contradictory and inconsistent. While taking steps to organise resistance to aggression, it adopted a capitulatory stand in the diplomatic talks with France. For example, an imperial edict was issued in March 1884 ordering the punishment of those who were guilty of defeats; Zhang Zhidong, a war advocate, was appointed viceroy of the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi (April 1884); by an imperial edict of April 8, 1884 the entire composition of the State Council and the Zongliyamen was changed[8]—the new appointees were dignitaries known for their hostility towards foreigners; Grand Prince Gong (Yi Xin) was also removed from his post of head of the State Council, which he had held for many years.[9] The direction of Vietnamese affairs was placed in the hands of Chen Yuying, an advocate of resistance. An imperial edict of April 30, 1884 ordered all senior officials (members of the State Council, ministers, members of the Imperial Secretariat, viceroys, governors, censors, and others) to state their attitude to the war. Most repeated that they favoured a continuation of the war and strongly censured Li Hongzhang, who in fact directed Qing foreign policy, for pursuing a conciliatory line.[10]

On the other hand, on April 28, 1884 Zeng Jize, a diplomat who consistently championed China's national interests, was recalled from his post of envoy to Britain, France, and some other European countries. But on May 3-7, despite the opinion of most officials, the court gave its sanction to Li Hongzhang to hold talks and sign an agreement with Fournier. The Li-Fournier talks revealed that the government was totally impotent. Formally, the government's instructions to Li Hongzhang were consistent with China's interests.[11] These were: to uphold China's suzerainty relative to Vietnam; deny Yunnan Province to European trade; champion the army of Black Flags.

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[7] Ibid., p. 2.

[8] "This was the only instance in its history when the Grand Council was dismissed en masse" (Li Ung Bing, *Outlines of Chinese History*. Edited by Professor Joseph Whiteside, Shanghai, The Commercial Press Ltd., 1914, p. 569.

[9] The French historian H. Cordièr sees this act as a triumph of the war party over the proponents of a peaceful settlement of the Franco-Chinese conflict, writing: "This was a new challenge to foreigners" (*Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, Paris,* 1902, p. 426).

[10] *Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled*, Chapter 14, p. 3.

However, Li Hongzhang signed an armistice convention with the French on a totally different political basis: China pledged to withdraw its garrisons from Tonkin without delay, abide by all existing and future treaties between France and Vietnam, and permit free trade with France along the entire frontier of North Vietnam on terms to be defined by a special trade treaty.[12] Although for form's sake the Qing government expressed its dissatisfaction with this agreement, it protected Li Hongzhang from attack by advocates of resistance.[13] The Li-Fournier convention was an indication that the Cixi government had capitulated, left Vietnam to the mercies of fate, and in fact agreed to South China becoming a French sphere of influence.

On June 23, 1884, before the Li-Fournier convention was ratified, French troops and a Chinese garrison, which had not yet received the armistice and withdrawal order, clashed at the village of Baklie near Langsong. The Chinese commander said he had to wait for instructions from the capital, but the French commander demanded the immediate fulfilment of the convention and the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Baklie. In reply to the Chinese refusal, the French troops opened fire. The Baklie incident torpedoed the armistice.

The signing of the Li-Fournier convention and the attack by French troops on the Chinese garrison at Baklie precipitated a wave of indignation throughout the country. The Baklie incident was the cause of another round of fierce struggle between the court groups and another series of attacks on Li Hongzhang. The court began receiving reports from provincial authorities, censors, local officials, representatives of court circles, and others condemning Li Hongzhang's actions and demanding his removal from the direction of foreign affairs.[14] Under public pressure the Qing government acceded to these demands and (in July 1884) temporarily removed Li Hongzhang from participation in the new negotiations with France. In September 1884 the struggle between the groups in the ruling circles led the Qing government to change the composition of the Zongliyamen once more; it dismissed six pro-foreign members.

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[11] *Historical Materials of the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* p. 14.

[12] *Documents diplomatiques française,* Vol. 15, Document 263, Paris, 1929, pp. 280-81.

[13] *Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* Chapter 14, pp. 12, 19; Chapter 15, p. 30.

The incident at Baklie was a turning-point in the war. It marked the beginning of French military operations against China itself. Accusing China of deliberate provocation, the French government demanded an indemnity of 250 million francs and to guarantee the receipt of this indemnity made an attempt to seize the port of Jilong (Kelung) on Taiwan on August 5, 1884. After this a French naval squadron bombarded the town of Fuzhou (August 23, 1884). In this battle, which lasted four days, the Fujian fleet was sunk and the forts and arsenal of Fuzhou were destroyed.

The French bandit attack on the territory of China proper set off another wave of actions by the Chinese people against foreigners and missionaries. Incident followed incident in Guangdong, Fujian, Zhenjiang, and other provinces. In an official letter to the Zongliyamen, the British minister Sir Harry Parkes wrote that from a report from the British consul at Wenzhou (Guangdong Province) it had become known that the local population had in one night damaged or burned down six Christian churches and destroyed all foreign-owned goods in the customs godowns.

With most of Chinese society inspired by patriotism and with the advocates of resistance exerting pressure, the Qing government had to make a formal declaration of war on France, issuing on August 26, 1884 an imperial edict, which ended with the words: "Public indignation is so great that there is every possibility for repulsing the enemy."[15]

This formal declaration of war by China further fueled patriotic feeling and anti-foreign sentiments. For example, on September 19, 1884 the population in Chaozhou County, Guangdong Province, drove out the Catholic missionaries and wrecked their houses. Chinese soldiers joined in the anti-foreign actions of the people.[16] There were similar incidents in other counties. Proclamations were distributed everywhere, saying that the people of Guangdong wanted to see on their land neither Frenchmen, nor their officials and merchants, nor their wealth and goods.[17]

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[14] Ibid., Chapter 8, pp. 43-44; Chapter 15, pp. 5, 38; Chapter 16, pp. 28, 30; Chapter 21, p. 8.

[15] To the very end France made no declaration of war. It regarded the war with China as no more than a "punitive" operation.

A strike in which all sections of the city's population participated was staged in Hong Kong (Xianggang) in the autumn of 1884. The strikers refused to repair French ships and to serve Frenchmen. The British authorities had difficulty suppressing this strike. One of the eyewitnesses was Sun Yat-sen, who was studying in Hong Kong at the time. He was angered and outraged by the Qings' defeatist policy. Precisely this was when Sun Yat-sen decided to dedicate himself to the overthrow of the Manzhou dynasty and institute a republic.[18] Patriotic feeling spread also among overseas Chinese, who organised a collection of donations for the war effort.[19]

The powerful tide of patriotism sweeping across all sections of society and the mounting scale of the people's actions against the invaders were making the Qing government apprehensive. What it increasingly feared was the liberative nature of the war. It saw that instead of abating the people's liberation struggle ran ever higher with every victory won by the Chinese army. To quote the British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, the Qing government feared that "if the French began fighting, ... the collapse of the Dynasty and of the Empire itself would in that case not be an impossibility."[20] While continuing to send reinforcements to North Vietnam and issue formal edicts on organising resistance to the enemy, Cixi and her entourage began secret probes for ways of ending the war. They were afraid to entrust the settlement of this question to Li

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[16] *Zhongfa zhanzheng* (The Franco-Chinese War. A Collection of Documents), Vol. 5, Shanghai, 1955, pp. 34-36.

[17] See Ibid., p. 27.

[18] S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The Reform Movement in China and Kang Youwei.* Moscow, 1959, p. 69 (in Russian).

[19] *Diguo zhuyi qin hua shi* (A History of Imperialist Aggression in China), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1958, p. 246.

[20] E. V. G. Kiernan, *British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885,* Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 97.

Hongzhang, who had discredited himself in the eyes of Chinese society, or to any other Chinese official, fearing further mass actions. They resorted to mediation by Sir Robert Hart, the British inspector-general of the Chinese marine customs, and also James Duncan Campbell, the commissioner and special secretary to the inspector-general of the Chinese marine customs.

In January 1884 Hart drew up the terms for the talks with France, and these were taken by Campbell to Paris to the French government. On March 1, 1884 the Qing government authorised Hart and Campbell to conduct negotiations with France.

Hart was entrusted to talk to members of the Zongliyamen and enlist their support for the government's capitulatory line. The victories of the Chinese forces over the French in the Red River delta in March 1885 could no longer influence the backstage talks that Campbell was having with the French government. They only forced the Manzhous to hasten the conclusion of an armistice, which was signed in Paris by Campbell on April 6, 1885 on behalf of China. Soon afterwards, on June 9, 1885, an unequal treaty was signed in Tianjin, under which China recognised the French protectorate over North Vietnam, withdrew its troops, and in fact acknowledged that South China was the exclusive sphere of French influence. France obtained sole rights to build railways in China.

Thus ended the betrayal of China's national interests by the Manzhou government. The capitulation of the Qings was all the more disgraceful because it was consummated behind the backs of the Chinese people, outside China, with the help of foreigners, at the height of a victorious counter-offensive by troops under Chen Yuying and Feng Zicai on the Tonkin front. It evoked angry protests from the proponents of resistance and from most of the army.

China's defeat in the war exposed the Qing government's policy as anti-popular and capitulatory and showed the rottenness of the Manzhou empire's social and state system. The overall economic, political, and military weakness of Qing China, vividly demonstrated in this war, was the outcome of the long predomination of obsolete feudal relations that were hindering the development of national capitalism.

The course of the war was affected by the apartness of the economic life of different regions, the weak links among

China's provinces, the lack of railways, and the undeveloped state of internal communication. A result of the absence of telegraph communication between the provinces and the capital was that orders from Beijing were delivered by messenger and took 50 or more days to reach their destination. The absence of modern communication was one of the reasons for the Baklie incident. To a large extent this was also the reason for the disconnected actions of the Chinese armies on the Tonkin front, the indecision of their commanders, and the frequent premature retreats of the Chinese troops. Often the Yunnan and Guangxi armies knew nothing of each other for months.[21] The suggestion made by Zhang Shusheng, the imperial viceroy of Guangxi and Guangdong provinces, that a telegraph line be built from Guangzhou to Longzhou (a frontier town in Guangdong Province) in order to have the possibility of sending telegrams to North Vietnam met with no response from the Qing government.

Because there were no railways the Qing government was unable to move troops, ammunition, and food quickly from north to south. That was why the armies of only southern provinces fought in the war. Because of the shortage of trained troops, hastily formed and poorly trained units were sent to the front.[22] Supplies of equipment and food for the troops came at long intervals. Chen Yuying, commander of the Yunnan army, reported that the "troops were experiencing considerable hardships and getting their pay irregularly".[23] A similar report was made by Pang Dingxing, commander of the Guangxi army.[24] This irregularity of supplies and pay caused unrest and mutinies among the troops.[25] The quantity of rice shipped by sea from south to north fell drastically during the sea blockade imposed on China by Admiral Amedee Courbet. The overland route was encumbered by inland customs posts. As a result, a food shortage developed in the northern cities.[26] The economic difficulties were particularly formidable in the provinces directly threatened by the enemy. The French seizure of Mawei (Fort Fuzhou) sparked unrest and panic among the people in Fujian and the gold exchange rate rose steeply: one liang of gold fetched 48 liangs of silver.[27]

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[21] *Zhongfa zhanzheng,* Vol. 1, Shanghai, 1955, p. 11.

[22] See Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] See Ibid., p. 12.

[25] *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Documents diplomatiques. Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin, 1884-1885,* Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, M DCCC LXXXV, Document 116, pp. 130-31.

[26] Ibid., Document 177, p. 197.

The material and fiscal difficulties experienced by the government were seen from the loans urgently negotiated by the Qings during the war with France. In the period from September 1883 to February 1885 China received seven loans through the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank for military expenditures, notably for the defence of Guangdong, Fujian, and other provinces, to the amount of 126 million liangs.[28]

China's economic weakness was aggravated by internal political factors, chiefly, the helplessness of the central government apparatus to bridle the separatist ambitions of the provincial feudal-bureaucratic cliques. The government knew of the situation in the provinces only from the embellished and untrustworthy reports of the provincial authorities and the censors. Senior officials of the central apparatus (Wu Dacheng, Cheng Bocheng, Zhang Peilong as government commissioners respectively for the Beian, Nanyang, and Fujian fleets,[29] Peng Yulin as the government commissioner for the defence of Guangdong, and others) were sent to reinforce control of the southern provinces and buttress the local authorities. But even these steps proved to be ineffective. The new appointments were, in many cases, merely formal and ill-advised—no account was taken of the knowledge and ability of those who were sent to the localities. For instance, upon his appointment to the post of government commissioner for the Fujian fleet Zhang Peilong informed the government that he knew nothing of naval affairs and requested to be relieved of this post.[30] He was nevertheless appointed. He had to rely entirely on the local incompetent and cowardly command. He could not control the organisation of the Fuzhou Fort's defences and the training of the Fujian fleet. This led to the destruction of the fleet on August 23-27, 1884. In order to change the development of hostilities in their favour the Qings, as we have seen, tried reinforcing the central apparatus by repeatedly replacing senior officials. But this brought no visible results. Corruption, red-tape, careerism, intrigues, and incompetence were eroding the Qing central apparatus like rust.

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[27] *Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* Chapter 22, p. 3.

[28] Xu Yisheng, "Jia-wu zhongzhi Qian Qing zhengfu di waizhai (Foreign Loans to the Qing Government Before the Japanese-Chinese War)", *Jingji yanjiu,* 1956, No. 5, pp. 112-224.

[29] Fan Wenlan, *China's New History,* Vol. 1, *1840-1901,* Moscow, 1955, pp. 344-45 (Russian translation).

[30] *Zhongfa zhanzheng,* Vol. 1, p. 17.

China's military weakness was the natural outcome of its economic and political weakness. Its land forces consisted of Manzhou bannermen and Chinese provincial troops. Most of the Manzhou army was inefficient: it was good only for parades and the protection of the imperial palace. The provincial armies, maintained on the meagre funds of the provinces, were armed with obsolete weapons and trained in the old fashion. Captain Norman, a staff officer with Bengali troops, who witnessed the events, wrote of the tactics of the Chinese army in Vietnam, that in conventional fighting the Chinese army was inferior to its European enemy, and could only succeed in irregular fighting. But while the Chinese soldiers could not give regular battle, they were able to wear down the enemy with the means at their disposal, denying him rest by night attacks and weakening him by letting him attack fortified towns in vain.[31] This tactic helped the Chinese troops in mountainous regions. But in the Red River delta it and the poor armaments caused the Chinese troops to suffer huge losses.[32] There were many incompetent generals in the Chinese army, and embezzlement was rife. As a result, a small French expeditionary corps (15,000-20,000 troops) could face a numerically larger Chinese force (50,000-60,000 troops).

At the outbreak of the war China had some units trained and armed in the European fashion; some European-type weapons were produced.[33] But the troops took their orders from cliques of warlords, the largest of which were the Anhui, or Huai, headed by the Zhili viceroy Li Hongzhang, and the Hunan, headed by Zuo Zongtang after the death of Zeng Guofan. These cliques had, in addition, a European-equipped fleet. However, neither the army nor the fleet of these cliques were committed in the war with France. During the war each of the feudal groups sought to utilise the armed forces in its own mercenary interests. Troops were needed by the groups of warlords to maintain the latter's power in the provinces and bring pressure to bear on the Qing government.

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[31] C. B. Norman, *Le Tonkin ou la France dans l'Extrême Orient,* Paris, 1884, pp. 262-63.

[32] In the fighting at Nui-Bop the French casualties were 19 killed and 65 wounded; the Chinese lost 600 in killed and a large number in wounded. At Pandou the French losses were 19 killed and 90 wounded, the Chinese losses were 3,000 killed. *Documents diplomatiques. Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin,* Documents 112, 115, 161.

[33] *A Collection of Geographical, Topographical, and Statistical Data on Asia,* Issue XXII, St. Petersburg, p. 135 (in Russian);

All these factors contributed to China's defeat in the war.

The Franco-Chinese war was another step towards turning China into a semi-colony of the imperialist powers.

The policy pursued by the Qing government in this war was further evidence that in order to preserve their regime the Manzhous were prepared to sacrifice the national interests of the Chinese people. All sections of Chinese society saw the anti-popular character of Qing foreign policy, and the rottenness and helplessness of the senile dynasty. All this gave an impetus to the emergence of a reformist and bourgeois-democratic movement in the country.

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*Historical Materials on the Franco-Chinese Conflict When Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty Ruled,* Chapter 4, pp. 3, 24, 116; Chapter 20, p. 10; C. B. Norman, op. cit., p. 261; *Documents diplomatiques. Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin,* Documents 115, 116, 147.

*L. N. BOROKH*

# ANTI-MANZHOU IDEAS OF THE FIRST CHINESE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTIONARIES

## (Lu Haodong Confession)

An anti-government action was planned in Guangzhou by the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui), an organisation of Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries. Several scores of armed people conspired to change the existing order and carry out their political programme at one stroke, with the help of mercenaries. This was a programme to drive out the Manzhous, restore China's prestige as a nation, and form a democratic government.[1] The conspiracy was uncovered, the Qing police came upon the trail of the organisation, smashed its headquarters, secret meeting-places, and storehouses, where it kept its weapons and documents, and arrested 70 persons, including one of the society's leaders, Lu Haodong.[2]

When he was interrogated Lu Haodong did not deny his convictions but flatly refused to reply to any questions concerning his associates. He asked for paper and a brush and wrote the following: "My surname is Lu, my name is Zhonggui, and my nickname is Haodong. I was born in the village of Cuiheng, Xiangshan County. I am 29 years old. I lived in foreign parts, and only now returned to Guangzhou. Like my fellow townsman Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen.—*L. B.*) I am outraged by the decay and despotism of the alien government, the greed and cowardliness of officials, and the intrigues and espionage by foreigners. I grieve over the ruin of China. Every time I think of it my eyes fill with tears as though pricked by blackthorn. I do not know where so much tears come from. For many years I lived in Shanghai, and could make nothing of the hustle and bustle. But then I returned to Guangzhou from Shanghai and luckily met Mr. Sun and visited him at his home. After long separation we, lying side by side, recalled the past, speaking our hearts out the whole night long. I wanted the foreign danger, that threatens day after day, to be our target. Sun regarded the Manzhou enemies as the main inescapable target of vengeance. In this lay the significance of our thoughts and quests. Thus, continuing our argument day after day we agreed on the main purpose. In this way the beginning was laid for Mr. Sun and me to start advocating the expulsion of the Manzhous. For the yellow souls must be awakened in order to restore the Chinese nation. Alas, corrupt officials, depraved *shenshi*, immoral scholars . . . eargerly serve the enemy. While they do not declare that the dynasty is profoundly virtuous and generous with good deeds, they tell us that we live on its land and eat its food. It is common knowledge that the Manzhou dynasty of Qing, the bandit spawn from Jianzhou, established itself in China, seized our lands, killed our ancestors, took our children, and the gems and silks of our wives. Ponder, who lives on whose land, and who eats whose fruits? The ten days of Yangzhou, the three massacres in Jiaqing, the invasion of two *wangs* in Guangdong—history contains innumerable instances of the killing of our countrymen. We know and remember this. Can all this be called virtuous? It must be understood that today, without exterminating the Manzhou Qings, the Han nation can under no circumstances be restored. Without destroying the Chinese traitors, the Manzhous cannot be exterminated. We passionately wanted to kill at least a few of the grovelling officials as the first blow struck by my countrymen. Although we failed, my mind is now at peace. I can be killed, but it is not possible to kill all who will rise after me. Gong Yang wrote that when a murder is committed, the wrong must be remembered through nine generations.[3] My words will come true, the aliens will be punished. I have finished. Please hasten by execution."[4]

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[1] Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi* (An Unofficial History of the Revolution), Shanghai, Vols. 1-4, 1945-1947, Vol. 2, p. 23.

[2] Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 12-13.

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[3] Gong Yang or Gong Yanggao, author of an ancient Chinese literary work *Gong Yang zhuang*. Here Lu Haodong recalls an episode from this work: before marching against one of his neighbours, the ruler of the principality of Qi asked a soothsayer whether it was right to avenge a murder committed nine generations previously. The soothsayer replied that vengeance had to be taken even if a hundred generations had passed.

In literature the testimony of Lu Haodong is known as the *Confession.*[5] In 1895 it was published in a Hong Kong journal.[6] In 1939 it was included by Zou Lu in the official history of the Kuomintang.[7] Modern Chinese historians, who compiled the multi-volume *Xinhai Revolution*, used the section on the Guangzhou rising from Zou Lu's *Essays on the History of the Kuomintang* and the testimony of Lu Haodong was thus included in the eight-volume work not as an independent document but as part of the work of Zou Lu.[8]

This source, dated 1895,[9] has hardly been used by historians researching the early revolutionary movement in China. Since to this day an academic debate continues about the sources of revolutionary ideas, the programme of the first Chinese revolutionaries and their understanding of the tasks confronting them, the evidence of Lu Haodong, one of the organisers of the Revive China Society, about the formation of his outlook should not be left without attention.

In their latest works, Soviet and foreign historians have made an attempt to shed the view, established under the impact of Kuomintang literature, that in the revolutionary movement there was only one outstanding personality, namely Sun Yat-sen. The question of the place of other leaders of the Revive China Society—Yang Quyun, Lu Haodong, and You Lie—was raised by V. N. Nikiforov in connection with a critique of one of the major sources of the history of the early period of the bourgeois-revolutionary movement, the reminiscences of Chen Shaobo.[10] Hsueh Chun-tu, an American researcher, wrote a special article devoted to the role played by Yang Quyun.[11] We feel that a study of the testimony of Lu Haodong will also help to broaden our view of the people who were the first to join in a revolutionary movement in China.

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[4] *Xinhai geming* (The Xinhai Revolution), Vol. 1, Shanghai, 1957, p. 229.

[5] Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen. His Life and Its Meaning. A Critical Biography,* The John Day Company, New York, 1934, p. 40.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Zou Lu, *Zhongguo guomindang shigao* (Essays on the History of the Chinese Kuomintang), Vol. 1, Chongqing, 1944.

[8] *The Xinhai Revolution,* p. 229. The text of the latest edition was used in this essay.

[9] Very few sources on the history of the revolutionary movement written in those years are extant: the *Declaration of the Revive China Society* and the early works of Sun Yat-sen. Historians are, as a rule, forced to base their writings on reminiscences written by the movement's participants 30-40 years after the events described by them.

From Lu Haodong's testimony we get only very scanty biographical information—the place and time of his birth (a native of Guangdong, he was born in 1866). We learn that for a long time he lived in Shanghai ("foreign parts"), and spent his last years in Guangzhou. Indirect sources and literature help to shed more light on his biography. Lu Haodong's father moved to Shanghai, where he opened a business. Lu finished an English school in Shanghai, and then worked in a British telegraph company.[12] Lu Haodong himself calls these years barren, for he "could make nothing of the hustle and bustle". He went to live in Guangzhou in 1886, and there he entered the Boji Medical School.

The life-story of Lu Haodong closely intertwines with the life-story of Sun Yat-sen, who was his own age and came from the same province. Upon returning from Hawaii in 1883 Sun Yat-sen met Lu, who had just then brought his father's body home for burial from Shanghai. Sun Yat-sen's biographers agree that from the first this was a meeting of kindred spirits. They shared the same view about the situation in the backward Chinese countryside. They reacted with similar intensity to each contact with the ignorance and superstition of the people. Both took a keen interest in the Taiping rebellion. Both were attracted to Christianity. In the *Confession* Lu Haodong writes of his meeting with Sun Yat-sen in 1886, which was destined to become the turning-point of his life. Like Sun Yat-sen, Lu became a medical student, a pupil of Dr. Kerr. Evidently, he began to study medicine under the influence of Sun Yat-sen. They shared rooms for some time. For the future members of the Revive China Society, the years of study were, according to Sun Yat-sen, a "period of revolutionary discussions". The group took shape during these years. They were Sun Yat-sen, Lu Haodong, Zheng Shiliang, Chen Shaobo, and You Lie, who subsequently were the core of the organisation. There is information to indicate that Lu Haodong was one of the most authoritative members of this group. In particular, the initiative in forming of a revolutionary party in Guangzhou in 1893 and in appointing Sun Yat-sen as the party's leader is attributed to him.[13] Lu Haodong took part in one of the most important events on the eve of the founding of the Revive China Society: he accompanied Sun Yat-sen to the north with a message to Li Hongzhang. Together with Sun Yat-sen, he toured Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and the Yangzi valley.[14]

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[10] V. N. Nikiforov, "The Shortcomings of One Historical Source. . .", *Problems of the History of the National Liberation Movement in Asian Countries,* Leningrad State University, 1963, pp. 76-92 (in Russian).

[11] Hsueh Chun-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yun and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China", *The Journal of Asian Studies,* N. Y., Vol. XIX, No. 3, May 1960, pp. 307-18.

[12] Lyon Sharman, op. cit., p. 17.

In the period the Revive China Society was formed, Lu Haodong helped to set up a branch in Guangzhou.[15] During the preparations for action in 1895 he was appointed an assistant to Sun Yat-sen, who was responsible for the military preparations of the rising, and helped to plan the operation in Guangzhou.[16] On the day of the action Lu was in one of the command posts and did not leave it when he learned that the conspiracy had failed. Lu Haodong designed the banner under which the insurgents were to fight: a white sun in a blue sky.[17]

After the failure of the conspiracy the Lu affair got wide publicity. Petitions for his release were sent to the Manzhou authorities. According to Lyon Sharman, there was a religious motivation for Chinese society's reaction to the arrest of Lu Haodong: he was a Christian student.[18] He refused to request a pardon and was executed. Subsequently Sun Yat-sen wrote that he was "one of the finest militants of our party", "one of the first to sacrifice his life for revolution and the republic".[19] Facts from Lu Haodong's biography and extant reminiscences of contemporaries indicate that on the eve of and during the formation of the Revive China Society he was one of the most outstanding personalities among the first Chinese revolutionaries.

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[13] Heinrich Herrfahrdt, *Sun Yatsen. Der Vater des neuen China,* Hamburg, 1948, pp. 24-25. Quoted from V. N. Nikiforov, *The Shortcomings of One Historical Source,* p. 88.

[14] *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 1, pp. 27-28.

[15] Feng Ziyou, *An Unofficial History of the Revolution,* Vol. 4, p. 9.

[16] Sun Yat-sen, "Programme for Building the Country", *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 259 (Russian translation).

[17] Feng Ziyou, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 17.

[18] Lyon Sharman, op. cit., p. 40. While we consider this explanation correct, we cannot agree with Lyon Sharman's repeated contention that Sun Yat-sen and Lu Haodong were brought together mainly by their attraction for Christianity. There is no religious overtone in the *Confession.*

There are passages in Lu Haodong's *Confession* that give a fuller picture of the development of revolutionary ideas, and in some instances, in particular, the question of the attitude to imperialist powers, to get a new angle on the views of the organisers of the Revive China Society.

One of the questions in dispute in the history of the revolutionary movement in China is that of the beginning of that movement. Historians usually quote the following pronouncement by Sun Yat-sen from his *Programme for Building the Country:* "From 1885, that is, from the time of our defeat in the war with France, it was my purpose to secure the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the assertion of the Chinese Republic on its ruins."[20] This pronouncement underlies all Kuomintang literature declaring that ever since the Franco-Chinese war Sun Yat-sen was set in his revolutionary convictions and republican views. What Lu Haodong writes of the formation of his convictions has much in common with Sun Yat-sen's recollections but does not coincide with them. From the Lu testimony it follows that Sun Yat-sen had anti-Manzhou sentiments as early as 1886, that already then he spoke of the Manzhous as the "inescapable target of vengeance". But Lu Haodong said also that from the moment of their meeting in Guangzhou (in 1886) it took time and innumerable arguments before they decided on fighting the Manzhous. Unlike Sun Yat-sen Lu Haodong gives a later date. He links the beginning of his revolutionary work and the work of Sun Yat-sen not with the Franco-Chinese war but with a later period, when they finally decided that it was necessary to fight the Qing monarchy.

Lu Haodong wrote: "Thus, continuing our argument day after day we agreed on the main purpose. In this way the beginning was laid for Mr. Sun and me to start advocating the expulsion of the Manzhous."[21] The Lu *Confession* thereby allows us to interpret Sun Yat-sen's reference to the Franco-Chinese war as to a development that gave the impulse for his ideological growth.

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[19] Sun Yat-sen, op. cit., p. 259.

[20] Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Zhongshan xuanji,* Vol. 1, Beijing, 1956, p. 168.

Its most interesting portion is where Lu Haodong writes of the character of the debates among the society's organisers, in the course of which the programme was shaped. To some extent the *Confession* helps to clarify the widely known concept of "revolutionary discussions", which Sun Yat-sen characterises as the initial period of the development of the revolutionary movement.

"I wanted," wrote Lu Haodong of how he initially saw the way of saving China, "the foreign danger, that threatens day after day, to be our target. Sun regarded the Manzhou enemies as the ... target of vengeance."[22] The *Confession* is the only evidence that the first Chinese revolutionaries, notably Lu Haodong and Sun Yat-sen, debated the question of what to begin with long before their organisation was formed. One of the central issues of the debate was whether to act against foreign domination or to direct the blow at Manzhou rule in China. "In this lay the significance of our thoughts and quests," Lu Haodong wrote.[23] His opinion that all efforts should be focussed on repulsing foreign aggression is one more argument reaffirming that the first Chinese revolutionaries very soon began to be aware of the foreign threat, that the revolutionary movement in China, to which a powerful spur was given by the defeat in the Franco-Chinese war, was a profoundly patriotic movement from the outset. Patriotic sentiments also united another group of young Chinese in Hong Kong, which later merged with the Revive China Society. Setting up the *Furen wen she* (Literary Society for the Restoration of Humaneness) in 1890, they chose as their motto the Latin dictum "Ducit amor patriale".[24] When we study the foreign policy views of the first Chinese revolutionaries at the birth of their movement, the question arises only of the extent of their understanding of how great the imperialist threat was, of the formulation of anti-imperialist demands, and not of whether they saw the threat of aggression or not.

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[21] *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 1, p. 229.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Hsueh Chun-tu, op. cit., pp. 307-08.

In his *Confession* Lu Haodong speaks of the intrigues and spying by foreigners, and assesses the policy of the Western powers as leading China to destruction. This is an aspect that the *Confession* has in common with the *Declaration of the Revive China Society,* which speaks eloquently of the insults being heaped on China, of the steadily mounting threat of foreign aggression.[25] But foreign policy demands are not spelt out clearly either in Lu's *Confession* or in the *Declaration.*

Lu Haodong's suggestion that the foreign danger should be "our target" was not accepted. Sun Yat-sen persuaded him that the immediate task was to fight the ruling Manzhou dynasty. The expulsion of the Manzhous—the first point of the political programme of the revolutionaries—holds the central place in the *Confession.* This document allows us partially to reconstruct the attitude of the revolutionaries to Manzhou rule. Their disaffection was evoked by the despotic administration of the alien Manzhous, the corruption and incompetence of the government officials, and the foreign policy of capitulation. In their quests for the reasons for foreign policy catastrophes and internal calamities, the revolutionaries inevitably encountered the fact that China was ruled by an alien dynasty, the "bandit spawn from Jianzhou", as Lu Haodong calls it. Under conditions of undeveloped capitalism Sun Yat-sen and his supporters did not always clearly see their class interests and therefore accentuated this aspect of the country's socio-political life, attributing all the vices of Chinese society to visible phenomena. This had its historical tradition—almost all the peasant risings during the reign of the Qing dynasty were directed not only against feudal landowners generally but chiefly against the Manzhous. Secret societies (*huidang*), with which, to use Sun Yat-sen's words, "China was teeming",[26] acted under the slogan of "Down with the Qing, Restore the Ming". Before action was taken by revolutionaries, the spontaneous peasant movement had already given its explanation of the causes of the calamities in China: all were attributed to the alien Manzhous. The Chinese revolutionaries were unquestionably attracted by the popularity of the traditional anti-Manzhou slogan; they adopted its first part in its entirety, but from the beginning dropped the monarchist ending. In the programme of the Revive China Society the slogan "Down with the Qing" underwent some modification and got a new ring side by side with the words "restoration of the nation's prestige" and "creation of a democratic government". The revolutionaries planned not only to overthrow the dynasty by force. For them (as distinct from the peasant secret societies) the expulsion of the Manzhous was only the starting point for more dramatic political, social, and economic changes. The terse pledge of the Revive China Society to restore the nation's prestige was interpreted by its members as a wide-ranging programme of the country's economic reconstruction on the European (i.e., capitalist) pattern. The society's members believed that without removing the Qing dynasty it would be impossible to put economic changes into effect. The key political point of the programme, the "creation of a democratic government", was likewise based on this renunciation of the alien dynasty.

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[25] Sun Yat-sen, "Declaration of the Revive China Society", *Selected Works*, p. 87.

[26] "Incredible Tales. The Story of the Chinese Dr. Sun Yat-sen About His Abduction and Detention in London. From the Translator", *Russkoye bogatstvo,* 1897, No. 12, pp. 29-30.

The anti-Manzhou element of the programme of the first Chinese revolutionaries was not independent; it was tangibly linked to demands for the economic and political reshaping of the Chinese society. Nevertheless, the anti-Manzhou problem is significant in the history of the birth of revolutionary ideas and for any study of how social phenomena were refracted in the consciousness of the bourgeois intelligentsia at the close of the nineteenth century. For the Chinese revolutionaries the struggle against the alien Manzhou dynasty was the point from which they began their ideological development and then moved on to an anti-imperialist struggle.

In his reflections about the ruling Qing dynasty Lu Haodong turned to the history of the Manzhou invasion: "It is common knowledge that the Manzhou dynasty of Qing, the bandit spawn from Jianzhou, established itself in China, seized our lands, killed our ancestors, took our children, and the gems and silks of our wives."[27] The convulsions experienced by the country in the seventeenth century, when tens of millions of people lost their lives, were so ghastly that they were recorded in many of the writings of those times. Demonstrating a superb knowledge of the history of the Manzhou invasion of China, Lu Haodong wrote of the atrocities committed by the invaders in South China: the seizure of Yangzhou,[28] the massacres in Jiaqing,[29] the Manzhou invasion of Guangdong. The sources of this knowledge were evidently the anti-Manzhou writings of the seventeenth century relating the invasion: *Ten Days in Yangzhou* by Wang Xiuchu and *A Short Description of the Massacres in Jiaqing* by Zhu Zhisuo. Because of the revolutionising impact of these anti-Manzhou works, the members of the Revive China Society used them widely in their propaganda. It is known, for example, that soon after Lu Haodong was executed the *Ten Days in Yangzhou* was issued in a special edition in a printshop run by one of the society's members, Feng Jingzhu, in Yokohama. The supplement to this book was a letter by a Chinese patriot, the head of the Ming government's War Department Shi Kefa, who defended Yangzhou.[30]

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[27] *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 1, p. 229.

Lu Haodong was strongly influenced by his knowledge of the history of the Manzhou invasion. In the *Confession* he denounces this invasion. "Can all this be called virtuous?" he asks, listing the calamities that afflicted China after Manzhou rule was established.

This look into the past allowed Lu Haodong to draw the conclusion that having been installed by means of robbery and violence, the Qing dynasty could not be "virtuous and generous with good deeds", that it was shameful to forget the country's disgrace and serve the dynasty. He called upon his countrymen to fight those who served the Qings, regardless of their status in society: "Alas, corrupt officials, depraved *shenshi,* immoral scholars, having lost their sense of shame and having forgotten the disgrace, eagerly serve the enemy." "We passionately wanted to kill at least a few of the grovelling officials."[31] This switch from vengeance against Manzhous to a call for a struggle against the existing order is very symbolic of the ideology of the Chinese revolutionaries and in the testimony of Lu it is seen very distinctly. For them the rule of the alien monarchy was only the foundation justifying their struggle. In their views, the anti-Manzhou slogan was the basis, the position from which they moved to the most revolutionary point of their political programme: the overthrow of the ruling dynasty.

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[28] Commanded by Shi Kefa, head of the Ming government's War Department, the garrison of Yangzhou resisted desperately. Upon seizing Yangzhou, the Manzhous razed the city and massacred the entire population. The number of killed, only according to data of the registration of cremated bodies service, exceeded 800,000.

[29] The population of Jiaqing resisted the enemy for more than two months. After the city fell, the Manzhous perpetrated two horrible massacres, killing nearly 20,000 people.

[30] Subsequently, too, the Chinese revolutionaries attached much importance to seventeenth-century anti-Manzhou writings. In 1907, in a special issue of *Min bao*, under the heading of *Tian tao* (Punishment of Heaven), members of the United League, a new and larger organisation of Chinese revolutionaries, addressed the history of the invasion with reference to *Ten Days in Yangzhou* and *A Short Description of the Massacres in Jiaqing*.—*Min bao,* Beijing, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 58.

But anti-Manzhou feeling was not a feature distinguishing revolutionaries from the bourgeois reformers of the close of the nineteenth century. For that reason the thesis, propounded by some present-day Chinese historians, that the attitude to the Manzhous was the starting point of the struggle between bourgeois revolutionaries and bourgeois reformers, that it was the watershed between revolution and counter-revolution,[32] does not define the essence of the disagreements between the two directions of the political activities of the then young bourgeoisie.

There was an explicit anti-Manzhou thrust in the Chinese reform movement as well. In a memorandum to Zai Tian (August 1898), Kang Youwei demanded the annulment of the privileges enjoyed by the Manzhous and the abolition of the inequality between Manzhous and Chinese. He insisted on returning to China its traditional name of Zhonghua. He dated his researches, letters, and memoranda not by the years of the reign of Qing emperors but from the year of the birth of Confucius, and this was one of the "crimes" with which he was later charged.

What distinguished the reformers from the revolutionaries was that they suggested a different solution of the problem of Manzhou rule: they wanted a non-violent settlement of the conflict between Manzhous and Chinese, the preservation of the Qing dynasty, the non-involvement of the masses in the political struggle, and a gradual erasure of the distinctions between Manzhous and Hans; the revolutionaries urged a resolute armed struggle and the overthrow of the Manzhou monarchy.

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[31] *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 1, p. 229.

[32] Liu Danian, *On Kangxi,* p. 13.

The programme of the reform movement was denounced by the Manzhou dignitaries. They charged Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao with undermining the power of the Manzhou élite. One of Cixi's advisers, Gang Yi, bluntly declared that reforms were useful to the Chinese but harmful for the Manzhous. [33]

In the reformers' camp the switch to bolder, particularly to anti-monarchic slogans was also linked to the development of anti-Manzhou ideas, to the recognition of the need to expel the Manzhous. This is strikingly exemplified by the political views of Tan Sitong, who proposed a programme for the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. [34]

This reference to Tan Sitong is not accidental. Lu Haodong was the first to be executed for the revolution in China, while Tan Sitong was the first who deliberately sacrificed himself for reform. [35] There is much in common between Lu's *Confession* and the sections in *Ren xue*, in which Tan Sitong states his attitude to the Manzhou problem, for both articulated the opposition feeling of the incipient class. This community of views was not the result of reciprocal influence. The two men did not know each other, but they thought in similar terms; their reflections had one and the same source.

Like Lu Haodong, Tan Sitong addressed the history of the Manzhou invasion, referring to the *Ten Days in Yangzhou* and *A Short Description of the Massacres in Jiaqing.*[36] Since Tan Sitong and Lu Haodong knew of the events of the seventeenth century from the same sources, there is much similarity in their description of the Manzhou invasion. They used the same expressions to give a picture of the invasion: "...took our children, and the gems and silks of our wives".[37] True, in a relatively long work Tan Sitong was able to state his view more exhaustively, to seek out new aspects in considering the consequences of the conquest. "Like thieves, hating their masters", he wrote of the policy of the Manzhous, "they have always spun intrigues to close our eyes and ears, to fetter our hands and feet, to cut short the sources of our wellbeing, to desecrate our life, to cloud our mind."[38]

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[33] S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The Reform Movement in China and Kang Youwei*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 209-22 (in Russian).

[34] Tan Sitong (1866-1899)—an outstanding member of the reform movement, head of the Hunan reformers, founder of the *Shi wu xue tang* reform school, editor of the local newspaper. During the "One hundred days" he was secretary of the Supreme Imperial Council. After Cixi's palace coup he refused to flee abroad, was arrested and executed. His views are enunciated in his many philosophical and publicistic works, the most important of which is *Ren xue* (Doctrine of Humaneness). Tan Sitong, *Tan Sitong quanji* (Complete Works), Beijing, 1954.

[35] See S. L. Tikhvinsky, "Tan Sitong—Leader of the Left Wing in the Reform Movement in China in 1898", *Sovetskoye kitayevedeniye*, 1958, No. 3, pp. 59-71.

Both Tan Sitong and Lu Haodong clearly saw the threat of foreign aggression. In Tan Sitong's discourses a direct link is traced between Manzhou rule and China's setbacks on the international scene: the alien Manzhous never valued Chinese territory because it was not their homeland.[39]

The greatest similarity in the thinking of Lu Haodong and Tan Sitong was in how they explained the need for changing the existing orders and substantiated the lawfulness of action against the Qing dynasty. Lu Hadong wrote: "...While they do not declare that the dynasty is profoundly virtuous and generous with good deeds, they tell us that we live on its land and eat its food."[40] In *Ren xue* Tan Sitong says the same: "They explain our fate to us: such is the lot of all who live on the land of the emperor and eat the fruits of this land."[41]

Both draw upon the same pronouncement from the *Zuozhuan*, namely, that there is no land that is not the emperor's and that he who eats the fruits of this land is the subject of the emperor.[42] The thesis that all the land in the

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[36] Tan Sitong, *Doctrine of Humaneness*, p. 59.

[37] *The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 1, p. 229: Tan Sitong, op. cit., p. 58.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., p. 59.

[40] *The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 1, p. 229.

[41] Tan Sitong, *Doctrine of Humaneness*, p. 59.

[42] James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, in five volumes. *The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p. 11.

Celestial Empire and the fruits grown on this land are the property of the emperor, that all who live on the land of the emperor are his subjects, and they use the fruits of this land by the grace of the emperor—was one of the dogmas of official Qing ideology. Precisely this dogma was questioned by both Lu Haodong and Tan Sitong. They questioned the legitimacy of applying this thesis to the China of their epoch, since the land was ruled by an alien dynasty. Their doubts were expressed in one and the same question: "Ponder, who lives on whose land, and who eats whose fruits?"[43] asked Lu Haodong. "Who lives on whose land, and who eats whose fruits?"[44] Tan Sitong repeated the same question in *Ren xue*. By refusing to recognise the Manzhou emperor as gracious and generous, they saw his rule as unlawful and held that their strivings, their economic and political demands were legitimate. A comparison of *Confession* with the *Ren xue* allows us to specify more exactly the place of anti-Manzhou ideas in the views of the Chinese intelligentsia at the close of the nineteenth century.

Lu Haodong's *Confession* is a short but lucid piece of writing that quite eloquently expresses the attitude of the Chinese revolutionaries to the Manzhou problem. The anti-Manzhou sentiments marked a turning point in their thinking. The Revive China Society began its activities with the slogan calling for the expulsion of the Manzhous. All the other points of the society's programme, notably, the reorganisation of the state and the demand for a democratic government (*hezhong zhengfu*), were made dependent on the fulfilment of that slogan. They saw this as the commencement of the revival of the Han nation, as opening up the ways to China's economic development.

The *Confession* was the first work, long before the Xinhai revolution, to clearly formulate the idea of nationalism. With the development of the revolutionary movement in China the principle of nationalism was formulated in many programme documents of the United League and interpreted in many of Sun Yat-sen's articles and speeches. Almost all aspects of the Manzhou problem dealt with by Lu Haodong recur in later documents of the Chinese revolutionaries. The question of the Manzhou invasion and the seizure of power by force, boldly raised in the *Confession*, runs through all of Sun Yat-sen's writings, in which he touches on the relations of the Manzhous and the Hans. In the foreword to *The History of the Wars of the Taiping State* Sun Yat-sen wrote: "The Manzhou Qing dynasty usurped power in China more than two centuries ago." [45] That the Manzhous seized power by force was put even more clearly in the *Declaration of the United League*. "Taking advantage of the unrest in China, they invaded it, destroyed our Chinese state, seized power, and compelled us, Hans, to become their slaves." [46] To substantiate the principles of nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, like Lu Haodong, cites the facts of history: "Our ancestors refused to submit to the Manzhous. Close your eyes and imagine the picture of the bitter battles, when rivers of blood flowed and the bodies of the fallen covered the fields, and you will realise that the conscience of our ancestors is clear." [47] As formulated by Sun Yat-sen at the turn of the century, the principle of nationalism differed substantially from the anti-Manzhou thesis of Lu Haodong. For instance, Lu Haodong very sharply raised the question of the extermination of the Han officials serving the Manzhous. Sun Yat-sen adopted a different approach. He does not urge their extermination, speaking of the traditional Manzhou policy of "subjugating Hans with the hands of Hans". [48] In the concluding part of the *Confession* Lu Haodong calls for the total extermination of the Manzhou enemies. The revolutionaries later renounced this idea. Sun Yat-sen stressed that the aim of the national revolution was not the destruction of the Manzhous as a nation. "We want to depose their government and revive our national state," [49] he wrote. After this comparison it becomes obvious that Lu Haodong's *Confession* is important not only for an understanding of the early period of the revolutionary movement in China but also for an understanding of how the principle of nationalism evolved.

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[43] *The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 1, p. 229.

[44] Tan Sitong, *Doctrine of Humaneness*, p. 59.

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[45] Sun Yat-sen, "Foreword to 'The History of the Wars of the Taiping State' ", *Selected Works*, p. 111.

[46] Sun Yat-sen, "Declaration of the United League", *Selected Works*, p. 114.

[47] Sun Yat-sen, "Three People's Principles and the Future of China", *Selected Works*, p. 122.

[48] Ibid., p. 111.

[49] Ibid., p. 122.

*A. S. KOSTYAEVA*

# THE "DOWN WITH THE QING" SLOGAN IN THE PINGXIANG UPRISING OF 1906

Throughout the period of the Manzhou dynasty's rule in China one of the most popular slogans of the people's movements was "Down with the Qing, Restore the Ming". This was quite natural because every intensification of exploitation, oppression, and tyranny was linked more often than not by the downtrodden and browbeaten peasantry to the fact that the country was ruled by the alien dynasty. This slogan was viable and popular largely because it was the traditional programme of the various secret societies that headed many of the popular risings.

However, it would be wrong to say that the aims of all the popular movements using this slogan were limited to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. In many cases "Down with the Qing" was a cover for more particular and specific reasons for mass action triggered mainly by feudal exploitation, although this was not always stated in any programme documents of the insurgents. And the very call "Down with the Qing" retained its effectiveness for 260 years because the Manzhou dynasty was the force that sustained the corrupt feudal system.

This essay is an attempt to analyse the programmatic and tactical guidelines of secret anti-Manzhou societies, the *huidang*, that headed the rising of 1906 in the counties of Pingxiang (Jiangxi Province) and Liling and Liuyang (Hunan Province). [1]

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[1] In historiography there are two assessments of the character of this movement. Sun Yat-sen and the other members of the United League saw the Pingxiang rising as one of the actions organised by revolutionaries shortly before 1911 (see Sun Yat-sen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 272 [Russian translation]). This

The armed uprising of the lower social strata in 1906, caused by feudal exploitation and oppression by the feudal-bureaucratic apparatus of power, took place under anti-Manzhou slogans.

The causes that aggravated social contradictions in the Qing empire throughout the first decade of the twentieth century were intensified exploitation of the people by the feudal-bureaucratic state machine (rise of taxes), the payment of huge indemnities and exhorbitant interest rates to the imperialist powers, and the decline of the living standard of the urban and rural population. This generated disaffection with the Qing regime as a whole. After 1901, in order to reinforce its tottering rule, the Qing government launched a "new policy".

The payment of the indemnity to the imperialist powers and the expenses on the "new policy" led to greater tax oppression, and this was the objective cause of the growth of the anti-Manzhou feeling among large sections of the population. Moreover, there were subjective factors—the anti-Qing agitation by revolutionary organisations and the activities of traditional secret societies, whose influence mounted during this period.[2] By virtue of tradition and also objective reasons there was massive support for anti-Manzhou slogans.

Apart from the conditions common to the whole of China, the crop failure of 1906[3], the cut in the wages of the

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view is accepted by Western and Chinese bourgeois literature on the history of the revolution generally and of the Kuomintang, in particular. Modern Chinese historians, for example, Li Shiyue, Yang Shiji, and Di Chen, see it as an action by secret societies under the political and ideological influence and leadership of the United League.

[2] This is noted in the documents of the time. For instance, on the rising in Pingxiang County the governor of Jiangxi wrote: "An inquiry conducted in the counties along the border of Hunan and Jiangxi established that recently there has been a rise in the price of rice, that life has grown harder, that this has caused unrest among the people, and disbanded soldiers and tramps are active everywhere." *Xinhai geming* (The Xinhai Revolution), Beijing, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 491.

[3] The provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Sichuan were the hardest hit. In Hunan, for instance, the price of one dan of rice rose from 3,000-4,000 to 6,000 wen at the close of 1906 (Li Shiyue, "The Rising of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers in the Counties of Pinxiang, Liling, and Liuyang in 1906", *Guangming ribao*, August 30, 1956).

Anyuan miners, the activation of local secret societies,[4] and the harassment by the authorities of the leaders of these societies, particularly the execution of Ma Fuyi, a prominent figure of the Gelaohui,[5] aggravated the social contradictions in the region affected by the rising.

The dissatisfaction of the masses and the activities of the secret societies inescapably erupted into an open action. A tense situation took shape in Hunan. Two members of the United League, which was headed by Sun Yat-sen, arrived in the province from Japan in 1906. They were Liu Daoyi and Cai Shaonan and they came with instructions from the League's Tokyo centre to establish close contacts with the secret societies, promote their political consciousness, and mobilise them for a rising against the Manzhous with the immediate aim of seizing the provincial capital. During this period the United League sought a mass base in secret societies, intending to make them the strike force of the imminent revolutionary actions.[6]

Contact by Cai Shaonan and Wei Zongquan, a local member of the United League, with leaders of the Gelaohui—Liao Shubao, Gong Chuntai, Shen Yigu, and others—led to the formation on the basis of the Gelaohui and the Wujiaoshihui of the Hongjianghui integral revolutionary organisation with its headquarters at Mashi (on the border between Pingxiang and Liuyang counties). Gong Chuntai[7] was elected leader of the new society, with Cai Shaonan as its executive secretary.

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[4] There were several organisations in Hunan and Jiangxi, the chief of which were the Gelaohui, the Hongfuhui, and the Wujiaoshihui. The first two had a membership of several thousand each, the third had a few hundred adherents.

[5] Chen Chunsheng, a member of the United League, writes in his reminiscences that the members of secret societies thirsted to avenge the death of their comrade. He regards the execution of Ma Fuyi as one of the causes of the Pingxiang uprising (*The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 2, p. 463).

[6] In 1904, in Hunan, members of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary society called Huaxinghui, which in 1905 joined the United League, made an attempt to use the secret societies of Liling and Liuyang to organise a rising in Changsha. The Gelaohui leader Ma Fuyi was in close contact with the Huaxinghui leader Huang Xing and others.

[7] Gong Chuntai came from a peasant family. In 1900 he took part in the Army of Independence movement that was headed by the left-wing reformer Tang Caichang; after Ma Fuyi's death he became prominent in the Gelao (Yang Shiji, *Xinhai geming qianhou Hunan shishi* [The Xinhai Revolution in Hunan Province], Beijing, 1958, p. 121).

To a large extent the formation of an integral organisation resolved the task of consolidating the disunited anti-government forces in this region for the purpose of preparing and conducting an uprising, the programme of which was reflected in the modified text of the vow of the Hongjiang[8] and in the *Manifesto of the National Army of China*. Another large local secret society, the Hongfuhui, headed by Jiang Shoudan,[9] did not join the new organisation and acted on its own programme, the *Appeal of the Insurgent Army of the South of the Great Chinese Empire to Its Countrymen.*

Both programmes were permeated with hatred for the Manzhous and propounded the revival of the Han (Chinese) nation. More than half of the *Manifesto* and almost the whole of the *Appeal* exposed the policies of the Manzhous in China in vigorous language, and formulated the main aim of the insurgents—the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the revival of Han sovereignty.

Thus, the *Manifesto,* signed by Gong Chuntai, listed ten basic crimes of the Manzhous: the seizure of primordial Chinese territory, the massive killings of Hans during the conquest, the conversion of the Chinese into slaves, inequality of the Chinese, defeat in the wars with Western powers, betrayal of the country's interests to foreigners, corruption in the state apparatus, the poverty of the people, the huge expenses on maintaining the splendour of the Manzhou court, and the false promises of a constitution.[10] The *Manifesto* stigmatised those Chinese who took service with the Manzhous and raised the sword against their own people—Zeng Guofan, Hu Linyi, the soldiers of the Hunan, "Xiang", army, who took part in crushing the Taipings.

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[8] The vow went: "I swear to devote all my energy to the Chinese Republic, carry out the order of my elder brother (leader.—*A. K.*), overthrow the Manzhous, and revive China" (Yang Shiji, *The Xinhai Revolution in Hunan Province.* p. 116).

[9] Jiang Shoudan came from a poor family. At age of 15 he worked at the Anyuan mines; after losing his job he lived the life of a vagrant. During the rising of the Army of Independence he joined the Gelaohui (Yang Shiji, *The Xinhai Revolution in Hunan Province,* p. 123).

[10] "Zhonghua guominjun qiyi xiwen (Manifesto of the National Army of China", in *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 2, pp. 476-77.

Gong Chuntai called upon all his countrymen—peasants, workers, merchants, small shopkeepers—to wash away the shame of the Hunan soldiers, kill the Manzhous, devote all their energy to expelling them from China, and revive the Han nation. Intolerance of Manzhous was expressed in emphatic terms: the insurgent army threatened to destroy those Chinese who remained on the side of the Qing government. "Officials of the Manzhou court should change their cast of mind, take the correct road, and welcome our army, but if they act as Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi did and serve the Manzhous, we shall treat them as Manzhous and destroy them without mercy."

The *Manifesto* was distinctly anti-Manzhou, and the aim proclaimed in it, that of overthrowing the alien Qing dynasty, coincided with the traditional aim of many secret societies. However, compared with the latter, which usually confined themselves to the demand for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the restoration of the lawful Chinese dynasty on the throne, the Hongjiang programme was a step forward: it proclaimed the creation of a republic. Thereby, in this case the "Down with the Qing" slogan acquired a new content and, together with the other aims listed in the *Manifesto,* fused with the programme guidelines of the United League.

"It is the purpose of our uprising," the *Manifesto* said, "to drive out the Manzhous and restore sovereignty... Workers, peasants, merchants, and small shopkeepers must remain calm and go on with their business... It is the purpose of the uprising to make our fellow-countrymen happy, we do not seek to seize the throne. Not only will we drive out the Manzhous, but we shall not permit small peoples to usurp power. We shall destroy the autocracy, which has been in existence for several millennia... A republic must be constituted, equal rights must be ensured to 400 million fellow-countrymen, and freedom and happiness must be secured to them. In the sphere of social organisation new laws must be studied, the rights of other peoples and countries must be respected, and the growth of wealth that leads to social inequality must not be permitted."[11]

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[11] Ibid.

This section of the *Manifesto* was unquestionably written under the influence of United League members, who, possibly, took a personal part in wording it;[12] the inclusion of the aim of making China a republic distinguished the Hongjiang programme from the traditional programmes of Chinese secret societies.

The *Appeal* of the insurgent army, on the contrary, exemplified the tenacity of the traditions of secret societies. In addition to the expulsion of the Manzhous and the restoration of the rights of the Chinese, the *Appeal* urged the creation of a great Chinese empire, citing the exploits of Liu Bang, founder of the Han dynasty, and of Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming dynasty, who liberated the Hans from foreign bondage. Consequently, the insurgents likened their rising to the mass movements that ended with the expulsion of aliens and the restoration of the Han rule. The *Appeal* of the Hongfuhui rejected the idea of setting up a constitutional monarchy, demanding only the installation of a Han emperor and leaving the entire apparatus of power unchanged. For their services the leaders of the insurgent detachments were promised posts in the government, while the officials who sided with the movement were guaranteed that they would retain their posts and have the "gratitude of descendants".

The *Appeal* said nothing at all about society's social reorganisation; on the contrary, it declared that "even if large taxes are levied on our countrymen and they are obliged to perform duties, the people will love and revere their emperor all the same".[13]

Thus, while the two Hunan revolutionary anti-Manzhou organisations had a common slogan calling for the overthrow of the Qings, this slogan was interpreted differently in their programmes. In the Hongjiang programme it signified not only the expulsion of the Manzhous but the liquidation of the monarchy altogether, and the institution of a republic. In the *Appeal* of the Hongfuhui insurgent army all this slogan meant was the replacement of one dynasty by another, for the downtrodden, oppressed masses associated exploitation and arbitrary rule not with the monarchy as such but with the rule of the incumbent, moreover, alien dynasty. In the Hongfuhui programme all calamities were attributed solely to Manzhou rule: "There is now a disastrous flood in the country... Our countrymen have lost their homes, they are dying in the north and the south. Everywhere one hears the groan of starving people, dying on the roads, the sight of whom makes the heart contract and tears flow. Heaven itself cannot bear the Manzhous and sends calamities,"[14] the *Appeal* said.

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[12] Li Shiyue assumes that the *Manifesto* was written by Cai Shaonan, who was executive secretary of the Hongjianghui. There are grounds for this assumption because for its ideas, language, and style the *Manifesto* is similar to the *Declaration of the United League* (Li Shiyue, *The Rising of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers in the Counties of Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang in 1906*).

[13] "Xin Zhonghua dadiguo nanbu giyi Huifujun bugao tianxia xiwen (Appeal of the Insurgent Army of the South of the Great Chinese Empire to Its Countrymen)" in *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 2, p. 479.

To a large extent the distinctions in the programmes of these two—Hunan and Jiangxi—anti-Manzhou organisations influenced their tactics for preparing and conducting the Pingxiang rising. Because of their objections to the United League's aim of establishing a republic, the Hongfuhui leaders acted independently. Moreover, the Hongjiang did not, in effect, unite all the members of the Gelao and Wujiaoshi secret societies, and the inner structure of this organisation remained narrow-conspiratorial and linked to many conditionalities, as that of any other secret society.

Thus, in the period when popular disaffection was mounting in Hunan and Jiangxi, two anti-Manzhou organisations claimed the role of leader of the imminent rising. They began preparations for the rising in the summer of 1906.[15] People were sent to neighbouring counties to recruit new members, organise the manufacture of weapons and the collection of money for the purchase of weapons, and contact Jiang Shoudan and leaders of the Gelao branches. Cai Shaonan and Wei Zongquan went to Guangzhou, Xianggang, and Shanghai to contact other revolutionary organisations, after which they planned to go to Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo to agree on the data of the rising with him.[16]

The Hongjiang conducted its organisational work in a situation favourable for the preparations for the rising: social contradictions were growing sharper. As early as July 1906, 3,000 miners of the Anyuan mines in Pingxiang, headed by Xiao Kechang, joined the Hongjiang.[17] Soon afterwards, Xiao Kechang went to the neighbouring county seat of Liling, where he established ties with the local secret societies and drew many workers of the porcelain factory into the preparations for the rising. The activities of the secret societies in Liling alarmed the authorities, who made a number of arrests and closed passenger traffic on the railway between Pingxiang and Liling.

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[14] Ibid., p. 478.

[15] The information at our disposal is mainly about the activities of the Hongjiang leaders.

[16] Li Shiyue, *The Rising of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers in the Counties of Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang in 1906.*

In the autumn of 1906 anti-government propaganda in Pingxiang was conducted under the slogan: "A great disturbance will break out in the Celestial Empire, and heroes will come who will destroy the rich and help the poor."[18] Tension was reaching breaking point.

Large crowds chanting "Kill the Manzhous" and "Expel the rich and help the poor" gathered in Mashi in early October, during the autumn harvest festival. The landowners called in troops, who destroyed a small *huidang* detachment under Li Jingqi. The developments in Mashi compelled Cai Shaonan and Wei Zongquan, who intended to go to Japan for a meeting with Sun Yat-sen, to return to Hunan. Jointly with the Hongjiang leaders they drew up a detailed plan for the rising. This plan envisaged action by three large groups: 6,000 Pingxiang miners under Xiao Kechang were to turn Anyuan into their base; after seizing the county seats of Liling and Liuyang, *huidang* detachments were to march to the provincial capital of Hunan, Changsha; an offensive on Nanchang (the provincial capital of Jiangxi) was planned from the counties of Wanzai and Yichun. On the plea that the preparations were not completed, that there were no weapons, and that no assistance was forthcoming from the United League, the uprising's leaders intended to act only at the close of 1906.

However, the developments that unfolded in all three counties independently of each other changed the timetable and plan of the uprising.

The source material at our disposal allows us to draw a fairly detailed picture of the events after December 4, 1906, i.e., the date of the official commencement of the anti-Manzhou rising, when Gong Chuntai gave the order for the rising to start. There is only fragmentary information about the preceding developments in Liling, Liuyang, and Pingxiang, but they nevertheless indicate that there were outbursts of open dissatisfaction as early as October and November 1906. At the close of October, for instance, the Anyuan miners planned to free the jailed leader of the Liling secret societies. There was a rally on October 26 in memory of Li Jingqi, who was executed. In November Xiao Kechang tried to get the leaders of the Liling secret societies and Jiang Shoudan in Liuyang to agree to joint action, but the Hongjiang leadership recommended abstaining from a rising.

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[17] Yang Shiji, *The Xinhai Revolution in Hunan Province,* p. 117.

[18] Di Chen, "The Rising in the Counties of Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang in 1906", *Lishi jiaoxue,* 1958, No. 10, p. 22.

Armed peasant action began in Liling and Liuyang at the end of November: landowners' estates and government offices were ravaged, *shenshi* heading the landowner defence units were attacked, and so on. In Liuyang, on account of programme disagreements with the Hongjiang, Jiang Shoudan decided to act independently. In Liling the isolated actions of members of secret societies were due to the lack of coordination among the Hongjiang leaders and the absence of effective guidance. At a conference in Gaojiatai (in the vicinity of Mashi) on December 2, 1906, virtually after the rising had in fact commenced, Gong Chuntai and Cai Shaonan were still insisting on a general action only at the very end of the year. Local leaders of the secret societies urged an immediate rising, arguing that the Qing army was unprepared and that their combined numerical strength exceeded 10,000 and they had as many more supporters. However, no decision was taken on the date of the uprising at the conference. Gathered at Mashi, a large crowd of Anyuan miners, secret society members, and local peasants demanded immediate action. For that reason, on December 3, without the sanction of the leadership, Liao Shubao raised the Dahan rising standard and arrived in Mashi at the head of a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men.

On December 4 Gong Chuntai and Cai Shaonan had to proclaim that the rising had started and order all the Hongjiang groups to act. At the same time they called on Jiang Shoudan and other leaders to join the movement. After the available weapons—rifles, a small number of cannon, spears, swords, and so on—were distributed among the insurgents, the order was given for an offensive on Shanglishi in Pinxiang. On December 7, 1906 Shanglishi was occupied by some 20,000 insurgents wearing white headbands with the inscriptions "Han soldier" or "revolutionary army" and carrying white banners bearing the words "Down with the Manzhous, long live China" and "Officials oppress, the people rise". A rising was staged in the neighbouring county of Yichun by members of the local branch of the Gelao society.[19]

Although fierce fighting raged in Liling since the end of November, while Jiang Shoudan was already active in Liuyang, December 4 is the day usually given as the beginning of a general rising. The action started by Liao Shubao on December 3 upset the initial plans of the leadership, and this affected the movement's development, although Gong Chuntai and Cai Shaonan tried to act in accordance with the plan drawn up earlier. The Anyuan miners prepared to attack police stations in order to seize weapons and join the secret society members in their offensive on the county seat. At the request of the mine management, the imperial viceroy of Hunan and Hubei Zhang Shidong sent to Anyuan eight battalions of infantry and artillery, and also units of the Pingxiang garrison. After Xiao Kechang was treacherously murdered, the leaderless miners dispersed; some joined the force under Gong Chuntai.

In Liuyang Jiang Shoudan announced that he would act jointly with Gong Chuntai, but in fact he acted independently. The movement reached its high point on December 7-12: the insurgents were in control of a large area of the counties of Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang; everywhere the houses of rich people, landowners, officials, and commanders of the landowner defence units were in flames; the insurgents confiscated food, weapons, and bleached cloth.[20]

The situation in this region made the government take speedy measures. Units of the local garrisons and landowner defence detachments were sent against individual groups of insurgents during the first decade of December; after the successful actions of the insurgents, the government had to send units of the "new army" of four provinces (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu) to suppress the rising.

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[19] Yang Shiji, *The Xinhai Revolution in Hunan Province,* p. 120.

[20] Chen Chongsheng, "Bingwu pingli qiyuji (Notes on the Rising of 1906 in Pingxiang and Liling Counties)", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 2, p. 470.

Arriving in Liling on December 10 government troops crushed the eastern group of insurgents moving to join the detachments under Gong Chuntai. Only a small portion of the encircled and defeated northern group of the insurgent army reached Liuyang.

The offensive of the government troops on Shanglishi in Pingxiang ended with the retreat of Gong Chuntai's units to Liuyang, where subsequent events were played out. Independently of each other the detachments under Gong Chuntai and Jiang Shoudan made several attempts to capture the county seat. On December 12 government troops smashed Gong Chuntai's force at the approaches to Liuyang. Together with Cai Shounan, Gong Chuntai fled, while his surviving forces joined the insurgents under Jiang Shoudan and continued the struggle. Due to their small numerical strength and shortage of weapons they retreated to Pingxiang, where on December 20, 1906 the last major battle with government troops decided the fate of the movement. Heavily wounded, Jiang Shoudan fled, while the remnants of the insurgent army disintegrated. Gong Chuntai and Cai Shaonan failed to mobilise new forces.

At the close of 1906 and beginning of 1907 some 50,000 troops of the "new army", local garrisons, and landowner defence detachments combed the villages, catching and killing "bandits". The punitive operations in this area went on for three months; altogether, more than 10,000 insurgents, including some 145 of their leaders, were killed.[21]

The preparations for and course of the Pingxiang rising of 1906 provide ample evidence of the predominance of traditional forms of spontaneous people's anti-government actions headed by secret societies. The leading revolutionary organisation of those times, the United League, tried to influence the programme and tactics of the secret societies, to unite these fragmented societies, and prepare the rising itself. However, the fact that an integral organisation was set up on the eve of the rising did not end the fragmentation of the forces, and the rising itself developed spontaneously.

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[21] Ibid., p. 466.

The participation in the movement of two representatives of the United League (who had no communication with the League's headquarters in Tokyo and had to act on their own) does not mean that the rising was directed by the United League. It had no hand in the preparations and conduct of the rising. The League's leaders in Tokyo learned of all the developments in Pingxiang, Liling, and Liuyang belatedly, from Japanese newspapers.[22] After the rising commenced Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing sent some of their associates (Hu Ying, Ning Daoyuan, Sun Yuyun, Yang Zhuoling, and others) from Tokyo to Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei to organise a rising in solidarity with the insurgents; but almost all were arrested by the police.[23]

Our examination of the programme guidelines and tactics of one of the largest popular anti-government actions on the eve of the revolution of 1911, an action aimed at overthrowing the Manzhou dynasty, allows us to draw some conclusions about the role played in this period by the anti-Manzhou slogans. The popularity of the "Down with the Qing" slogan in the Pingxiang rising is corroborated by the text of the vow of the secret societies and the inscriptions on the insurgents' headbands and banners. Because anti-Manzhou traditions were deep-rooted and undoubtedly influenced the programme guidelines of the Hunan and Jiangxi secret societies, we should not lose sight of the specific objective reasons that determined the anti-Qing character of the programmes of the Hunan insurgents in 1906.[24]

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[22] Song Jiaoren writes in his biography: "On December 12, 1906 I read in a newspaper that an uprising had broken out in Pingxiang County, Jiangxi Province, and that the siege of the county seat had created a tense situation. I decided that this was the work of the supporters of Ma Fuyi. In the latter half of the day I went to see Liu Linsheng (brother of Liu Daoyi) to learn the details of the Pingxiang events. He told me that these were his old associates but knew nothing definite. At eight o'clock, when I was about to leave I heard the cries of newspaper vendors, bought a newspaper, and read: 'Revolutionaries have risen in Liling, foreigners have fled to Changsha.' " (Yang Shiji, op. cit., p. 127).

[23] *Manifesto of the National Army of China,* p. 477.

[24] There is only indirect data to indicate when the *Manifesto* and the *Appeal* were written. The *Manifesto* was signed by the commander-in-chief Gong Chuntai; he got this rank after the Hong-

Thus, because of the objective and subjective reasons we have mentioned earlier, the slogan "Down with the Qing" was one of the most understandable for the mass of the people. Although it did not exclude the existence of other slogans, for instance, "Kill the rich, help the poor", given prominence without the backing of the other democratic demands of the United League, it objectively hindered the development of the class consciousness of the insurgents and diverted the masses from making their own social demands. This is seen from the Hongfuhui programme in particular. The social problems raised in the Hongjiang's *Manifesto* were abstract and far removed from the urgent demands of the peasants and workers (coal miners and workers of porcelain factories) who fought side by side with members of peasant secret societies against government troops.

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jiang was formed. In the *Appeal* there is direct mention of the elemental calamities of 1906. See *Manifesto of the National Army of China*, pp. 475-79.

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# THE XINHAI REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTION OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MANZHOUS

Western bourgeois historiography denies that the character of the Xinhai revolution was anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, portraying it as a purely anti-Manzhou movement (or, at best, as a struggle against a despotic monarchic system). In *The Chinese Revolution of 1911* Liang Chin-tung writes that this revolution "was a revolt against alien rule as well as against despotic rule".[1] This narrow characteristic of this revolution gives bourgeois scholars the opportunity to falsify its history. Liang Chin-tung, for example, claims that the Chinese republic was created by "both sides",[2] i.e., the counter-revolutionary north headed by Yuan Shikai and the revolutionary south led by Sun Yat-sen. Another Americanised Chinese, Hsueh Chun-tu, associate of the Department of Political Studies of Standford University, USA, likewise contends that the Manzhou monarchy was deposed not by the revolutionary bourgeoisie in alliance with the Chinese masses, but by the constitutionalists (Chinese liberal landowners and liberal bourgeoisie) and Yuan Shikai.[3]

At the same time, while justifiably accentuating the bourgeois, anti-imperialist nature of the Xinhai revolution, some modern Chinese historians have begun to underrate the "Down with the Qing" slogan that was given prominence at the close of the nineteenth century by Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries in their struggle for a republican, democratic China. For instance, in the article "The Xinhai Revolution and the Anti-Manzhou Question", which was published three times in 1961-1962,[4] Liu Danian wrote that the struggle against Manzhou rule was only a "specific outward form" of revolution, that it was "only a wave driven by the wind in the mainstream of the class struggle of those times".[5]

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[1] Liang Chin-tung, *The Chinese Revolution of 1911,* St. John's University Press, Jamaica, New York, 1962, p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 40.

[3] Hsueh Chun-hu, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1961, p. 187.

This interpretation of the role of the anti-Manzhou struggle in China is unacceptable. It was not accidental that the participants in the Wuchang Scientific Conference of 1961 dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution noted that Liu Danian underrated the role of the anti-Manzhou factor in the revolution, that he belittled Manzhou-Chinese contradictions.[6]

The anti-Manzhou struggle of the Chinese people was neither the "form" nor "varnish" of the Xinhai revolution. It was part of that revolution.

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The Xinhai revolution was a bourgeois revolution. Its main aims were anti-feudal and anti-imperialist: to depose the monarchy, create a republic, and liberate China from foreign dependence. However, in the programmes and propaganda of the United League and other bourgeois-revolutionary organisations prominence was given to the slogan "Drive out the Manzhous, restore Chinese rule". Why did the Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries see this as the immediate and even basic aim of the revolution?

One of the reasons was the privileged status of the Manzhous relative to the Chinese. Throughout the period from the conquest of China in the mid-seventeenth century to the Xinhai revolution the Manzhous had exclusive rights and privileges, the foundation of which was their undivided political power in the country. On the eve of the Xinhai revolution, as during the preceding two and a half centuries, the Manzhous held the main, key posts in the empire's machinery of state. The emperor, the ministers, most of the viceroys and governors of provinces, and the senior generals were Manzhous. This circumstance was pointed out in many of the appeals of the Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries to the people. In its first appeal to the people, the revolutionary Wuchang government, set up after the rising of October 10, 1911, wrote: "Fellow-countrymen! Have you hearts? If the traditions of your fathers tell you nothing, look around you and see who comprise the garrisons in all the provinces, who hold important government posts, and then all will become clear." [7]

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[4] *Renmin ribao,* October 22, 1961; *Lishi yanjiu,* 1961, No. 5; *Collection of Essays on the 50th Anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution (Xinhai geming wushi zhounian lunwenji),* Vol. 1, Beijing, 1962.

[5] *Renmin ribao,* October 22, 1961.

[6] *Lishi yanjiu,* 1961, No. 6, pp. 16-17.

In the last years before the Xinhai revolution the Manzhous felt the growing opposition of the lower classes and of the Chinese bourgeois-landowner liberal camp, with the result that they concentrated power in their own hands, ousting Chinese from some senior posts in the state apparatus and the army. Thus, the government (Imperial Cabinet) formed in April 1911 consisted entirely of Manzhous. Manzhous were appointed to head the army in the centre and in the localities. The Manzhous Yin Chang, Dai Tao, and Dai Xun were placed at the head of the war ministry, the general staff, and the naval ministry respectively. *Jiangjun,* i.e., generals of Manzhou nationality, were put in charge of provincial headquarters, which were the highest military organisations in the localities.

Addressing Chinese (Hans) serving in the government army, the Wuchang government stated: "Lately, in the face of the imminent revolution, the Manzhous have been anxious to take over the command of the army and appoint themselves to the highest posts, while using Hans to carry out their orders." [8]

In effect, a large proportion of the Manzhous took no part whatever in productive labour. Most Manzhou men were officials, officers, soldiers, or simply idlers living on allowances from the treasury. For instance, as soon as the sons of bannermen soldiers and officers came of age they were granted an allowance from the government. All this gave the Chinese revolutionaries in 1911 grounds for telling the Chinese people that the "contemptible Manzhous eat their fill but do not plough the land, are dressed but weave no cloth".[9] By the time the revolution broke out the Manzhous had become a parasitical stratum, many of whom were physically degenerate and unable to serve either in the government or the army. Colonel Bolkhovitinov, the Russian military attaché in Japan and China, wrote in 1907 about the Manzhous: "There continues to be a huge class of parasites, who by their existence antagonise the Chinese people against their rulers."[10]

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[7] "Appeal of the Wuchang Government to the Nation", *Xinhai geming* (The Xinhai Revolution), Shanghai, 1957, Vol. 5, p. 137.

[8] "Address by Li Yuanhong to Fellow-Hans Serving in the Manzhou Army", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 5, pp. 144-45.

For one and the same crime a Chinese received a sterner punishment than a Manzhou. Chinese courts had no jurisdiction over Manzhous. As a token of submission Chinese men had to wear a pigtail (a plait of braided hair hanging down the back), the traditional hair-style of the Manzhous. Those who dared to ignore this humiliating custom, strikingly showing the unequal status of the Chinese, were sentenced to death. Small wonder that the first thing Chinese patriots and revolutionaries did, an example being Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was to cut off their pigtails, which symbolised Manzhou rule over the Chinese people. Thus, on the eve of the Xinhai revolution elements of the national inequality of the Chinese were quite considerable and tangible.

Naturally, the ascendant young Chinese bourgeoisie sought to shake off inequality and discrimination. It was not the aim of the bourgeois revolutionaries to decimate the Manzhous physically or drive all of them out of China. Their purpose was to end Manzhou tyranny and strip the Manzhous of their exclusive status. For example, the military government of Yunnan declared that after the Qing dynasty was deposed and China proclaimed a republic the Manzhous would be able to return to their native territory—Jilin (Girhin) and Heilongjiang. "The Manzhous desiring to remain in China proper must engage in agriculture or livestock-breeding, they must have the same status as ordinary folk. Guided by humaneness, our government will grant them equal rights with everybody at elections and equal taxation."[11]

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[9] "Declaration of the Shanghai Military Government", *The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 7, p. 71.

[10] *Report of the Military Attaché in Japan and China Colonel Bolkhovitinov, October 7, 1907. Summary of Information on China*, Central State Naval Archives, Fund 418, Inventory I, File 10012, Sheet 49.

In its revolutionary agitation the Chinese bourgeoisie made wide use of the fact of national discrimination against Hans, for it was well aware that the seeds of this agitation would yield abundant shoots, that it would prompt many sections of the Chinese people to join the struggle against the Manzhou monarchy. It was not mistaken.

However, the anti-Manzhou slogan received prominence in the programme of the bourgeois revolutionaries not only and not so much because the privileges of the Manzhous had to be eradicated. Chinese bourgeoisie was determined to destroy the Manzhou feudal monarchy chiefly in order to liberate China from its bondage to imperialism, to make it an independent, sovereign country.

On the eve of the Xinhai revolution the Qing government was anti-national mainly because it was in fact an instrument of the leading imperialist powers.

The Chinese revolutionaries clearly saw that the foreign capitalist countries were pursuing an aggressive policy towards China, that they were out to turn the Chinese people into colonial slaves, and that they were being aided and abetted in this by the Manzhou monarchy. Addressing the people, the Wuchang government wrote: "The insults that we are enduring from foreigners on account of the existing relations with them are steadily becoming more intolerable. Although we have homes and families, our further existence is inconceivable. The Manzhous do not care what this or that step brings, they are prepared to act against common sense if only it is prejudicial to us ... Besides, they dare to declare brazenly: 'We would rather give everything to friendly powers than to the Hans.' Today they are giving land to foreigners, tomorrow they will give them cities; today they are selling mines, tomorrow they will be selling railways. And if the people take it into their heads to protest, they say that this is interference and that the punishment for this is summary death. Even the railways built on money from the population are being nationalised. Alas! The life and property of each of us are daily in jeopardy, and this can no longer be tolerated. The purpose of any government is, above all, to care for the people, and if it only brings the people harm what is the use of such a government?"[12]

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[11] "Declaration of War on the Manzhous by the Military Government of Yunnan", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 6, p. 262.

In all the propaganda material and documents of Chinese revolutionary organisations and revolutionary authorities in the different provinces of the period of the Xinhai revolution the keynote was that to save the country from the threat of foreign enslavement it was vital to overthrow the corrupt Qing government. "All our attempts to save our country encountered resistance from the Manzhous; we then realised that it was not the foreigners but the Manzhous who would ruin our country. Consequently, as long as the Manzhou government is not brought down, as long as the Manzhou officials are not expelled, it will be impossible to revive our country."[13]

Although during the Xinhai revolution the Chinese bourgeoisie did not advance any slogans calling for an anti-imperialist struggle, its national, anti-imperialist demands were indirectly reflected in the slogan calling for the overthrow of the Manzhou monarchy.

The slogan of struggle against the Manzhous had an anti-feudal content as well. The Qing empire was a medieval feudal monarchy blocking China's capitalist development. Hence the determination of the revolutionary Chinese bourgeoisie to remove this barrier and open up scope for the development of the country's productive forces. "If we promoted industry, built a network of railways, and developed our mineral wealth," the *Declaration* of the Yunnan military government said, "we would have been a fabulously rich nation. But the Manzhous did not strive to multiply our wealth, they are capable only of robbing the people. Since they reduced the people to poverty, they are asking foreigners for loans and speaking of reform of the monetary system, but in fact the money from loans is being used for the pleasure and entertainment of the Manzhou rulers and their families."[14] Needless to say, to develop industry, build a large railway network, and so forth, there had to be free capitalist enterprise unhindered by the feudal fetters of the Qing monarchy that was, in its turn, held in the vice of finance capital and political pressure of the leading foreign powers.

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[12] *Appeal [of the Wuchang Government] to the Nation,* p. 137.

[13] *Declaration of War on the Manzhous by the Military Government of Yunnan,* p. 260.

[14] Ibid., pp. 260-61.

Thus, various demands of the Chinese revolutionary bourgeoisie combined in the slogan of struggle against the Manzhous: the abolition of the privileges of the Manzhous and an end to national discrimination against the Chinese; China's liberation from foreign dependence and struggle against feudalism. The chief of these were national demands for, as Lenin pointed out, the "bourgeoisie[15] always places its national demands in the forefront".[16]

From the aforesaid it is obvious that the anti-Manzhou struggle of the period of the Xinhai revolution was far from being a "form", a "wave", a "varnish". It was an essential vital component of the bourgeois-revolutionary movement in China in the early twentieth century.

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The Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries used the slogan of anti-Manzhou struggle as a powerful ideological weapon. Under this national banner they formed a broad anti-Manzhou front that embraced different segments of the population: peasants, workers, the urban poor, the middle and petty urban bourgeoisie, a section of the Chinese landowners, and patriotic *shenshi*. At the first stage of the revolution this wide composition of the revolutionary camp determined the success of the struggle against the Manzhous, against the Qing monarchy. However, there was also a weak side in the anti-Manzhou slogan, in the form it was interpreted and presented by the bourgeois revolutionaries to the people.

The Chinese revolutionaries greatly exaggerated the significance of the anti-Manzhou struggle, and in their ardent anti-Manzhou agitation they went to extremes. In their propaganda literature and documents the overthrow of Manzhou rule was depicted as almost the panacea for all the misfortunes, troubles, and sufferings that fell to the lot of China, to the lot of the Chinese people. For instance, the Wuchang government declared that the destiny and the very lives of 400 million Hans depended solely on one step—whether or not they act against the Manzhous. "Shall we take that step, and our beloved fathers, brothers, and sisters in all of China's 18 provinces will achieve happiness for all time to come; if we do not take that step we shall have hopeless darkness and never again will the day of our rebirth come." [17]

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[15] Meaning the bourgeoisie of the epoch of ascendant capitalism.

[16] V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Moscow, 1977, p. 410.

We should, of course, take the emotional aspect of the document into account. However, it must be acknowledged that this assessment of the significance of the anti-Manzhou struggle was grossly exaggerated, misleading the masses of China, for it prevented them from seeing their two principal enemies—imperialism and feudalism. The revolutionaries magnified things when in their many appeals, declarations, and addresses they portrayed Manzhou rule as the sole cause of the deplorable condition of the Chinese people. "To this day the Manzhou are as cruel and inhuman as in former times," stated the *Declaration of the Shanghai Military Government.* "Using the cover of false promises about introducing a constitution they seek to ward off the vengeance of the Hans. In order to maintain their foul tribe of five million, 400 million Hans deny themselves bare necessities, and exhaust all their spiritual and physical strength." [18] The blame for everything was imputed to the Manzhous: the fact that "onerous taxes are growing from year to year", [19] and the fact that "millions of people in the country are starving". [20] This explanation of the causes of the oppression and suffering of the Chinese people was much too one-sided, narrow, clouding the class consciousness of the people and drawing them away from the struggle against their principal enemies.

In no document of the revolutionary authorities was there a word about the Chinese feudal landowners and bureaucrats being similarly brutal exploiters and oppressors of the Hans as the Manzhou rulers. A keynote of all the appeals and telegrams of the Wuchang, Shanghai, Yunnan, and all other revolutionary provincial governments was that all Chinese—from the most hardened bureaucrat and big landowner to the peasant-labourer and coolie, who had neither a home nor food—were one huge family, abused and oppressed by a common enemy, the Manzhous. For that reason there was no need to remake the socio-economic foundations of the old society, or to counterpose the poor peasant to the landowner. All that had to be done was to depose the Manzhou government—and there would be tranquillity and order in China, and all the Chinese would live happily. "Let the poor work and the rich pay money. People who have neither property nor employment must be able to apply their strength and have food, while the rich must live in safety. This is a very good plan and a better is not required." [21]

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[17] "Appeal [of Li Yuanhong] to Public Opinion of China", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 5, p. 138.

[18] *Declaration of the Shanghai Military Government,* p. 71.

[19] Ibid.

[20] *Declaration of War on the Manzhous by the Military Government of Yunnan,* p. 261.

The leaders of the bourgeois revolutionaries held that it was necessary to expel the Manzhou officials from the state apparatus and allow Chinese officials to remain in their jobs if they wished to serve the republic. In its address to Chinese officials the Yunnan government assured them that if they stopped serving the Qing government and "humbly awaited instruction, they would retain their former posts". [22] More, the introduction of the republican form of administration in the regions, districts, and counties was entrusted by the republican provincial authorities to the local Chinese *shenshi*, who thus had the task of inducing local officials to serve the republic. [23] The following is by a member of the Chongqing republican government, one of the few provincial governments that consisted entirely of members of the United League: "Manzhou officials [24] have nothing to worry about if they have sincerely sided with the revolution, surrendered the old seals to our government, and jointly with the local *shenshi* conscientiously continue to occupy themselves with the affairs of administration." And further: if officials "leave their posts without relevant orders, the eminent *shenshi* responsible for their arrest and convoy, must inform the military government".[25]

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[21] "Address [of the Wuchang Government] to Officials of Self-Administration Bodies of Towns, Hamlets, and Villages", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 5, p. 140.

[22] *Declaration of War on the Manzhous by the Military Government of Yunnan,* p. 261.

[23] "Telegram [from Li Yuanhong] to the Administrative Bodies of Regions, Districts, and Counties, and also to the Bodies of Self-Administration of Hubei", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 5, p. 139.

[24] Meaning Chinese officials serving the Manzhou government.

At the price of renouncing social changes the largest and most influential group of representatives of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the leadership of the revolution wanted to unite all Hans into a single anti-Manzhou camp regardless of their class affiliation and the posts held by them. The revolutionary authorities appealed to officers (both senior and junior), the police, and governors of Han nationality to leave the enemy imperial Manzhou camp and side with the Chinese republicans, who were their brothers. In its appeal to Chinese serving in the Manzhou army, the Wuchang government wrote: "All of us are Chinese, but at this moment some of us are officers and men of the Chinese national army and others are officers and men of the Manzhou government; all of us are bound by ties of blood but have found ourselves in opposing camps; all of us have been equally oppressed by the Manzhou government. But while some of us have risen to fight, others are still doing nothing although they nurse a grudge. Thus, while we are on opposite sides, bonds of friendship and blood remain between us and our hopes and thoughts are the same."[26]

While heavily accentuating the anti-Manzhou slogan, the leaders of the Chinese revolutionaries pushed the slogan of a republic into the background. The third of the "people's principles" proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen as the basis of the programme of the United League, namely, the principle of "equal rights to land", was in fact cast aside in the period of the Xinhai revolution. Although it was sometimes in the declarations of some local revolutionary authorities, neither the provincial revolutionary governments nor the central republican government at Nanjing tried to put it into effect. With thousands of threads linking it to feudal landownership, the Chinese bourgeoisie feared to break its alliance with the Chinese landowners, feared real reliance on the peasantry.

Economic weakness and fear of true reliance on the masses did not permit the Chinese bourgeoisie to advance slogans openly calling for an anti-imperialist struggle. It hoped that with the overthrow of Manzhou domination and the proclamation of a republic the imperialists would no longer be able to interfere in Chinese affairs as brazenly and unceremoniously as in the past, and that perhaps with time they would entirely abandon their aggressive policy towards China. For instance, the republican government in Chongqing proclaimed: "With the overthrow of the Qing autocratic government by the national armed forces of China and the proclamation of a republic, friendly relations with all countries will grow stronger."[27] However, these were no more than pipe-dreams of a weak bourgeoisie of a semi-colonial country, for losing under the blows from the revolution the instrument of its domination in China—the Manzhou Qing dynasty—imperialism immediately found a replacement in the person of the Chinese Yuan Shikai and his clique of warlords.

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[25] "Statement of the Military Government of Sichuan", *The Xinhai Revolution*, Vol. 6, pp. 18-19.

[26] *Address [by Li Yuanhong] to Fellow-Hans Serving in the Manzhou Army*, p. 143.

The anti-Manzhou slogan had reactionary aspects as well: chauvinism and even racism were implicit in it. The Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries drew a dividing line between all the Hans and all the Manzhous, maligning the latter as "barbarians", a "base breed", a "foul tribe"[28], accusing them of all sins and making no charges against the Han landowners, officials, and military. Moreover, the anti-Manzhou feeling of the Chinese liberals and revolutionaries was coupled with territorial claims on neighbouring countries. The following, for example, is from the "Letter on the Self-Defence of the People of Sichuan" that was circulated by the Sichuan Provincial Advisory Committee (organ of the Sichuan liberals) among the population in September 1911: "It is particularly disturbing that *Lüshunkou*, in which Japan is established, *Siberia, in which Russia is established* (italics mine here and below.—*Y. B.*), *Jiaozhouwan,* in which Germany is established, *Weihaiwei* and *Xianggang,* in which England is established and Guangzhouwan and Annam, in which France is established, have already been turned into bases for a war against China."[29] It is clear from this excerpt that the Sichuan liberals regarded Siberia and North Vietnam as territories taken from China by Russia and France respectively. The revolutionary government of Guizhou saw "terrible crimes" of the Manzhous in that: "The Manzhous did nothing to protect our frontiers and preserve our vassal possessions. As a result Macao, Xianggang, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands were wrested from us, and we lost *Vietnam, Burma, Siam, Bhutan, Liuqiu, Korea, and Western Turkestan.* Because the Manzhous did nothing to fortify our frontiers, in the southwest, in Yunnan Province, we lost a territory of over 10,000 square li,[30] and in the northwest, in Xinjiang—more than 100,000 square li; in the Wuyanghai territory[31]—more than a million square li, and northeast of the provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin we lost more than three million square li."[32]

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[27] "Address of the Military Government of Sichuan to Foreigners", *The Xinhai Revolution,* Vol. 6, p. 19.

[28] *The Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1913. A Collection of Documents and Other Material,* Moscow, 1968, pp. 50, 72, 92 (Russian translation).

[29] *Documents on the History of the Movement in Defence of the Railways in Sichuan,* Beijing, 1958, p. 305.

Thus, the Chinese bourgeois nationalists saw neighbouring countries (Vietnam, Korea, Burma, Siam, Bhutan, and also vast territories of Russia—Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia) belonging to China.

Lenin wrote that the nationalism of an oppressed nation has a general democratic content and also reactionary orientations, reactionary features.[33] The bourgeois Xinhai revolution bore out these words entirely. A general democratic content, aimed against the oppression of the Chinese people by the Manzhou feudal aristocracy and foreign imperialist powers, prevailed in the nationalism of the Chinese bourgeoisie of those years.

With the abdication of the Qing dynasty in February 1912, the slogan of struggle against the Manzhous, a slogan that served as the banner for forming a broad anti-Manzhou front, lost its strength and, naturally, was dropped from the programme of the bourgeois revolutionaries. As a result, the anti-Manzhou revolutionary camp disintegrated rapidly. The Chinese landowners and the liberal bourgeoisie moved away from the revolution and sided with Yuan Shikai. The peasants and the urban lower classes, on the contrary, wanted the revolution to go on developing, but were not supported by the republican bourgeoisie, who held that the revolutionary programme was fulfilled. Deprived of its mass base, the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie lost its strength and had to make concessions to the Chinese counter-revolution. Ultimately, this brought about the defeat of the Xinhai revolution.

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[30] one li = 0.576 km.

[31] Wuyanghai territory—Tuva.

[32] *The Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1913,* p. 97.

[33] V. I. Lenin, op. cit., p. 412.

Nevertheless, the slogan of anti-Manzhou struggle of the period of the Xinhai revolution played a positive role in China's history. This slogan enabled the revolutionary Chinese bourgeoisie to unite the masses, lead them to victory over the Manzhou monarchy, end the 268-year-long rule of the Manzhous in China, liberate the Chinese people from national humiliation and discrimination at the hands of a small group of aliens, depose the monarchical system that was in existence for over 2,000 years, and proclaim a bourgeois republic. The eradication of Manzhou oppression and the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, which was an instrument of the monopoly bourgeoisie of the imperialist powers, cleared the way for the Chinese people for a further struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In this lay the historical significance of the long anti-Manzhou struggle of the Chinese people, a struggle that ended in victory in 1912.

## Emperors of the Qing dynasty

Chronological Table

| Name of Reign | Years of Reign | Name and Lifetime | Posthumous temple name |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tianming | 1616-1627 | Nuerhaqi *<br>1559-1626 | Taizu Gaohuangdi |
| Tiancong | 1627-1636 | Abahai<br>1592-1643 | Taizong Wenhuangdi |
| Chongde ** | 1636-1644 | | |
| Shunzhi *** | 1644-1661 | Fulin<br>1638-1661 | Shizu Zhanghuangdi |
| Kangxi | 1662-1722 | Xuanye<br>1654-1722 | Shengzu Renhuangdi |
| Yongzheng | 1723-1735 | Yinchen<br>1678-1735 | Shizong Xianhuangdi |
| Qianlong | 1736-1795 | Hongli<br>1711-1799 | Gaozong Chunhuangdi |
| Jiaqing | 1796-1820 | Yunyan<br>1760-1820 | Renzong Ruihuangdi |
| Daoguang | 1821-1850 | Minning<br>1782-1850 | Xuanzong Chenghuangdi |
| Xianfeng | 1851-1861 | Yichu<br>1831-1861 | Wenzong Xianhuangdi |
| Tongzhi | 1862-1874 | Zaichun<br>1856-1875 | Muzong Yihuangdi |
| Guangxu | 1875-1908 | Zaitian<br>1871-1908 | Dezong Jinghuangdi |
| Xuantong | 1909-1912 | Pu Yi<br>1906 | |

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* In 1616 Nuerhaqi founded the Late Jin dynasty in Manzhouli and made the city of Hetuala his capital. In 1625 the capital was moved to Mukden.

** In 1636 Abahai gave the name of Qing to the dynasty.

*** In 1644 the Qing dynasty was formally proclaimed Chinese at Beijing.

*SUPPLEMENT 2*

# WORKS BY SOVIET SCHOLARS ON CHINA'S HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS UNDER THE QING DYNASTY *

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Y. P. Dementyev, *French Policy in China and Indochina, 1844-1862,* Moscow, 1958, 202 pp.

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